Build a Mishkan Build Communal Accountability

Vayakhel Pekudei

Vayakhel Pekudei, 27Adar 5773

Build a Mishkan – Build Communal Accountability

Harav Yosef Carmel

Were the building of the Mishkan and the commandments to bring korbanot a response to the Sin of the Golden Calf, as a way to deal with the nation’s diminished spiritual level? Or, does the Mishkan embody the fundamentally ideal form of service of Hashem? This topic has been the subject of extensive debate by the greatest Jewish thinkers. This week, we want to address this question from a slightly different angle than usual.

During a long period of time, Bnei Yisrael were enslaved by the Egyptians in a cruel manner. As these slaves emerged from the crucible, they had to undergo a change of mentality. The need to make decisions having to do with priorities and goals, planning and execution, are not part of a slave’s spiritual or intellectual life. He never will have to contemplate the impact his decisions will have on society. Slave’s lives are focused on carrying out the technical instructions of their owners and task masters. Where there are slaves, society will also not usually concern itself with questions as to how their decisions will impact the lives of the slaves. Slaves are viewed as no more than machines to create desired results for their masters.

The project to collect materials for the building of the Mishkan and the planning of its erection created a revolution in the spiritual and societal mindset of the nation of ex-slaves. The call to donate, which included an obligation of everyone to donate something, showed that everyone has to have a societal/national value system. They learned that for the nation to succeed in its calling, everyone would have to give at least something.

The bringing of sacrifices is not, Heaven forbid, a matter of satisfying some type of divine appetite. Hashem certainly does not need the animals placed on the altar for Himself. The significance of the laws of set sacrifices is that Bnei Yisrael has a spiritual center with an orderly mode of operation. There is a nation, and there is a way in which the nation acts, demonstrating that we are not just an accumulation of individuals.

There is another element to korbanot that is focused more on the individual, and that is the element of accountability for one’s action. When a nation has rules of accountability for sins and mistakes, it is a sign of an organized nation, rather than a random group of wild ex-slaves. Being a free person allows one the freedom and the right to choose. Along with that right comes the responsibility to pay for mistakes, even unintentional ones.

Let us stress again that part of the national element of the Mishkan finds expression in that it was not a project that could fall on an individual or a group. It was always the responsibility of the king or the representatives of the people. This communal element is an aspect of the Mishkan and its operation that was an ideal even according to the opinions that it was erected as part of the struggle against idol worship.

Let us pray for the rebuilding of the Mikdash on the holy mountain, which shall serve as the base for the Divine Presence to rest on the holy nation, living a spiritual and idealistic life in the Holy Land, Eretz Yisrael.

Hemdat Yamim
is dedicated
to the memory of Gershon (George)
ben Chayim
HaCohen Kaplan o.b.m. / This edition of
Hemdat Yamim
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to the memory of
R' Meir
ben Yechezkel
Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m / Hemdat Yamim
is endowed by
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in loving memory of
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and
Louis and Lillian Klein, z”l

by Rav Daniel Mann

Beracha on Homeopathic Medicine

Question:I understand that one does not make a beracha on medicine. This raises a question for Orthodox users of homeopathic medicines (which are normally sweet). Should they listen to their homeopaths, who consider it medicine, and not make a beracha or listen to conventional doctors, who say it is not medicine, and make a beracha on it?

Answer:There is disagreement on the topic of alternative medicine. Like in most topics, extreme opinions are rarely right. It is clear that some treatments under the umbrella of alternative medicine are helpful, and it is clear that some are quackery and serve as a placebo at best. There is also a significant category of medicines and treatments (homeopathic or conventional) whose efficacy is unclear or varies greatly from person to person. We are not in the position to take a stand on the important question as to which treatments fall into which category.

