IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA
FAMILY LAW DIVISION
BOB DOE Case No:
PLAINTIFF, Div:
vs.
ALICE DOE,
DEFENDANT.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S PETITION FOR ANNULMENT, DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE, AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO INVALIDATE PREMARITAL AGREEMENT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on February 3, 2015 upon the Plaintiff’s Complaint and Motion for Summary Judgment against the Defendant, Alice Doe. The Court heard argument from counsel and upon review of the file and being otherwise duly advised of the premises, makes the following findings of fact:
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties.
3. PLAINTIFF, Bob Dole, lived with DEFENDANT, Alice Doe, in her home for 1 (one) year prior to the parties’ marriage in 2001.
4. Prior to the marriage, DEFENDANT owned a home valued at $500,000, subject to a $400,000 mortgage debt, at the time of the marriage.
5. At the time of the marriage, DEFENDANT was the primary earner in the family, as she earned approximately $90,000 per year as Public Defender; PLAINTIFF worked at Wal-Mart and made $10 per hour.
6. Approximately one month prior to the marriage, DEFENDANT, through her attorney, drafted a premarital agreement to requiring PLAINTIFF’s signature
7. The premarital agreement waived all forms of support payments, pre-marital property, and child support as to both parties, and provided that in the event of a divorce each party would be responsible for his or her own attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.
8. The premarital agreement also provided that all property acquired during the marriage would be split seventy (70) percent as to the DEFENDANT, and thirty (30) percent as to the PLAINTIFF.
9. The premarital agreement was delivered to the PLAINTIFF a month prior to the marriage.
10. Five (5) days prior to the marriage, the premarital agreement was still not signed; DEFENDANT informed the PLAINTIFF that she was pregnant. The premarital agreement was subsequently signed.
11. No child has been born between the parties during the course of the marriage, or to date.
12. PLAINTIFF filed a Complaint and Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the due to the DEFENDANT’s fraudulent inducement into marriage, the marriage is thereby voidable, and moved to annul the marriage. Thus, the premarital agreement is also not enforceable, as the agreement cannot be enforced when the marriage it is based upon is annulled.
13. In the alternative, PLAINTIFF petitions the court to dissolve the marriage, and invalidate the premarital agreement as the marriage is irretrievably broken, and the agreement was obtained by fraud. The PLAINTIFF also argues that the premarital agreement is void due to overreaching, as the agreement would work substantial injustice as to him.
This Court will first address the PLAINTIFF’s Motion to Annul the Marriage.
The Plaintiff’s Motion to Annul the marriage is hereby DENIED. Florida law provides that once a marriage is licensed and solemnized, “marriages are presumed valid and the burden is on the party seeking to invalidate a marriage.” Florida Family Law § Annulment and Dissolution of Marriage, pg. 63, 2014 (referencing Cobo v. Sierralta, 13 So. 3d 493 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009). However, a marriage that is induced by fraud is “voidable” and can be annulled “at the option of the non-offending party.” Id. at 61. But, it may only be annulled if it is not consummated or otherwise ratified. Id. at 63.
Florida courts have found that a false representation of pregnancy is not grounds for an annulment. Brandt v. Brandt, 167 So. 524, 525–26 (Fla. 1936). In that case, the parties had been “intimately acquainted with one another for a long period of time prior to their marriage,” and at some point, the wife represented that she was pregnant, inducing the husband to marry her. Id. at 525. In the instant case, the parties lived together for a year prior to marriage. Further, the Plaintiff proposed marriage to the Defendant prior to any alleged false statements. Consequently, the Plaintiff married the Defendant and continued living together after the marriage. The Plaintiff does not allege, nor refute Defendant’s allegations that the marriage was consummated.
Thus, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment is denied, as the marriage was ratified by the parties through continued cohabitation and consummation. Therefore, the court will not address the void-ness of the premarital agreement under Count I as here the issue is rendered moot.
As to Count II of the Plaintiff’s complaint, Court hereby DENIES the Plaintiff’s petition to dissolve the marriage.
