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Tartu University
Department of Political Science
ESTONIA’S SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS 1991-1999
Gert Antsu
MA Thesis
Supervisor Professor Kaido Jaanson
Tartu 2000
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Contents
Introduction 4
1. Theories of international relations 7
1. 1. Realism 7
1. 1. 1. Origins and main assumptions of realism 7
1. 1. 2. Neorealism 8
1. 1. 3. Balance of power – a Central Feature of Realism Further Developed 10
1. 1. 4. Offence-defence balance 12
1. 1. 5. Neoclassical realism 14
1. 2. Neoliberal Institutionalism 16
1. 3. Liberalism 18
1. 4. Constructivism 22
1. 5. Hypotheses about the Estonian case 24
2. Neutrality 27
2. 1. Arguments Favouring Neutrality 27
2. 2. Arguments Against Neutrality 30
3. Finlandisation (Alignment with Russia) 33
3. 1. Russia as the Main Threat 33
3. 2. Nationalist Approach to Russia in early 1990s 35
3. 3. The Policy of ‘Positive Engagement’ 39
3. 3. 1. Positive Engagement 39
3. 3. 2. Reasons for Policy Shift 40
2. 3. 3. Increased Hopes in 1997-1998 42
3. 4. Russian Security Guarantees 44
3. 5. Why Finlandisation Is Not a Realistic Option 46
3. 6. Lessons from 1990s 49
4. Baltic cooperation 51
4. 1. Early Cooperation 51
4. 2. Practical Cooperation between the Baltic States 51
4. 3. Pros and Cons of a Baltic Military Union 54
4. 4. Problems since 1997 57
4. 5. Critical Assessment of the Perspectives for Baltic Cooperation 59
5. Nordic cooperation 61
5. 1. Historic Ties and Early Cooperation 61
5. 2. Political Support of the Nordic Countries 62
5. 3. Practical Cooperation 63
5. 4. No Nordic Security Guarantee 64
6. European Union and Western European Union 67
6. 1. Estonian Relations with the European Union 67
6. 2. EU Membership as a Security Guarantee 69
6. 3. Western European Union 72
7. NATO 74
7. 1. Arguments for joining NATO 74
7. 2. Categorical Approach to NATO 77
7. 3. Ambiguous Responses of NATO or Speaking Different Languages 79
7. 4. Problems and Conditions Connected to the Estonian Accession to NATO 80
7. 4. 1. Problems Connected to Readiness of Estonia 80
7. 4. 2. Problems on the Side of NATO 83
7. 4. 3. Problems Connected to the Russian Opposition 83
7. 5. Madrid and Its Consequences 85
7. 5. 1. Keeping the Enlargement Process Open 85
7. 5. 2. Homework To Be Done 86
7. 5. 3. Practical Cooperation with NATO 88
Conclusion 94
Kokkuvõte 98
List of Abbreviations 102
Bibliography 103
Books and Articles 103
Media Sources 111
Documents and Speeches 125
Introduction
The present thesis ‘Estonia’s Security Policy Options in 1990s’ has an aim of exploring the current theories of international politics and test their applicability in the post-Cold War era. Among the theories, special attention is being paid to theories that aim to explain state behaviour – how are security policies of states shaped, and what is the main motive behind state actions.
In particular, the theory of neoclassical realism has been chosen as the focus of study. Neoclassical realism is a recent development of the realist school, and the main reason for choosing this theory was to test whether the realist theory, dominant in international relations for the last fifty years, is still valid in explaining and predicting state behaviour under the new world order after the end of the Cold War. The reason why the neoclassical strand of the realist school has been chosen is its aim on explaining state behaviour – an aspect that differentiates it from neorealism, the central current within the realist school for much of the last two decades, that explicitly excludes the possibility for a theory of international politics to explain foreign policy.
Neoclassical realism argues that the foreign policy of a state is in the long run conditioned by the relative capabilities of the state. The relative capabilities can be defined in terms of economic and military power and population as compared to other states. The theory argues that the smaller the relative capabilities of a state, the narrower are its foreign policy options and consequently the foreign policy of the state should be more acquiescent. However, neoclassical realism admits that the relative capabilities only set a framework for policy-making, the concrete policy is to a large extent an outcome of domestic-level factors. At the same time the domestic-level factors still remain secondary in regard to the systemic constraints.
