Submission to the Naval War College Review

Dr. Edward A. Smith, Jr.

(703) 465-3319

Network Centric Warfare:

Where's the beef?

What is network centric warfare? Where's the beef? Most attempts to answer these questions seem to emphasize the "network" and the new technologies used to create more effective sensor and communications architectures. These architectures, it is argued, will enable us to create and exploit a common situational awareness, to increase our speed of command, and to "get inside the enemy's OODA loop."[1] Yet, descriptions of the technologies and capabilities alone can leave us asking the same questions. What is it? Just what does it bring to warfare? Why is it so critical to America's future military power that we must give up other capabilities to buy it?

These persistent questions point to the need for a different emphasis, one that focuses first on the "warfare" side of the equation. That is, we need a working warfare concept of what we are trying to do with network centric operations before we can create the necessary information architectures. Such conceptual work can help us not only to recognize the potential in networking but can help us discern the limits and limitations of the changes we propose. It also can provide a fundamental understanding of the role of network centric operations both in battlefield and across the spectrum from peace through war, as well as in our national security and national military strategies. An evolving working concept is, in short, the first step in drawing a road map for building a network centric "Navy after next."

As we gradually build this working concept, we need to bear some common-sense caveats in mind. We are not likely to find in any network a single universal technological solution to all our warfare problems. Older forms of warfare are likely to persist alongside the new. Greatly accelerated speed of command will be a critical measure of our success, but numbers and endurance will still count. Enhanced common situational awareness will multiply our power, but knowing our enemy will be more critical than ever. Adversaries will respond and, the more successful our concept of warfare, the more asymmetrical their responses are likely to become. Our objective in network centric warfare is not to provide a single answer or to provide all the answers. It is to identify those combinations of new thinking and new things that offer better answers to our warfare needs on as many levels of war as possible and over as great a portion of the spectrum of conflict as possible. The measure of our success will not be the quality of the network or the quantity of firepower we build but rather, what effect the networking of combat resources enables us to have on the enemy. That suggests two things.

-First, our concept of network centric operations will be intimately tied to an understanding of effects-based warfare, that is, a results-oriented process centered on the relationship between our actions and specific desired enemy reactions. [2] Network centric operations are the "enabler" for effects-based warfare. The shared situational awareness, speed of command, precision, "lock out," and other capabilities we seek to effect in network centric operations are the tools needed to implement effects-based warfare. Indeed, we can almost begin to think in terms of a single working concept of network centric effects-based warfare.

-Second, as this connection between network centric and effects-based warfare implies, our working concept must step beyond the problems of the tactical battlefield engagement. It must address how network centric operations can be used to produce decisive effects in theater/ campaign level operations and in the politico-military and strategic dimensions of war. Even more, it should address how such capabilities might help us translate our warfare prowess into a broad stabilizing deterrence running from peace through crisis and war.

The better our concepts and technologies, the more often and more widely network centric warfare will be applicable. And, the more often it works, the better will be our success in deterring future conflict.

For the United States, the success of both network centric warfare and effects-based warfare is likely to hinge on how they enhance our ability to project decisive military power over vast distances. Power projection is one of the pillars of our National Military Strategy and is the focus of the Navy's …From the Sea. The reason is simple. It is the capacity to project decisive military power across the world that makes the United States a global power and undergirds a national security strategy founded on engagement and shaping. This requirement is rooted in America's geography. Because the United States lies far from most of the regions in which it has vital interests, it must deploy its military power to the regions where it is needed if it is to be effective.[3]

Projecting decisive power is costly. Not only is it expensive to transport and sustain forces over vast distances or to maintain the capability to do so, but the distance tends to attenuate the quantity of conventional forces that can be deployed and sustained. To apply decisive military power at considerable distances from the American heartland, the United States has relied heavily on high technology to multiply the power of the forces it projects. These force-multiplying technologies are at the root of network centric warfare and effects-based warfare. Both concepts may be enabled by new technologies, but there is clearly much more to them. Their real power derives from the combination of new thinking and new technology applied to a new, more decisive style of expeditionary warfare.

