2Nd MULTI-Conference2nd Session: the UN System

2nd MULTI-conference2nd session: The UN system

Prepared for the NFR conference, Oslo 18-19 January, 20001

Astri Suhrke

Chr. Michelsen Institute

Draft only. Not for citation without permission of author

“Reason and Reconstruction: The multiple logics of UNTAET”

ABSTRACT:

Reason and Reconstruction: The multiple logics of UNTAET

Astri Suhrke, Chr. Michelsen Institute e-mail:

The UN presence in East Timor is an unprecedented “governance mission”. Vested with more sweeping authority and power than in Kosovo, the UN administers a de facto protectorate in East Timor. Although unique in this respect, the mission also has some features that seem to characterise UN missions generally in transitions from emergency to “normalcy”, or what in UN language is called peace-building, or “governance missions”.

East Timor, it will be recalled, was forcibly annexed by Indonesia when Portugal decided to relieve itself of its colony in 1975. Claiming that this aborted their rightful path to independence, the Timorese launched a national liberation struggle but did not succeed until almost 25 years later, when the Suharto-government in Indonesia collapsed. The successor regime declared it would permit a “popular consultation” in East Timor to determine whether the people wished to remain a part of Indonesia, or not. The UN-administered referendum in August 1999 produced an overwhelming “no” to Indonesia, provoking a campaign of murder and destruction in the territory as the Timorese militia and its Indonesian army supporters took revenge. A UN-authorised military intervention ended the violence, followed by a UN operation to keep the peace, provide humanitarian relief, and govern the territory in a transition period until East Timor became independent.

This paper focuses on the first year of the “governance mission”, from late 1999 to late 2000. In this period, UN governing structures were established, ground rules formed and consolidated, and preparations simultaneously made for independence, provisionally scheduled for 2002-3.

The analysis takes a classic political system approach (Easton, Apter) as its starting point. The key questions in this respect are: What determines the power structure of a given system? How does the system function in terms of setting policy goals and implementing them? Whose interests or which ideals are served? What are the accountability mechanisms vis-à-vis the main constituencies?

The “system” in this case is the UN de facto protectorate over East Timor, with the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) as its governing centrepiece. Wielding full legislative, judicial and executive power (and staffed almost exclusively by internationals), UNTAET is effectively a UN state.

Other key components of the mission are the UN agencies and the World Bank, which have major responsibility for social services and reconstruction/development. The mission is answerable to the UN Secretariat (Department of Peacekeeping Operations), and in the last instance to the UN Security Council. However, the Security Council has moved from the role of a governing actor towards that of a constituency of UNTAET. The Timorese civil society has moved in the opposite direction, from being solely a constituency to increasingly share political power with UNTAET. Other important actor-constituencies of UNTAET are the donors and the NGOs.

UNTAET has the all attributes of a state, with the functional equivalent of a constitution (Security Council resolution 1272/1999), an ideology (democratisation, preparation for independence, sustainable economic development, efficient administration), a police force (ca 1000 UN- hatted international CivPol), a military force (some 8500 UN peace-keepers) a flag (blue), and a viceroy (the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who is the Transitional Administrator).

How does this transitional state work? And what are the consequences? The paper explores these questions by considering the conditions under which the state came into being, the models on which it was based, and the nature of rules according to which governing actors entered and govern.

The paper argues that the structure and functions of the UN state in East Timor can be understood in relation to the two, generally competing arenas of field vs. headquarters, and as expressing four logics of politics that are partly competing and partly reinforcing.

As for the arenas of politics, it appears that the fast diminishing interest in East Timor in the UN Security Council had two important consequences. It significantly enhanced the Transitional Administrator’s discretionary power, and it permitted the field to orient itself to local needs and constituencies. Both factors worked to the advantage of the mission (in terms of meeting its stated goals), in no small measure, it should be noted, because of the capability of this particular Transitional Administrator and a highly developed civil society of East Timor.

As for the pattern of politics, four logics – or implicit principles of behaviour – can be discerned:

the logic of consensus politics in the UN (which determined the constitutive rules – the ground rules – of the state. In this case it meant full UN authority to govern East Timor, rather than sharing with the Timorese at the outset, and set the framework for a rather slow “Timorization” of the state;
the logic of peacekeeping (heavy, foreign and largely self-sufficient and self-contained presence, international recruitment and political neutrality, quick results, short time frame)
the logic of emergency relief (similar attributes as a peacekeeping operation, only civilian in character; in addition, top-down orientation, emphasis on visible and immediate results)
the logic of development (emphasis on Timorese participation, bottom-up, long time frames, process-as-result, institution building).

