Executive Summary
On October 10, 2017, fourteen years after its second civil war ended, Liberia will hold presidential and legislative elections that could lead to a peaceful democratic transfer of power for the first time in its history. Liberia is inexperienced with both democracy and peace; if its upcoming election is successful, it will help to consolidate its post-war democracy and establish a precedent for peaceful and legitimate elections.
Liberia’s 2017 election is unlikely to occur without incident. Its history of electoral violence and the context in which it approaches the election indicate that the country will almost certainly experience some level of electoral violence.
This risk assessment determines that there are four areas of concern in the upcoming election: security forces, political parties’ campaigns, the National Election Commission (NEC), and specific voter grievances. Security forces are a likely source of violence, as they are underfunded, unstable, and have a long history of electoral and political violence. They are not likely to show restraint if provoked by an unruly crowd at a protest or even at polling stations. However, they can also mitigate violence by quieting crowds and stopping incidents before they escalate.
Political parties are another potential source of violence, as the election’s high stakes make opposition parties determined to unseat the ruling Unity Party, and the Unity Party desperate to stop them. Campaigns are the most competitive in voter-rich Montserrado, Nimba, and Bong counties, where clashes between campaigns or supporters is most likely. The high tensions and hateful rhetoric of the campaign increases the likelihood of violence.
The underfunded NEC can indirectly cause violence if it fails to properly train and prepare its staff to conduct the election. Frustrated voters in long lines at polling stations can lead to unruly crowds, and a poorly managed election can lead to accusations of fraud. But the NEC can also be a strong mitigating force, by working with international organizations to conduct voter education programs, by properly handling dispute adjudication, and by determining the validity of the election. In these ways, it can provide legitimacy to the election and the new president.
Finally, voter grievances can inspire isolated or group incidents of violence. Feelings of marginalization from an entrenched elite and inevitability about the outcomes of elections can provoke individuals or small groups to attack parties’ headquarters, steal ballot boxes, or commit similar crimes. Accusations of fraud from unsuccessful parties can inspire supporters to protest or riot. Severe incidents like the deadly opposition riot in 2011 could destroy the legitimacy of the election and damage the democratic process for future elections as well.
Introduction
This report examines Liberia’s upcoming elections according to USAID’s electoral violence risk assessment framework. It aims to analyze the risks for violence in Liberia’s presidential and legislative elections, scheduled for October 10, 2017, and to identify stakeholders who are likely to perpetrate violence or become targets of violence in different locations and times throughout the election period. It also identifies several potential mitigating forces that could reduce the likelihood of violence.
A contextual analysis for Liberia’s elections is given below, including security, political, economic, social, and state institution risk factors, as well as election-specific risk factors. Next, the historical conflict analysis describes Liberia’s civil wars, election history and recent political climate. The stakeholder analysis examines state and non-state stakeholders to determine likely sources and targets of violence. Findings are discussed in the conclusion.
Contextual Analysis
This section analyzes Liberia’s current electoral context to determine the likelihood of violent behavior. The first level of contextual analysis involves identifying broad risk factors in the security, political, economic, social, and state institution sectors. The second level of analysis examines election-specific risk factors. This section will determine potential triggers or concerns for violence in the different phases of the election.
Security Risk Factors
Liberia’s security forces will be a key factor in the upcoming election. They have the potential to be the perpetrators or the victims of electoral violence. They can also serve as mitigating forces to prevent violence from occurring.
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which helped Liberia negotiate a peace agreement in 2003 at the end of its second civil war, is nearing completion. On June 30, 2016, the UN reduced its number of uniformed personnel from 3,745 to 1,200 soldiers and 600 police, which the UN will maintain through the election.[1]In doing so, UNMIL is transferring security responsibility back into the hands of the Liberian National Police (LNP) and army. This will cause a period of instability as the LNP adjusts to the change. Liberians have very low confidence in their security forces, in part because of their involvement in human rights violations in the past.Many worry that actors may be emboldened to violence in the face of a new, unstable, and underfunded electoral security force.[2]
UNMIL has assisted Liberia with election security in the past, but the 2017 election will be the first Liberian election held with its own national security forces since the end of its civil wars. Funding for the LNP is running dangerously low, partly due to the Ebola crisis of 2013-2015. This is likely to decrease the effectiveness of the LNP and Ministry of Justice’s violence prevention plans, which include assessments and reaching out to stakeholders and youth party leaders.[3] UNMIL and the Ministry of Justice have worked together to develop a transition plan, but that too may be disadvantaged by a lack of funding.[4]
Liberian politicians are desperately appealing to the UN to leave more forces to help with security, or to send in foreign troops or aid. The most recent estimates show that Liberian armed forces have 2,050 personnel and 5,170 police. In addition, the LNP’s current situation is grim; they have a bad reputation among Liberians, very low salaries, and most are not armed.[5] Security forces are also plagued by internal conflicts as leaders try to usurp others’ positions and operations, which will further decrease their effectiveness. As campaigning begins in the country, they must demonstrate visibility, non-partisanship, and restraint if they are to be an effective electoral security force.[6]
Another risk for Liberia’s security forces is politicization. Unity Party candidate Vice President Joseph Boakai has been endorsed by Defense Minister Brownie Samukai.[7] This may affect the armed forces’ alliances and how they behave or overlook the behavior of others during the election.
