Protecting and Assisting Children and Women

Protecting and Assisting Children and Women

in Extraordinary Circumstances

UUNICEF SomaliaSupport Centre

(USSC)

Emergency Preparedness and

Response Plan

[

DFINAL DRAFT – FOR ENDORSEMENT]

Nairobi, 2630 August June 2005

Contents:
Introduction-------------2
Projected Emergency Scenarios for 2005 (by zone)------------3-8
Core Planning Assumptions for USSC EPRP----------9
First 12 Hours: Standing Procedures----------9
USSC Priorities in Supporting Zonal Response------10
Emergency Management Tools:
Emergency Management Team------10
Emergency Resource Centre-----------10
Management EPR:
Representative, SPO, Operations Officer------11
Emergency Officer, PCU------12
Media/External Relations------13
Program EPR:
Health & Nutrition------14
Water and Sanitation------15
Education--------16
Communication, Protection and Participation--------17
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation-------------18
Operations EPR:
Admin/Finance, Supply/Logistics------20
Human Resources-------------21
Information Technology-------------22
ANNEX:
Emergency Resource Centre-----------------------22

IIntroduction

The USSC 2005 EPRP represents the umbrella under which de-centralized, field-based EPR plans for Northwest, Northeast and Central South zones are undertaken. The USSC EPR plan identifies specific commitments and accountabilities at the country office level intended to enablea timely, appropriate and effective emergency response.

The USSC EPRP is structured to establish its roles and responsibilities in areas of country office leadership, program and operations guidance and support, resource mobilization with donors and coordination with UN and NGO partners in addition to UNICEF regional, Geneva and New York offices and both Nairobi and international media.

OBJECTIVE: The overall objective of UNICEF’s emergency planning is that children and women’s survival and well-being (fulfilment of their basic rights) are assured in whatever emergency situations develop. UNICEF maintains a preparedness and response capacity to support national and sub-national efforts to help protect basic rights and to ensure that essential needs of children and women are met, effectively, dependably and in a timely manner, according to the UN/UNICEF mandate.

DEFINITION: Declaring a situation or problem an “emergency” is a call to action! In accordance with our mandate, we in UNICEF define situations as emergencies in terms of the rights/well-being of children and women. It should be no surprise then than we may categorise situations as “emergencies” which others will not; and visa versa. The working definition of an “emergency” which under-pins this preparedness plan is: An emergency is a situation in which there is consensus that extraordinary action--beyond routine programmes and systems--is required to ensure the basic rights/survival and well-being of children and women,” (1996 UNICEF EMOPS Board Paper).

FOCUS: Many different types of situations may be considered emergencies: a) on-going quiet emergencies (e.g. economic crisis, absolute destitution, preventable diseases, diarrhoea, malnutrition, insufficient education, abuse); b) “natural” disasters; c) “man-made” emergencies (e.g. conflict, civil unrest, governance crisis, ethnic/religious tensions). UNICEF strives to ensure in all types of situations the survival and well being/fulfilment of the rights of children and women. However, given the high vulnerability of Somali children to the effects of natural and man-made disasters, this plan is predicated on enabling an effective mult-sector response to a rapid-onset emergency occurring within Somalia and for which zonal offices will undertake immediate, first-line response. To this end, it is recognized that effective field-level response assumes the provision of timely, relevant and appropriate guidance and support from USSC both prior to (preparedness for) and as an outcome of (response to) the emergency.

UNICEF EPR planning is rooted in and accountable to the Core Commitments for Children in emergencies (CCCs) with emphasis on the first 6-8 weeks of a crisis. UNICEF Somalia zonal EPR plans are structured around an initial, largely self-contained response capacity for the first 7-10 days. This is the time in which the zonal office (s) will have to mobilize an effective response in advance of immediate supply or human resource support from Nairobi taking into account the logistical, security and infrastructural limitations within what remains a cross-border operation. The USSC EPRP will ensure that zonal offices (and the office as a whole) have the capabilities to respond effectively from the first 7-10 days and beyond;

STRATEGY: This plan also reflects the integrated approach to emergency planning expected of all UNICEF Offices. Preparedness and response is seen as an integral part of the country program, operationalized through a strategy of integration, meaning that preparedness and response is a responsibility of every staff member and section (not simply a specialized unit or program).

