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SPANISH COORDINATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE CASE OF THE

HABITATS DIRECTIVE.

Susana Aguilar Fernández (Complutense University, Madrid)

C/ Gargaliga nº 11, Urbanización El Bosque

Villaviciosa de Odón, 28670 Madrid. SPAIN

Tel. (work): 34-1-3942945

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ABSTRACT

Spain’s successful negotiation of the habitats directive can be explained by the political salience of this particular issue (the priority attached to the strategy whereby the EU had to be convinced of the need to link environmental protection to the provision of special funds) and by the nature of the domestic political system, characterized by its powerful and autonomous executive as well as by the non-cooperative system of interest-intermediation. Above all, the triumph of the Spanish strategy is due to the ability of succesive heads of government to tightly control leading EU issues by not allowing a highly departmentalized state administration as well as the regional governments to be too closely involved in Community negotiations. The absence of formal mechanisms which would allow contending interest groups to partake in the decision process, thereby reducing time-consuming procedures and administrative costs, must also be taken into account. As a result, Europeanisation, understood as a process involving the convergence of political structures and policy styles, has scarcely made any progress in Spain.

Introduction.

This paper begins by presenting a seemingly paradoxical situation: On the one hand, deficient administrative coordination and the dispersion of powers have been repeatedly identified by the European Commission as the main causes of the environmental deficit in Spain; on the other hand, the Spanish administration (and its Euro-bureaucrats) is perceived as a rather skilful negotiator on the Community stage which sometimes manages to change Brussels’ bills to its own advantage. One of the most recent and widely publicized successes in this respect has been the approval of the cohesion funds relating to the financing of environmental protection measures and public works in the poorer member states. Another case in relation to which Spain has managed to alter Community views was the 1992 habitats directive. The question which therefore arises is how can one explain the skill with which these European Union (EU) negotiations have been carried out if the country's own administration is characterized by excessive fragmentation and by troublesome intergovernmental relations?

The answer may lie in accepting, contrary to what common sense leads us to believe, that weak coordination can also be functional (Wright, 1996), or in trying to locate the specific factors which compensate for the shortcomings of the Spanish administration. Undoubtedly, one factor is the special attention devoted to those environmental protection measures with important economic implications, thereby providing the policy with a domestic prominence it would not otherwise enjoy. A second factor is that the entry into the EU has been accompanied by a learning process which has resulted, amongst other things, in the setting up of new institutions and coordinating mechanisms both formal and informal. That this process has proven satisfactory is evident, for instance, in the more anticipatory and active stance adopted recently by the government in relation to environmental issues (Aguilar Fernández, 1997a). A third factor to bear in mind is that Community membership seems to have reinforced, contrary to expected, the well-entrenched traits of the political system: a strong and pressure-free executive, the relative unimportance of its two parliamentary chambers, weakly articulated interest groups and a problematic accommodation between the state and the regions, as well as between the nationalist-ruled regional governments and the non-nationalist ones. In this sense, the “quasi-presidential” nature of the executive has facilitated coordination, if this is undertood as speaking with a single voice on crucial political issues such as the opposition to any institutional reform that would threaten the position of the country as one of the five largest member states and as regards the efforts at maximizing EU funds (Molina, 2001). Environmental policy coordination may have also unfolded relatively smoothly until now because the Spanish administration has not been characterized by its openness to social participation nor by the transparency of its decision-making procedures, while the need to accommodate contending private interests has been absent on the whole[1].

1. Coordination Problems in the State Environmental Administration.

The state administration for environmental protection has been traditionally depicted as one in which a marked fragmentation of powers had prevailed. The administration was composed of heterogeneous public agencies which could only partially be said to have pursued the same goal (CIMA, 1978). Its most significant characteristic was the deficient co-ordination among its various ministries (intersectoral unco-ordination) and within them (intrasectoral unco-ordination). In an effort to overcome this problem the Interdepartmental Commission for the Environment (CIMA) was set up in 1972. Although the CIMA lasted until 1987 its performance was disappointing overall. However, this limited success was partially compensated for by the gradual upgrading of the state environmental administration.

In 1977 responsibility for the environment was transferred from the Presidency of the Government to the Ministry of Public Works (MOPU). One year later, the MOPU created the General Directorate of the Environment, which was replaced by the General Department of the Environment in 1990 (SGMA). As a result of the transformation of the MOPU into the MOPT (Ministry of Public Works and Transport) in 1991, the State Department for Water Policies and the Environment took the place of the SGMA. After the 1993 elections this unit was renamed the State Department for Environment and Housing, and the MOPT added the term "environment" to its name, becoming the MOPTMA. Finally, the Ministry of the Environment (MIMAM) was created in 1996 after the right acceded to power, following fourteen years of socialist rule (1982-1996). Before the creation of the MIMAM, environmental policy was still scattered amongst eight different departments (with 17 general directorates and 36 general subdirectorates). Not only did the MIMAM end the "exceptionalism" which had made Spain the only EU country lacking a department of this type, but it also furthered the concentration of environmental powers.

