W. Scott Wood's Study Objectives

1

W. Scott Wood's Study Objectives

For B.F. Skinner's

Science and Human Behavior

Wood, W.S. A Study Guide to Accompany B.F. Skinner's Science and Human Behavior

SECTION I: THE POSSIBILITY OF A SCIENCE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

I. CAN SCIENCE HELP?

The Misuse of Science. pp. 3-5

Q1: To what does Skinner refer when he states, "science has developed unevenly." Why does he believe this to be so?

A1:Technologies of control over inanimate nature are available, but effective knowledge about the social consequences of the implementation of such technologies is absent. This has resulted in misapplication and sometimes the creation of more problems than solutions.

COMMENT: This introductory section is illuminating for two reasons. First, it clearly reflects Skinner's social concerns, and second, it contains the first of many literary references that will appear in this and many other of Skinner's books and articles.

Science as a Corrective. p. 5

Q2: What does Skinner see as a solution to misapplied scientific techniques?

A2:The development of an objective science of behavior that will permit society to be able to direct scientific development wisely.

The Threat to Freedom. pp. 6-8

COMMENT: Several important issues are raised in this section, ideas that Skinner returns to time and again both in this book and elsewhere. The first involves Skinner's view of the overall conceptual nature of a science of behavior.

Q3: What else is involved in science other than the description of facts?

A3:Science not only describes, it predicts and controls.

COMMENT: At this point, Skinner points out that to arrive at a science that provides both prediction and control, you have to begin by assuming that such a science is possible; in Skinner's words, "..we must assume that behavior is lawful and determined." This assumption, of course, leads Skinner into a direct conflict with certain traditional assumptions concerning human nature.

Q4:What tradition stands in opposition to the assumption that behavior is lawful and determined?

A4:The traditional Western philosophic position that man is a free agent; that he has a "free will" and his behavior results from inner and unknowable processes of decision making.

Q5:What are some ways of defending a free will doctrine without exactly saying so?

A5:a) Behavior is essentially unknowable.

b) Value judgments are more important determiners of human affairs, and science cannot help in this realm.

c) Some "sciences" are, in fact, compatible with free will concepts.

The Practical Issue. pp. 8-10

COMMENT: Again we see Skinner as the social critic. He appears to be demanding a science of behavioral prediction and control because of its social necessity. Obviously, this is in contrast to what many other psychological theorists view as the goal of a science.

Q6:What is the practical issue?

A6:That the concept of free will stands in opposition to the development of any practically effective science of behavior.

II. A SCIENCE OF BEHAVIOR

Q7: Skinner states that science is not to be identified with certain common features of a science. Be able to list three.

A7:a) Organized accumulations of information, which are the products of a science

b) instruments of research

c) precise measurement or mathematical calculations

COMMENT: An interesting feature of this section is the comment of Skinner's upon the noncumulative and thus "unscientific" aspects of writing, art, and philosophy. Few contemporary practitioners of any of these fields would be likely to agree that there has been no progress in 2500 years.

Some Important Characteristics of Science. pp. 12-14

Q8: What are the essential characteristics of science?

A8:A set of attitudes, objectivity, honesty, and patience, and a search for lawful relations which can be systematized in such a way as to permit effective prediction and control of the subject matter.

COMMENT: Skinner understands science to be a set of behaviors that ultimately result in effective control of the environment. He points out that the order of development of scientific laws is similar to our own behavior during our early years, when we learn from our early experiences to appreciate the orderliness of our environment through experience. For Skinner, science is nothing more than a set of practices which increase the effectiveness of a natural behavioral process. For him, seeking uniformity or orderliness in order to be able to better predict and control our environment is something that we all do automatically. Science consists merely of procedures which permit us to do this better. This, of course, stresses the importance of the ultimate objective of environmental control and is something that a more traditional interpretation of science as "seeking knowledge for its own sake" is somewhat opposed to. This contrast is brought out by his distinction between science as an active process, not a passive or contemplative one.

