Marbury v. Madison, 1803 Judicial Review; Fedearlism

BackgroundThomas Jefferson, a member of the Republican Party, won the election of 1800. The outgoing President, John Adams, proceeded to rapidly appoint 58 members of his own party to fill government posts created by Congress.

It was the responsibility of the Secretary of State, John Marshall, to "deliver the commissions," finish the paperwork, and give it to each of the newly appointed judges. Although Marshall signed and sealed all of the commissions, he failed to deliver 17 of them to the respective appointees. Marshall assumed that his successor would finish the job, but when Jefferson became President, he told his new Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver some of the commissions, because he did not want members of the opposing political party to take office. Those individuals couldn't take office until they actually had their commissions in hand.

William Marbury, whom Adams had appointed as justice of the peace of the District of Columbia, was one of these last-minute appointees who did not receive his commission. Marbury sued James Madison and asked the Supreme Court of the United States to issue awrit of mandamus, a court order that requires an official to perform or refrain from performing a certain duty. In this case, the writ would have ordered Madison to deliver the commission.

Marbury argued that he was entitled to his commission and that the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court of the United States original jurisdiction to issue awrit of mandamus. Madison disagreed. When the case came before the Court, John Marshall — the person who had failed to deliver the commission in the first place — was the new Chief Justice. If this situation were to arise today, Marshall would likely disqualify himself because of a conflict of interest.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

  1. Who was Marshall likely to side with, Marbury or Madison? Why?
  2. If the Court decided that Marbury was entitled to the commission, how could it be sure that the executive branch would deliver it? Does the Court have the power to force compliance? What would happen if the Court issued the writ, but the executive branch refused to comply?
  3. According to Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution, in what types of cases does the Supreme Court of the United States have original jurisdiction? Does the Congress have the authority to alter the Court's jurisdiction?

The DecisionThe Court unanimously decided not to require Madison to deliver the commission to Marbury. Chief Justice Marshall understood the danger that this case posed to the power of the Supreme Court. Because Madison was President Jefferson’s secretary of state and Jefferson was head of the Democratic Party while Chief Justice Marshall and Marbury were Federalists, President Jefferson was almost certain to direct Madison to refuse to deliver the commission to Marbury. If the Court required Madison to deliver the commission and Madison refused, the Court had no power to force him to comply, and, therefore the Court would look weak. If the Court did not act, it would look like the justices made their decision out of the fear that Madison would not obey their decision.

The justices struck a middle ground between these alternatives in their opinion, written by Chief Justice Marshall. The Court ruled that Marbury was entitled to his commission, but that according to the Constitution, the Court did not have the authority to require Madison to deliver the commission to Marbury in this case. They found that the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution because it gave the Supreme Court more authority than it was given under the Constitution. The dispute centered around the difference between the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction and its appellate jurisdiction. If the Court has original jurisdiction over a case, it means that the case can go directly to the Supreme Court and the justices are the first ones to decide the case. If the Court has appellate jurisdiction, however, the case must first be argued and decided by judges in the lower courts. Only then can it be appealed to the Supreme Court, where the justices decide whether the rulings of the lower courts were correct. Marbury brought his lawsuit under the Court’s original jurisdiction, but the justices ruled that it would be an improper exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus in this case.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the Supreme Court to “issue writs of mandamus … to persons holding office under the authority of the United States.” A writ of mandamus is a command by a superior court to a public official or lower court to perform a special duty. The Court said this law attempted to give the Court the authority to issue a writ of mandamus, an exercise of its original jurisdiction, to Secretary of State Madison. However, Article III, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, as the Court read it, authorizes the Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdiction only in cases involving “ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those [cases] in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” The dispute between Marbury and Madison did not involve ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, or states. Therefore, according to the Constitution, the Supreme Court did not have the authority to exercise its original jurisdiction in this case. Thus the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Constitution were in conflict with each other.

Declaring the Constitution “superior, paramount law,” the Supreme Court ruled that when ordinary laws conflict with the Constitution, they must be struck down. Furthermore, it is the job of judges, including the justices of the Supreme Court, to interpret laws and determine when they conflict with the Constitution. According to the Court, the Constitution gives the judicial branch the power to strike down laws passed by Congress, the legislative branch. This is the principle of judicial review. Thus, it has been recognized since this decision that it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”

Through this decision, Chief Justice Marshall established the judicial branch as an equal partner with the executive and legislative branches within the developing system of government. By refusing to require Madison and Jefferson to deliver the commission to Marbury, he did not give Madison the opportunity to disobey the Court, making it look weak. And, by declaring the Court’s power through the principle of judicial review, he made it clear that the justices did not make their decision out of fear. Instead, he announced that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and established the Supreme Court as the final authority for interpreting it.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819 State Taxes, National Supremacy

BackgroundIn 1791, the first Bank of the United States was established to serve as a central bank for the country. It was a place for storing government funds, collecting taxes, and issuing sound currency. At the time it was created, the government was in its infancy and there was a great deal of debate over exactly how much power the national government should have. Some people, such as Alexander Hamilton, argued for the supremacy of the national government and a loose interpretation of its powers, which would include the ability to establish a bank. Others, such as Thomas Jefferson, advocated states' rights, limited government, and a stricter interpretation of the national government's powers under the Constitution and, therefore, no bank. While Jefferson was President, the Bank's charter was not renewed. After the War of 1812, President James Madison determined that the country could utilize the services of a national bank to help fulfill its powers listed in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution. In response to his suggestion, Congress proposed a Second Bank of the United States in 1816.

President Madison approved the charter and branches were established throughout the United States. Many states opposed opening branches of this bank within their boundaries for several reasons. First, the Bank of the United States competed with their own banks. Second, the states found many of the managers of the Bank of the United States to be corrupt. Third, the states felt that the federal government was exerting too much power over them by attempting to curtail the state practice of issuing more paper money than they were able to redeem on demand.

