Democratic Institutional Pluralism and Cultural Diversity. (Draft for ECIP, July 2-5 2002

Veit Bader

Democratic Institutional Pluralism and Cultural Diversity. (Draft for ECIP, July 2-5 2002, Amsterdam)

Introduction

Why Cultural Diversity?

Political philosophers discussing Cultural Diversity and Multiculturalism have focused on some very general questions like: Why should we value culture(s)? If we live in culturally diverse societies, why should we accept cultural pluralism as a fact instead of fighting it? Why should we even strife to promote it? If cultural pluralism is a good thing in itself, should the state promote it or should that be left to civil society? Or to “private” actors? Is there a crucial distinction between cultural and religious pluralism? Yet I do not want to deal with this debate in this article, I briefly state my own position at the outset. Living in culturally and religiously diversified societies, for me, is not a regrettable fact threatening “our” identity. It is enjoyable and valuable. Broadly speaking, cultural pluralism can be normatively defended in two ways. Perfectionists state that cultural diversity is a value in itself and living in culturally diverse societies constitutes an important aspect of a good life (ethical approaches). Justice based arguments try to show that ‘fairness as evenhandedness’ requires the recognition of minority cultures in all contexts of structural and cultural inequalities (moral approach). Even if one recognizes that moral arguments can and need not be ethically completely neutral and that states and policies cannot be strictly anti-perfectionist (Bader 1997, Carens 1997, 2000) I find justice-based arguments more convincing because they are less demanding. All stronger and more meaningful notions of perfectionism have difficulties to cope with the fact of deep cultural and religious pluralism and thorough disagreement on most matters of a good life in culturally diverse societies. Fairness arguments are more minimalist combining two broad ideas. Firstly, the fact that the state has not been “neutral” but has actively promoted and guaranteed deep inequalities between cultural/religious majorities and minorities and is still doing so, morally requires some redress, the more so if one recognizes that “difference-blind” mechanisms like markets (Rickard) and procedural democratic rules (Horowitz, Lijphart, Williams) tend to reproduce these inequalities. Secondly, enforced cultural assimilation - either by the state or by cultural majorities - is a serious moral wrong incompatible with meaningful notions of substantive, informed, individual or collective freedom of choice. These minimalist moral arguments may not be incompatible with considered, weak perfectionist arguments like (i) liberal perfectionism holding that thin notions of individual autonomy and real choice imply a positive evaluation of cultural diversity because it broadens the contexts of meaningful choices of a good life (Kymlicka); or (ii) weak but more substantive perfectionism holding that the diversity of cultural and religious frames and practices is a healthy safeguard against secularist (“modernist”, “Western”) imperialism (Tully 1995, Parekh 2000:167). But, in my view, they are convincing in themselves without such backing and my case for Institutional Pluralism (IP) does not depend on them. If not, we would have to continue the well-known and a bit outworn general discussion.

Why Democratic Institutional Pluralism ?

Most liberal political philosophers agree that cultural diversity is guaranteed by classic (individual and collective) freedoms in liberal democratic constitutions. Disagreement arises regarding questions whether this also requires policies of multiculturalism, including specified group rights. Highly contested is my more demanding claim that a justice-based defence of cultural diversity may require much stronger forms of democratic institutional pluralism (DIP). It is explicitly rejected by (neo-)republicanism, by comprehensive libertarianism and liberalism and, more tacitly and implicitly, also by political liberalism (Rawlsians), discursive democracy (Habermasians) and even deliberative democracy (Bartholomew 1999, Squire 1999, Valadez 1999, Williams 1998, 2000, Waldron 2000). And it is not broadly and systematically defended by liberal nationalists (Tamir, Kymlicka), liberal communitarians like Taylor and Walzer, or theorists of contextualized morality like Carens, Bauböck and Parekh. In this article I intent to start, in a preliminary and sketchy way, such a systematic elaboration. My general claims are the following.

