Somalia: Al Shabaab Pressuring Pirates?
Teaser:
Somalia's pirates could be facing new, land-based pressure from the jihadist group al Shabaab. (With STRATFOR map)
Summary
The European Union's anti-piracy mission announced April 26(not the 27th? (just doublechecking – yep, April 26)) that a Royal Dutch Navy ship pursued and captured several small pirate vessels April 24. Eyewitness reports indicate that a similar operation (or the same one) occurred close to shore near the known pirate haven of Hobyo. Also on April 26, reports surfaced that forces from the Somali jihadist group al Shabaab had entered the pirate town of Harardhere and that some pirates had fled. This move is inconsistent with al Shabaab's normal activities and, while it might be an isolated event, could signal the development of land-based pressure against Somali pirates.
Analysis
The European Union's anti-piracy mission, NAVFOR, released a statement April 26 claiming that the Dutch warship HNLMS Johan de Witt had intercepted and confiscated two small pirate vessels April 24 near the Somali coast and then sent the pirates back to shore. The incident appears similar to one described in two local media reports citing eyewitnesses in Hobyo -- a known pirate haven in Central Somalia -- as saying that foreign warships entered the port, confiscated three fishing boats and some pirates and fired on the town. STRATFOR cannot verify that these are the same incidents, but the details appear to match up, indicating that the Dutch vessel engaged pirates near the town of Hobyo.
The same day EU NAVFOR made its announcement, forces from the Somali jihadist group link nid="160822">al Shabaab reportedly moved in on the pirate haven of Harardhere</link, prompting some pirates to flee the town. This is the first time that al Shabaab militants have been reported operating in this area of Somalia.
These incidents indicate two things: First, that foreign navies are willing to pursue Somali pirates close to shore; and second, that on land, al Shabaab could putpressure on the pirates in their safe havens.
STRATFOR previously has noted an<link nid="155767">increase in the seizure or destruction of pirate motherships</link> off the Somali coast by EU NAVFOR and other anti-piracy operations, like the U.S.-backed Combined Task Force 150. Eliminating these motherships is key to diminishing Somali pirates' capabilities. The motherships -- often hijacked fishing vessels -- are used as floating launch pads from which the pirates can conduct attacks using smaller, more maneuverable boats. They increase the pirates' range and the duration the pirates can stay out on the water looking for targets. The increased operations against these motherships could very well account for the 59 percent decrease in attacks in the Gulf of Aden during the first quarter of 2010 compared to the same period last year.
INSERT MAP
However, pirates are responding to the increased naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden (which began in 2008) by expanding their area of operations. The pirates are shifting from the Gulf of Aden to the sea lanes in the <link nid="151427">Indian Ocean</link> that run between the Seychelles and the coasts of Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique. The shift to the south means the pirates are operating in a far larger area -- one that cannot be efficiently covered by international maritime forces. Pursuing pirates closer to land, then, allows foreign navies to cut pirates off in a more limited (albeit more dangerous) geographic region.(I can't quite tell what this sentence is supposed to mean -- if the pirates have moved, they've moved. Are we saying it's better to get at them as they're leaving Somalia, before they can get to the Indian Ocean?(This line is referring to the NAVFOR operation that pursued pirates closer to shore. It’s easier to patrol a coastal swathe than the entire western Indian ocean)
The April 24 operation carried out by the HNLMS Johan de Witt showed that international forces are willing to go closer to shore, but not go on land to remove pirates from their onshore havens. Known pirate towns along the eastern and northern Somali coasts -- such as Hobyo, Haradhere and Eyl -- provide safe havens for pirates. Even when they lose a mothership or supplies or fighters, the pirates can always retreat back to their homes and gather their strength to strike again.
Their ability to establish themselves in these towns means the pirates can develop tactics and systems and continue to use them over and over again, without facing the risk of being chased out of their bases and having to develop new methods of doing business.For example, villagers in some pirate towns have started "investing" in pirate activities, providing the pirates funding and supplies in order to grow their operation with the promise of payouts when the ransom payments come in. Having a stable community like this allows pirate activity to flourish and gives everyone in town a stake in their activities, making them a crucial part of the local economy -- especially when there are virtually no other economic prospects in these towns nearly as lucrative as piracy.
Pirates can operate on land in Somalia with impunity. The Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has no way of projecting power over many parts of Mogadishu, much less central and northern Somalia where the pirates operate. Furthermore, the TFG is focused on extending its influence in central and southern Somalia, where it has at least announced it intends to carry out more offensives against al Shabaab.
Foreign naval forces do not appear to be preparing to launch raids on these pirate towns.However, the April 26 targeting of Harardhere is significant, as it indicates that al Shabaab has the ability to put pressure on the pirates from land.
Al Shabaab's main strongholds are in <link nid="153973">central and southern Somalia as well as several pockets of the capital of Mogadishu</link>. STRATFOR sources say most of al Shabaab's forces are dedicated to defending its positions in these areas, but the group is also engaged in fighting with the TFG and its supporters on link nid="153973">several fronts</link>.Extending itself into pirate havens would require al Shabaab to use more precious manpower and resources, since the people who support pirate activity would certainly not welcome al Shabaab fighters into their town.The organization does have sympathizers all across Somalia, including the semi-autonomous region of Puntland and the autonomous region of Somaliland. Al Shabaab has <link nid="126163">attacked these areas before</link>, and regularly makes known its plans to do so again. However, logistics and geography serve as dual constraints on the jihadist group's ability to turn all of what is commonly thought of as Somalia into its own mini-caliphate. (great sentence)
It is unclear what the al Shabaab fighters' intentions were in the raid on Harardhere, but they probably were not conducting anti-piracy operations out of international goodwill. Pirates in Harardheere were holding a British couple hostage in Harardheere and asking for $2.5 million for their release. Al Shabaab, which had reportedly once offered the couple's abductors around $1.8 million, might have been attempting to steal these hostages from the pirates in order to claim the ransom for itself.
Al Shabaab’s latest activity does not mean that pirate activity is anywhere near over, though. It appears that Al-Shabaab has already left the area, which means that the pirates who left are likely to return soon. Furthermore, havens such as Harardheere and other towns further north have nothing to offer al Shabaab besides pirate revenue.Therefore, there is no reason for al Shabaab to go into these towns and stop piracy. Al Shabaab might get some thanks from Western forces patrolling the waters off the coast of Somalia, but no anti-piracy activity from al Shabaab could counteract the strategic threat its jihadist ideology poses to the West.
STRATFOR will continue to monitor for similar moves from al Shabaab.If the jihadist group continues advancing on piratetowns, it does not mean that piracy will end. Without piracy, pirate havens such as Harardhere are not worth the energy al Shabaab would have to exert to gain control over them.