Logic (ii) and (iii) are mutually reinforcing, both generally and in this case. For institutional reasons, the logic proved seductive beyond the humanitarians and the peacekeepers to a variety of actors whose formal mandate was of a more developmental and political nature. Logic (i) happened in this case to reinforce (ii) and (iii). That left (iv), the development perspective, as the looser. A principal consequence was considerable tension between the state and its major constituency – Timorese civil society. Pointing to the official ideology of the mission (Res 1271/1999) the Timorese argued that its principal purpose was to prepare for independence; this required training in the act of governing, and hence participation. Another result was a markedly dual economy (with heavy foreign procurement etc), which neglected opportunities for local economic development in the recovery period.

Over time, this imbalance was partly corrected as the field arena became more important relative to the headquarters arena in UNTAET’s operations. Nevertheless, it appears that the UN responded to the East Timor challenge with most of the standard tools of peacekeeping and emergency relief, and these remained dominant even after the initial emergency was over and “governance” became the primary mission.

Concerning rule-making, it seems that the ad hoc and novel nature of the enterprise made inter-agency competition a major determinant of entry rules (which agency should have what role, or “the battle of the boxes” on the organigram). Similarly, basic decisions by UNTAET (e.g. budget planning) were dominated either by idiosyncratic variables (given weak institutionalisation of the new state), or ideological competition among international agencies “imported” via the international staff. As a new and small state, literally built on the ashes of massive civil violence, UNTAET’s own rules and structures were somewhat fluid during its first year. Yet as a field operation, it was accountable to headquarters (the Secretariat in New York), which had elaborate and rigid rules. This made for complex and time-consuming bureaucratic politics and intense internal struggle for resources which, typically, were in short supply, late, or bottled up in the UN bureaucracy.

SUMMARY

This paper analyzes the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) established in October 1999. Adopting a classic systems approach, the study examines the nature and determinants of the structures of the transitional state, the rules by which it functions, and some preliminary consequences. UNTAET is significant in part because it is a UN mission enjoying unprecedented administrative and sovereign authority. It also has some features that characterize a new type of UN operations, often referred to as “governance missions”. While possibly a future trend in UN activities, few “governance missions” have been carefully studied.

Part I of this study examines the conditions under which UNTAET came into being and the broader political system of which it is a part. What are the rules of entry and constitutive rules of this de facto UN state? What determine the rules?

Part II of the study looks at the first year of UNTAET’s operation. Military, humanitarian and “governance” operations are examined with a view to identifying the logic of central functions and decision-making processes.

Only Part I is included in this paper.

Preliminary Conclusions:

As for the arenas of politics, it appears that the fast diminishing interest in East Timor in the UN Security Council had two important consequences. It significantly enhanced the UN Transitional Administrator’s discretionary power, and it permitted the field to orient itself to local needs and constituencies. Both factors worked to the advantage of the mission (in terms of meeting its stated goals), in no small measure because of the capability of this particular Transitional Administrator and East Timor’s highly developed civil society of East Timor.

As for the pattern of politics, four logics – or implicit principles of behavior – can be discerned:

the logic of consensus politics in the UN (which determined the constitutive rules – the ground rules – of the state. In this case it meant full UN authority to govern East Timor, rather than sharing with the Timorese at the outset, and set the framework for a rather slow “Timorization” of the transitional state;
the logic of peacekeeping (heavy, foreign and largely self-sufficient and self-contained presence, international recruitment and political neutrality, quick results, short time frame)
the logic of emergency relief (similar attributes as a peacekeeping operation, only civilian in character; in addition, top-down orientation, emphasis on visible and immediate results)
the logic of development (emphasis on Timorese participation, bottom-up, long time frames, process-as-result, institution building).

Logic (ii) and (iii) are mutually reinforcing, both generally and in this case. For institutional reasons, the logic proved seductive beyond the humanitarians and the peacekeepers to a variety of actors whose formal mandate was of a more developmental and political nature. Logic (i) happened in this case to reinforce (ii) and (iii). That left (iv), the development perspective, as the looser. A principal consequence was considerable tension between the state and its major constituency – Timorese civil society. Pointing to the official ideology of the mission (Res 1272/1999) the Timorese argued that its principal purpose was to prepare for independence; this required training in the act of governing, and hence participation. Another result was a markedly dual economy (with heavy foreign procurement etc), which neglected opportunities for local economic development in the recovery period.

