The Right of Peaceful Assembly in the A.C.T

THE RIGHT OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY IN THE A.C.T.

Occasional Paper No. 8
February 1985

Australian Government Publishing Service
Canberra 1985

ISSN 0810-0314 ISBN 0 644 03893 4
Occasional Paper No. Occasional Paper No. / 1
2 / Incitement to Racial Hatred: Issues
and Analysis, October 1982.
Incitement to Racial Hatred: The
International Experience, October 1982.
Occasional / Paper No. / 3 / Words that Wound:. Proceedings of the
Conference on Freedom of Expression and
Occasional / Paper No. / 4 / Racist Propaganda, February 1983, Compendium of Human Rights Courses in
Australian Tertiary Institutions, August 1983.
Occasional / Paper No. / 5 / Aboriginal Reserves By-Laws and Human
Rights, October 1983.
Occasional / Paper No. / 6 / The Teaching of Human Rights, August
1984.
Occasional / Paper No. / 7 / Epilepsy and Human Rights, October

1984.

This is the eighth of the Human Rights Commission's Occasional Papers series. Occasional Papers are issued by the Commission from time to time to deal in depth with a particular problem or subject.

The views expressed or implied in this Occasional Paper do not necessarily represent the views of the Human Rights Commission or its members on the subject and should not be identified as such.

Contents

PREFACE / Page Nos
1

Part IBACKGROUND

Ch.1Introduction4

Ch.2Anzac Day Legislation in the A.C.T.11

1980-1984

Part IITHE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

Ch.3The Perception of the Right of Assembly20

Ch.4Common Law Prevention and Control Measures32

Ch.5Statutory Prevention and Control Measures69

Ch.6Criminal and Tortious Liability105

Part IIITHE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND THE INTERNATIONAL

COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS142

Part IVCONCLUSION176

Summary of Recommendations184

Table of Cases186

Select Table of Legislation191

Bibliography194

Appendix 1
Appendix 2 / Statistics on Demonstrations in the A.C.T.207
(a)Submission to the Department of Territories and Local Government209
(b)Copy of Proposed Public Assemblies Ordinance225

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This Occasional Paper was prepared by Mr Robin Handley, then a Lecturer at the Canberra College of Advanced Education, while he was attached to the Human Rights Commission under the Public Service Board's Interchange Program. It was completed by him after he had finished his attachment to the Commission. The Commission acknowledges, with gratitude and appreciation, the skill, time and effort put in by Mr Handley in preparing this Paper, both during the time he was with the Commission and afterwards.

PREFACE

In March 1982, the Human Rights. Commission instituted a public inquiry on the right to freedom to expression as set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 19 of the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and invited submissions from the public.

Article 19(2) and (3) states:-

2.Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

3.The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a)For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b)For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

One area of concern revealed in the submissions received was the extent to which laws governing freedom of assembly restricted the right to freedom of expression.

2.The Human Rights Commission, noting that the right to
peaceful assembly was a specific right guaranteed by Article 21 of the International Covenant decided to have a separate inquiry into the right of peaceful assembly in the A.C.T.

Article 21 states:-

The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right

other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or

morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

The inquiry was restricted to the A.C.T. because the Human Rights Commission's jurisdiction does not cover State

legislation on this subject, and also because at that stage it was aware of pending changes to the relevant legislation in the A.C.T.

3.It invited Mr Robin Handley Lecturer at the Canberra College of Advanced Education who was then attached to the Human Rights Commission under the Public Service Board's Interchange Program to research the subject, consider public submissions received, and to prepare this Occasional Paper. Mr Handley had made a special study of the laws relating to public assembly as part of his research for his LL.M degree at the Australian National University.

4.Although the Occasional Paper concentrates on the laws relating to public assembly in the A.C.T. the points made in this Paper would have relevance generally to the laws of the States as well and the Commission is hopeful that this Occasional Paper would prove useful to persons interested in the laws relating to public assemblies in the States and Territories (other than the A.C.T.).