(i) Moral principles like ‘difference-blind’ neutrality may or may not be appropriate in ideal worlds (well-ordered states, just societies, ideally reasonable citizens), in the actual world they tend to stabilize existing structural (economic, social, political) and cultural or symbolic inequalities between ethno-religious and national majorities and minorities, and they serve to hide this from view: presumed neutrality masks majority bias. DIP not only criticizes this but provides resources and opportunities for minorities to organize and mobilize in order to redress inequalities and power-asymmetries in specific societal fields as well as in polities. Though this claim is generally relevant, it is particularly important in cases of ‘deeply divided’ or ‘plural societies’.

(ii) Fairness as ‘hands-off’ regarding cultures and identities is not only impossible but also morally not required and, from an ethico-political perspective, not desirable. Fairness as ‘evenhandedness’ recognizes not only existing cultural diversity generally, but cultural or symbolic domination in particular and requires context-sensitive fair changes. DIP strengthens cultural pluralism (cultural diversity or difference is much stronger if backed by institutions), it particularly strengthens cultural minorities in their opposition against enforced assimilation.

(iii) Flexible DIP is better able to find productive balances between collective autonomy of minorities in order to prevent enforced cultural assimilation and retain and develop their cultures if they wish so, on the one hand, and individualautonomy in order to prevent enforced assimilation by minority groups, organizations and leaders, because it develops real exit-options (not only exit-rights), it is based on overlapping and cross-cutting membership in many associations, and its institutional design is - compared with pre-modern and with illiberal and undemocratic IP - much more flexible, fluid, reversible and accountable. Political pluralism in this regard is conducive to individual freedom and ‘healthy personal development’ (Eisenberg).

(iv) DIP is much better able to cope with actual cultural diversity, actual IP and actual developments of multi-level polities than its counterpart: institutional monism and its outdated, unitary, homogenous and static notions of state, sovereignty, nationality, citizenship, culture, political identity and commitment. Any realistic evaluation of the - intended and unintended - highly contested effects of institutional settings has to take actual IP and multi-level polities into account.

A comprehensive elaboration of DIP requires a close cooperation between recently developing contextualized theories of morality in political philosophy (Kymlicka, Carens, Parekh, Walzer, Williams, Bauböck) and empirical (historical, comparative, explanatory) theories of IP in the social sciences. This cooperation is not easy (Bader 2001c) but we may hope for collective work in progress. It is impossible, in a short article like this, to give more than the broad outlines. After shortly introducing different types of IP and different theoretical traditions (section I) I present four ideal types of democratic incorporation of minorities (section II) in order to facilitate a focused practical evaluation of monistic versus pluralistic options (section III). In my conclusion I point out some open questions on the research agenda for the further elaboration of associative democracy, the most promising version of DIP.

IVarieties of Practical and Theoretical Institutional Pluralism

Mapping the diversity of institutionally plural arrangements in different societal fields as well as in societies and polities is contested, and so is mapping of the variety of relevant theoretical traditions of IP. First, we need a fairly general, preliminary definition of IP which should contain two core aspects: (i) the existing plurality of categories, groups, organizations, or political units has not only to be more or less formally recognized, it has also to be integratedin the political process of problem-definition, deliberation, decision-alternatives and decision-making, implementation and control. The mode of formal recognition is variable, stretching from constitutional recognition via legal to administrative and political de facto recognition but merely ‘private pluralism’, interest-group pluralism or so-called ‘social, but not political’ pluralism in civil society (Rawls) - guaranteed by the freedoms of political communication (like free speech, association, organization, demonstration) - is not enough.[1] ‘Political’ should be understood broadly, not only territorially: wherever collective decisions are required, whether in “private” or in “public” organizations. (ii) this recognition and integration has to be combined with a fair amount of actual decentralization. If institutionally pluralist designs contain some hierarchical subordination of the units, a considerable amount of delegation of powers or - better, to prevent “concessionist” misunderstandings[2] - of the acceptance of autonomous powers, is required which also means that these units have a fair amount of de facto ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-determination’ to decide specific issues. Again, the mode of formalization of actual decentralization is open: it need not - in all cases - be constitutionalized.

