Development Programme /
Kosovo
FINAL REPORT: PHASE II OF THE UNMIK/UNDP-SPONSORED
KOSOVO POLICE SERVICE (KPS)
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT
(INCLUDES A SUMMARY OF
PHASE I & II LESSONS LEARNED)
PREPARED BY: TERRY O’NEIL*
APRIL 2005
* Terry O’Neil, an American citizen, is a local government practitioner and advisor with nearly twenty years of administrative experience in the United States and in international settings, including Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor. While every effort has been made to objectively compile this evaluation, in the interest of full disclosure it should be noted that Mr. O’Neil served as a consultant to UNDP-Kosovo in September 2002 on six-month assignment to help develop and launch Phase I of the KPS Institutional Capacity Building Project. For this reason, certain observations made and conclusions drawn in this document, particularly as they pertain to earlier stages of the project, are, in part, based on the evaluator’s firsthand experiences. Other points of view regarding the efficacy of the KPS project and the content of this report are, of course, welcome.
Acronyms
ASD Administrative Services Division
DSRG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
ICT International Criminal Tribunal
IPO International Police Officer
KCB Kosovo Consolidated Budget
KIPA Kosovo Institute of Public Administration
KFOR NATO-based Peace Keeping Force in Kosovo
KPS Kosovo Police Service
KPIS Kosovo Police Information System
KPSS Kosovo Police Service School
KPSICBP Kosovo Police Service Institutional Capacity Building Project
KTC Kosovo Trust Corporation
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
SRSG Special Representative to the Secretary General
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
Terms of Reference:
The International Consultant will be responsible to produce the Kosovo Police Service Institutional Capacity Building Project (KPSICB) Phase II Final Report and will include a lessons learned section covering Phase I and II. Specifically he/she will be responsible for:
(a) Summarizing the obstacles and challenges faced by the project and how they were overcome;
(b) Examining and evaluating interim project impact;
(c) Consulting with all stakeholders and beneficiaries on project impact and future needs;
(d) Producing a comprehensive Final Report on KPSICB Phase II;
(e) Making recommendations for future planning and assistance for KPS Administration.
CONTENTS
Section A. Executive Summary
Section B. Putting the Project in Context
Section C. Final Report on Phase II Activities
1. Reporting Approach
2. Phase II Objectives, Inputs and Outputs vs. Results
3. Organizational Chart of the KPS Administrative Support Division (March 2005)
4. Snap Shot of the KPS ASD (staffing levels, senior appointments, etc.)
5. Review of Capacity Building Team’s Work Products (policies, procedures, manuals)
6. Training Activities
7. Targeted Donations
Section D. Phases I & II – Lessons Learned
1. Approach
2. The Project’s Partners, Stakeholders and Beneficiaries
3. Obstacles & Challenges Faced By the Project and How They Were Overcome
4. Stakeholder & Beneficiary Views on Future Needs
5. The Project’s Impact on the KPS Thus Far
6. Recommendations for Further Planning Assistance to the KPS
7. Comments Regarding Gender Issues
8. Synergies With Other UNDP Projects
Section E. Concluding Remarks
Section F. Persons Interviewed & Supporting Documentation
1. Persons Interviewed
2. Documents Reviewed
3. Targeted Donations
4. Phase II Training Matrix
SECTION A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“As part of its overall peace building and conflict prevention mandate, UNDP has begun to focus on the need to transform the justice and security sector in crisis-post-conflict countries to comply with the principles of democratic governance. It is increasingly recognized that bringing the security sector under civilian control and establishing equitable justice are integral elements of any peace-building . . . effort.”
“At the same time, it is widely acknowledged that UNDP’s policy formulation must build upon its comparative strengths and position within the larger international donor community, compliment existing expertise in the area, and be grounded in operational experience from the field.”
Aide Memoire, UNDP Conference, “Coherence, Cooperation and Comparative Strengths – Justice and Security Sector Reform” 10-11 April, 2003
In September 2002, as part of its Justice & Security Sector portfolio, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Kosovo sought to put the above words into action by developing and executing, in partnership with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and through the generous financial support of the governments of The Netherlands and Norway, the Kosovo Police Service Institutional Capacity Building[1] Project (KPSICBP).
