TortsFall – 12’James Wegener

Negligence

  1. Duty

Preliminary Question: Is this an existing category or duty or an analogous situation? (Hill)

Some Recognized Affirmative Duties (p.8 and 9)

Donaghue is most regularly used unless new duty.

If yes, then Anns Test is not needed. If no, proceed with Anns.

  1. Does the relationship disclose sufficient (a) foreseeability and (b) proximity to establish a prima facie duty of care?

Who counts as neighbor? Donaghue v. Stevenson (p.4)

Who doesn’t? General (p.6), Unborn Children (p.7), Rescuers (p.8)

Consider expectations, reliance, representations, property interest… etc.

This is about specific policy considerations about this relationship

  1. If yes, are there any residual policy considerations which ought to negate or limit that duty of care?

Look at broad societal policy considerations

Other legal obligations, legal system, society generally - Kamloops (p.5)

Many looked at in Hill (p.5)

  1. Breach (Standard of Care)

Watt v. Hertfordshire County Council (p.11): Also consider Social Utility or Value

Menlove/Blythe (p.12): Must use objective test  reasonable objective person

Evidence for or against: Custom and Statutory Standards (p.13)

Higher Standard of Care: Physicians (p.15-16), Lawyers (p.16), Disabled People (p.12)

Lower Standard of Care:Young (p. 14), Mental Physical Disability (p. 15), Disabled People (p.12)

  1. Damage Flowing from the Breach (Causation)

‘But For’ Test(p.17)

  • If the loss would not have occurred “but for” the act of the defendant, then it is justified for defendant to compensate plaintiff (onus on plaintiff)
  • This is the general test. The other tests have very limited usages.

Inference or Reverse Onus (p.17)Material Contribution (p.18)

Table of Contents

Duty

General

Donaghue v. Stevenson (1932) UK

Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1978) UK – footnote 5, 6, 7 p. 290

Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board (2007) SCC

A Primer on Cooper v. Hobart (2001) SCC

Unforeseeable Plaintiff

Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad (1928) US - footnote 1 p. 322

Hay (Bourhill) v. Young (1943) UK

Duval v. Seguin (1972) Ont. – footnote 5 p. 323

Dobson v. Dobson (1999) SCC

Horsley v. MacLaren (1972) SCC

Good Samaritan Act RSBC (1996) - handout

Failure to Act – Affirmative Duties

Klar’s Categories of Affirmative Duties p. 334

Jordan House Ltd. v. Menow (1974) SCC

Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd. (1988) SCC) – footnote 9 p. 339

Stewart v. Pettie (1995) SCC – footnote 10 p. 339

Childs v. Desmormeaux (2006) SCC

Breach (Standard of Care)

Vicarious Liability

Evaniuk v. 79846 Manitoba Inc.

Unreasonable Risk

Bolton v. Stone (1951) UK

Paris v. Stepney County Council (1951) UK – footnote 8 p. 174

Watt v. Hertfordshire County Council (1954) UK – footnote 13 p. 176

The Reasonable Person

Vaughn v. Menlove (1837) UK

Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works (1856) UK

Carroll and Carroll v. Chicken Palace Ltd. (1955) Ont. – footnote 10 p. 183

Haley v. London Electricity Board (1965) UK – footnote 10 p. 183

Dziwenka v. The Queen in Right of Alberta (1972) SCC – class handout

Custom

Waldick v. Malcolm (1991) SCC

Statutory Standards

R. v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (1983) SCC

Gorris v. Scott (1874) UK

Ryan v. Victoria (City) (1999) SCC

Particular Cases

Heisler v. Moke (1972) Ont.

Nespolon v. Alford (1998) Ont. CA - Handout

Fiala v. Cechmanek (2001) AB. CA

Wenden v. Trika (1991) AB. CA – footnote 1 p. 215

Challand v. Bell (1959) AB.

Ter Neuzen v. Korn (1995) SCC – footnote 2 p.220

Reibl v. Hughes (1980) SCC

Brenner v. Gregory (1973) Ont.