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DRAFT USSC 2005 EPR PLAN

Projected Emergency Scenarios for 2005[1]

#1. Central/South Zone

Situations potentially requiring extraordinary action from UNICEF

/ Likelihood
(5 = existing or certain) * /

Current status

/

Affected areas and potential cale

/ Current UNICEF Planning Assumptions***
CONFLICT: Clashes leading to displacement and disruption of services* / Galgaduud (Saad/Sulieman) / 4 / Limited information on IDPs, Ethiopian mediation; heavy weapons on the scene; a fragile ceasefire is in place; implications of new fighting could also affect situation in Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle (and vice-verca) / Cadaado and Hobyo / Consultations with WFP, FSAU and ICRC to better understand, be able to monitor the situation
Strategic discussions with select partners operating in the areas including MSF-H, CISP (Xaradhere), SRCS, etc.; Need to obtain security clearance and a credible access agreements with local authorities
Links to TFG dynamic
Galgaduud (Marehan/Dir) / 2 / Uncertain but ongoing peace process; limited return of IDPs (from April 2004 clashes); more recently inter-Marehan clashes also occurring / 2,000 (caseload from 2004) / Limited access opportunities for access (mostly ex-Galkalyo) but worth pursuing; ongoing discussion with agencies on the ground (SRCS, Cadaado hospital, ABC NGO)
Lower Juba/Kismayo (Marehan/Haber Gedir and internal Marehan) / 5 / No access for UN staff into Lower Juba (especially Kismayo); very limited no. of agencies working in Kismayo (Muslim Aid, SRCS); Kismayo town remains mostly unstable though JVA still in control, potentially opposed to TFG; / Kismayo district most affected; Afmadow, Jamame and Bhadaade less affected / Need for security clearance and access
Work toward the establishment of at least limited regular visits by key national staff.
Links to TFG dynamic
Lower and Middle Juba (Haber Gedir/Sheikal) / 4 / Displaced Sheikal have moved to coastal areas; conflict linked to control of checkpoints in Jilib, mostly among militia groups; HG have upper hand; linked to JVA politics; Kismayo-Mog. traffic continues to be impeded; vehicles robbed. / Mostly Jilib town affected (Brava to a lesser extent) / Monitoring with the few agencies operating in the area (Mercy Int’l, MSF-H, SRCS, WVI, etc.)
Situation will affect ongoing Mareery/Jilib/Jamame response plans (nutrition, WES, educ, etc.)
Links to TFG dynamic
Hiran (Galjeel sub-clans) / 2 / West Beletweyne clashes appear ended and the peace agreement is holding / Unlikely / Monitoring of the situation
Gedo (Marehan sub-clans) / 2-3 / Recent signing of peace agreement (late Jan); continuing severe restrictions on UN access (Luuq is possible for UNCAS); possible opportunities with other agencies, i.e. GHC / Dolo, Bula Hawa, Luuq (ref. FSAU figures) / Access may improve if peace holds; similar opportunities for joint approaches with agencies operating in the area.
Bay (Rahenweyne sub-clans) / 3 / Reconciliation of Sheikh Madobe and Shattigadud appears to have quelled major conflict; Ethiopian intervention seen as “mitigating” factor;
2004 saw increase in lawlessness and banditry in Baidoa; Possible TFG presence in Baidoa seen to be either stabilizing or destabilizing factor;Function of UNICEF Baidoa office are critical for ongoing programs in the region. / Wolweyne (LS), Burakahaba and Baidoa all in line of possible anti-TFG attack if it occurs / Ongoing office operations and access (national staff)—pursue opportunities for international staff (RPO, AOO) visit if/as possible
Close coordination with CSZ Jowhar
Inter-agency coordination: OCHA, WHO, MSF-S (Dinsoor), SRCS, WFP, DMO, WVI, WFP, etc.
Bekol (Rahenweyen/Ogadeni sub clans) / 3 / Increased recent clashes between Hadamo and Awihan in Rabdure; contributing to increased tensions in Huddur and disrupting aid agency operations, Bekol being hitherto a major program region for many organizations / Rabdure town with impact on programs in Elburde district / Inter-agency monitoring
Elman port Mogadishu (potential impact on Abgal) / 2-3 / Conflict among port “shareholders” (May-June 2004) appears; Mohammed Dheere and Muse Sudi fault line could be affected by developments this area / Mostly among militia / Monitoring of political situation from both Jowhar and Mogadishu
Links to TFG dynamic
Extremists/opportunists / 5 / Expression by various elements including opposition to announced deployment of “Front Line Troops”; factor of general political opposition to TFG; actions of anti-TFG commercial and related interests / Mogadishu and TFG “temporary capital” (Baidoa, Jowhar..?) / Need to very close coordination and liaison with UN Security supported by UNICEF political analysis at Nairobi (USSC) and CSZ levels
Natural / Drought / 4 / Poverty, food insecurity, illiteracy—exacerbated by insecurity and limited access and sustained services by agencies / Gedo (Luua, BX, Dolo); Galg. (DM, CB); MJ (Buale, Jilib; parts of Bekol / Opportunistic access strategy; close inter-agency coordination (especially field-based); effective monitoring; advocacy at USSC level
Cholera / 5 / Potential for large scale rapid onset emergency; response closely scrutinized by authorities and media / Lower & Middle Shabelle, Benadir / Rigorous application of 2004 Cholera outbreak lessons learned; timely pre-outbreak preparedness actions
River flooding / 4 / Potential for large scale rapid onset emergency / Middle/Lower Shabelle, Middle and Lower Juba / Systematic inter-agency regional, zonal, national and cross- preparedness and coordination; practical engagement with local authorities; strong support from PO Emergency USSC
Other / Village/IDP camp fire / 2 / Jilaal season conditions are most vulnerable for sudden fires; access within Middle Shabelle should be OK, for other locations would be more difficult / Middle/Lower Shabelle, Hiran / Capacity to undertake rapid assessment with proximity to quick delivery of targeted non-food items (primarily Family Relief Kits) followed by rapid emergency response for health and education. Application of “Guidelines for Distribution of Relief Items” checklist developed in 2004

