The Function of Sceptical Arguments Within the Advancement of Knowledge

The Function of Sceptical Arguments within the Advancement of Knowledge:

Bacon, Gassendi, Hume

ANIK WALDOW

Introduction

Bacon, Gassendi and Hume are names that are commonly taken to represent classic empiricism, the doctrine which understands sense data to be the basis for factual knowledge claims. In grouping these names together it seems that the aim of the essay is to describe how the empiricist concept of knowledge emerged and opposed rationalist theories as exemplified by Descartes, Spinoza, Malebrache and Leibniz. It is clearly not my aim in this essay to give a description of the battles that empiricists needed to fight against their rationalist opponents. In recent years the labels empiricism and rationalism have been scrutinised and found to be inappropriate as an account towards early-modern philosophical thought. And although commentators vary in their opinions as to whether the classic scheme be revised or abandoned, it seems that the general message continues to be ignored, namely that there is something wrong with the terms empiricism and rationalism. One example can be found in Russell Hardin’s recent analysis of Hume. He writes: “Hobbes and Hume are proto scientists who foremost wish to understand the empirical world. They are not empiricists in the manner of Francis Bacon and Tycho Brahe, collecting a mass of facts and then inferring conclusions from them. But they solidly ground their theories and explanations in the real world … Hume’s Newtonian move is to reach conclusions ‘deduced from the phenomena’”[1] One could here wonder what precisely is the advantage of presenting Hume as an empiricist and of opposing him to Bacon, while joining him with Newton, when all three of them are understood to extrapolate principles from the results of observable phenomena.

Unfortunately, even those who try to raise critical awareness of the difficulties relating to the distinction occasionally slip back into detecting a hidden rationalism in empiricist accounts, and vice versa. Hans Jürgen Engfer traces the origin of ideas in early modern philosophy and thus remains bound to the conceptual scheme he ventures to criticise.[2] Louis Loeb, Michael Ayers and David Norton all challenge the story of empiricism by revealing continuities between those traditionally seen as representatives of the rival camp.[3] In so doing it sometimes seems that all we need to do is reorganise the classificatory scheme, but not that it is necessary to let go of the outworn categories as such, categories which obscure rather than elucidate what drove early-modern thinkers in their interest in the workings of the human mind.

In the following I will not attempt to regroup the canon of empiricists, but nevertheless challenge the classificatory scheme. I will try to show that we can understand the concerns of early-modern thinkers better if we concentrate on their use of sceptical arguments. These arguments, as I will point out in discussing Bacon, Gassendi and Hume, did not aim at the relegation of knowledge claims. On the contrary, I will argue that sceptical arguments were employed in order to replace and improve a useless concept of knowledge that could no longer keep up with the advancements in science. The particular purpose of these arguments consisted in demarcating the reach of the human understanding and in showing at which point the mind engages in delusion and speculation. In other words, sceptical arguments were employed as a device that prepared the basis for the advancement of knowledge; they revealed within which boundaries knowledge could be gained. This way of putting things makes clear that concerns with sceptical arguments did not result from the awareness of a severe threat that Popkin understands to have emerged with the availability of the writings of Sextus Empiricus from the mid-sixteenth century onwards.[4] The reason for which Bacon, Gassendi and Hume took issue with scepticism was rather that the advancement of knowledge called for a re-adjustment of the available conceptual resources. All of them challenged Scholastic conceptions of formal deduction and syllogistic reasoning. This suggests that those that we like to see as empiricists did not line up to establish the dogma that experience is the basis for knowledge claims against the tenet that all knowledge must derive from reason.[5] They opposed dogma themselves, namely the dogma of Scholastic traditions which they deemed to prevent a fruitful scientific practice.

Sceptical Arguments: a clarification

Commonly it is assumed that those who engage in sceptical arguments are sceptics, while the sceptic is taken to deny the possibility of knowledge. Ancient scepticism seems to express such an attitude: the Pyrrhonist urges his adversaries to accept that by means of reason one cannot know the truth. He does so by presenting counter-arguments that establish the contrary of that which had been claimed before. Sceptical arguments here have a critical function. They call us on the alert, rather than dwell on the defectiveness of the human mind. As a remedy the Pyrrhonist recommends intellectual suspense: one does not venture to assert the truth of things and contents oneself with the insight into how things appear to be.[6] Academic sceptics, at least those of the late Academy, take a more radical stance. They do not merely doubt the possibility of knowledge; they assert that nothing can be known. But although being certain in this particular point, they do not urge us to withhold assent in general: if assent is formulated after the careful examination of all available evidence and as long as it is clear that one claims things only to be probable but not true, one is entitled to judge.

This account is very brief and cannot grasp the different nuances of ancient scepticism. What is important for our discussion, however, is that Academic scepticism precludes the possibility of knowledge only if one rejects a probabilistic concept of knowledge. The Academics openly endorsed assent to that which, after careful consideration and examination, seemed justified and probable. Hence, if one accepts these results as pieces of knowledge, Academics appear to hold on to the claim that things can be known. They seem to deny only that we can have knowledge which surpasses probabilistic claims. On this perspective, sceptical arguments can be seen to prepare the grounds for an alternative concept of knowledge, one that takes into account the limitations of the human mind. If so, it turns out that sceptical arguments are an option not only for sceptics, that is for those who deny that something can be known. They are also an option for those who hold on to the belief that knowledge is possible, because they only point out that the traditional criteria of knowledge need to be replaced.[7] So, it is no contradiction to claim that someone uses sceptical arguments and yet believes in the possibility of knowledge.[8] In the following I will show that Bacon, Gassendi and Hume employed sceptical arguments in this particular way. They did not want to deny the possibility of knowledge per se, but only a certain kind of knowledge. The motivation behind this was that they took themselves to be the advocates of a modern scientific practice that required new routes to the generation of knowledge.