Damage Flowing from the Breach (Causation)

‘But For’ Test

Kauffman v. TTTC (1959) Ont. CA

Reverse Onus and Inference

Snell v. Farrell (1990) SCC

Cook v. Lewis (1951) SCC

Material Contribution

Walker Estate v. York Finch General Hospital (2001) SCC

Resurfice Corp v. Hanke (2007) SCC

Clements v. Clements (SCC) 2012

Market Share

Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) US

Loss of Chance

Laferiere v. Lawson (1991) SCC

Duty

General

  • No duty, No Negligence
  • Traditionally, recognized categories of duties were worked through and this patchwork was expanded through analogy
  • These cases create a modern approach to duty

Donaghue v. Stevenson (1932) UK

  • “the categories of negligence are never closed” – need only refer to the standards of a reasonable man to determine whether any particular relationship gives rise to a duty
  • Plaintiff: consumer of ginger beer with decomposed snail in restaurant
  • Defendant: manufacturer of ginger beer
  • “golden rule”: you must not hurt your neighbor
  • A neighbor is anyone you can reasonably see as being closely and directly affected by your actions
  • Persons who are so closelyand directly affected by myact that I ought reasonably tohave them in contemplation
  • Due to the type of bottle, the server or restaurant would not be able to see inside the bottle or inspect the quality
  • Only the manufacturer could have prevented the damage
Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970) UK – footnote 4 p. 289
  • Re-examined the neighbor principle
  • Borstal boys are taken on a trip and escape their supervisors one night
  • They damaged a yacht at a nearby yacht club during the night
  • Unique Aspects: new instance, human actor intervention (supervisors), public policy
  • The courts said that foreseeability sets limits for the duty; not a duty to the whole world
  • The yacht club was nearby and it was foreseeable that the kind of act that caused the harm could happen if the borstal boys escaped, so the supervisors are liable
  • Public authorities (third party) can be liable in negligence

Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1978) UK – footnote 5, 6, 7 p. 290

  • Lays out a two part test
  • Part 1 is specific, and comes from Donaghue v. Stevenson
  • Part 2 is broad, and looks at policy considerations
  • Shortened Anns: (as revised over cases)
  1. If reasonable foreseeability and proximity, then prima facie duty.
  2. Is there any policy considerations which justify reducing prima facie duty?
Kamloops v. Nielsen (1984) SCC – footnote 7 p. 290
  • Emphasizes role of proximity and policy concerns in determining scope of liability
  1. Is there a sufficiently close relationship between the parties so that, in the reasonable contemplation of the defendant, carelessness on its part might cause damage to the person? If so, go to 2.
  2. Are there any policy considerations which ought to limit the duty?
  1. The scope of the duty
  2. The class of persons to whom it is owed
  3. The damages to which a breach of it may give rise

Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board (2007) SCC

  • Courts added an introduction step to Anns Test
  • Preliminary Question: Is this an existing category or duty or an analogous situation?
  • If yes, then Anns Test is not needed. If no, then proceed with Anns.
  • Re-worked Anns Test:
  1. Does the relationship disclose sufficient foreseeability and proximity to establish a prima facie duty of care?

This is about specific policy considerations about this relationship

  1. If yes, are there any residual policy considerations which ought to negate or limit that duty of care?

Look at broad societal policy considerations

  • Step 1 found a prima facie duty, but Step 2 did not find policy considerations that caused such reasonable negative effects as to negate or limit the duty of the officers
  • So there was a duty owed, then moved to standard of care issue

A Primer on Cooper v. Hobart (2001) SCC

  • Gives first introductory step that we see used in Hill
  • Hill means we no longer have to look here for the step
  • Apparently a good thing, as this case is really unclear and difficult to work through

Unforeseeable Plaintiff

  • No duty owed to unforeseeable plaintiff
General

Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad (1928) US - footnote 1 p. 322

  • Employee tries to assist a passenger onto a train, as a result, the passenger loses his package of fireworks from his grasp and they go off when they hit the ground
  • The exploding fireworks knock over a scale which in turn hits a woman (Palsgraf)
  • Courts found that though the employee owes a duty to the passenger, but they do not owe one to Palsgraf as she was not reasonable foreseeable
  • Test: whether a reasonable hypothetical observer could have reasonably foreseen the likelihood that anyone placed in the position of the plaintiff would be effected by events in the way the plaintiff was

Hay (Bourhill) v. Young (1943) UK

  • Plaintiff is a pregnant woman whose child was still born, which she alleges was a consequence of hearing a motorcycle crash
  • The plaintiff is suing the motorcyclist’s executor
  • The test was not passed here, it was not reasonably foreseeable that anyone in the position of the plaintiff would be effected the way she was when the accident occurred
  • If a plaintiff has a cause of action it must be because it is a wrong to herself, not secondary of building off a wrong to another
  • Duty is not to the world at large
Farrugia v. Great Western Ry. (1947) UK - footnote 3 p. 323
  • The defendant loaded a trick so high that when passing under a bridge a container was knocked off and fell onto the plaintiff
  • The defendant argued that the plaintiff was trying to jump on the truck as a trespasser when he was hit, so was not reasonably foreseeable
  • The court found that he was reasonable foreseeable, as the defendant owed a duty to anyone that happened to be in the neighborhood at the crucial moment
  • It is reasonably foreseeable that a container falling off the truck could hit anyone in the immediate neighborhood and injure them
Unborn Children

