Issue: (1) Did Marbury Have a Right to the Commission? (2) Do the Laws of the Country Give

Marbury v. Madison

Issue: (1) Did Marbury have a right to the commission? (2) Do the laws of the country give Marbury a legal remedy? (3) Is asking the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus the correct legal remedy?

Holding: (1) Marbury has a right to the commission because process of appointment was complete, so withholding the commission violated his legal rights. (2) There is an implicit notion in rule of law that a violation of rights provides some remedy. (3) A Writ of Mandamus is the wrong remedy because the Supreme Court is the wrong court since the Judiciary Act is unconstitutional. The Judiciary Act is unconstitutional because Art. III does not allow SC to have original jurisdiction—Congress cannot give SC original jurisdiction if Constitution itself does not allow.

Implications: Creation of Judicial Review. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”

• Textual argument (not strong): Article III allows federal courts to have SMJ to cases that arise under the Constitution, creates inference of judicial review. Article VI requires oath of offices for judges to support Constitution
• Historical argument: Judicial review originated in England (but was later removed), but the practice remained known in the colonies. The Federalist Papers discussed the power and some anti-federalists even agreed it existed but argued it would give the Courts too much power.
• Structural: The structure of the government is for courts to interpret the law. If there were no judicial review of Congress, it would abolish the notion of limited power by letting them disregard the Constitution.

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee

Issue: Does the Supreme Court have authority over state courts in civil matters of federal law? (Here, VA SC says they cannot)

Holding: All questions of federal law are within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction establishing its supremacy in matters of constitutional interpretation.

Implications:Jurisdiction comes from the type of case not the court.

• Historical argument: History and the Preamble show that federal power was given directly by the people, not the states giving the Supreme Court authority to overrule a state’s interpretation of constitutional law.
• Textual argument: Art. III, § 2, cl. 2, “in all other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction” If the Supreme Court could not review decisions from the highest state court, the state courts would be excluded from ever hearing a case in any way involving a federal question because the Supreme Court would then be denied appellate jurisdiction in those cases.
• Uniformity Concerns: Even if state judges were not biased (they also are bound to uphold the Constitution), the legislative power to remove a case to federal court would be inadequate for maintaining uniformity in federal law without this power.

Cooper v. Aaron

Issue: Do Supreme Court decisions bind all the states or just the state which they are reviewing? (Here, Gov. of AK tried not to apply Brown v. Board of Education)

Holding:Everyone is bound by the constitutional interpretation if the case in question clearly extends.

Implications:The Supremacy Clause of Article VI made the U.S. Const. the supreme law of the land and Marbury v. Madison gave the Supreme Court the power of judicial review, thus making the precedent set forth in Brown v. Board of Education is the supreme law of the land is therefore binding on all the states, regardless of any state laws contradicting it.

Baker v. Carr

Issue: Do redistricting issues present justiciable questions? (Here, a group of TN voters argue that poorly redistricted boundaries violate 14th amendment)

Holding:The redistricting of legislative districts is not a political question.

Implications:Creates the 6-factor test for determining what is and is not a political question.

• Textual commitment: Does the Constitution clearly allocate authority away from the court?
• Must be explicitly stated in the Constitution that the Supreme Court has no power to review the issue under any circumstances
• Judicially discoverable/ manageable standard: All Constitutional standards are vague isn’t this then the same as judicial review?
• Policy determination: Is a policy question required that would be best determined by other branches?
• What is Consitututional vs. What is the government allowed to do?--> By accepting Marbury, must also accept a certain level of policy.
• Respect for other branches
• Unquestioning adherence: Is this case one where the Supreme Court should just adhere to a decision by another branch?
• Opposite of Marbury, if the Court has too much unquestioning adherence to Congress, then it could result in tyranny of the majority.
• Avoid international embarrassment: Don’t want multiple pronouncements by various departments on one question lack of legitimacy

Dissent: The above factors are bad and the Court was not practicing judicial restraint thus violating the Separation of Powers by allowing the court to decide what should have been decided as a political question.

Nixon v. U.S.

Issue:Whether or not the Senate had properly tried an impeachment?

Holding: It is a political question that can not be determined by the courts.

Implications: The Baker factors don’t predicate outcome, allow for the court to argue whatever they want.

Muskrat v. U.S.

Issue: Whether Muskrat was entitled to Indian tribal lands that had been previously allocated to him?

Holding: Despite the U.S. being a named party, the case was not an actual controversy because the statute was merely devised to test the constitutionality of a certain type of legislation, and the Court’s ruling would be nothing more than an advisory opinion.

Ex Parte McCardle

Issue: Does the Court have jurisdiction to hear cases where the legislature has limited its appellate jurisdiction?(Here, McCardle was being held illegally during the Civil War)

Holding: While the Constitution confers the Supreme Court’s appellate power, the legislature is permitted to place limits on it.