The neoclassical realist theory is then applied to the case of Estonia. Estonia has chosen as a case study for various reasons. First, for Estonia the question of security is highly relevant. As an independent state it has only existed for thirty years and ensuring its security has clearly been the most important issue after regaining the independence in 1991. Secondly, Estonia is a small state and this makes using the theory all the more interesting, as it has usually been used to explain the behaviour of great powers. Thirdly, the issue has direct relevance in Estonia, as the years after regaining the independence have been the time when the security policy directions for the country have been set. Finally, the availability of information on Estonia has also influenced the choice of country to be studied.
As Estonia is a country with low relative capabilities, the hypothesis presented in the thesis is that Estonia’s security policy will in the long run be relatively acquiescent. As regards the meaning of an ‘acquiescent’ policy then this could be described as oriented at avoiding confrontation and reaching compromise. Lack of power determines the broad contours of Estonia’s security policy
I will attempt to show that due to false perceptions about the relative power of Estonia by the policy-making elite, Estonia’s security policy was uncharacteristically assertive for a small power in the early 1990s. This assertiveness manifested itself above all in the policies towards Russia – territorial demands, unofficial support for the Chechen separatists etc. However, as a country will eventually adopt a foreign and security policy more in line its with capabilities, then the policy has turned more complacent since the mid-1990s. This is shown by the new approach to Russia that is more oriented at conflict-avoidance, including dropping the territorial demands.
However, in accordance with the neoclassical realist theory, domestic-level variables determine the concrete content of foreign policy. The hypothesis I would submit to testing suggests that Estonia’s security policy has been determined by the elite perceptions, more concretely by the majority view of Russia as the main threat for Estonia. Thus the policy has been to get as much security as possible against Russia and the choices have been made accordingly. Due to this fear of Russia neither alignment with the eastern neighbour nor neutrality (as it would have left Estonia exposed) have never been considered as serious options. Also security cooperation with the Baltic and Nordic states has not been too significant as they are not seen as providing the necessary protection. Hence the choice has been made to join the European and Trans-Atlantic institutions, namely NATO and the European Union. The former clearly plays a more important role in Estonian security policy, as membership in NATO would offer a collective security guarantee.
In order to find support for the hypotheses pesented, the security policy of Estonia from regaining the independence in August 1991 until the parliamentary elections in March 1999 is studied. During this time there were eight different governments in office and the security policy orientations were formed. The diminishing assertiveness of Estonia’s foreign and security policy is induced from Estonia’s behaviour in relations with other states and international relations. The data is gathered mostly from scientific articles and newspaper articles published during the period. As regards the second part of the hypothesis on the influences of elite perceptions on the policy, then for observing this speeches, newspaper articles and other public performances of policy-makers have been used.
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter outlines the main theories of international relations, especially focusing on the realist and neoclassical realist theories. Other chapters look at the various security policy options that have been discussed in Estonia. The second chapter looks at the possibility of neutrality, as this was the first solution presented to the security problem. Then follow chapters on relations and cooperation with Estonia’s immediate neighbours – Russia, the Baltic States and the Nordic countries. The two final chapters concentrate on the attempts of Estonia to join two organisations seen as potential contributors to the country’s security, NATO and the European Union (together with the Western European Union).
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1. Theories of international relations
In order to better understand the security policy of Estonia and to put into the more general context of foreign policy behaviour of states, we first need to take a closer look at the theories of international politics. The following chapter outlines the main theoretical approaches to international relations. It starts with realism, which has been the dominant school for studying the international relations. Besides looking at the traditional version of realism, the attention focuses on neorealism, the main theory of the last two decades. Then two more recent developments within the realist camp are studied – the offence-defence balance and neoclassical realism.