Staffed by a team of experienced administrative practitioners and technical advisors, the project’s ultimate goal has been (and remains) the creation of an effective, responsive and transparent Administrative Services Division (ASD) within the emerging Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The task has not been easy. A late start in focusing on the newly forming agency’s administrative wherewithal, and delays in transitioning from international control to a fully “Kosovarized” operation have unquestionably slowed the pace of capacity building. Uncertainty, and in some cases skepticism, on the part of some within UNMIK as to the role the UNDP-sponsored project should play in aiding the KPS transition have been complicating factors as well.
Yet despite these and other challenges, and owing in no small measure to UNDP’s perseverance and UNMIK’s early 2003 decision to place a lead international administrator (now Deputy Police Commissioner) in charge of creating the ASD, the KPS Capacity Building Project, particularly Phase II, has managed to produce exceptional results. Two years ago critical administrative functions within the fledgling KPS, such as budgeting, logistics, asset management, human resources, fleet maintenance and information technology were being provided by UNMIK’s mission-wide logistics apparatus, a stand-in crew of international police officers (IPOs) and a handful of Kosovar employees. Today, there exists a clearly defined, coherently structured administrative services division with nearly 750 competitively-hired KPS employees, both sworn officer and civilians, deployed across three departments and nineteen sub-departments and directorates. A closer look finds a new ASD that is reasonably well equipped, grounded in sound budgeting and operational procedures, and, assuming an accelerated pace in hiring permanent managers and the completion intensive training called for in Phase III of the project, substantially on its way to providing the essential services needed to sustain a modern police force. By any reasonable measure, the UNDP capacity building effort has been instrumental in helping to bring this about.
As mentioned, not all has been smooth sailing. Throughout the course of the project, significant obstacles were encountered, including delays in securing facilities to house the ASD, delays in hiring KPS administrative staff, conflicting opinions as to what standards and protocols should be used, differing views as to the pace and urgency of transitional activities, turnover amongst project staff, and a host of other difficulties. While the evaluation that follows touches on a wide range of issues pertaining to phases I & II of the project, some of the initiative’s more general “lessons learned” might be summed up as follows:
(1) Start early. Notwithstanding the post-conflict imperative of rapidly training and deploying officers on the street, addressing the “back office” administrative capacities of a start-from-scratch police force cannot be effectively accomplished as an afterthought.
(2) Secure the right mix of skills. With some exceptions, international police officers (IPO’s) deployed in Kosovo did not included trained budget specialists, human resource specialists, asset management specialists, logisticians or other administrative types. In setting up, training and provisionally managing a post-conflict police force, UN policy makers and their national counterparts need immediate, ongoing, hands-on assistance from experienced administrative practitioners. While recruiting IPO’s with administrative backgrounds might appear to be a viable option, it is not a reliable alternative to a structured, targeted initiative such as the KPSICBP.
(3) A clearer understanding of respective roles. At times, UNDP’s partnership with UNMIK has been unbalanced. Delays by in launching important components of the transition were not adequately addressed in terms of their impact on the project. At the same time, the project should have probably been better calibrated to apply resources on a “when ready” basis. The project’s steering committee met only twice in the course of phases I & II and focused mainly on the status of the KPS operations in general rather than on the workings of the project itself. From the outset, a memorandum of understanding or similar agreement between UNDP and UNMIK, clearly identifying each partner’s roles and obligations, would have likely benefited the project.
(4) Adaptability. Among the project’s most noteworthy characteristics has been its adaptability. Because of the start from scratch nature of the effort, capacity building team members were routinely called upon to perform tasks outside the scope of what might ordinarily be considered traditional capacity building. True, training and mentoring did not begin as quickly as might have been desired, but had the team not aggressively played a provisional role in helping to lay the organization’s crucial groundwork, the KPS Administrative Services Division would not be the viable, soon-to-be independent agency that it is today.