The LNP may perpetrate violence itself, as it has done in the past. Liberia’s precedence for the involvement of security forces in electoral violence is explored further in the historical conflict factors portion of the risk assessment. However, it also can mitigate violence by quieting crowds and stopping incidents before they escalate. This as well as its violence prevention programs, makes the LNP an important potential mitigating factor.
Political Risk Factors
This section discusses Liberia’s regime type, governance style, and condition of democracy in order to analyze its systemic vulnerability to electoral violence.
Liberia’s government is a democratic republic modeled after the United States. However, it is very highly centralized with no federal districts or elected local officials.[8] This, along with the two six-year terms that a president is allowed, gives presidential elections very high stakes, which could make tensions high enough to spark violence. Additionally, much of President Sirleaf’s governance style has had authoritarian characteristics, including censorship and attacks on the media, mysterious deaths of government critics, and allegations of nepotism and corruption. This has given recent Liberian governance a culture of impunity. She has managed to reform political culture to a certain extent, but not democratic practices. This is dangerous because elections in unconsolidated democracies like Liberia’s can be at a greater risk for violence.[9]
Liberia’s government is still in transition after its last civil war, which ended in 2003. This will be the first transfer of power since the war ended, and the first time that a president has willingly left office in Liberia since 1944.[10] The newness of Liberia’s government and its transition away from violence leave it vulnerable to violent incidents in its upcoming election.
Economic Risk Factors
Poverty and the possibility of wealth can be incentives for violence during elections. This section analyzes Liberia’s financial situation to find areas of vulnerability.
Liberia is an incredibly poor nation, in great need of development and still suffering financially from its recent Ebola crisis.[11] The country’s GDP in 2015 was US$2.053 billion, with a growth rate of 0.3%.[12] Countries with a very low GDP and growth rate like Liberia’s have been connected to greater electoral violence.[13] Similarly, Liberia’s GNI per capita for 2015 is only US$380,[14] which is statistically likely to increase conflict.[15]
Liberia’s GINI coefficient for distribution of wealth is at 38.2,[16] which is low enough to not put the country at increased risk of violence.[17] However, 54% of Liberians currently live below the poverty line, 18% of which lives in extreme poverty. The highest percentages of poverty are in rural areas, but similar numbers of impoverished people live in rural and urban areas. The highest poverty areas are Maryland, River Gee, and Grand Kru Counties, while the lowest are in Montserrado County and the central and southeast regions that have the majority of the country’s iron ore and logging industries.[18] The poorer rural areas and high concentration of urban poor could contribute to the likelihood of electoral violence. Centers of Liberia’s natural resource industries may be scenes of conflict as well; during the Liberian civil wars, competing factions fought for control of natural resources to fund their militias.[19] The upcoming election could increase tensions by providing opportunities for Liberians to gain or lose control of these resources.
Social Risk Factors
This section analyzes social cleavages and demographics that may put Liberia at a greater risk of election violence, especially concerning the lasting impact that the Liberian Civil Wars had on society.
Liberian society has many cleavages that may lead to heightened tensions and violence during the election. Tribal and ethnic tensions have led to violence in the past, including Samuel Doe’s rule showing favoritism toward his own Krahn ethnic group and a failed coup led by the Gio and Mano ethnic groups.[20] Some political parties are also ethnic-based, such as the Kpelle-led People’s Unification Party (PUP), which could exacerbate ethnic tensions.[21] Additionally, cleavages still remain from Liberia’s recent civil wars, which ended in 2003. Citizens and politicians often accuse elites of supporting one side or another during the civil wars, which alienates people and reinvigorates tensions.[22] Furthermore, some of the candidates running for president have ties to or were directly involved in the civil wars, polarizing Liberians as they form opinions about candidates.