Implication: Structural argument that if the exceptions clause is read in a way that takes away Supreme Court’s essential function (to review other branches), then it could destroy the separation of power.

McCulloch v. Maryland

Issue: Could the State of Maryland use a tax to impede the operation of a branch of the U.S. bank?

Holding: No, because the Constitution grants Congress implied powers for implementing the Constitutions express powers via the N&P clause in order to create a functional national government. Second, state action may not impede valid constitutional exercises of power by the Federal Gov’t.

Implication:

• Non-originalist argument: “We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding” The Constitution is merely an outline that allows to be read broadly so the government can support the ends it needs to serve
• Structural argument: Allowing states to tax would interfere the Constitutional ‘scheme’- inconsistent with the supreme power of the federal government in concurrent area of authority.

U.S. v. Comstock

Issue: Does Congress have the authority to require the civil commitment of individuals already in Federal custody introduced by the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act?

Holding: Yes, under the N&P clause.

Implication:“[B]ase[d] on five considerations taken together.”

• The N&P Clause grants Congress broad power to enact laws that are “rationally related” and “reasonably adapted” to executing the other enumerated powers.
• The statute at issue “constitutes a modest addition” to related statutes that have existed for many decades.
• The statute in question reasonably extends longstanding policy.
• The statute properly accounts for state interests, by ending the federal government’s role “with respect to an individual covered by the statute” whenever a state requests.
• The statute is narrowly tailored to only address the legitimate federal interest.

Textual Arguments for a Broad N&P clause: “Necessary” does not mean by the only means available rather than convenient, useful or essential. A narrower textual reading would cripple the Constitution because the Framers could not think of every power the future would require. N&P Clause is phrased in the affirmative, granting power rather than limiting it.

Textual Arguments for a Narrow N&P clause: Necessary means necessary, just because it is a means to an end doesn’t mean that it’s the only means and therefore not necessary. Text should be interpreted to say that Congress is to use the least invasive way of exercising its powers.

Structural Arguments for a Broad N&P clause: It’s located in the § of the Constitution that confers power rather than limits and as an outline the Constitution should be flexible.

Structural Arguments for a Narrow N&P clause: Narrower federal power increases democracy. Greater State power and rights prevents corruption. Allowing different states to have different laws reflects their different communities and they know what laws do and don’t work for them.

Gibbons v. Ogden

Issue: Should NY law which granted Ogden a monopoly hold over federal law which gave Gibbons the right to compete?

Holding: The power to regulate interstate commerce was granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause.

Implications:

• Textual arguments: Provides broad definitions for commerce related terms.

U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co.[BAD LAW]

Issue: Could the Sherman Antitrust Act suppress a monopoly in the manufacture of a good, as well as its distribution?

Holding:Manufacturing is a local activity not subject to congressional regulation of interstate commerce.

Implications: Made any action against manufacturing monopolies extremely difficult because they would have to be taken by individual states, making such regulation extremely difficult with regards to out-of-state monopolies because states are prohibited from discriminating against out-of-state monopolies under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Although the decision was never expressly overturned, the Court later retreated from this position limiting it to its precise facts.

Shreveport Rate Case

Issue: Did the discriminatory pricing of Texas Railway companythat also served Louisiana violate pricing regulations valid under the Commerce Clause?

Holding:The federal government’s power to regulate interstate commerce also allows it to regulate purely intrastate commerce in cases where control of the former was not possible without control of the latter.

Implications:Creates the first iteration of the effects test.

Champion v. Ames

Issue: Does the Commerce Clause give Congress the power to regulate the transport of lottery tickets across state lines?

Holding: Trafficking lottery tickets constitutes interstate commerce and can thus be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause.

Implications:Congress’ power to regulate interstate traffic is plenary and thus Congress has the power to regulate traffic as it sees fit within Constitutional limits, EVEN to the extent of prohibiting goods.

Hammer v. Dagenhart[BAD LAW OVERTURNED]

Issue:Is the prohibition of interstate commerce of any merchandise that has been made by children within Congress’ Commerce Clause powers?

Holding:No, because the actual manufacturing of cotton, the good at issue here, did not in itself constitute interstate commerce.

Implications:Distinguishes between the manufacture of goods and the regulation of certain goods themselves inherently evil (lottery tickets in Champion v. Ames)

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., (limited by Darby)

Issue:Does Congress have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the production of coal?

Holding:Congress doesn’t have this power just because a commodity is manufactured or produced within a state and is intended for interstate commerce does not mean it has met the requirements to at that time fall under the category of interstate commerce. The court further used the direct effects test to find that because this intrastate activity did not have a direct effect on interstate commerce it could not be regulated. Also, as a local not national evil, coal production couldn’t be regulated.