Behavior as a Scientific Subject Matter. pp. 14-16

Q9:What features of behavior make it a difficult subject matter for science?

A9:Its complexity, and the fact that behavior is a fluid process rather than a physical object.

COMMENT: Notice again on p. 16 how Skinner refuses to equate science with the abstract process that is represented by logical or mathematic statements of relationships. Techniques of observation, experimental manipulation, and mathematical systematizing are seen as the tools of science, not the hallmarks. The goal for Skinner remains effective prediction and control. Remember that the rationale for this position results from Skinner's belief that science is nothing more than an amplification of a natural behavioral process.

Some Objections to a Science of Behavior. pp. 17-22

Q10: Be able to summarize briefly the typical objections to a science that Skinner cites and be able to give Skinner's counterarguments.

A10:a) Objection: that the Principle of Indeterminacy may be effective in a science of behavior.

Reply: that principle itself is a scientific relationship and doesn't imply philosophic freedom from control inherent in the subject matter.

b) Objection: reason cannot, for philosophical and/or logical reasons, comprehend itself

Reply: no evidence

c) Objection: each individual is unique

Reply: science ultimately can explain the individual case more effectively through general principles than by simple descriptions of individual diversity.

d) Objection: A statistical description of the average case is of little help in predicting and controlling a given individual's behavior, which should be the goal of an effective science of behavior.

Reply: Skinner agrees, but refuses to identify statistical techniques as essential to a science of behavior.

Comment: This point, of course, is one that Skinner returns to many times in his writing.

e) Objection: Behavior is too complex to be successfully systematized even though it may ultimately be understood to be lawful.

Reply: First, this is scarcely an argument for individual self-determination. Second, it is an experimental question whether or not it is even true.

f) Objection: predictions alter resultant behavior, and thus effective predictions can never be made

Reply: this is merely a practical problem which, in fact, reflects the orderliness rather than the capriciousness of behavior

e) Objection: an effective utilization of laboratory-based behavioral laws requires impractical conditions in society

Reply: this is not necessarily true, since laboratory control and systematization may point out unsuspected lawful relationships in the surrounding "real" world. Besides, considerable environmental control does exist in several different social institutions.

III. WHY ORGANISMS BEHAVE

COMMENT: Notice Skinner's discussion of "cause and effect" versus functional relationship between the independent and dependent variable. He literally discounts the entire definitional issue by asserting that both refer to the same factual core.

Q11:Why are there so many spurious caused accounts of behavior available?

A11:Men have anticipated scientific inquiry in their desire to explain behavior.

Some Popular "Causes" of Behavior. pp. 24-27

Q12:What principle does Skinner use to account for the emergence of astrology and body type as causal factors for behavior?

A12:Conspicuous events correlated with behavior are interpreted by many as causal, and these beliefs are supported by occasional chance predictions.

COMMENT: After Skinner similarly disposes of the issue of "heredity" as the layman uses it, he discusses the possibility of genetically determined behavior. He makes two quite different but related points. The first involves the reason why the issue of genetic predisposition is so volatile, and the second is a rationale for his own lack of interest in the topic.

Q13: What role does genetics play in a practical science of behavior?

A13:It only permits us to make better use of other causes to control behavior. As an independent variable, it only features importantly in long-range eugenic programs.

Inner "Causes." pp. 29-31

Q14:Why does Skinner discount any particular interest in a search for physiological causes of behavior?

A14:Because even highly accurate knowledge about physiological antecedents can be traced back outside the organism to the environmental factors that produced the physiological antecedents, and these environmental causes will be more practically useful in a science of behavioral control.

COMMENT: Notice how this argument against physiological psychology is a practical one involving a technology of control rather than any philosophic belief in the "empty" organism. Much confusion has resulted from other theorists who don't understand Skinner's objectives in establishing a science which not only "understands" but also is effective in the prediction and control of behavior. We will return to this point later in this chapter.

Q15:Skinner's argument against psychic inner causes seems to take two forms. (What are they?)

A15:a) Since they are unobservable, they can too conveniently account for anything.

b) Their supposed non-physical status removes them from everything we know about cause and effect in the physical universe.