Technologies, Synergies and Force Multipliers

Using technology to multiply the impact of military forces seems almost axiomatic. But, how do we identify which technologies in which combinations hold the most potential? Then, how do we make them decisive both in battle and across the spectrum of conflict? That is, "how do we fight smarter?"[4] The information technology at the core of network centric operations is one obvious force multiplier, but there is clearly more to the technological revolution than computers and communications. What we really are seeing are three on-going global technological revolutions, each with great military import but under only limited military control.[5]

  • Sensor Technologies. The revolution in sensor technologies is twofold. On one hand, there is a movement toward more and more capable sensors, especially satellite-borne sensors able to achieve near-real-time surveillance over vast areas. On the other, there is a movement toward dispersed fields of smaller, cheaper, and more numerous sensors, ultimately including those based on nano-technologies. Fields of sensors, both space-based and local, might then be netted to detect, locate, identify, track, and target potential threats or vulnerabilities, and to disseminate vast quantities of surveillance data to all levels of command. Thus, we stand to create a new "shared situational awareness" that is "global in scope and precise in detail."[6]
  • Information Processing Technologies. The revolution in information technologies will bring a geometric increase in computing power and, hence, increases capabilities of all forms of computer applications including communications. Over the next 10 to 15 years, increased processing capabilities will provide the means of processing, collating, and analyzing the vast quantities of sensor data. It will provide military forces with the ability to handle those vast amounts of data quickly and begin to apply automatic correlation. It also will provide the means of distributing information[7] to any designee or "shooter" anywhere in the world at near real time speeds. Over the longer term, therefore, the information revolution offers military planners what amounts to a blank check to create whatever "network" they may need to support operations.[8] The limit is that of imagination rather than of technology.
  • Precision Weapons Technology. The weapons revolution is not toward increasing weapon accuracy so much as it is toward more efficient production. Current accuracy is sufficient to exploit the vast majority of potential targets in the world, but cost and limited numbers make precise weapons "silver bullets" to be used only sparingly. However, this seems poised to change. Redesign, incorporation of new electronics, lean manufacturing, and mass production can result in a sharply decrease in cost for a given level of accuracy and capability -- and, thus, increasing numbers and more widespread deployment of more lethal missiles.[9] Similarly, better networking and targeting data streams from external sources can enable us to use cheaper guidance packages on precise weapons, also decreasing cost.

Separately, each of the three individual revolutions promises significant change, but only when they are taken together does the potential for the revolutionary new synergies embodied in network centric warfare begin to emerge. Without the new sensors, targeting[10] would never be sufficiently broad, accurate, or timely to exploit the potential of highly accurate weapons. Without the information structure, any set of sensors would quickly submerge the system with so much data as to make it unworkable. Without adequate numbers of low-cost, precise, long-range weapons, successes in sensing and information processing could not be translated into a decisive battlefield effect. What is more, each revolution is an on-going trend that will continue for decades to come. There is no single technology or system to be mastered and incorporated into warfare, rather a continuing, uneven succession of developments will create staccato opportunities for change in our own and our adversaries' forces and capabilities. [11]

As we pursue network centric warfare, therefore, we must accept that there will be no immediate conclusive answer, but rather a rapidly evolving situation in which we must be able to identify and grasp technological opportunities as they occur. There also are two further complications.

-First, since the evolving sensor, information and weapons capabilities will interact and multiply each other’s effectiveness in a kaleidoscope of potential synergies, we should expect a geometrically increasing set of possible outcomes.

-Second, while we must assess the utility of each new technology in the context of warfare as we know it, the technologies will also change the character of warfare dramatically.

The situation is analogous to the triple revolution in guns, armor, and propulsion that marked warship design in the fifty years between 1862 and 1912.[12] That three-fold revolution introduced a period of trial and error experimentation and forced such rapid change in warship design that new units were obsolete within a few years of fleet entry. It also brought forth Mahan and a fundamental rethinking of what navies could do.

Our problem, thus, is not simply to integrate information technology into our current way of war. It is rather to manage a complex iterative process in which the synergies generated by a succession of sensor, information and weapons technological developments will redefine the character of warfare and lay the basis for a precise effects-based approach. New technologies will continually present new possibilities that will make our working concept, of necessity, a "work in progress." The changing concept will in turn suggest still more ways in which those or other technologies may be applied, and so on in an unending cycle. Our challenge is to identify the evolving synergies, to adapt them to the power projection needs of the United States on a continuing basis, and do so within the defense budgets we are likely to have.