All institutionally pluralist arrangements can thus be characterized as ‘power-sharing’ systems. Power (of states, of private property, of management, etc.) has actually to be divided, delegated, and limited and this requires a conceptual break with concepts of absolute, unlimited, undivided sovereignty and property and a theoretical break with monistic, unitarian or simply majoritarian normative strategies.[3]

The huge and complex variety of practices of IP can be reduced into three basic types according to three major, analytically distinct arena’s or ‘spheres’ of representation (1) Political/territorial pluralism : power-sharing systems in territorially bounded units (‘spatio-jurisdictional’ (Smith 1995:3) under the hypothetical condition that ethno-religious or national pluralism and social/functional pluralism are absent. Most majority-restraining elements of the consensus-model of democracy by Lijphart (like executive power-sharing: grand coalitions; separation of powers; balanced bi-cameralism ; multi-party-system, multi-dimensional party system, proportional representation, territorial federalism and decentralization, written constitution, some “separation” of state and church, state and society, public and private) are purely political in this sense. (2) Social/functional pluralism: the representation of classes, professions, elites, of categories of producers, consumers or clients in the political process in different societal fields (economic firms, schools, hospitals etc.) and on different levels (neo-corporatist councils), analytically completely distinguished from political and ethno-religious/national pluralism but practically only possible in combination with political pluralism. (3) Ascriptive Minority pluralism: the main form of institutional representation of ascriptive categories, groups, associations, organizations in different fields and on different levels, analytically independent from social/functional and political pluralism but practically only possible in combination with political pluralism. Only if ethno-religious minorities are sufficiently territorially concentrated this type of pluralism tends to merge with federalist political pluralism. For those ethno-religious minorities who are territorially dispersed, and for all other ascriptive minorities, like women, lesbians and gays, this type of group-representation is the only available one.[4]

Combined with a multi-level approach, these types of IP can be graphically represented in the following way:

See Figure 1: Arena’s and Levels of Representation (Appendix)

Four explications seem in place:

(1) Institutionally pluralist settings, particularly federalism, have stimulated multi-level analysis and multi-level institutional design from the beginning but they have been mainly focused on constitutionally or legally formalized distribution of powers among hierarchically super- and subordinate units and resulting ‘joint decision traps’ (Scharpf). Recently, hierarchy-failures are more broadly recognized, private and public hierarchies are seen as one among many mechanisms of coordination/governance (markets, networks, associations, communities (Hollingsworth/Boyer 1997)) and the possible advantages of loose, negotiated couplings of units with competing competencies are recognized (Benz 1998, Héritiér 1999, Scharpf 2001, Streeck 2001). In this way, institutional pluralism ties in with broader neo-institutionalist analysis, but little use has been made of these developments for studies of ‘multi-cultural’ representation.

(2) The distinction between political and functional representation - between political democracy and citizenship on one hand, economic, industrial or social democracy and citizenship on the other hand - is fairly traditional. The first detailed institutional designs and practical experiments with democratic social/functional representation can be found in the socialist labour movement, particularly in Austromarxism (Otto Bauer, Karl Renner, Max Adler), in developing labour law (Sinzheimer, Renner, Klare), in Guild-Socialism (Cole), in Laski’s political pluralism, later in democratic neo-corporatism (Schmitter, Lehmbruch, Streeck). They range from works-councils and co-determination in all bigger private or public organizations in all different societal fields via local, regional and federal chambers of industry and commerce and neo-corporatist tri-partite councils and supra-state committees. Originally their focus has been the representation of labour and capital/management but already in socialist experiments around 1900 consumers and clients have been integrated and many attempts have later been made to include occupational and professional representation and also so-called ‘non-productivist’ interests.[5]

(3) Institutional design and practical experiments with ascriptive minority IP- as distinct from territorial representation of national minorities (and the respective models of ethno-national federalism) - and related models of ‘tertiary’ or ‘multicultural’ citizenship are less well-known though they also reach back to the early decades of the 20th century (Austromarxists like Bauer and Renner and their influence on Randolph Bourne and others). Consociational democracy (Lijphart) explicitly covers not only ethnic and national but also religious groups, associations and organizations. Models and practical experiments with institutional representation of other ascripitive minorities (mainly of women and homos) are only recently developed under the broad and somewhat misleading heading of ‘multiculturalism’, ‘group rights’, and politics of ‘difference’ or ‘identity’ by Minow, Young, Phillips, Williams and many others.Six clarifying remarks seem in place:

(i) For descriptive, explanatory and for prescriptive purposes it is important to distinguish ascriptive categories defined on the basis of socially defined biological, physiological or phenotypical characteristics (descent, sex, age, skin colour etc.) from ascriptive categories defined on the basis of socio-historical characteristics (clustered together in the container-concept of ethnicity),[6] because the respective practices of morally illegitimate discrimination, oppression, exploitation and exclusion and their ideological legitimations show relevant differences (degrees of ‘visibility’ and ‘immutability’: ‘biology is destiny’). The container-concept of ethnicity masks relevant distinctions among - broadly speaking - ‘ethnic minorities’ however blurred the boundaries may be in reality. Indigenous peoples (First Nations), ‘national minorities’, ‘ethnic-immigrant minorities’, religious minorities, gender- and social-class minorities differ from each other[7] with regard to criteria of historical and ongoing injustice (Williams 1998), degree of territorial concentration or dispersion, degrees of voluntariness or involuntariness of incorporation into the polity, and these differences are also normatively relevant: not one model of institutionally pluralist incorporation fits all (Kymlicka 1995, Bauböck 1999, Carens 2000, Williams 1998:204; Valadez 1999).

(ii)Territorial concentration plays a role in at least three distinct problems (a) minorities in a polity can be majorities at a territorial meso-level (regions across state-borders or states or provinces within federal states). If this is the case, territorial federalization may be feasible to address problems of First Nations or national minorities. (b) If ethno-religious or national minorities do not form numerical majorities at this meso-level (and in this sense can be characterized as ‘territorially dispersed minorities’) there are still minimal thresholds of territorial concentration required for their own separate associations or organizations in order to make possible the ‘parallel existence of self-governing communities sharing the same space but applying rules in matters of community concern to their members’ (Hirst 2001:23, Lund-Recommendation, Oslo Recommendation and Hague Recommendations). (c) Distinct from such situations of ‘mutual extra-territoriality’ are situations in which specific ethno-religious, national, but also broader ascriptive, gender minorities form numerical majorities on a micro-level. This local concentration of gay communities, of retired people,[8] of religious sects,[9] or - most well-known -of ethnic immigrants in neighbourhoods or villages enable the formation of regimes of ‘territorial micro-governance’. Obviously, these local majorities may be either very rich and powerful or ghettos of the very poor and powerless.

(iii) “Belonging” to ascriptive categories or groups is notvoluntary. Even critics of liberalism like Paul Hirst or Nancy Rosenblum have difficulties to account for this basic fact that freedom of choice is absent in this case, and for its consequences for DIP.[10] Individuals do not freely chose their associational ties or cultures but are born and raised in them, and this socialization “either through involuntary or nonvoluntary association in groups” (Eisenberg 1995:171)[11] is partly constitutive of the individual “in the sense that no self exists apart from these constitutive elements. These attachments are ones that the self can come to understand and reflect on but cannot choose to keep or to discard” (177): “Race, culture, or gender constitute one’s self regardless of one’s choice in the matter’ (179). Three consequences are important: (a) there is no escape from being ascriptively categorized by others though there are important differences between biologistic ascriptions like sex, “race”, age, handicaps and culturalistic/historical ascripitions; (b) even exit-rights do not provide real exit options in cases in which individuals affiliations and identities are constituted in part by non- or involuntary associations: “associational ties are sometimes too deep to sever” (24) but, again, there are important differences in degree (e.g. between gender-, linguistic- and religious cultures/habits/identities). Real exit-options from “communities” may be easier but can be extremely costly (threat/practice of ostracization) and even exit from organizations has its price (weakening minorities: see below). (c) normatively richer theories of self-development should distinguish between constitutive and contingent aspects of identity and oppose the “communitarian” reduction of self-development to mere socialization: biology nor history is destiny.