Liberia’s population is approximately 65% youths, who experience a particularly high rate of unemployment. A large population of young, dissatisfied and idle people can increase the likelihood of violence. During the Liberian Civil Wars, politicians mobilized similar groups of young people to participate in violence. In addition, Liberia has over 84,000 veterans of the civil wars, who are particularly impoverished, unemployed, and desperate.[23] This group could be especially prone to violence during the election.
State Institution Risk Factors
The perception of the legitimacy and effectiveness of Liberian institutions is a potential risk factor for tension and violence, especiallyif Liberians feel dissatisfied or cheated out of their expected outcomes. Legitimacy is defined as the perception that the institution is using its power fairly and for the best interests of all. Effectiveness is defined as the capability of the institution to carry out its tasks of providing order and goods and services.
Liberians have very low confidence in their security forces, which are largely ineffective and poorly managed.[24] Their bad reputation comes in part from their history of human rights violations. Not only do Liberians not view their security forces as effective, but they may also question their legitimacy, after questions of partisanship arise.[25] The LNP has made efforts to counter their poor image, conducting confidence patrols in different towns and increasing citizens’ knowledge of their rights and security forces.[26]
However, Liberians have much more faith in their electoral management body, the National Election Commission (NEC). The NEC is generally perceived as competent, credible, and nonbiased. It is a useful, if underfunded, tool for decreasing electoral tensions; it regularly contributes to civic education and holds weekly Inter-Party Consultative Committee meetings.[27] But in order to more effectively counter electoral violence, it must focus on its staff capacity, gender sensitization, and both political parties and security forces in order to help prevent conflict.[28]
Most Liberians generally see their government and courts as legitimate institutions, although they do not place much trust in either the courts or in the president.[29] While President Sirleaf is currently unpopular with Liberians, it is a good sign that they view the institution as legitimate, and will therefore be more likely to respect it.
Election-Specific Risk Factors
This section analyzes different aspects of Liberia’s electoral system, including its election type, decentralization, political party system, electoral management body, election timing, confrontations, fraud, hate speech, and new media. Areas of concern in these categories will be identified as potential for electoral violence.
Liberia holds elections only at the national level, since they have no federal or local elected government. Presidential elections are conducted in two rounds; the second is a run-off election between the top two candidates from the first, if none received a majority. The legislature is divided into the Senate and House of Representatives, members of which are elected in a winner-take-all system. Presidential and legislative elections will be held on October 10, 2017, and the run-off election will be held on the second Tuesday after the results of the first round are finalized, likely about a month later.[30]
This system increases the stakes of winning elections; with no local elected officials, the government is highly centralized and very powerful. UNDP is working with Liberia on the Liberia Decentralization Support Programme (LDSP), which grants more responsibilities, capacity, and accountability to local governments. The LDSP has also gotten a bill for the election of local officials into the legislature, where it is being deliberated.[31] However, these changes still leave the national government highly centralized, and any change toward electing local officials will not take place before the 2017 elections.
Additionally, a winner-take-all system in the legislature means less representation for smaller groups, although Liberia has a multiparty system and dozens of political parties. This, along with Liberia’s highly centralized government, may make parties and candidates more competitive and desperate to win, and more frustrated if they lose, all of which may contribute to electoral violence.
Liberia’s party system also may increase the likelihood of electoral violence. Most politicians form parties so that they can join alliances with stronger parties and be given political positions when that party wins. Parties then tend to dissolve after elections,and members that get positions with the ruling party then abandon their original party. A strong and institutionalized political party system would help Liberia in its post-war transition by ensuring that the results of elections are accepted and that citizens are engaged in politics. The country has been attempting to institutionalize their party system for this reason; the NEC requires parties to keep permanent headquarters in Monrovia to prevent the temporary creation of parties around election years.[32]
Although the country has a multiparty system, it is not inclusive for all Liberians. Although there are over 40 parties expected to compete in the 2017 election,[33] for a campaign to have a real chance of winning, it must spend US$5-8 million, which is far out of reach for most Liberians, even many politicians and successful business owners.[34] Because of this, many presidential hopefuls had been relying on securing the support of President Sirleaf and her government for help with finances and resources to run a campaign. However, when she endorsed her vice president Joseph Boakai, they were frustrated and felt that President Sirleaf’s administration and the ruling Unity Party were taking advantage of their position to ensure that Vice President Boakai will be reelected.[35] This leads to the sense that running a campaign in Liberia is not inclusive or accessible, and that the ruling elites dominate the process enough that others do not have a real chance. This frustration has contributed to riots, boycotts, and violence in the past.