Under Florida law, a judgment of dissolution of marriage shall only be granted if (1) the marriage is “irretrievably broken,” or (2) there is lack of mental capacity of one of the parties. Fla. Stat. 61.052(1)(a)–(b) (2014). However, the Legislature did not intend for courts to grant divorces to parties carte blanche, as it intended to “preserve the integrity of marriage and to safeguard meaningful family relationships.” Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181, 183 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Therefore, while fault of one of the parties no longer matters in determining whether a marriage is “irretrievably broken,” the parties must now show that the marriage is “no longer viable, a hollow sham beyond hope of reconciliation or repair.” Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 271 (Fla. 1973). And, if one parties denies the breakdown of the marriage, he or she must be given an opportunity to be heard on the issue. See Canon v. Weissman, 983 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
In the present case, the Plaintiff has not shown evidence sufficient for this court to find that the marriage is irretrievably broken. In his pleadings, the Plaintiff alleges facts that the Defendant induced him into marriage, when in fact, the Plaintiff proposed marriage to the Defendant prior to the alleged misrepresentation. Further, and while the Defendant admits representing pregnancy prior to the marriage, the Plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant was not actually pregnant at the time of marriage. In other words, the Plaintiff has not shown that the Defendant did not miscarry, or otherwise lose the baby after the marriage. Finally, the Defendant contests the Plaintiff’s petition for divorce, indicating that it is not broken or beyond repair. Thus, this court must provide the Defendant an opportunity to be heard.
Despite denying the Plaintiff’s motions as to Count I and II of his complaint, this Court will still review and rule as to the enforcement of the premarital agreement if the marriage is so dissolved in the future. Therefore, as to Count III and IV of the Plaintiff’s complaint, alleging the premarital agreement void due to fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or coercion, the Court hereby concludes the agreement is NOT VOID, but strikes certain provisions as unenforceable.
Under Florida law, a premarital agreement is not enforceable if a party can prove that (1) the agreement was not executed voluntarily, (2) the agreement was the product of “fraud duress, coercion, or overreaching, or (3) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed. Fla. Stat. 61.079(7)(1)–(3) (2014). The critical test in determining “the validity of marital agreement and whether there was fraud or overreaching on one side, the fact that one party to the agreement apparently made a bad bargain is not a sufficient ground by itself to [void a premarital agreement].” Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1987). However, typically the court will not decide on the issue of fraud in a motion for summary judgment because fraud requires a “full explanation and exploration of the facts and circumstances of the alleged wrong.” Robinson v. Kalmanson, 882 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
In the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, he cites Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007), where the Court held a premarital agreement voidable as it was obtained by coercion. In that case, the court determined that the agreement was voidable by the wife as she was presented with the agreement and required to sign it within twenty-four hours of the wedding. Id. at 1259. Essentially, the wife was given an ultimatum with very little time to consider the ramifications of signing the agreement. Id.
In the present case, however, the Defendant presented the Plaintiff with the premarital agreement a full month prior to the wedding. Thirty days was sufficient time for the Defendant to seek counsel. See Gordon v. Gordon, 25 So. 3d 615, 617 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that ten days prior to a wedding was sufficient time for a party to review a premarital agreement and/or seek the assistance of counsel).
Further, the Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that suggest he was coerced or under any duress to sign the agreement. Indeed, Florida courts have invalidated premarital agreements where there is misrepresentation between the parties. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330. However, generally at issue is one spouse’s lack of knowledge of financial information, property, or other assets prior to being induced into signing a prenuptial agreement. See, generally Cuillo v. Cuillo, 621 So.2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962). Here, the Plaintiff was aware of the financial assets and income of the Defendant. This court cannot find that the agreement was void due to the fact that its terms favor the Defendant. See Waton v. Waton, 887 So.2d 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that even though an agreement is “one-sided and unfair, that alone does not make it the result of overreaching”).
Although this court recognizes that certain provisions of the premarital agreement are unenforceable, that does not invalidate the entire agreement. This court hereby strikes the child support provisions in the premarital agreement as unenforceable. Fla. Stat. 61.079(8)(b), but the rest of the terms as enforceable.
THEREFORE, this Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion for Annulment, and Petition to Dissolve Marriage and hereby declares the parties’ premarital agreement enforceable, with the exception of the stricken portions previously described.
DONE and ORDERED in chambers, in Pinellas County, Florida on this 24th day of February, 2015.
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CIRCUIT JUDGE
Team Pinellas
Desire Colson
Steve Cohen
Natalie Jones
Shadi Traish
Therese Adipietro
Lindsey Sheppy