Advanced Topics in Social Institutions

PS 716

Geoffrey Brennan

( )

and

Michael Munger

()

Spring 2013Social Sciences 10910:05 am – 12:20 pm

(Draft: Revisions to be made after first class meeting and discussion!)

Philosophy and Approach:

The idea underlying this course is that basic principles of analysis developed with particular problems and settings in mind can often be better understood by seeing those principles in action outside the original contexts. “Institutional analysis” largely developed out of the application of techniques used in the analysis of the ‘market order’ to the analysis of democratic political processes. In this course, we want to extend such applications to the analysis of the “institutions of civil society” – ie to non-market, non-political institutions. We have in mind arenas like: the law; academia; sport; the arts; religion – and the organizations that go with them: courts; universities; the NCAA (for example); the French academy (for example); the church(es). We want to take these arenas and their institutional structures as objects of interest in their own right. But we also want to test out how well (or badly) the standard methods of analysis we use in relation to political institutions perform in illuminating the analysis of institutions in these alternative settings.The thought is that foregrounding these less common social institutions there might be some insight gained for the study of markets and politics – lending a broader range of considerations to, and hence greater nuance in, our treatment of these more familiar sites.

This course has a matrix structure. The rows deal with the analytic tools that are to be mobilized in institutional analysis – and the columns with different arenas within which those tools can be animated and applied to human social organization. So, for the rows we have incentives, selection devices, norms—and pieces of motivational apparatus that might serve to support them such as esteem, publicity, and shame. And for columns we will focus not (primarily) on markets and politics but rather on institutions of civil society – academia, the arts, sport,religious worship, and the law.

  1. Principles of Institutional Analysis

Issues of definition

Explanansvsexplanandum

Institutional design vs‘spontaneous order’

  1. Mechanics of Institutional Effects
  2. Incentives
  3. Selection
  4. Second level incentives and signaling
  5. Endogenous preferences
  6. Organizational structure
  7. Esteem and esteem incentives
  8. Behavioral Constitutionalism
  1. Specific Institutions:
  2. Markets
  3. Electoral politics
  4. The Law
  5. Religious rites and worship
  6. The arts
  7. Sport
  8. Academia

Institution

Mechanism / market / politics / law / academia / arts / religion / sport
incentives
selection
Esteem effects
Organizational structure / Firms
Unions? / parties / Courts, police / universities / salon / church / NCAA
Olympic Committee

Outline, Schedule, and Readings (Subject to Change)

(Please read selections before the assigned class!)

A. Institutions

  1. January 9: What institutions are (and aren’t!)
  1. Buchanan and Tullock. 1965. The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press. Chapter 5 (link), Chapter 6 (link)
  2. Danto, Arthur (1964). "The Artworld." Journal of Philosophy 61 (19): 571–584. (link)
  3. Mackie, 1996. “Ending Footbinding and Infibulation,” American Sociological Review. 61: 999-1017. (link)
  4. Munger, Michael. 2010. "Endless Forms Most Beautiful and Most Wonderful.” Public Choice, volume 43: 263-268. (Introduction to edited volume on the contributions of Elinor Ostrom on the occasion of her Nobel Prize). (Sakai resource)
  5. Myerson, Roger. 2004. "Justice, institutions, and multiple equilibria," Chicago Journal of International Law. 5: 91-107. (link)
  6. North, Wallis and Weingast (2006) “A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History” NBER (link)
  7. Ringel, Gail. 1979. “The Kawkiutl Potlatch: History, Economics, and Symbols.” Ethnohistory. 26(4): 347-362. (link)
  1. January 14: Explaining Institutions
  2. Demsetz (1967) “Towards a theory of Property Rights” American Economic Review. (Sakai resource)
  3. Grief, Avner. 1993. “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition.” American Economic Review, 83(3): 525-548. (link)
  4. Hodgson, Geoffrey. 2002. “The Evolution of Institutions,” Constitutional Political Economy. (13): 111– 127. (Sakai resource)
  5. Kreps, David. 1990. “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” Alt and Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press. (Sakai reading)
  6. Shepsle, K (2005) “Rational Choice Institutionalism” (unpublished manuscript) (link)
  1. January 21: No class, MLK Day