Bacon: Cures for the Mind

Let us first turn to Bacon. Bacon is well aware of the shortcomings of the human understanding, and in this sense critical and even sceptical because he questions the mind’s ability to know. The mind, as he tells us in the New Organon and The Advancement of Learning, is infested by a variety of idols: the idols of the tribe, the idols of the cave, the idols of the marketplace and the idols of the theatre. The mind must therefore be viewed as an “enchanted glass”[9] or “uneven mirror”[10] that “alters the rays of things from their proper shape and figure, so also the mind, when it is affected by things through the senses, does not faithfully preserve them, but inserts and mingles its own nature with the nature of the things as it forms and devices its own notions.”[11] This leads him to conclude that “the assertation that the human senses are the measure of things is false; to the contrary, all perceptions, both of the senses and the mind, are relative to man, not the universe.”[12] This clearly expresses a certain scepticism: Bacon questions not only that the senses can give a true account of how things stand; he extends his doubts from the senses to the mind’s general natural powers and denies that they are sufficient for arriving at a correction of sensory delusions. He thus seems to line up with the ancient sceptics and their claim that the only things of which we can be certain are appearances: for the mind projects rather than detects.

Scepticism conceived along these lines can be defined as a position that results from the awareness of the fiction-enhancing shortcomings of the human mind. Although Bacon acknowledges the defectiveness of the human mind, he leaves no doubt about the untenability of the Pyrrhonean suspension of judgement: “In its initial position our ways agree to some extent with the method of the supporters of the lack of conviction; but in the end our ways are far apart and strongly opposed. They assert simply that nothing can be known; but we say simply that not much can be known by the way which is now in use. They thereupon proceed to destroy the authority of sense and intellect, but we devise and provide assistance to them.”[13] This clearly shows that, instead of giving up on the possibility of knowledge, Bacon reaches for assistance. Experiments, he explains, can act as a guide to correct judgement. They aid the senses to take notice “of things that cannot be seen”[14], focus and instruct the mind. Experiments thus provide a sort of straightjacket to the mind: they discipline the “influence of the will and emotions”[15] and reduce the mind’s tendency to spread itself upon the world. Furthermore, for Bacon the authority of judgement does not lie with the mind; it is the experiment that enables us to know about the nature of things: “Sense only gives judgement on the experiment, while the experiment gives a judgement on nature and the thing itself.”[16]

Certainly, this leaves unexplained how it can be granted that the senses are veridical in their reports of experiments. Hence, the problem of the deceitfulness of the senses has only been shifted but not solved. Bacon does not seem to be troubled by this. He claims that the Academic sceptics were plainly wrong in charging the deceit upon the senses, because they are “very sufficient to certify and report truth”[17] … “perhaps not immediately”[18], but with the aid of reason, experiment and invention. This clearly marks Bacon’s attitude as non-sceptical. Although he admits that the mind is defective and unable, if unaided, to achieve true judgement, he is certain that with the assistance of experiments the ignorant state of mind can be overcome. This reveals that one function of Bacon’s sceptical arguments consists in identifying the sources of error and delusion which, once identified, can be blocked by the adoption of experimental methods. Sceptical arguments can thus be seen to contribute to what Bacon considers as a cure for the disease infected mind: “As in medicining of the body, it is in order first to know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases, and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the diverse characters of men’s natures, it followeth, in order, to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the perturbations and distempers of the affections.”[19]

If we revise the nature of the four categories of idols, a further function of Bacon’s sceptical arguments can be singled out. The idols of the tribe are common to mankind and derive from the mind’s tendency to assume more order and regularity in nature than there really is. The idols of the cave relate to each person’s individual inclinations which have been fostered by education, social surroundings, and the respect for authorities. The idols of the marketplace are illusions caused by words which are “a poor and unskilful code that obstruct the understanding”[20]. The forth group, the idols of the theatre, result from dogma in philosophy. At first sight, it seems that the first category of idols is concerned with the natural deficiencies of the mind, while the last three describe delusions which result, at least to a certain degree, from social influences exerted on an individual’s mind. It is interesting to note, however, that also the socially steered idols stand in close connection to the natural, illusion-enhancing dispositions of the mind.[21] Bacon states that the mind naturally tends to generalise: “The human understanding from its own peculiar nature willingly supposes a greater order and regularity in things than it finds.”[22] Furthermore, he maintains that “the human understanding is most affected by things that have the ability to enter the mind all at once and suddenly, and to fill and expand the imagination.”[23] Now it is these two propensities, the propensity for generalisation and imagination-stimulating events, that are crucially at work when indulging in the socially steered idols. Bacon explains that idols of the cave are often the product of “admiration for antiquity”[24] or “the love and embrace of novelty”[25]. In other words, they are caused by that which calls on our affections and stimulates the imagination. Idols of the marketplace emerge with distorted meanings which result from a practice that fails to “reflect particular instances and their sequence and order”[26]. They are thus affected by the minds natural propensity to view generalities where one needs to respect uniqueness and disparities. A similar analysis applies to the idols of the theatre. Bacon writes: “They are openly introduced and accepted on the basis of fairytale theories and mistaken rules of proof.”[27] He here criticises first Aristotelian syllogistic proof, secondly, the scientific practice of the “empirical brand of philosophy”[28], conceived as the branch of science which derives rules from an insufficiently large experimental basis, and, thirdly, superstition resulting from the introduction of “abstract forms and final causes and first causes, and the frequent omission of intermediate causes”[29]. The idols of the theatre can thus be seen to be particularly susceptible to the mind’s natural propensity to generalise too hastily and to ignore individual instances while dashing ahead to the most abstract principles.