Duval v. Seguin (1972) Ont. – footnote 5 p. 323

  • Injury sustained to child while in womb, in the car accident
  • Reasonably foreseeable that a pregnant woman could be a driver
  • The born child is reasonably foreseeable
  • That such damage could occur due to a negligent motorist is foreseeable
  • The damage is “suffered” when child becomes living person

Dobson v. Dobson (1999) SCC

  • Mother was driving car negligently and got in an accident causing harm to unborn child
  • Majority: for public policy reasons a pregnant woman owes no duty of care to her unborn child
  • Maternal Immunity—motherimmune from common law actions in tort by her child forinjuries suffered by the child on or after birth.
  • Intrusive effects on right to privacy, bodily integrity, and autonomous decision making
  • The resolution of these privacy rights is an issue for the legislature, not the courts
  • Also does not meet primary purposes of tort law, compensation and deterrence
  • Majority cited the negative effects of inter‐family litigation, but they were really only suing so that they could get money from insurance company
  • Dissent: references Duval, there is a duty to born child
  • Dissent: also this concerns driving negligently, and no one has freedom to drive negligently
Rescue and Rescuers
  • In general, there is no duty to rescue
  • At common law, once a rescue is undertaken there is a duty to undertake the rescue non-negligently; rescuee is a foreseeable plaintiff

Horsley v. MacLaren (1972) SCC

  • At common law, a private carrier owes a duty to his passengers
  • Here a passenger slips and falls overboard (no negligence) and MacLaren attempts to rescue
  • MacLaren’s rescue attempts to maneuver the boat are ineffective; & passenger is unresponsive
  • Horsley dives into water to attempt rescue and he too becomes unresponsive; both men die
  • Does MacLaren owe a duty to the rescuer?
  • Denning in Videan (1963): “If the rescuer is killed or injured in the attempt, he can recover damages from the one whose fault has been the cause of it” – creation of peril
  • If MacLaren caused passenger to fall in, then he would be liable to passenger and any rescuer
  • If MacLaren was negligent in his rescue attempts, then this invites other rescuers and there would be liability to any subsequent rescuers
  • Majority: found that none of these situations applied, there was no duty owed to Horsley
  • The rescue attempt failed, but it was not sufficiently inept given the agony of the moment
  • Dissent: MacLaren owed a duty as a private carrier and he did perform the rescue negligently, so he did owe a duty to both the passenger and Horsley for both reasons
Saccone v. Fandrakis (2002) Can. – footnote 5 p. 408
  • Is there a duty owed to a rescuer of property?
  • “to acknowledge a duty of care… to persons who seek to protect their economic interests when there is no risk of further harm to person or property goes beyond the rational of the rescue cases… [and] would be an unwarranted extension of the law”
Ogwo v. Taylor (1987) UK – footnote 12 p. 410
  • Professional rescuers are foreseeable, but are held to a higher standard of care
  • Fireman have a duty to use best endeavors to extinguish fires
  • If a professional rescuer is negligent in his rescue and damages occur as a result, then he would be contributory negligent

Good Samaritan Act RSBC (1996) - handout

  • Meant to promote rescuers
  • There is no liability for emergency aid, unless gross negligence, for a person who arrives at the immediate scene of an act or emergency
  • Not unlike how the majority ruled in Horsley v. MacLaren

Failure to Act – Affirmative Duties

General
  • When there is an affirmative duty, there is liability for the failure to do something

Klar’s Categories of Affirmative Duties p. 334

  1. Relationships of economic benefit

Selling a product or a service

  1. Relationships of control or supervision

Teacher-student, parent-child, lifeguard-swimmer

  1. Creators of dangerous situations

Causing potentially harmful situations

  1. Reliance Relationships

Doctor-patient, rescuer

  1. Statutory Duties

Teachers, doctors

“Nonfeasance” and “Misfeasance”