5. The Commission has left open, for later consideration, the

desirability of an examination of State laws which by virtue of the Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970 apply to public assemblies held in Commonwealth places in the States and invites persons who may have an interest in this subject, to forward their comments to the Commission, as to whether they feel such an examination would be useful.

PART I: BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Meetings and Demonstrations

6.Recognition of the right to peaceful assembly concerns freedom to organise and participate in demonstrations and public and private meetings. In this context, although the word 'assembly' is generally only thought of as meaning those assemblies which take the form of demonstrations and public or private meetings which involve some protest or action, it does, of course, include assemblies in the widest sense of the word meaning a 'gathering of people' which eccompasses other forms of assembly performing community functions, many of which have become institutionalised. This needs some amplification.

7.Assemblies are a fundamental part of the life of every community. People assemble for a variety of reasons: to engage in political discussion or air political grievances; to participate in religious ceremonies; for social or recreational purposes; in the course of employment; to adjudicate disputes and criminal prosecutions. Without assemblies basic community functions could not be fulfilled. Recognition of the fundamental importance of particular assemblies in the conduct of community functions has in many cases led to their institutionalisation, and to their acceptance as a part of the normal order of things. For example, the assembly in which power to govern the community is founded, has become a parliament. Religious assemblies have become institutionalised in the church. Social and recreational assemblies have adopted institutionalised forms: race meetings, athletics fixtures, football and cricket matches, dances, bingo meetings, clubs. Groups of employees have adopted institutional form in trade unions. The adjudication of disputes and criminal prosecutions has become a function of specialised courts of law.

8.These institutionalised assemblies are not generally envisaged as the subject of the right of assembly. And, indeed, for most practical purposes it is only in relation to demonstrations and protest or action meetings that questions concerning recognition of the right of peaceful assembly arise. Accordingly, in this Occasional Paper discussion of the right of peaceful assembly is limited to this narrower category of assemblies.

Rights

9.Article 21 of the ICCPR refers to the 'right' of peaceful assembly. But what does it mean to say that one has a right to do something? Definition in this area is difficult and has long perplexed philosophers and jurists. The problem seems to lie with differences in how the word 'right' is used and understood, especially among lawyers, philosophers and the public generally. Indeed, it seems now to be widely accepted that any abstract definition is bound to be misleading and that one must examine the typical context in which the word is used in order to understand the meaning of the word when it performs that function.5

10.An examination of the use of the word lrightl5 indicates that it can be used in three senses. First, a right in the widest sense is a claim derived from some moral standard or rule of law.7 This is a sense in which the word is commonly used in everyday speech. Secondly, a right in a more restricted sense is a claim recognised though not necessarily enforceable by law. Thirdly, a right in the narrowest sense is a claim not only recognised by law, but for violation of which the law provides a specific remedy. Some jurists contend that such 'positive' rights are the only ones which should be accorded the description 'rights'.

11.A consideration of the relevant law in Australia shows that the right of peaceful assembly belongs in the second category of this analysis. The law recognises the assembly as lawtul to the extent that there are no restrictions on it, but provides no specific legal remedy for violating that lawful 'activity. Remedies may be available as a result of the violation' but'auch remedies derive from coincidentally violating other 'positive' rights, for example that of personal physical security.8 Thus, the right of peaceful assembly is, in Australia, often more closely defined as a residual 'freedom'. The 'right' comprises the residue of freedom left over when account is taken of allthe many restrictions imposed by law. Hence, reference is commonly made to the freedom of assembly rather than the tight of assembly,

The Right of Assembly in a Liberal Democracy

12.'Definitions of democracy vary considerably. Some theorists regard liberal democracy as a set of mechanisms or procedures, designed to ensure a high level of government accountability to the electorate:9 others stress the underlying attitudes of tolerance, co-operation and fair play which ensure that these mechanisms and procedures are .effective. In most definitions, however, either 'consent' or

'participation' is a key notion,10 and both presuppose protection of the rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.'