Then I will proceed to the main theories that have suggested alternatives to the realist school, namely neoliberal institutionalism, liberalism and constructivism. The present analysis intentionally leaves out the theoretical schools that are not influential any more in today’s debate (Marxism-Leninism) or which despite criticisms they direct at mainstream theories are not themselves capable of presenting a coherent explanation to international politics (such as postmodernism or feminism). Also the small state theory is not covered by the thesis, as this is not a theory of international politics strictu sensu, explaining only the behaviour of a certain type of states.[1]
1. 1. Realism
1. 1. 1. Origins and main assumptions of realism
Realism has through the times been the dominant approach to the international relations. The beginnings of political realism are usually traced back to Ancient Greece and Thucydides, the author of The Peloponnesian War. It is also linked to the thinking of Niccolò Machiavelli, the Italian author who suggested optimal ways for successful behaviour for a ruler. They both stressed the role of self-interest in the behaviour of political entities and their leaders (Kegley and Wittkopf 1993, 22-23). Philosophically, realism relies on the ideas formulated by Thomas Hobbes that a human being is by nature sinful and ‘bad’. Thus it cannot be trusted and the world can be described as “a war of all against all” (Kegley and Wittkopf 1993, 23).
In the 20th century realism reappeared as a response to the pre-war idealism, expressed in the shape of the League of the Nations and the principles of Woodrow Wilson. Idealism itself had taken a severe blow from the experiences of the Second World War and was further discredited by the emergence of the Cold War animosities.
Although the realist school is not homogeneous, we could identify certain core assumptions common to all of its representatives. Ole R. Holsti (1995, 36-37) lists the following characteristics:
1) Realists believe that the causes of war and the conditions of peace are the central issues in international relations.
2) There is a ‘structural anarchy’, i.e. there is no central authority to settle the disputes.
3) Nation-states are the key actors in the international system.
4) State behaviour is rational, guided by the logic of ‘national interest’.
5) Nation state is a unitary actor, i.e. its behaviour is determined by the international setting and not internal developments.
In addition we might add the focus on power, especially military power, in order to enable a state to protect itself as allies cannot be trusted and too much hope should not be put into the international law (Kegley and Wittkopf 1993, 23).
Realism remained a dominant school of thought during the Cold War as the best explanatory theory of the great power standoff. It was able to face and fight back challenges from other approaches all through the 1980s, during the heydays of realism as the rivalry and arms race between the great powers intensified.
1. 1. 2. Neorealism
The theory had been modified by the beginning of 1980s under the name of neorealism. The main author of neorealism was Kenneth Waltz. One of the main contributions of Waltz was to formulate a coherent theory of international politics instead of a loose collection of statements of political realists (Keohane 1986, 15). Although there had been several attempts earlier to create a theory of international politics, most notably by the founding father of modern realism H. Morgenthau, these efforts remained easy targets for criticism because of their methodological inconsistency (Keohane 1986, 10-11). Waltz, on the other hand, took as his aim to create a theory that would be as simple and elegant as the ones developed by the natural scientists (Waltz 1979, 69).
The main cornerstone of Waltz’s theory is that the only possible approach for explaining the outcomes for international politics would be systemic (Waltz 1979, 67-78). He tries to prove that looking at the state level is not enough for predicting the outcomes of the whole system, at the same time as a “systems theory shows why changes at the unit level produce less change of outcomes than one would expect in the absence of systemic constraints” (Waltz 1979, 69). In a rather poignant comparison, he draws a parallel with the market theory in economics, where it is sufficient to know which pressures are put on firms by the market and there is no need for a theory of firms in order to explain the functioning of the market (Waltz 1979, 71-72).
In continuation of the realist tradition Waltz describes the system as anarchic and having states as the main actors. The anarchic system influences and even conditions the behaviour of actors (Waltz 1979, 73-74). All states in the system have an equal status – differently from the domestic political systems, governed by hierarchy (Waltz in 1979, 88-93). All the states are performing similar tasks – there is no significant division of labour, as noone would trust another state with being responsible for its security (Waltz 1979, 93-97). Therefore neorealists are also sceptical of the possibility of international cooperation. The reason is that states are interested in relative gains of cooperation and not so much in absolute gains. It is not important to gain as much as possible but to ensure that others would not gain more as they could later use their advantage against you (Waltz 1979, 105).