*Common concerns relating to conflict scenarios:

• Need to strengthen existing linkages with Nbi level humanitarian actors (WFP, OCHA, INGOs) including the HRG mechanism along with effective OCHA coordination at Nbi and field levels.
• Need to ensure close coordination, information sharing and exchange with USSC senior management and section heads
• If Jowhar becomes TFG “temporary capital” either in near future or as a transition point following Baidoa, the pressures and obligations placed on the office will increase significantly; the ability of the TFG to become established in Mogadishu before 31 July is seen as unlikely. Similar factors apply as regards impact on Baidoa operations, opportunities regarding Kismayo (less likely)
• In general the establishment of the TFG inside Somalia will have a major impact on the situation in many areas. This could play out either way as a stabilizing or de-stabilizing factor

#2. Northeast Zone

Situations potentially requiring extraordinary action from UNICEF

/ Likelihood
(5 = existing or certain) * /

Major concerns/current status

/

Affected areas and potential cale

/ Current UNICEF Planning Assumptions***
Conflict/Civil Unrest / Increased tension between Puntland and Somaliland / 3 / Possible impediments to programmes in “joint administration” areas of Sool and Sanaag, particularly mobile outreach and WES services for drought affected communities; present activities are not severely restricted / Sool and Sanaag regions; figures speculative / Ongoing consultation and coordination with UNICEF NWZ and USSC in addition to internal UNICEF/UN NEZ monitoring activities
Conflict with Somaliland / 2 / Fighting could range from Los Anod into Southern Sanaag region. / Up to 2,000 HHs could be displaced / Populations would move into Gardo, Garowe and Bossaso. Ongoing consultation and coordination with UNICEF NWZ and USSC in addition to internal UNICEF/UN NEZ monitoring activities. Maintain pre-stocking capacities for up to 3,000 HHs
Political instability linked to the deployment of IGAD troops to support the TFG in Southern Somalia; such instability probably leading to increased targeting of UNICEF (and other agency) staff / 3 / Situation highly unpredictable. Conflict could arise as outcome of extremist groups attacking TFG/IGAD forces contributing to destabilization of much of CSZ with implications for PL. Three scenarios identified:
1.-PL stays quiet but receives some IDPs from CSZ
2.-Instability in Galkayo area (green line)
3. TFG uses PL as base of operations thus bringing PL more directly into the contested situation
Another concern is that of deliberate targeting of aid workers (UN, western or otherwise) by extremist groups opposed to the TFG / speculative / Progressive reduction in UN access within NEZ with Nugal, Mudug regions most affected; Impact on UNICEF programs would be serious
Natural / Drought arising from late or failed “Gu” season rains / 3 / General improvement in most areas following good Deyr season rains across most areas. However, genuine recovery will have much to do with the outcome of the long rainy season, beginning in July / 5,000 under fives in Eyl, Garowe, BanderBeyla, Ishkushuban, Jerriban, Gold-ogob, Gardo and Dangoronyo districts / Close monitoring of continuing mobile outreach activities (health, nutrition and WES) based on improved planning and monitoring tools to be developed in consultation with NWZ and USSC colleagues
Cholera / 4
pre-Gu and pre-Deyr seasons / Need to anticipate and monitor possible sudden increases in diahhreoal cases along with immediate response actions / Major urban areas (normally some time following a Mogadishu out-break) / Application of existing cholera preparedness and response plan.
Effective iner-agency coordination mechanism in place
Early warning from Mogadishu/USSC
Cyclone and severe storms / 2
Cyclone season being Nov-Dec / Need for seasonal monitoring in consultation with USSC. Internet satellite-based monitoring tools can be quite helpful. / speculative / Seasonal monitoring
Maintenance of existing emergency pre-stock items
OCHA lead inter-agency humanitarian coordination
Localized flooding in Bossaso / 2 / Continued high vulnerability to rapid increase in water born disease in Bossaso town as a consequence of locally heavy rains / 100-500 HHs / Need to ensure linkages to Municipal Task Force are in place and reliable
Other / IDP camp fire / 4 / Jilaal season conditions are most vulnerable for sudden fires / Normally affecting 100 HHs or less in main urban areas / Maintain pre-stocking capacities for up to 3,000 HHs overall