These rights are essential to the very existence of our democratic system of government. Furthermore, the ultimate goal of a democracy is the liberty of the individual: the state of being free - free to act, free to choose, free from restraint or compulsion. 11

13.The right to freedom of expression and the right of peaceful assembly are obviously closely associated: the right to assemble in meetings and demonstrations provides the opportunity to exercise freedom of expression. As Lord Denning recognised in Fubbard v. Pitt (1976), exercise of

the right to demonstrate and the right to protest ... is often the only means by which grievances can be brought to the knowledge of those in authority - at

any rate with such impact as to gain a remedy. 12

A demonstration is a way for groups with no other community voice to mount an effective protest where the money, education or organisational experience essential to some other avenues of protest is lacking. 13

14. Demonstrations and meetings have ,achieved a,greater impact in recent years as a result of television and radio reporting, permitting ,instant communication of sound and pictures to a mass audience nationally and internationally. 14 But this has posed its own problems. Irresponsible reporting can produce a distorted impression of an incident. The over-exposure of

a handful of demonstrators 'acting up' in front of the cameras can easily antagonise an otherwise sympathetic public.15 Accurate, balanced and responsible reporting is essential.

15One of the dangers of a meeting or demonstration is its
potential volatility. Where there are a large number of interacting persons, their behaviour is not always governed by 'established norms. People in a crowd may attain a .state of heightened arousal, susceptible to contagious passions, and impulses which are ordinarily suppressed or controlled may be acted upon 16 Someone or something can easily precipitate what began as a peaceful protest into violent disorder. Yet, public order is essential to the preservation of a democracy in order to enable citizens to participate freely in their community government. The problem is how to prevent and control violence and disorder, without limiting the right of peaceful assembly. To quote Lord Scarman:

Civilised living collapses - it is obvious - if public protest becomes violent protest or public order degenerates into the quietism imposed by successful oppression. 17

16. No right is absolute. In the case of the right of peaceful assembly, the community accepts, and Article 21 of the ICCPR permits, that certain limitations may be justifiable in the interests of maintaining public order. There may also be a need to accomodate other conflicting rights: in the case of a large demonstration in a public place, the right of citizens who are not demonstrating to go about their everyday business without undue interference. In such a- case allowance has to be made for the rights of others, and a judgment made about the rights of each But in making such a judgment, the special importance of the right of peaceful assembly in a democracy must be

recognised.

Footnotes to Chapter 1

1. Lecturer in Law at the Canberra College of Advanced

Education on secondment to the Human Rights Commission during the first part of 1984.

The interpretation of Article 21 is examined in Part III.

.Relevant State and Northern Territory law apply to "Commonwealth places" in the States and Northern Territory by virtue of the Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970.

4..S•3(1) Human Rights Commission Act 1981 (Cwth).

5.E.g. Jeremy Bentham who warned that legal words demand a special method of elucidation:

We must never take [these] legal words alone, but consider whole sentences in which they play their characteristic role.

Quoted by H.L.A.Hart, "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence" (1954) 70 Ism 37, 41.

6.C.f. the analysis by W.N.Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (W.W.Cook ed. 1978). There are of course, many analyses. eg. Max Radin, "A Restatement of Hohfeld" (1983) 51 Barv. L. Rev. 1141; H.L.A. Hart "Bentham on Legal Rights" in A.W.B. Simpson (ed), Oxford Essays in Junsprudence (2nd Series 1973); F.K.H. Maher, "The Kinds of Legl Rights" (1965) 5 Melb. u.

14.Rev. 47.

7.F.E.Dowrick, "Introduction" in F.E. Dowrick (ed), Human Rights - Problems. Perspectives. Texts (1979) 1,8.

8.Actions may be for trespass (including assault and false imprisonment).

9.Carl Cowen, Democracy (1973) 7.

10.Robert Y Fluno, The Democratic Community: Governmental Practices and Purposes (1971) 66; Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (1976); Barry Holden, The Nature of Democracy (1974); C.B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (1966).

