FINAL
disarmament, demobilization & reintegration
somalia militia
(With recommendations for possible World Bank, and expanded TFG and International Community engagement on DDR)
Ted Morse, May, 2005
World Bank Consultant Nairobi, Kenya
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......
INTRODUCTION......
I.Context......
II.What is DDR in the Somali Context? Why is a Program Needed, Now......
A.What is Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration?......
B.Is the DDR Term Applicable in Somalia?......
C.The Lexicon of Post-Conflict DDR and Reconstruction in Somalia......
D.Why is a Comprehensive, Intergrated DDR Program Needed, Now?......
E.Is the Reintegration Component Ready if Peace Breaks out in Mogadishu?......
III.Current Status of DDR Papers......
A.Summary Comments on the Status of DDR......
B.Summary Comments on the SDPU Paper on DDR......
C.Comments on the Rapid Assistance Programme (RAP) (With Reference to DDR)......
D.Comments on the TFG Relocation Plan (With Reference to the DDR Section)......
E.Comments on the Mogadishu Security & Stabilization Plan......
F.Comments on the Concept Note on DDR......
G.Comments on the Reintegration References in the SDPU Draft Final Report......
H.SDPU/ Civil Society Consultations......
I.Technical Working Group......
J.UNDP Somalia DDR Project......
IV.Status of International Community Views on Somalia DDR......
A.Different Donor Approaches to DDR......
B.Regional Status of DDR......
V.What DDR Actions are Needed, Now......
A.Management Steps......
B.Program Steps......
C.Three Broader DDR Challenges Facing Somalia Action......
VI.Recommendations for World Bank Consideration of DDR......
A.World Bank Involvement in DDR/ Reintegration......
B.Option 1: World Bank Technical Assistance and Training in Reintegration......
C.Option 2, 3 and 4: Full, Phased or No Involvement......
D.Linkages of Somali DDR AND Ex-Militia Reintegration with Economic Recovery......
E.Integrated Planning......
List of Figures......
List of Annexes......
Bibliography......
Acronyms......
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Context of somalia DDR
Somalia has been plagued by instability most of its 45 years history. After over 14 failed attempts at peace to build a new central government, the current (2002-2005) National Reconciliation and Peace Process, Somalia is still fractured. Multiple militias make the capital, Mogadishu and several key regional centers, insecure. However, there is great pressure to succeed at peace this time. Negotiations of differences continue and self-help is evident.
The transition to a new central government is a fluctuating work in progress. Continued existence of an estimated 53,000 militia constrains state building and sets the requirement for DDR.
what is DDR in the somali context? why is a DDR program needed, now
The usual application of the DDR concept does not fit Somalia's unique situation in regard to militias. Few will be totally disarmed. Important types of militia probably will not be disbanded. Many do not need to be reintegrated into their home communities. New concepts and terms are needed. These are suggested. New planning is needed for a national DDR program. A Mogadishu contingency plan is recommended.
Arms control and alternative livelihoods are more applicable terms than DDR. Planning is needed now to be prepared for DDR actions, which will be required sooner or later.
current status of DDR PAPERS
The focus on political negotiations and security predominate in current DDR planning, to the neglect of integrated DDR planning. There are multiple earlier Somali DDR papers, pilots, studies, profiles and small DDR activities. None constitute a workable national DDR plan, integrated with a national security strategy. There is no leadership within the TFG or international community on introducing a national DDR program. There is no agreement on approach or a joint structure to plan a national DDR. Comments on the key DDR documents are offered. The international community driven Somali Demilitarization Planning Unit was just dissolved after being pulled in too many directions to finalize DDR plans. TFG and IC decisions are needed on SDPU recommendations, including deciding on a way forward for DDR in Somalia.
Integrated national DDR planning is a void in Somalia.
Status of international community views on somalia DDR
In the absence of Somali government or international community leadership on militia DDR, the international community is much divided on key DDR issues. Different donor views on the DDR issues are summarized. It will take good leadership and focus on a common security task to compromise the donor differences.
Many donors have been and are willing to be involved in DDR. None appear ready to lead a comprehensive, integrated national DDR program.
what DDR actions are needed, now
Peace will break out sooner or later and the DDR component does not now exist to respond to a political breakthrough. If peace stalls, it allows time to prepare for an integrated national DDR, which ultimately will be required. Management and program suggestions are made for immediate action by the TFG and international community. The TFG needs to decide on which transitional structure will ‘sponsor’ DDR; the organization and staff for planning DDR needs to be established. Vision and principles are needed to guide the planning and ultimate implementation.
Planning must be collaboratively done and synchronized with other restructuring planning. Unique reintegration solutions must be found. Management structures must be established. Raising tens of millions of dollars must start. Training and accountability systems must be put in place. Difficult expectations must be managed before they subvert a DDR program before it starts.