COMMENT:This material should be read carefully since most lay and/or philosophic interpretations of behavior are of this kind. Essentially, the groundwork for an argument against dualism is established in this section. Notice also that in all cases of discarding alternative interpretations of behavior, Skinner points out how these interpretations might have arisen in the first place.

Q16:How does Skinner describe a conceptual inner cause?

A16:As a behavioral description which has been inverted into a cause.

The Variables of Which Behavior is a Function.pp. 31-35

Q17:Where do the independent variables that provide for a scientific analysis of behavior lie?

A17:Outside the organism, in its immediate environment and in its environmental history.

COMMENT:Several other key issues are discussed by Skinner in this section. One, which he almost breezes over, involves the topic of what the dependent variable of what a science of behavior ought to be. In the drinking example, he points out that it is the probability of a single act of drinking that should be determined. Keep this objective in mind when Skinner begins talking about a rate of measure.

COMMENT:The next few pages return to the issue of psychic and physiological "inner" causes, where Skinner refines his earlier arguments by discussing a causal against a science oriented toward a "second link" analysis.

Q18:What are the links in a causal change chain of behavior?

A18:Environmental operations, inner states, behavioral outcomes.

Q19:What are the essential features of Skinner's objection to inner states?

A19:They are not relevant to a scientific analysis. Valid knowledge concerning the inner state may help illuminate the causal relation between the first and third, but would be of little practical utility.

COMMENT:Again, notice that the force of Skinner's argument is against inner states (and we can correctly assume that he discounts the psychic and is referring here only to the physiological) because of their current limited utility in a science of behavioral control. How do you imagine he would discuss the topic of drug effects where currently a relatively powerful control technology exists?

A Functional Analysis. pp. 35-39

Q20:Be able to give Skinner's position on what constitutes the laws of a science of behavior.

A20:The relationships between external conditions and the behaviors of the individual organism.

Q21:What does Skinner mean by an analysis within the bounds of a natural science?

A21:That the independent and dependent variables must be observable and describable in physical terms.

Q22:Briefly enumerate the potential sources of data for a behavioral analysis.

A22:a) causal observations

b) controlled field observation

c) clinical observation

d) human laboratory studies

e) laboratory studies of lower organisms

Q23:What is Skinner's view on the position that there is an essential discontinuity between humans and animals?

A23:That to assert this distinction prior to an evaluation of the facts is to beg the question.

Q24:What are some of the advantages of studying lower organisms?

A24:a) simpler

b) behavior can be recorded for longer periods of research time

c) no complicating social relations between the subject and the experimenter

d) conditions can be better controlled, e.g., genetic histories, and deprivation states

Analysis of the Data. pp. 39-42

COMMENT:The key to an understanding of the book lies in this section. As with the text Verbal Behavior, Skinner refers to his objective as an "extrapolation" of certain known relationships for the purpose of gaining an understanding of complex human events. Many have accused Skinner of really providing a "hypothesis" about human behavior, but talking about it rather than rigorously testing it, and even being guilty of denying that he is in fact hypothesizing. The issue isn't that simple: For Skinner, science is a behavioral chain which proceeds from observation to prediction and control. His extrapolations represent, for him, examples of stimulus and response generalizations which are themselves recognized processes. But they are behavioral processes, not logical or philosophical ones, If one does not understand Skinner's concept of science, or more accurately, scientific behavior, then he seems to be violating the "scientific principles of the hypothetico-deductive system by his extension of behavioral principles. On the other hand, if you understand science as a behavioral process, not a rational or logical one (which Skinner views only as helpful tools to sharpen scientific behavior) then his extrapolations are completely in line with what currently is known about behavioral relationships.

SECTION II:THE ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR

IV. REFLEXES AND CONDITIONED REFLEXES

Man a Machinepp.45-47

COMMENT:This, obviously, is a very brief treatment of mechanistic philosophy of the 17th century. Decartes hardly deserves all the credit (or blame). However, Skinner subtly heads off scholarly criticism and acknowledges a philosophic debt by his selection of the section heading, which is also the title of Julien de la Mettrie's famed treatise on human behavior.