11.J.S.Mill, On Liberty (Oxford University Press ed. 1912) 18.

12.Hubbard v. Pitt [1976] 1 QB 142, 178.

13.Amitai Etzioni, Demonstration Democracy (1970) 18-20.

14.Ibid 12; James D. Halloran, Phillip Elliott and Graham Murdock, Demonstrations and Communications: A Case Study (1970).

15.Such 'acting up' may, however, be provoked by the media itself, as was probable in Ulster in May 1981: e.g. Observer, 10 May4981, p.4; The Times, 15 May 1981, p.9. See also Richard Clutterbuck, The Media and Political Violence (1982).

16.The classic work on the psychology of the crowd is Gustave Le Bon's, The Crowd (1896 English Translation). The most important recent study is Neil J. Smelser, Collective Behaviour (1962).

17.Lord Justice Scarman, The Red Lion Square Disorders of 15 June 1974, Cmnd 5919 (1975) para.5.

CHAPTER 2
ANZAC DAY LEGISLATION IN THE A.C.T. 1980-1984

17.The law concerning the right of peaceful assembly in the A.C.T. has undergone a number of changes in recent years, largely in response to demonstrations held or planned to be held on Anzac clay. It is appropriate that these changes in the law and the events which led up to them should be recited briefly here as the background to Part II of this Occasional Paper on the present state of the law.

18.On 25 April 1980, Anzac Day, a group of about 14 women, dressed in black, attempted to march at the end of the Anzac Day parade as a protest about women raped in war. Some carried placards: one read "Soldiers are Phallic Murderers"; another "Patriots Kill"; another "Heroes Rape". The placards, of approximately 65 by 50 centimetres in size, could be read at a distance of 20 to 30 metres. When the women ignored a police sergeant's instruction not to continue their march, they were arrested and charged with obstructing the police in the execution of their duty. All fourteen were convicted in the Canberra Court of Petty Sessions: eleven received fines of $200 each; three, who had previous convictions, were sentenced to one month's imprisonment. On appeal to the A.C.T. Supreme Court these convictions were set aside. Connor J. held that mere disobedience of a police officer's command to cease a lawful activity could not constitute the offence of obstruction of the police in the execution of their duty.1 Connor J.'s decision was delivered on 14 January 1981.

19.In the early part of April 1981, the Australian Federal Police and the Returned Services League (RSL) learned that a group of women were again intending to join the Anzac Day parade. The Minister for the A.C.T., Mr Michael Hodgman, said that he had received secret police information from a person who had infiltrated the Women Against Rape organisation, that the group of women intended to break up the parade. The Minister said later that he had been informed that the protest was being organised by Marxists and lesbians.2 These allegations were not subsequently substantiated. As a result of lobbying by the RSL and the Australian Federal Police, the Minister decided to amend the existing law. Two days before Anzac Day, there having been no consultation with members of the A.C.T. House of Assembly, nor with the locally elected representatives in the House of Representatives and the Senate, a Traffic (Amendment) Ordinance was gazetted, giving power to police officers of the rank of sergeant or above to direct any person not to take part in the Anzac Day parade where there were reasonable grounds for believing that that person might disturb or disrupt the parade.3 Any person disturbing or disrupting the parade or contravening a police officer's direction committed an offence punishable by a fine of up to $100.

20.Like other A.C.T. Ordinances, being delegated legislation, the Traffic (Amendment) Ordinance was made by Order of the Governor-General acting on the advice of the Federal Executive Counci1.4 In practice, the Governor-General acts on the advice of the responsible Minister, in this case, Mr Michael Hodgman. The Ordinance took effect on the date of its gazetta1.5 Thus, legislation with serious implications for civil liberty had been made without any opportunity for consideration by a legislative assembly. Two days after the Ordinance had taken effect, in the course of the 1981 Anzac Day parade, 64 demonstrators were arrested and charged, the majority under the new provision.,