Action must start now on the management and program steps to develop a comprehensive national DDR program.
recommendations for World Bank consideration oF DDR
Four options are presented: assist reintegration planning, only; Bank involvement now in the entire DDR process; phased involvement from reintegration assistance to leading on a national comprehensive DDR program; or do not get involved at all.
It is recommended the World Bank get involved in Somalia DDR, on a phased basis of increasing level of involvement if conditions continue to be positive.
Initially, it is recommended the Bank fund technical assistance for planning the reintegration component of DDR if specified conditions are met. Also fund a comparative experience trip to African DDRs, to build Somali capacity to implement DDR. Reintegration planning involvement will produce insights on political, security, strategy, organizational, program and funding conditions needed for disarmament and demobilization decisions. They should be a part of a comprehensive, integrated DDR process. Justification for the Bank’s involvement is suggested along with linkages to other planning for Somalia recovery.
The Bank needs to decide on the type and level of involvement it will support, if at all, in Somalia DDR of militias. Then the DDR work can be synchronized with the Bank’s other pre-economic recovery preparations and TFG and international community state building and security sector reforms.
IF SOMALIA DDR FAILS, OTHER RECOVERY WORK WILL FAIL
INTRODUCTION
The terms of reference for this consultancy asks for an understanding on the status of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) for Somalia and recommendations of what, if anything, the World Bank might do in this field. By the security, economic and social character of DDR it is of interest to the Bank in the post-conflict transition to reconstruction and economic recovery. In the context of a broader security and recovery program, this paper concentrates on the Bank’s interest in DDR, with an initial focus on reintegration and a recommended phased involvement.
Figure 1: Somali Peace Process and Transition
ALL SECTORS STATEBUILDING(RECONCILIATION)
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
(RECONSTRUCTION)
(ECONOMIC RECOVERY)
D
D
C/B FOR FM / SECTOR PRE-PLANNING / R
DDR is only one part of security sector reform. They are only one part of the total state building that must take Somalia from a failed state to a functioning state.
Along with the capacity building for future Somalia financial management, and pre-planning in Somali community development, livestock, fisheries etc sectors, World Bank involvement in DDR of ex-militia can be a learning experience for expected Bank future involvement in Somalia reconstruction and economic recovery. But Bank help in DDR has value for its own sake:
If militias go back to conflict for lack of optional livelihoods, all other peace and recovery efforts will cease.
Ted Morse: May, 2005
Methodology
The methodology used for this report was several steps of inquiry, preliminary findings, cross-checking validity and reportdrafting.
Before deploying to the field, extensive research was done as background to the assignment. The World Bank provided several current documents on the peace process and DDR to complement the background reading. Consultations were held in Washington and Nairobi and with the Bank conflict manager from Ethiopia to focus the task. An outline of investigation was prepared and reviewed with the Bank oversight officer in Nairobi. This was followed by over thirty meetings with over seventy people in Nairobi and Addis Ababa knowledgeable about different aspects of DDR for Somalia. Insecurity inside Somalia and Somalia’s transitional government staff preoccupation with political and security matters resulted in only two meetings with Somali authorities in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Multiple DDR papers and reports were collected and analyzed. The line of investigation was to:
- Determine the current status of DDR for Somalia.
- Identify constraints and opportunities for Somalia DDR.
- Listen to suggestions for possible World Bank help, or not, in Somalia DDR.
In every meeting, it was made clear the World Bank did not intend by this consultancy to take a lead on Somalia DDR. There have been no decisions regarding Banks involvement in DDR. The Bank was continuing to focus on financial management and macro-economic capacity building for the day when Somalia’s debt arrears might be solved.
The report is prepared for the World Bank. But it is hoped it will be useful to the TFG and international community to raise awareness and result in action on DDR for Somalia.
Two clarifications may be helpful to guide the reader. Because the term “DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration” is in common use, it is retained in most of this report. However, Somalia’s unique situation requires a more applicable term: “arms control and alternative livelihood” is recommended, but not used here until stakeholders make the decision on acceptable terminology. Second, the words “integrated, comprehensive, and national” are used to describe a future DDR program for Somalia. An effective DDR program must be integrated with the peace process, national security strategy, state building, economic reconstruction, reconciliation, etc. An effective DDR must not be just removal of militias off the street or removal of intimidating extra government check points. It must encompass every facet of moving war lords and militias into law abiding, reconciled, sustainable alternative livelihoods. There has been, and continues to be, good DDR work by the UN, INGOs, civil society and the international community. But integrated, comprehensive programs must be planned and implemented throughout the country to avoid vacuums and regional insecurities arising from regional differences.
Appreciation
Appreciation is expressed to the many people who shared their insights during interviews. (Annex 24 is a list of meetings held.) Special thanks go to Per Wam, Priya Gajraj and Ingo Wiederhofer from the World Bank who guided this effort. The mission would not have been possible without the full support and timely scheduling by Lucy Kangarua and professional report preparation of Peter Ireri.