Concerning rule-making, it seems that the ad hoc and novel nature of the enterprise made inter-agency competition a major determinant of entry rules (which agency should have what role, or “the battle of the boxes” on the organogram). Similarly, basic decisions by UNTAET (e.g. budget planning) were dominated either by idiosyncratic variables (given weak institutionalization of the new state), or ideological competition among international agencies “imported” via the international staff. As a new and small state, literally built on the ashes of massive civil violence, UNTAET’s own rules and structures were somewhat fluid during its first year. Yet as a field operation, it was accountable to headquarters (the Secretariat in New York), which had elaborate and rigid rules. This made for complex and time-consuming bureaucratic politics and intense internal struggle for resources which, typically, were in short supply, late, or bottled up in the UN bureaucracy.

PART I

1. Introduction

The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) constitutes an unprecedented governance mission. Vested with more sweeping authority and power than in Kosovo, the UN administers a de facto protectorate in the territory. Although unique in this respect, the mission also has features that characterize UN missions generally in transitions from emergency to “normalcy”, or what in UN language is called peace-building or “governance missions”.

East Timor, it will be recalled, was forcibly annexed by Indonesia when Portugal decided to relieve itself of its colony in 1975. Claiming that this aborted their rightful path to independence, the Timorese launched a national liberation struggle but did not succeed until almost 25 years later when the Suharto-government in Indonesia collapsed. The successor regime declared it would permit a “popular consultation” in East Timor to determine whether the people wished to remain a part of Indonesia, or not. The UN-administered referendum in August 1999 produced an overwhelming “no” to Indonesia, provoking a campaign of murder and destruction in the territory as the Timorese militia and its Indonesian army supporters took revenge. A UN-authorized military intervention led by Australia ended the violence. It was followed by a UN operation to keep the peace, provide humanitarian relief, and govern in a transition period until East Timor became independent.

This paper focuses on the first year of the “governance mission”, from late 1999 to late 2000. In this period, UN governing structures were established, ground rules articulated and consolidated, and preparations made for independence, provisionally scheduled for 2001-2.

The analysis takes a classic political system approach as its starting point.[1] The key questions in this respect are: What determines the power structure of a given system? How does the system function in terms of setting policy goals and implementing them? Whose interests or which ideals are served? What are the accountability mechanisms vis-à-vis the main constituencies?

The system in this case is the UN de facto protectorate over East Timor, with UNTAET as its governing centerpiece. UNTAET is effectively a UN state. In the authorizing language of the Security Council, it was “ endowed with the overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and …. empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority”.[2] UNTAET has all the attributes of a state - the functional equivalent of a constitution (the authorizing Security Council resolution), an ideology (the formal objectives in UNTAET’s mandate: democratization, preparation for independence, sustainable economic development, efficient administration), a police force (ca 1600 UN- hatted international CivPol), a military force (some 8500 UN peace-keepers) a flag (blue), a civilian administration (staffed almost exclusively by some 1200 internationals) and a viceroy (the Special Representative of the Secretary-General) to rule a population of around 800 000. It was a state that had to be rebuilt from the ashes as the Indonesians withdrew in a mayhem of violence and destruction, taking most of the administrative and professional staff with them.[3]

How does a transitional state of this kind work? What are the relationships with other main actors and its constituencies? What are the characteristics of its transitional nature? And what are the consequences? The paper explores these questions by considering the conditions under which the mission came into being, the models on which it was based, and the nature of the rules by which governing actors entered and govern. Because the mission was an ad hoc and novel undertaking, the factors that determined its structure are of particular interest. Which implicit or explicit models were used? Did they reflect sensitivity to local conditions? Did standard operating procedures prevail or was there a process of learning and adaptation? Finally, while it is too early to assess the results of the mission, we can discern some consequences of the way in which the mission is structured and operates.

The sources for this study are primarily primary data collected through interviews in the field, scouring of UN document banks and, where possible, internal files. A small literature is emerging that deals with the political context at the time the mission was constituted and various aspects of East Timor’s economic and political life during the first year after it separated from Indonesia. Internal reviews of various aspects of the mission have been undertaken, but there is as yet no comprehensive analysis of the transitional state.