One state opposed to the Bank of the United States was Maryland. In an attempt to drive the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States out of business, the Maryland State Legislature required that all banks chartered outside of Maryland pay an annual tax of $15,000. There was a $500 penalty for each violation of this statute. James McCulloch, cashier of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States, refused to pay the tax.

The State of Maryland took him to court, arguing that because Maryland was a sovereign state, it had the authority to tax businesses within its border, and that because the Bank of the United States was one such business, it had to pay the tax. Luther Martin, one of the attorneys for Maryland, reasoned that because the federal government had the authority to regulate state banks, Maryland could do the same to federal banks. Besides, he argued, the Constitution does not give Congress the power to establish a Bank of the United States. McCulloch was convicted by a Maryland court of violating the tax statute and was fined $2,500.

McCulloch appealed the decision to the Maryland Court of Appeals. His attorneys, who included Daniel Webster, asserted that the establishment of a national bank was a "necessary and proper" function of the Congress. Webster stated that many powers of the government are implied rather than specifically stated in the Constitution. Furthermore, he argued, Maryland did not have the authority to levy the tax, because doing so interfered with the workings of the federal government.

After the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the original decision against McCulloch, he appealed again. The case was heard by the Supreme Court of the United States, then headed by Chief Justice John Marshall.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

  1. What are the advantages for the federal government of establishing a national bank? Read through Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the U.S. Constitution to determine which functions of Congress might be helped by such a bank.
  2. Why would states feel threatened by a national bank?
  3. In your opinion, does the United States government have the authority to establish a national bank? Provide justification for your answer. You may want to review Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution to see what powers it specifically gives Congress.
  4. If the United States does have authority to establish a bank, does Maryland have the authority to tax that bank? Why or why not?
  5. Why do you think the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear this case? What larger principles were at stake?

The DecisionIn an opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of McCulloch and against the state of Maryland. The Court addressed two questions: 1) whether Congress had the authority under the Constitution to commission a national bank, and 2) if so, whether the state of Maryland had the authority to tax a branch of the national bank operating within its borders.

The justices first addressed the issue of whether the Constitution gave Congress the power to establish a national bank. They acknowledged that it was not within the enumerated powers of Congress, authority explicitly given to Congress in the Constitution, to establish a national bank. He also noted that there is nothing in the Constitution restricting the powers of Congress to those specifically enumerated. Rather, only the “great outlines” of the powers of the three branches are specified. Instead of listing every power of Congress, the Constitution gives Congress the authority to make “all laws which shall be necessary and proper” for exercising the powers that are specifically enumerated. This means that Congress has the authority to pass any law that is “necessary and proper” to exercise its power as specified in the Constitution, even if the Constitution does not explicitly give Congress the authority to pass that specific law or to regulate that specific matter. This is the principle of unenumerated powers. The justices noted that the Constitution expressly gives Congress the powers to “lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies.” Because a national bank would be “necessary and proper” to allow Congress to exercise these enumerated powers, the Court concluded that the Constitution gave Congress the authority to establish one.

The second issue the Court considered is whether the state of Maryland had the authority to tax a branch of the national bank operating within its borders. The Court determined that it did not. In their decision, the justices declared that “the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them.” In other words, if the United States Congress passed a law within its authority under the Constitution, a state legislature could not pass a law to interfere with that action. “The power to tax is the power to destroy,” they decided. Allowing a state to tax a branch of the national bank created by Congress would allow that state to interfere with the exercise of Congress’s constitutional powers. Thus because “states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control” the operation of constitutional laws passed by Congress, Maryland could not be allowed to tax a branch of the national bank, even though that branch was operating within its borders. The law passed by the Maryland state legislature imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States “is unconstitutional and void.”

Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824States Rights, Commerce Clause

BackgroundThe case ofGibbonsv.Ogden(1824), decided 35 years after the ratification of the Constitution, was a key turning point for the expansion of federal power to address national problems.

Under the Articles of Confederation, the national government was virtually powerless to enact policies to rationalize the actions of states. One problem that emerged during this time was the way in which state policies tended to restrict commerce within and beyond their borders, making market exchanges inefficient and costly. In the Constitution, the framers included the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8 to address this issue. The Commerce Clause states that Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. . . ." The hope was that giving Congress such a power would help to unify commerce policies thereby making market exchanges more efficient and less costly.

Though the clause clearly gave Congress some power over commerce, it was unclear just how much. It was also unclear what constituted commerce. The Gibbons case clarified some of these issues under a decision issued by Chief Justice John Marshall, who had nationalist intentions.

In 1808, Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston acquired a monopoly from the New York state legislature to operate steamboats on the state's waters. This monopoly extended to interstate waterways, those areas of water that stretch between states. Aaron Ogden held a Fulton-Livingston license to operate steamboats under this monopoly. However, Thomas Gibbons held a federal coasting license, granted under a 1793 Act of Congress, and operated steamboats between New Jersey and New York that competed with Ogden's.

Ogden filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery of New York asking the court to restrain Gibbons from operating his boats. Ogden's lawyer contended that states often passed laws on issues regarding interstate matters and that states should have fully concurrent power with Congress on matters concerning interstate commerce. The monopoly, therefore, should be upheld.

Gibbons' lawyer, Daniel Webster, argued that Congress had exclusive national power over interstate commerce according to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and that to argue otherwise would result in confusing and contradictory local regulatory policies.

The Court of Chancery of New York found in favor of Ogden and issued an injunction to restrict Gibbons from operating his boats. Gibbons appealed the case to the Court of Errors of New York, which affirmed the decision. Gibbons appealed the case to the Supreme Court of the United States.