DR DUŠAN JANJIĆ
Principal Research Fellow
Centre for Sociological Research
Institute of Social Sciences
University of Belgrade, Serbia
CONFRONTING ETHNO – NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF KOSOVO
(International Conference: The Adriatic – Balkan Area from Transition to Integration, Ancona, May 21 – 22, 2010)
In the recent history, Serb-Albanian relations are marked by confrontations, which reveal numerous characteristics of ethnic conflict. The conflict itself is over the status of Albanians and control over the territory of Kosovo. It is a conflict between the Serbian majority opting for self isolation and the Albanian minority opting for separation. At the some time, both sides choose irredentism.
Kosovo has become a synonym for political, social and security risks. Like the heroes of Greek tragedy, Kosovo is condemned in advance to move from the uncertain present towards the future that will undoubtedly be uncertain. In which, its faith does not depend on the fact who is ruling Kosovo, because the same problem always remains: Kosovo needs to invest in its own development and survival much more resources than it has. Even the international administration in Kosovo has not avoided this pattern.
The order in Kosovo was not based on the rule of law, but on the balance of fear: either fear of the revenge (“vendetta”), which is especially widespread within the Albanian community, or fear of state sanctions. Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo are established according to the domination model. Both communities seek to institutionalise their domination.
Eleven years of the international presence in Kosovo is characterized withde facto independence of Kosovo from Belgrade and last two by self proclaimed independency, but the international community's proclaimed goal of having stable, democratic and multiethnic Kosovo has not yet been achieved. The future of Kosovo is still uncertain and the future position of Serbs and other “non-Albanians” is unfavourable. The future perspective is multi-ethic Kosovo, yet it is still not clear how it will be achieved. It is certain that the existing crisis and the new attempt to solve the crisis by defining the future status of Kosovo will be followed by many problems and security risks. Therefore, Kosovo symbolizes an example of Balkanization rather than a successful peace mission.
The Origin and History of Kosovo Confrontations
Kosovo is a place where people and communities of different ethnicity, culture and religion meet, cooperate and clash. Since they make up 82% of the total population, Albanians represent the major ethnic community. However, in Serbia where they are 17.2% of the population, Albanians are a “major minority” group. This makes the concept of majority-minority a relative concept where Serbian-Albanian relations are concerned.
Serbian-Albanian relations are marked by the clashes which could be defended as ethnic conflict. The conflict itself is pertinent to control of the territory of Kosovo and status of the Albanians in it.
To date, order in Kosovo has been based on fear, or rather a balance of two kinds of fear – a fear of ethnic violence and fear of state sanctions. Serbian-Albanian relations in Kosovo were established according to the supremacy model, that is, both communities strove to institutionalise their supremacy.
The history of Serb - Albanian relations in the former Yugoslavia went through a number of stages (see the following Chronology):
CHRONOLOGY OF SERB - ALBANIAN CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION:
PHASES AND LEVELS / TIME PERIODS / CHARACTERISTICSPhase 1 / 1918-1941/45 / Mutual violence and domination
Phase2 / 1945-1966 / Armed violence and administrative limitation of ethnic Albanian community
Phase 3 / 1968-1981 / Strengthening of Kosovo autonomy, national affirmation of ethnic Albanian community
Phase 4 / 1981-1999 / Conflicts concerning Kosovo status
1st Level / 1981-1985 / Strengthening of ethnic Albanian national movement
2nd Level / 1986-1989 / Political disputes on the status of Kosovo and ethnic Albanian community
3rd Level / 1989-1997 / Suspension of autonomy and establishment of parallel Serbian and ethnic Albanian communities
4th Level / 1998-1999 / Armed conflict (war)
Phase 5 / 1999- 2008 / Deployment of the international (UN) civilian and military missions and continuation of conflicts about the status
Phase 6 / 2008 (February 17) - / The conflict about unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo and its non-recognition by Serbia.
War over Kosovo - The Bloody Feast of Ethnic Nationalism
Milosevic’s reign over Kosovo from 1989 to 2000 was marked by open political conflicts. Such policy inevitably ended by war in 1999, marking the end of Milosevic's government in Kosovo and the beginning of international presence in Kosovo.
By invoking the “ethnic principle” the Serbian authorities tried to constitute Serbia as an ethnic state and protect all Serbs on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. However, in their approach to the Kosovo issue the priority was given to the “historical right” and the “principle of statehood”. On the other hand, Albanian leaders tried to build institutions of a “parallel state” and self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo. While cast in a variety of historic terms-nationalist Serbs claiming to save Kosovo as Serbia’s cradle of statehood, nationalist Albanians claiming to fight for the correction of the unjust territorial division of Albanian lands by Great Powers in 1913-the particular contours that the conflict took are more legibly read off of the institutional framework inherited from the socialist era, and the particular political dynamics that precipitated and followed the final unravelling of the former Yugoslavia.