Implications:

NLRB v. Jones & Lauglin Steel Corp.

Issue: Can Congress regulate companies from discriminating against and firing workers who choose to unionize?

Holding: Congress has the power to regulate intrastate activities that have a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce.

Implications: Marks the first case following the “switch in time that saved nine” which effectively ended the Court’s striking down New Deal economic legislation and greatly increased Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.

U.S. v. Darby

Issue: Does Congress have the power to regulate employment conditions of a lumber company in GA?

Holding: In prohibiting interstate shipment of goods produced under the forbidden substandard labor conditions, the Act is within the authority of Congress, if no Constitutional provision forbids. Congress may exercise power over intrastate activities as a means to exercising its legitimate power to regulate interstate commerce.

Implications:Overruled Hamerand limited Carter.

Wickard v. Filburn

Issue: Do limits on wheat production apply to farmers growing excess for their own consumption and not for sale?

Holding:Yes, because his wheat growing activities reduced the amount of wheat he would buy for chicken feed on the open market and because wheat was traded nationally, his production of more wheat affected interstate commerce (in the aggregate).

Implications:Created the aggregate effect tests.

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S.// Katzenbach v. McClung

Regulation of discrimination under the Civil Rights Act is within Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.

U.S. v. Lopez

Issue: Does Congress have the power to regulate the carrying of handguns (at schools)?

Holding:No, there was no evidence that carrying handguns affected the economy on a massive scale.

Implications:Creates the modern test (see outline) and is the first case since the New Deal to set limits to Congress’ power under the Commerce clause.

U.S. v. Morrison

Issue:Is the Violence Against Women Act that gave victims of gender-motivated violence the right to sue their attackers in federal court within Congress’ Commerce Power?

Holding:No, based primarily on the fact that the acts of violence VAWA intended to remedy had only an “attenuated” effect, not a substantial one, on interstate commerce.

Implications:If Congress could federalize rape and assault, it’s hard to think of anything it couldn’t.

Gonzalez v. Raich

Issue: Can Congress under the Commerce Clause criminalize the production and use of home-grown cannabis even where states approve its use for medicinal purposes?

Holding:Yes, banning the growing of marijuana for medical use was a permissible way of preventing or limiting access to marijuana for other uses because any exception to the Controlled Substances Act would make it unenforceable in practice.

Implications:If Congress can regulate a class of activities, it may regulate each member of that class, no matter how local.

New York v. U.S.

Issue: Is the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 which provided states incentives for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders constitutional?

Holding: Congress has the power to encourage the States to do something but that does not conger upon Congress the ability to compel the States to do so.

Printz v. U.S.

Issue: Are provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act which require state officials to adhere to a federal scheme governing the distribution of firearms legal?

Holding: No, because of a historical and structural argument (see Printz v US)

Child Labor Tax Case(bad law, overruled by Kahringer)

Issue: Is it improper for Congress to tax employers using child labor?

Holding:Yes, because such a tax amounts to a penalty.

U.S. v. Kahriger

The Congressional purpose of penalizing intrastate gambling under the guise of imposing a tax did not violate the Constitution by infringing the police power reserved to the states.

Implications:Overruling the penalty doctrine of the Child Labor Tax Case

U.S. v. Butler

The processing taxes under the Agricultural Adjustment Act were unconstitutional because the so-called tax was not a true tax but a means to an unconstitutional end which violates the reserved rights of the states.

South Dakota v. Dole

The Court found it Constitutional for a federal statute to withhold federal highway funds from states whose legal drinking age did not conform to federal policy.

Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisc.

A municipal ordinance requiring all milk sold in Madison to be pasteurized at an approved plant within 5 miles of the city, unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce.

Hughes v. Oklahoma

Oklahoma’s ban on selling OK minnows outside of the state of Oklahoma for the purpose of wildlife conservation violated the DCC because it discriminated the flow of interstate commerce without being the least discriminatory alternative.

City of PA v. NJ

The New Jersey Waste Control Act violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. “[W]hatever New Jersey’s ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”

Southern Pacific Co. v. State of AZ

AZ’s Train Limit Law made it illegal for any person or corporation to use the state railroad that has more than 14 passenger cars or 70 freight cars and was thus found illegal under the DCC.

Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware

An Iowa state statute restricting the length of tractor-trailers violated the DCC.

South Central Timber Devp’t Inc. v. Wunnicke

Alaska’s inclusion requirement that purchasers of state-owned timber process it within the state before it was shipped out of the state did not fall within the market-participant doctrine because “allowing a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant, but to go no further.”

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin

SC placed a tax on insurance co.’s thus placing a substantial burden on interstate commerce, but still constitutional because Congress authorized it by authorizing state regulation of insurance