Until the the establisment of the MIMAM, and in spite of the upgrading of environmental policy, conservation powers had belonged to a different department, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) -or, more precisely, the Institute for the Conservation of Nature (Icona) -which had continuously had to fight off attempts by the MOPTMA to absorb them[2]. The MAPA never took conservation very seriously and somehow left Icona a free hand to devise policy. Icona was created in 1972 and suppressed in 1995 once its presence had become untenable for the regions, which insistingly claimed that the agency interfered with their powers. Shortly before the disappearance of ICONA important changes took place within the MAPA which helped to patch up its fragmented nature through the concentration of conservation powers[3]. This process proved to be futile in the end because the setting up of the MIMAM was accompanied by a transfer of these powers from the MAPA to the new department.

The entry of Spain into the EU facilitated the approval of several projects whose aim was to fight deficient environmental co-ordination, both on the traditional horizontal axis (different ministries in the state administration) and on the new vertical one (the state and the regions). For some time, the effect of the measures to provide horizontal co-ordination was negligible because various projects were abandoned after the CIMA was suppressed and because a number of sectoral coordinating units proved to be rather inefficient (Martínez Salcedo, 1989). The setting up of an interdepartmental commission which would coordinate environmental powers amongst different agencies within the MOPTMA, and between this department, the MAPA, and the Ministries of Industry (MINER), Education and Justice, was announced in 1994 (Información de Medio Ambiente, nº 24, 1994), but never put into practice. Currently, attempts at coordination have been helped by the creation of the MIMAM, not only because the probability of boundary conflicts has diminished but also because water administration and conservation powers fall now under its remit. Yet the dispersion of environmental responsibilities amongst 61 regional units (consejerías) at the sub-national level was left untouched by the upgrading of the state administration.

2. The Intergovernmental Dimension of Environmental Policy.

The constitution of 1978 set in motion a process of decentralization which has gradually led to the emergence of a quasi-federal state in which the regions have become crucial political actors, above all in the implementation phase. The problem of regional reinforcement is that it has not been linked to an institutional framework designed to coordinate the increasing number of administrative units with policy responsibilities. The accession of Spain to the EU has highlighted this deficient coordination because of the need to fulfill a growing number of highly technical Community requirements. Thus, the establishment of new regional environmental departments from the beginning of the 80s has not improved the poor Spanish environmental record, while the drawbacks associated with troublesome intergovernmental co-ordination have undoubtedly contributed to the high number of breaches of Community green rules. Although the state recommended that environmental agencies should be adopted as relatively centralized models of management, the regional governments ended up choosing other administrative designs which did not significantly contribute to overcoming the dispersion of powers at the subnational level. Fragmentation of responsibilities and insufficient co-ordination have been repeatedly cited by the European Commission as the main causes of Spain’s failure to meet the Union's environmental policy targets.

The measures which were targeted to provide vertical co-ordination began at the end of 1986 by means of a number of informal meetings which, convened by the MOPU, brought together state and regional officials. In 1987, the different departments responsible for environmental policy gathered for the first time at a Sectoral Conference of the Environment. This forum, which has been held regularly since then, has functioned rather disappointingly because the negotiations between the state and the regions have been usually bilateral, this impairing a global exchange of information and the adoption of long-term agreements on a national basis. Moreover, only in 1991 did the Conference produce a document that put forward the overall objectives of Spanish environmental policy (Mopu Informa, 1991). The poor performance of this forum was implicitly recognized by the then Minister of the MOPTMA, José Borrell, who pointed out the need to implement a policy which would integrate the actions of the regions, municipalities and the EU through a National Plan for the Environment. In line with this objective, proposals to foster the Sectoral Conference and to set up a coordinating commission were announced (Información de Medio Ambiente, nº 22, 1993; nº 26, 1994). The same idea has been adopted by the different heads of the MIMAM, who (first Isabel Tocino and now Jaume Matas) soon emphasized the need to improve intergovernmental coordination.

Prior to the creation of the MIMAM, when conservation powers were still in the hands of the MAPA, a new institution called the National Commission for the Protection of Nature (CNPN) was created by Law 4/1989 for the Conservation of Natural Areas and Flora and Fauna and regulated by RD 2488/94. This institution was set up within the MAPA to coordinate conservation policy between the state and the regions. It began to work in 1995, and functions through two types of fora: One in which general directors are brought together, and another in which experts of the administration gather in four different technical committees (natural areas, flora and fauna, wetlands, and forest fires). The need for an institution of this character was evident because the regions had not recognized (or even ignored) the state’s responsibilities in conservation issues for some time while the central administration had not played an active role for fear of being accused of interference[4]. In spite of its belated creation, the CNPN has, it seems, been working smoothly and has turned out to be a useful instrument for the discussion of conservation policy, basically the guidelines associated with the management of national parks.