*Common concerns relating to conflict scenarios:

• Need to strengthen existing linkages with Nbi level humanitarian actors (WFP, OCHA, INGOs) including the HRG mechanism along with effective OCHA coordination at Nbi and field levels.
• Need to ensure close coordination, information sharing and exchange with USSC senior management and section heads
• In general the establishment of the TFG inside Somalia will have a major impact on the situation in many areas. This could play out either way as a stabilizing or de-stabilizing factor

#3. Northwest Zone

Situation Requiring
UNICEF Action / Likelihood
1=low, 5=high / Humanitarian Consequences / Affected Population / UNICEF Planning Assumptions
Sool and Sanaag / Increased/prolonged tension with Puntland over Sool and Sanaag regions / 5 / Continuing restrictions, possible increase in Phase level to Phase V; more limited movement of staff to Sool and Sanaag leading to disruption of current drought response activities / 40,000 / Close coordination with NEZ and USSC; monitor population movements with focus on most vulnerable; interagency coordination and contingency planning; enhanced child protection-based preparedness planning; review and reinforcement of pre-stock relief supplies
Conflict with Puntland over Sool and Sanaag region / 3 / Displacements from Las Anod to Ethiopia, Togdeer and Garowe; disruption of ongoing humanitarian drought response, mobile team activities in particular / 20,000 / Close coordination with NEZ and USSC; monitor population movements with focus on most vulnerable; interagency coordination and possible establishment of forward operations base at Erigavo, etc.
Natural / Drought / 5
(through 31.7) / Sool, Sanaag and Togdeer regions continue to be at risk with interventions projected to continue at least until end July / 26,000 (Sool)
26,000 (Sanaag)
22,000 (Togdeer)
74,000 / Continued/strengthened humanitarian response capacities for Sool and Sanaag; effective inter-agency coordination (especially with WFP); develop an exit strategy for possible phase-out
Cholera / 2 / Reduced awareness levels allow outbreak to spread quickly among destitute, IDPs and other vulnerables / ? / 2005 Cholera plan updated (by March) and implemented;
Other / Conflict in CSZ triggers displacements into Somaliland / 2 / People arrive seeking shelter; unlikely to form new camps, rather to seek shelter, support from relatives; would increase burden on existing IDPs / ? / Ability to monitor situation as it occurs through UNICEF CSZ;
Broader IDP initiative will enable considerable improvement in UNICEF/UN IDP baseline for ‘Somaliland’
Earthquake / .1 / If occurring in Burao (last affected by an earthquake in 1982) the consequences would be very serious / ? / Likely little if any preventative monitoring that can be done; regional seismic monitoring capacities..?

Additional notes:

1. Assistance for repatriated refugees, returnees within Somaliland and from other zones as well as for IDPs will be addressed outside the ‘emergency’ context as part of a special UN initiative in close collaboration with UNDP, UNHCR, OCHA and other agencies including NGOs.
2. Insecurity can present major challenges to UNICEF operations through attacks on aid workers with resulting implications of reduced program activities; the likelihood of such incidents may be a consequence of the proposed lifting (easing) of present Security Phase levels from 4 to 3.
3. Political unrest is another scenario that could influence the humanitarian situation; parliamentary elections now rescheduled to July that may include a pre-election census could precipitate violence if undertaken in Sool and Sanaag region. Possibility for political disturbances in Hargeisa also needs to be monitored.

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