Jordan House Ltd. v. Menow (1974) SCC

  • Does a tavern owe a duty to an intoxicated person?
  • It is a situation of economic benefit , creation of danger, control and supervision
  • There is no existing duty or analogous situation (preliminary question), so proceed with Anns
  • There is a prima facie duty
  • They then looked at step 2,
    residual policy considerations
  • Courts stated there was an affirmative
    duty to do something for Menow
  • Dissent: only duty to not overserve
Dunn v. Dominion Atlantic Ry. Co. (1920) SCC – In Jordan House p. 337
  • Looks at the right to removal of a disorderly passenger
  • It was found a duty was owed to the person
  • Courts stated that:cannot eject a passenger in such circumstances that, as a direct consequence, expose the passenger to danger or losing his life or serious injury

Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd. (1988) SCC) – footnote 9 p. 339

  • Plaintiff seriously injured himself during tubing contest; was intoxicated
  • Like Jordan House: creation of danger, control over situation, economic benefit, knowledge of intoxication and increased risk, provided liquor to person and measure available to avoid risk
  • Duty of care owed to an intoxicated person when the host is a promoter of risky activity

Stewart v. Pettie (1995) SCC – footnote 10 p. 339

  • Does a commercial host (restaurant) have a duty to third parties if their patron becomes intoxicated?
  • Here, Pettie drove and got in a car accident with Stewart
  • The restaurant served him past the point of intoxication
  • Yes, they have a duty to take positive steps
  • It is reasonably foreseeable that an intoxicated patron could leave and endanger other drivers if they got in a car and drove
  • However, as the intoxicated person was in a group with non-intoxicated people, it was reasonable to assume that one of the sober individuals would drive, so the drunk driving accident was not reasonably foreseeable

Childs v. Desmormeaux (2006) SCC

  • Does a social host have a duty to third parties if their guest becomes intoxicated?
  • No the social host was not liable
  • Differences from commercial host: no economic benefit, less control over situation, not institutionalized and no statutory duty, was not providing alcohol to guests, no training or special knowledge for monitoring intoxication
  • This is a novel duty, so Anns Test was run
  • It raises issues with foreseeability, and how it differs, and there are also policy considerations
  • Three new factors for proximity
  1. Creation and control of risk
  2. Concern for autonomy
  3. Reasonable reliance

Breach (Standard of Care)

Vicarious Liability

Evaniuk v. 79846 Manitoba Inc.

  • Not sure if this is the right place for this, but it needed to go somewhere
  • For vicarious liability you need:
  1. Employee-employer relationship
  2. Tort committed in the course and scope of employment

Unreasonable Risk

Bolton v. Stone (1951) UK

  • It is not the case the a person must not carry out or permit operations which may cause damage
  • Rather, a person is only bound to take into account the probability of such damage and determine the risk in regards to the safety of others, and then act accordingly
  • Here the act was foreseeable, but the risk was quite minimal
  • A reasonable person does not create unreasonable risk
  • Must look at:
  • Foreseeability of Risk
  • Probability or likelihood of Risk
  • Seriousness of the risk (gravity)
  • Prevention costs (not always applicable)

Paris v. Stepney County Council (1951) UK – footnote 8 p. 174

  • One eyed mechanic loses sight in good eye due to workplace accident
  • The likelihood of damage is the same as a two eyed employee
  • The seriousness is greatly increased, as now he is completely blind
  • Though usual practice was not to supply goggles, this was an unusual circumstance
  • Must consider the relevant circumstances
  • A reasonable employer would have provided goggles, they did not, so they are liable

Watt v. Hertfordshire County Council (1954) UK – footnote 13 p. 176

  • A heavy jack is used at a fire station and during transportation it falls on a worker
  • One must balance the risk against the measures necessary to eliminate the risk
  • Here the emergency was great, so the risk was deemed reasonable
  • They needed to hurry to rescue a person, and this created the risk
  • The saving of a life or limb justifies taking considerable risk – social utility

The Reasonable Person

Vaughn v. Menlove (1837) UK

  • Defendant warned plaintiff about hayrick’s combustibility; nothing done and does combust
  • Fire spreads to defendant’s property
  • Requires an objective approach
  • The objective reasonable man standard must be used

Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works (1856) UK

  • A reasonable person acts within the reasonable circumstances
  • Do not have to take precautions against unreasonable risk.
  • Here, the “water authority” behaved as a reasonable “water authority” would
  • It was not reasonable for them to foresee a severe frost with no prior occurrence of one
Prasad v. Frandsen (1985) BC. – footnote 8 p. 183
  • Does the reasonable person ever have an obligation to make inquiries?
  • Yes. But must look at circumstances
  • Here the foreigner was injured for not wearing a seatbelt and was found contributory negligent as she did not inquire into the usage of seatbelts or the law
Disabled People

Carroll and Carroll v. Chicken Palace Ltd. (1955) Ont. – footnote 10 p. 183