- Context
Somalia has been plagued by instability most of its 45 years history. After over 14 failed attempts at peace to build a new central government as well as the current (2002-2005) National Reconciliation and Peace Process, Somalia is still fractured. Multiple militias make the capital, Mogadishu, and several key regional centers insecure. However, there is great pressure to succeed at peace this time. Negotiation of differences continues and self-help is evident.
The transition to a new central government is a fluctuating work in progress. Continued existence of an estimated 53,000 militia constrains state building and sets the requirement for DDR.
Despite being a relatively homogenous society, Somalia has been an unstable country since independence from Italy and Great Britain in the 1960s. A military coup, three major armed conflicts, a legacy of state corruption and oppression, deep clan divisions and state collapse marked the first 30 years. The next ten years were equally unstable. Armed conflict by clan-based militias, a massive famine, diverted food aid, disastrous US and UN interventions and two failed major peace attempts continued to plague the country. The Northwest and Northeast administrations were reasonable exceptions. Since the mid-1990s, the nature, duration and intensity of warfare in Somalia has changed significantly. That gave opening to the 2000 Arta Peace conference, which resulted in a Transitional National Government (2000-2003). It faced internal and regional opposition and was not dedicated to transparent state building. It ultimately failed. In Mogadishu, central and southwest Somalia, armed militias exercised territorial control through extortion, intimidation and fighting among themselves. Despite set backs, Somaliland (Northwest) and Puntland (Northeast) maintained a modicum of peace and progress. Somalia continues to be the only ‘failed state’ in the world.
The latest attempt to broker peace and revive a central government in Somalia began in October 2002. It was undertaken by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with the Kenyan government hosting and external partners such as the EU, the AU and the UN, providing support. A rather inclusive approach was taken to the cessation of hostilities and drafting a blueprint for a Transitional Charter, Transitional Federal Government and Transitional Federal Parliament. The parliament elected a Transitional President, who selected a Prime Minister, who in turn appointed a cabinet, which was ratified by parliament in January 2005.[1] The power sharing negotiations behind this process have encountered multiple problems, but the peace process continues to evolve. The reconciliation phase, which required participants to address key conflict issues, has not been successful. The lack of reconciliation is at the core of differences, which split members in the TFG and TFP, and threatens the peace process even today. Those differences have delayed relocating the transitional institutions from Kenya to Somalia. They reflect differences on several issues including the roles of foreign troops in demilitarizing the country, especially the historical capital of Mogadishu. Disarming and controlling the multiple militias is critical to sufficient security to allow the transitional institutions to relocate inside Somalia.
The Transitional Federal Government says it cannot enter Mogadishu because it is too insecure. It is made insecure by the intimidation and control of different parts of the city by different militias. It is estimated there are 11-15,000 militia people controlling Mogadishu (out of national estimates ranging from 50,000 to 200,000).[2] The militia throughout the country periodically fight each other for control of lucrative parts of the cities ports, airports, etc, or control of transport routes where they can demand ‘protection money’ in exchange for ‘safe passage.’ Other militia have personal agendas, to assert power and control; the militia have religious agendas – to enforce sharia court interpretations. Other militia have clan agendas, that range from community protection, retaliation or extending clan influence for business, economic, political or territory/land purposes.
Several key Mogadishu-based war lords are members of the TFG or TF Parliament. They have returned to Somalia with an estimated 100 members of Cabinet and Parliament. They have drawn up a Mogadishu Security and Stabilization plan, to pacify the city, to make it possible for the TFG to relocate there. (See section III.E.). The “pre-demobilization” could be a significant DDR self-help measure or a power/turf move. It should be monitored closely.
The two main political factions are negotiating their differences. Soon it will be possible to tell if these differences will stall or abort the peace process, or succumb to the great pressures to compromise, allowing the process to move forward, maybe even quickly. It is within this context of instability, political wrangling and continued militia control, that the consideration of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militias is taking place. Some good work has been done on disarmament and demobilization, but not to the point of having an agreed, implementable national plan.
The commonly used characteristics of militias are:
Freelance – Armed Youth
Factions – Political Warlords
Business– Businesses Protection/Expansion
Courts– Enforce religious interpretations
Clan – Protection, Retaliation, Expansion
Disaggregating types of militia and crafting differing DDR approaches will be essential. Conceptually, the following could be a basis for discussion:
Clan and Court militias Community based options?
Business militiasConvert to Private Guard Services?
Faction and Freelance militias Consider individual treatments?
Hard-core/ Technicals Convert to controlled police back up strike forces or consider individual treatments
Mid-level leaders Separate treatment – leadership roles or send out country?
Spoilers/Resisters Confront or charge as criminals
It is important to make this distinction: Somalia is a failed state – meaning the failure to have a central government authority. In the absence of central government, Somali society continues to find ways to meet its basic needs and conduct economic activity. Somali society has not failed itself, except to control security in some areas. There is capacity and activity. Great care must be taken during DDR and state building not to override existing, positive activity.
Again, the very existence of militias sets the context for DDR in Somalia.