These questions are relevant regarding cases where we want to do something which would otherwise be forbidden in order to heal the sick (see Orach Chayim 301, 328). However, your question does not depend on this matter. It is not that the status of medicine uproots the need for a beracha. Rather, berachot were instituted for the benefits of food (primarily, taste), not for medical benefits alone (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 204:8). If one receives both benefits, he must recite a beracha (ibid.). Therefore, if any medicine’s taste is good, a beracha would be required on it. If there is not a good taste, then even if there is no medicinal value either, there would be no beracha. (Indeed, there is no beracha on swallowing paper).

However, there is still a question about the beracha for anything taken for medicinal purposes that has additives that give it a somewhat positive taste. The Sha’ar Hatziyun (204:37) says that medicinal food does not need to have a particularly good taste; the main thing is that it does not have a bad one. One might claim that the classic sources discuss cases where the therapeutic agent has a reasonable taste but that if the medicine tastes bad and sweetener improves it, the sweetener is the medicine’s less important part and should not count regarding berachot (see Berachot 36a).However, the rule that the beracha follows a food’s more important ingredient for berachot applies only when the important part has a beracha, but if the medicinal part has no beracha, we should make a beracha on the sweetener (Pitchei Halacha, Berachot pg. 246; Yalkut Yosef, Berachot, pg. 442).

Yet, there still are cases where a beracha is doubtful. If one swallows a pill, it is not considered a manner of eating in regards to berachot even if it leaves a sweet taste on the tongue before swallowing (V’zot Haberacha pg. 311). Also, Rav S.Z. Auerbach is quoted by several as minimizing the cases in which a beracha is called for. Nishmat Avraham (IV, OC 204:8) quotes him as saying that if the sweetener is on the outside of a chewable pill and one enjoys the taste before getting to the medicinal part there is a beracha, but if the tastes are all mixed together, there should not be a beracha. This is based on the assumption that the mixture does not have a taste which would interest anyone as a food. V’zot Haberacha (pg. 312) cites Rav Auerbach from a different angle. If the active ingredient’s taste is neither bad nor particularly good, the minor taste enjoyment suffices for a beracha. However, for an external taste to turn a non-food into a food, the medicinal mixture must have an actually good taste overall. Not all agree with Rav Auerbach (see ibid.), and it is logical to say that as long as one appreciates the positive element, the fact that the negative element neutralizes it somewhat does not take away from the beracha. However, it is hard to require a beracha against Rav Auerbach’s opinion. There also will be borderline cases regarding how they are to be considered according to the different opinions. In a case of doubt, one should not make a beracha (one who wants, can eat something else first, having in mind to cover the medicine).

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Free Choice of the Individual and of the Collective

(condensed from Ein Ayah, Berachot 9:259)

Gemara: “[David said to Shaul: If Hashem incited you against me …” (Shmuel I 26:19) – Rav Elazar said: Hashem said to David: “You call Me an inciter? Behold, I will cause you to stumble in a matter that even schoolchildren know, as the pasuk says: ‘When you will count the heads of Bnei Yisrael, each man shall give atonement for his soul’ (Shemot 30:12).” As a direct result, it says “Hashem placed a Satan on Israel [and it incited David to count Israel]” (Divrei Hayamim I 21:1). It is also written: “[The anger of Hashem continued to be aroused at Israel] and it incited David in them, saying: ‘Go count Israel’” (Shmuel II 24:1). When David counted them, he neglected to take from them the atonement.

Ein Ayah: The question of free will is always the most severe one in regard to the basic principles of the Torah and the perception of the intellect and human experience. We know that the world must operate in a way that evil exists within it. In fact, there are several things of great value in the world that would not have been actualized if they were not accompanied by the possibility and the preparedness of people to choose evil. The fact that evil is needed for the world to be complete causes many people to think that there cannot really be free choice.

The truth is that there is a great difference between the rules of free will that govern the collective and those that govern the individual. Certainly regarding the collective, there cannot be full free choice, as evil must exist just as good exists. On the other hand, in regard to the collective, nothing is absolutely bad, as something which is bad from the perspective of an individual can bring good communally. This is what the Rabbis meant when they said: “Just as praise of Hashem emanates from the righteous so does it emanate from the wicked” (Shemot Rabba 7:4). This is supported by the pasuk: “All that Hashem did is for Him, even an evil person for the day of evil” (Mishlei 16:4).