As this suggests, a static "if you build it, they will come" approach focused solely on communications architecture would leave us just reacting to individual technology developments as they occur, and making only incremental changes. Harnessing the rolling synergies of this complex technological revolution will require a broad, long-term perspective wide that encompasses both the potential impact of the new technologies' on our military power and the derivative impact of new capabilities on our operational and strategic objectives. We must ask not simply how new technologies might handle existing tasks better, but also what we might now do that we have never been able to do before.

This would indicate that our conceptualization should start by identifying the defining military capabilities that derive from the combined impact of the sensor, information and weapons revolutions. We can then assess how those capabilities affect the character of military operations in peace and war, then how new technologies might be made to interact to produce a desired effect, and finally, how that effect might be enhanced by new organization, training, doctrine and tactics.

Precision, Speed and … Flexibility

From the military standpoint, perhaps the most striking common element in the new technologies is the increased precision and speed that may now be possible in military operations. Evolving sensors will provide more and better data, thereby enabling military operations to be more and more responsive and exact. Evolving information technology will enable us to handle the vast quantities of data from the sensors quickly, and to meld the resulting situational awareness with the information needed to control and support our forces. Increasing numbers of highly accurate weapons and forces, in turn, will enable us to exploit the information we acquire on the battlefield.[13] In each case, the result of applying the technology is an increasing ability to be highly exact in our operations, and to generate a pace of operations that would not heretofore have been possible. The more successfully we develop and combine the technologies, the more exact, and the more nearly real-time our responses to battlefield threats and opportunities are likely to become. This relationship suggests that to optimize technologies or explore potential synergies, we must first understand the potential impact of precision and speed on warfare.

What do precision and speed do for us? The starting point is the realization that “precision” lies in the effects achieved and not in the arms and systems employed. We must talk in terms of effects-based warfare. To achieve precise effects, we must do more than simply identify a target or category of targets. We must know the specific political or military effect we seek at each level of war. Thus, we must identify which enemy vulnerability or target subjected to what form of duress where, when and for how long will create the precise effect we seek. This is far more than seeing where the enemy is or tracking his forces. It also means that we must be able to assess not only the potential military impact of our actions, but also the potential political, economic, or other impact upon the enemy and even upon our own public, e.g. collateral damage. Nor is that all. We also must be able to generate the right force at the right time, and then monitor measures of effectiveness that will test our success – a requirement that far transcends conventional notions of bomb damage assessment and focuses instead on enemy will. Finally, if we are really to make the most of the precision our technology permits, we must be able to do all of this reliably in the heat of battle, and quickly and accurately enough to take advantage of each fleeting opportunity.

In short, to be decisive in anything more than a one-time, pre-planned strike, we need more than speed and precision. We must be have a third element, operational flexibility, i.e. the ability to change from one rapid, precise operation or tactical engagement to another at will to exploit the opportunities and deal with the threats of a changing battlefield. We need to be able to compress a relatively complex targeting and command and control process until it fits the nearly real-time dimensions of a battlefield engagement. These requirements are at the center of ideas like "speed of command," "the ring of fires," and "time critical targeting." Each of these ideas makes intuitive sense, and each can be understood in the context of a limited engagement, such as a call for fire support or a long-range strike. The key to understanding how both the concepts and the new technologies fit together is "network centric warfare."

Network Centric Warfare and Combat Efficiency

VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, the leading proponent of "network centric warfare," has described it in terms of the more efficient application of combat power. This idea of combat efficiency as the true measure of the success of network centric warfare clearly steps beyond the tactical C4ISR focus. It implies a fundamental change in how we think and operate as well as what we use, and it demands an understanding of how the precision, speed, and flexibility of military operations that the network can produce change what we can do with the forces we will have available.

As Cebrowski puts it, traditional military operations usually occur in stair step fashion. A mission is assigned and planned; forces are generated and coordinated; and finally, an operation is launched that concentrates this power on an assigned objective. As a result of this inaction-action cycle, military power tends to be applied in spurts. The horizontal part represents