B. Methods

  1. January 28: Incentives
  2. Paul Gans “The Great Stirrup Controversy” [Medieval Technology Pages]
  3. Brennan and Tullock (1980) “An Economic Theory of Military Tactics” JEBO
  4. Brennan and Lomasky (1993) Democracy and DecisionCambridge University Press ch 2
  5. Grant (2011) Strings AttachedPrinceton University Press ch 1
  1. February4:Selection and the Currency of Reward
  2. Besley (2006) Principled AgentsOxford University Pressch 3
  3. Guth and Kliemt(1994) “Competition or Cooperation” Metroeconomica
  4. Brennan in Goodin (1998) The Theory of Institutional DesignOxford University Press ch 10
  5. Kurt Gabel (edited by Mitchell): The Making of a Paratrooper, chapters 2-5
  1. February11: Currency of Reward
  2. Brennan and Pettit (2004) The Economy of Esteem Oxford University Press chapters 1-5
  1. February18: Behavioral Constitutionalism
  2. Brennan and Buchanan. 1985. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. (Link)
  3. Brennan and Hamlin (2006) “Constitutions as Expressive Documents” in Weingast and Wittman (eds) Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
  4. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) Nudge

C. Case Studies:

  1. February 25: Academia
  2. Tullock The Logic of Enquiry
  3. Buchanan and Develotoglou Academia in Anarchy
  4. Goldman and Shaked “An Economic Theory of Scientific Activity and Truth Acquisition” Philosophical Studies (1991)
  1. March 4: Religion
  2. Tollison and Bob EkelundJ Law and Econ (1989)
  3. Lehman “Rational Choice and the Sociology of Religion” Handbook of the Sociology of Religion
  4. R. Heiner, “The Origin of Predictable Behavior,” American Economic Review, 1983. (Link)
  5. Innaccone et al “The Economics of Religion” Faith and Economics (2005)
  6. Condon, Daniel. “The ‘Price’ of Religious Participation: An Economic Model of Contributions.” J of Applied Business & Economics

March 11: No class, Spring break!

  1. March 18: Beyond Markets and States: CPR
  2. McKean, Margaret. 1982 "The Japanese Experience with Scarcity: management of traditional common lands." Enviornmental Review 6(2): 63-88.
  3. Ostrom, Elinor. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources. University of Michigan Press.
  4. Ostrom, Elinor. 2009. Nobel Prize Lecture: “Beyond Markets and States.” (link)
  1. March 25: The Law
  2. T. Tyler Why Do People Obey the Law?
  3. S. Pahis (2009) “Corruption in our Courts” Yale Law Journal
  4. R. McAdams (2009) “Political Economy of Criminal law and Procedure”
  5. G. Tullock Trials on Trial
  6. Landes and Posner “legal Precedent” (1976)
  7. Landes and Posner “Rational Judicial Behaviour” J Legal Studies
  8. Klein and Morrisroe (1999) “Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges” J Legal Stud
  9. Spence and Cross (2000/2001) “A Public Choice case for the Administrative State” Georgetown Law Journal
  10. Cross (1997) Political Science and the New Legal Realism” Northwestern University Law Review
  1. April 1: Arts
  2. De Marchi and Greene (2005) “Adam Smith and Private Provision of the Arts” HOPE
  3. De Marchi and Van Miegroot (2006?) “Rules versus Play in early modern art markets” Louvain Economic Papers
  1. April 8: Sport
  2. Linc Allison The Politics of Sport
  3. Taylor Branch Atlantic Monthly
  4. Ostrom et al Rules, Games and Common Property Resources
  1. April 15: Exchange in anarchic settings

a.Radford (1945) On the Economics of a POW Camp, Economica

b. Skarbek (2011) Governance and Prison Gangs, American Political Science Review 105(4) 2011: 702-716.

c. Leeson, (2009) The Invisible Hook, Princeton.

D. Overview:

  1. April 22: What have we learned?