3. The Coordination Scheme for EU Affairs Within the State Administration.

When Spain entered the EU on 1 January 1986, the country had to adjust its administrative structure to the new situation brought about by Community membership. In some cases, a process of institution-making was set in motion (thus, the representation in Brussels was entrusted to an entirely new unit) whereas, in others, no ex-novo mechanisms were put in place (for instance, specific divisions for Community matters have not been created in most ministries).

In general terms, the coordination scheme has two pillars: an external one in Brussels, and an internal one, at the domestic level, which would coordinate tasks within the state administration as well as between the state and the regions. The external coordination resides in the REPER (Permanent Representation), which was set up in 1986 (RD 260/86). The REPER brings together the advisors and representatives of different ministries and is internally organized following the distribution of portfolios at the domestic level. This new unit is headed by an ambassador and "serviced by national officials on secondment" (Wright, 1996: 25), and works basically through the COREPER II and I (Permanent Representation Committee). In a nutshell, when the government adopts a position on a certain issue the COREPER has to draw up the government’s defence in relation to the different European fora. Only under unexpected circumstances and when lacking instructions from Madrid, will this committee not only represent but also formulate the Spanish point of view[5]. In contrast to this structure, the internal coordination of Community affairs is much more complex and can be summarized as follows.

Before the accession to the EU and during the negotiations leading up to it, the first unit to be established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the SECE (State Secretariat for the European Communities) in 1981 (RD 170/1981). In 1985 (RD 1485/85) this unit became permanent and one of crucial importance, its role being defined as the coordination of the state administration’s actions towards the Community institutions without prejudice to the powers attributed to other departments. Later on, the same unit underwent a nominal change in order to adjust to the Maastricht Treaty or European Union Treaty: it became State Secretariat for the European Union, and, in 1996, following its merger with the Foreign Policy General Secretariat, it was renamed the State Secretariat for Foreign Policy and the European Union (SSEU).

Alongside the SSEU, interdepartmental coordination has been entrusted to specific commissions. Some of them have been created ex novo whereas others existed before entry into the EU. To the first group belong the Interdepartmental Commission for European-related Economic Affairs (A), set up in 1985 for the everyday coordination of the state administration in economic matters and for the monitoring of issues affecting more than one ministry, and the Coordinating Commission for the Defence of Spain before the European Court of Justice (B) created in 1986. The Delegated Commission for Economic Affairs (C) of 1985, which deals with highly sensitive economic issues not resolved by A, and the Commission of State Secretaries (D), belong to the second group. The body ultimately responsible for this structure is the Consejo de Ministros (Cabinet).

The role of the SSEU consists mainly of receiving drafts and working documents from Brussels and the COREPER and distributing them to the ministries affected (more precisely, to their general technical secretaries) which, for their part, produce reports for Parliament and the Congress-Senate Commission for the European Union. The working of the Secretariat is rather informal because it basically relies on (constant) contacts with the ministries and (regular) ad hoc meetings amongst officials. If different ministries are involved in a Community issue this unit helps to coordinate them, and if a conflict arises the Secretariat gathers together the contending parties in order to reach a common standpoint. Furthermore, the SSEU has an important presence in the above mentioned Commissions: “A” is chaired by the Secretariat, the representation of the country as plaintiff or defendant in Court cases involving “B” is equally in its hands (Lefevere, 1997), and the same unit is also present in “C” and “D”. Notwithstanding this role, the SSEU has not alleviated administrative fragmentation as the ministry concerned with a particular issue does not wait for a common position to be taken up by the coordinating structure but, rather, follows its own strategy. However, this sort of fragmentation has been compensated for by a reinforcement of executive power and by the confinement of sectorization to the realm of low politics. Thus, “coordination is organised hierarchically and this has enabled actors within the core executive (...) to achieve a relatively high level of efficiency with respect to the most important issues” (Molina, 2001: 135).

3.1. The Intergovernmental Coordination Scheme for EU Affairs.

Until recently, regions have not played a significant role in the ascending phase, or in the phase leading to the coordination of the Spanish stance when bills and drafts are being discussed in Brussels. This has happened despite the fact that "a continuous dialogue between the [regions] and the central state must be an essential objective of the internal process of formulation of the Spanish position in the EU" (in Lefevere, 1997). Yet this situation has been gradually changing not only because the Maastricht Treaty allows regional representatives to participate on a ministerial level within the European Council, but also because a 1996 coalition agreement in Spain -between the right-wing ruling party, the Partido Popular (PP), and the nationalist catalans, Convergència i Unió (CiU)-, has led to an acceptance of the regional presence in the committees and working groups which operate around the European Commission. Moreover, the PP has agreed to create an attaché (agregado) in the REPER which will inform the regions about issues being debated by the Commission[6]. Further, a new Department for Regional Affairs responsible to the REPER was established last year as well.