Reflex Action. pp. 47-49

Q1:Define the following terms:stimulus, response reflex and reflex arc.

A1:a) stimulus: an environmental event which produces (elicits) an almost inevitable behavioral reaction.

b) response: the behavioral reaction to a stimulus.

c) reflex: a stimulus-response combination

d) reflex arc: a hypothetical neurological connection between sensory input and behavioral reaction.

COMMENT: Skinner's treatment of "spontaneity", i.e., free will, is particularly interesting since he obviously sees the contemporary situation as analogous. That is, free will is a "null hypothesis" that can be eliminated only by bringing more and more behavior under demonstrable environmental control. It is interesting to speculate whether or not any advocate of a free will position would (a) be persuaded by such evidence or (b) even be willing to admit that such an attempt should be made.

The Range of Reflex Action. pp. 49-50

Q2: What is the range of reflex action?

A2:Only a small fraction of the total behavior of the (human) organism can be described by the principle of the simple reflex.

COMMENT: Notice that Skinner is delineating a reflex response as one which is almost an invariant reaction to environmental stimuli. This distinction will be critical to his later analysis of operant stimulus control.

Conditioned Reflexes. pp. 50-54

Q3: Describe the process that Pavlov referred to as "stimulus substitution."

A3:A previously neutral stimulus acquires the power to elicit a response originally elicited by another stimulus when paired with (reinforced by) that originally effective stimulus.

COMMENT: There are a number of terms which usually appear in a treatment of the conditioned reflex which don't appear here. Among them are conditioned stimulus (CS) and conditioned response (CR). A conditioned stimulus is that previously neutral stimulus now capable of eliciting a response similar to that elecitable by the originally effective stimulus. The response to the conditioned stimulus is called the conditioned response. It is interesting to note that the term "conditioned" is a mistranslation from Russian, and is more correctly read as "conditional," referring to the fact that the effectiveness of a new stimulus in eliciting a response is conditional upon continued pairing with the originally effective stimulus.

COMMENT: There are two points that Skinner makes in this section in addition to briefly discussing the basic reflexive (Pavlovian, classical, or "respondent") conditioning process. The first involves the distinction between "what a child knows" and "what a scientist knows" about a given subject area. You might keep this in mind when next someone tells you that operant principles are just common sense. Unfortunately, in an attempt to appear nonthreatening to the layman, behavior modifiers have tended to emphasize the common sense approach, e.g., referring to the reinforcement principle as "Grandma's Law," etc.

Q4:When can a scientist effectively dispense with explanatory fictions as causal accounts for various observations?

A4:One must be able to give a complete quantitative account of the process under observation, in other words, be able to predict and control the phenomena in question.

Q5:What, according to Skinner, was not Pavlov's major contribution and why?

A5:Pavlov's original efforts were devoted to an inferrential account of the physiological processes underlying reflexive behavior. Skinner discounts this (a) because it was demonstrably incorrect and (b) even when such an account is availabale, we are still required to relate these processes to prior environmental events and to achieve practical prediction and control over the resultant behavior.

The Survival Value of Reflexes. pp. 54-56

Q6:How can evolutionary theory provide an account for the existence of reflexes and the process of reflex conditioning?

A6:There is considerable survival value in being able to respond automatically to certain environmental stimuli, as well as, to come to be able to make similar behavioral adjustments to new features of the environment as they occur within the life of the organism.

COMMENT: Notice how Skinner describes the evolutionary process as a selection mechanism which gradually determines a reflexive behavioral repertoire for a given species, both in terms of certain inherited classes of behavior as well as in susceptibility to the reflexive conditioning process. In a sense, it is the evolutionary consequences, i.e., survivability, that determine the behavioral process... a situation which Skinner sees as analogous to the process of operant reinforcement. An expanded treatment of this perspective is available in his paper, "The Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Behavior" (1970).