During 1997, become clear that extreme goals set by Albanians and Serbs could not be reached without war. Final goal set by Albanians was "independent and sovereign Kosovo". However, the United States and European Union clearly stated that political autonomy with guaranteed minority rights was the only status of Kosovo that could be accepted by the international community. Yet, even the word "autonomy" had unacceptable meaning both for Serbs and Albanians: for Albanians, autonomy was less than they want – independence, while for the Serbs this word was a coded language for the Constitution of 1974. Therefore, the only way for non-violent solution of Kosovo Dilemma was strong international pressure.[1]
The beginning of 1997 was ominous. In March, protests in Albania grew into a chaotic rebellion against the government of President Sali Berisha. The events in Albania had two consequences on Kosovo: first, an increasing insecurity and uneasiness among the Kosovo Albanian political leaders, and second, strengthening of radicalization and reinforcement of military activities of the KLA[2], which used the training camps in northern Albania. The targets of their attacks were the Serbian police and state officials as well as the Albanians who were perceived to be “collaborators” or “the people of the Serbian regime”.
During 1998, the KLA supported radicalization of political situation, including armed resistance to Serbia. Its influence among the Albanians kept growing and KLA became the “movement worth joining”. It resulted in change of political power and weakening of the influence of Rugova and LDK. For the Serbian side and the international community the KLA became a political factor that had to be included in all negotiating processes.
The war in Kosovo, which began on February 28th, 1998, was yet another in the line of armed conflicts waged on the soil of the former Yugoslavia over the past decade. These wars were part of the process of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the inception of new states. In the armed conflicts that lasted until July 30, 1998, killings and abductions were very frequent in Kosovo. The responsibility for these crimes lied with the Serbian Police and KLA.[3]
Milosevic started the political preparations for solving the Kosovo problem by war. In March 1998, the government of “national unity” was constituted making the Serb Radical Party a part of Republic Government, and the Serbian Renewal Movement a part of the Federal Government. This simulated a division of power and provided general support to the government. From that time, the picture about Milosevic’s government and its activities was created only on the issue of Kosovo, which became “the issue above all other Serb issues”. The Kosovo crisis was presented to the public only as a result of “terrorist and criminal activities of Shiptar (Albanian) terrorists, who threaten the past and the future of Kosovo, both for the Albanians and the Serbs“. Anti-American attitude was spread in the public and support to isolation of government, with accusations of the international community of taking the “Albanian side”.
The Serbian authorities brought to Kosovo special security forces in January 1998. They responded with attacks on villages, using military helicopters and armed personal carriers, accompanied by brutal house-to-house raids and indiscriminate arrests. Two such attacks on villages, in late February were followed by an assault on the village of Prekazi and Poshtem, in the beginning of March, whereas at least 54 people were killed by Serbian force, including a local KLA leader, Adem Jashari, most of his family, and the rest were women, children and elderly[4].
Limited international sanctions against Serbia posed a threat on 9th of March 1998 were intended to back up calls by the “Contact Group”[5] for negotiations on autonomy instead of the use of force. The deadline for compliance was postponed, but to no effect, and the sanctions were introduced in late April. In the year of 1998, the UN Security Council approved three Resolutions for Kosovo: UNSCR 1169; UNSCR 1199 and UNSCR 1203. With the first one[6], the UNSC imposed the arms embargo against the FRY, by the second resolution[7], UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, called for an immediate cease-fire in Kosovo, an international presence to monitor it, the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression and dialogue on the future of Kosovo. According to these provisions of UNSCR 1199, in October 13 1998, in Belgrade, the Milosevic- Hollbrooke Agreement was signed, followed by another agreement between the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Bronislaw Geremek and the FRY Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic, on 16 October 1998, for the establishment of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, (OSCE- KVM)[8]. In accordance to these agreements, the Permanent Council of OSCE on 25th of October 1998, decided to “establish the Kosovo Verification Mission, (KVM)”[9]. The first part of 2.000 members of KVM began to deploy in Kosovo beginning from November 1998[10].
After the agreement signed between Milosevic and Holbruck followed by several other agreements based on this one: NATO Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM, Clark – Perisic) and OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (Geremek – Jovanovic), the truce was set and the process of withdrawal of police and military forces from Kosovo started, with intensified activities on searching for the political solution.[11] Nevertheless, in December 1998, the process of implementation of the agreement was interrupted. Milosevic kept his military and police forces in Kosovo, especially in the area of Podujevo where there were no significant actions in the past military and police campaign. The KLA military activities and fear of new armed conflicts that was present among the Serbs and the Albanians was an excuse for Milosevic to start broad military and police actions near Podujevo and Pristhina, on December 23, 1998. Such developments announced breaking down the truce and intensification of fighting. It happened on December 25, 1998, when KLA announced the break down of truce (the truce was set unilaterally on December 8 in the area of Podujevo), due to military and police attacks. On the other side, Milosevic decided to deliver a severe blow to partly renewed KLA forces by continuous military and police actions, while Kosovo faced another problem of self-organization and the first armed actions of the local Serbs (blockade of roads around Pristina, January 7, 1999).[12] These activities of the local Serbs supported by the authorities in Belgrade represented an act of authentic self-organization and a late attempt to constitute the local political elite. The real effect of the Serb self-organization was instigation of broad armed conflict.