(5) Policy influence. Finally, in designing and executing the KPS Institutional Capacity Building Project, it is clear that UNDP officials intended to provide not only technical advice and expertise, (which proved particularly effective), but also a certain measure of policy guidance with regard to matters of enhanced civilian oversight, civilianization of the KPS administrative workforce, transparency of operations, responsiveness to wider civil society environment and similar “principles” which tend to define security sector reform in the broader sense. In practice, however, with UNMIK officials exercising nearly exclusive policy oversight, it must be acknowledged that KPS capacity building project has held relatively little sway in these areas. Any future efforts by UNDP to strengthen its role in shaping security sector policy, particularly in the context of a similar police capacity building project, will undoubtedly prove more effective if policy directions are agreed to
SECTION B. PUTTING THE PROJECT IN CONTEXT
In June 1999, following NATO air strikes that forced the withdrawal of Yugoslav military and paramilitary troops from the majority ethnic-Albanian province of Kosovo, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 established the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Headed by a Special Representative to the Secretary General of the United Nations (SRSG), UNMIK is organizationally divided into four sectors or “pillars” encompassing Police & Justice, Civil Administration, Democracy & Institution Building, and Reconstruction & Economic Development. In addition to resources marshalled through UNMIK, a host of non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), as well as donor-governments have provided aid and development assistance to Kosovo’s roughly two million citizens. Also present in Kosovo is the NATO-led multi-national stabilization force known as KFOR, which has played a critical role in maintaining peace and stability in Kosovo. Charged with bringing order, democracy, and fundamental self-governance to the shattered region, UNMIK has, during the five-year span of its mission, temporarily administered a wide range of government functions, including civilian policing. Today, nearly all basic functions, including the judiciary, municipal authorities, central banking, economic development and cultural development, are no longer held by UNMIK as “reserved authorities” but rather are administered on a day-to-day basis by Kosovo’s duly elected Provisional Institution of Self-Government (PISG) and its relevant ministries. Police, however, is still a reserved function and is expected remain so until near the end of UNMIK’s mission. Discussions regarding Kosovo’s final status, based on several progress indicators, are scheduled to begin in the summer of 2005.
From the outset establishing and mobilizing an effective civilian police force has been among UNMIK’s most pressing mandates[2]. Initially meeting the post-conflict security challenge by deploying a multi-national force of several thousand international police officers, UNMIK, aided by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has made significant gains in fielding a resident police force through its Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS). At present, well over 6,000 Kosovar men and women (both Albanian and Serb) have graduated from the school and are now on the KPS payroll. In addition to in-service training, the bulk of these new recruits have also had an opportunity to work side-by-side with international officers. A rapid draw down of IPO’s is currently underway with the expected departure of all but a small contingent by mid 2006. As currently structured, the KPS is divided into five regions, with a main headquarters at Pristina, the capital city, and five regional stations at Pristina, Mitrovica, Pec, Prizren and Gnjilane. A total of 51 stations and substations are scattered throughout the Kosovo’s regions. Border patrol, which regulates eight checkpoints, is also a police responsibility. Today, the KPS main headquarters, and nearly half of the regional HQ’s, stations and substations are under the day-to-day command of senior KPS officers. UNMIK police commanders, who until recently supervised all day-to-day activities, are now rapidly taking on the role of observers and advisors.
The ongoing transfer of both operational and administrative functions to the emerging KPS has understandably been accompanied by a marked reduction in international funding. At present, with the exception of unilateral contributions made directly through donor governments, KPS funding is derived almost entirely from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (KCB). Managed by the UNMIK-established Central Fiscal Authority (CFA), the KCB derives its revenues from local customs duties, as well as sales and excise taxes. As might be expected, because of Kosovo’s struggling economy, high unemployment, lack of skilled workers, tradition of black market activities and nascent tax administration, the KPS budget, a modest € 632 million in 2004[3], falls well short of the government’s actual needs. Anticipated KCB spending on police will be about € 50 million in 2005[4], or roughly nine percent (9%) of the provisional government’s projected annual revenues. Given this revenue outlook, it is clear that KPS spending will remain modest for the foreseeable future and that capital spending will be a fraction of that spent under the UNMIK umbrella. Across the board, salaries for government workers in Kosovo, including those within the police service, are extremely low. At present, senior KPS officers above the rank of major receive € 275 per month. Lower ranking officers are paid € 235 per month. The monthly salary of KPS civilian administrative staff ranges from a high of € 217 for senior administrators to a low of € 130 for support staff such as receptionists, janitors and carpenters[5]. In this low-pay environment, attracting skilled employees and combating corruption are persistent concerns.