The confusion that emerges when people do not distinguish between the parameters of free choice that exist for the masses and for the individual causes unanswerable questions, as things appear to be both free and compelled to exist. The phrase that David used, “If Hashem incited you against me,” seems to indicate that a specific individual lacked free choice. This is not true, as individuals have full free will.

The matter of atonement while counting hits at the heart of the issue we have been discussing. Without counting individuals, the whole nation can be seen as one mass. We know that a nation must include bad and deficient people, as this is the nature of a collective. The nation does not lose its right to exist because of these people; as a matter of fact, they are needed to provide certain positive opportunities for the community. When it comes to the accounting of an individual, though, every shortcoming must be reckoned with based on the rules of responsibility for free choice, and there is often a need for atonement. These concepts are confusing and cause many to make mistakes. Even David erred when he said that Shaul’s personal free will was curtailed, as this violates an article of basic faith. It is true that David did not do so purposely but was under the pressure of anguishing experiences. Nevertheless, the result was the lack of atonement for the counting of the individual, which indicates a lack of understanding of the difference between the individual and the collective in regard to free will. In truth, regarding an individual, including Shaul, there is both free will and a directive of “you shall choose life” (Devarim 30:19).

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Sharing in Building Expenses When One Did Not Directly Benefit – part I

(from Hemdat Mishpat, rulings of the Eretz Hemdah-Gazit Rabbinical Courts)

Case: Neighbors jointly presented an expansion plan for their apartments to the Urban Planning Board and received permission for their building plans. The plaintiffs (=pl) received permission to build rooms totaling 60 square meters. The defendants (=def), who are their upstairs neighbors, asked for permission only to close off a 20 m. balcony and use the roof of pl’s extension for open balconies. Originally, pl and def planned to have their work done jointly, sharing the costs. However, def became short on money and delayed their plans, and pl built on their own and presented def with a bill of 85,000 shekels for their part in the costs. Def paid 19,000 shekels without receiving a waiver for further pay. Years later, just before the permission to build expired, def sold their apartment, and the buyers built immediately. Pl are now suing for the remaining 66,000 shekels. Def responds that their share of the building expenses should not be divided evenly with pl, because pl made more serious use of the building. Furthermore, def didn’t use the building at all, as only the buyers built on the extension. According to the law, pl should also pay def for using more joint area than def did.

[This summary does not explore all elements of the ruling.]

Ruling: There are two possible reasons for def to be obligated to share in building expenses. The first is based on agreement, but that does not apply in this case. Although they planned to build together, there was never a commitment to do so, nor was there a serious discussion about apportioning expenses. Pl thus had no ability or right to force def to build with them.

The second possibility is based on the concept that one who benefits due to his counterpart has to pay for the benefit unless it is waived. If one built a wall between his and his neighbor’s properties higher than halacha requires, the neighbor has to chip in toward the extra building if he built his other walls to this height (Bava Batra 5a).

Acharonim ask why when he shows that he enjoyed the building, he is obligated, in light of the halacha that when one takes benefit from another party who does not lose as a result, the one who benefits does not have to pay (see Bava Kama 20b). The K’tzot Hachohen (158:6) explains that when the neighbor shows he likes the wall, he turns into a partner in the wall, and then he is obligated to pay as one who so-to-speak bought part of the builder’s wall. The Maharam MiRotenberg (IV:685) that the halacha that one who benefits does not have to pay is only when his presence is beneficial for the person who provided the benefit. Otherwise, there is a natural obligation to pay for the benefit.

According to the latter opinion, while having a second floor on top of pl’s extension protects pl’s roomsfrom leaks and cold, overall most people prefer to not have neighbors on top of their heads. Therefore, it is likely that the Maharam would require payment.

[We will continue from here next time.]

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