At the beginning of 1999, the Kosovo crisis entered into the new phase marked with renewal of armed conflicts and absence of any political will for finding the political solution. The crisis led to international presence in Kosovo. Extension of the OSCE Mission placed a question of NATO presence on the agenda. Decision on NATO presence was influenced by the horrifying picture of 45 dead and mutilated bodies in the village of Racak (municipality of Stimlje), which shocked the world on January 15, 1999. The case of Racak became a “hot” subject between the Belgrade authorities and OSCE Verification Mission. Belgrade authorities claimed that it was “the clash between the police and the terrorists”, while the OSCE and Walker thought that it was a massacre of civilians and that the Serb authorities were responsible.[13]
The difference between the “patriotic” and antimilitary part of Serbian society diminished. Estimating that Milosevic’s reign was near the end, the “patriotic” block of intellectuals and politicians who had strongly supported him in the past, tried to distance them from him by turning into the “fierce critic” of his policy. Their criticism was built on the Kosovo issue and on belief that the regime would break on it. Nevertheless, the “patriots” did not raise the issue of war responsibility for heavy human and material losses, confirming that they intended to keep the influence and control of power in Serbia, and to avoid any responsibility for the consequences of Milosevic’s policy.[14] But on the ground, local Serbs began to self-organize into “village guards” and the first militant actions took place (blockade of roads around Prishtina, on January 7, 1999). At that time, Milosevic decided to defeat KLA with massive military and police action. Milosevic's conviction (shared by most political parties and the Serbian public) that the problem could be solved by the use of force was one of the reasons why Serbia and the FRY were pushed into the armed conflict with strongest powers of the world (NATO alliance).
In taking up arms, Serbs and Albanians believed they took their destiny into their hands. For the first time, the survival in Kosovo became a problem on individual level for the Serbs and for the Albanians, and it had to be resolved by force. The Serbs who supported Milosevic for 11 years believing that he would “finally solve the Kosovo problem”, did not find a way to give up. Many local Serbs were taking part in these actions, mostly through the police forces. Local Serbs who took part in ethnic cleansing were in total conflict with their Albanian neighbours. Many Albanians tried to find an answer to the dilemma: Now or never! The KLA was ordering: Freedom cannot be gained without blood!
In the meantime, after the massacre in Racak, in Rambouillet, the Serbian and Albanian leaders began the last tour of negotiations, which started on 6th of February 1999. A weekend before the continuation of peace negotiations in Rambouillet, March 13, 1999, was a “bloody Saturday in Kosovo”, when six people were killed and 66 wounded in the bomb attacks in the canter of Podujevo and the market place in Kosovska Mitrovica. Although mutual accusations for the attacks by KLA and government repeated, it was a clear message that termination of conflicts in a peaceful way is not desirable.
The plan of the international community that was presented to both delegations stipulated that KLA must be disarmed, within three months and all Yugoslav and Serbian troops withdrawn from Kosovo, apart from 1,400 border guards and 2,500 security forces. NATO, with 30,000 troops, would be deployed in Kosovo to ensure the implementation of the agreement[15]. For a three year interim period, Kosovo would once again have autonomous institutions, as prior to 1989, including its own elected assembly, president and constitutional court. Various national communities of Kosovo would have powers to block the legislation if it threatened their national interest, and the official posts would be divided among them on a quota basis[16].
The negotiations in Rambouillet did not bring any progress. For the Serb delegation, the most disputable part was the Annex II on NATO Military Presence. Milosevic did not intend to give up the control over Kosovo. After the suspension of negotiations in Paris on March 19, 1999, the Contact Group announced that negotiations were “postponed and will not continue unless the Serb side accepts the agreement on Kosovo”. They pointed out that the agreement from Rambouillet was the only solution for the Kosovo problem and that the Kosovo delegation signed this agreement in Paris, while the Yugoslav delegation tried to dispute it. The Contact Group also stated that NATO was ready for action, and that members of Contact Group had “officially warned” the authorities in Belgrade to stop any military actions that might affect the freedom of movement and work, and any other activities that interrupt the operation of the Kosovo Verification Mission (“Danas”, Belgrade, March 20 – 21,1999).
The continuation and suspension of negotiations in Paris (March 14 – 20, 1999) between the Serb and Albanian delegations on the status of Kosovo had the following outcome: Beginning of the process of political negotiations and agreement on termination of conflict; General agreement that the solution was temporary and that it lied in some form of high autonomy; Active and public participation of international community as a mediator and guarantor of peace process; Definition of problem (political goals, scope and framework) of military and civilian presence of the international community in Kosovo; The questions of NATO presence in Kosovo and the influence of NATO on other parts of Serbia were placed on the agenda.