Peru: Consultation Meeting Report

Consultation Summary: Peru

Peru: Consultation meeting report

TOWARD GREATER TRANSPARENCY

Rethinking the World Bank’s

Disclosure Policy

Hotel Thunderbird

Lima, Peru

Tuesday, April 28, 2009

A consultation to gather feedback on the Bank’s draft approach paper “Toward Greater Transparency: Rethinking the World Bank´s Disclosure Policy” was held in Lima, Peru on April 28, 2009. The paper was provided in advance of the meeting to all those invited. Fifty seven participants attended the two hour consultation (list attached as an annex). Participants made relevant and well-informed comments. The entire event was recorded and a transcript is available at www.bancomundial.org.pe.

The agenda included welcoming remarks by Felipe Jaramillo, World Bank Regional Director for Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela and Laura Newman from the Carter Center, a short summary presentation of the approach paper by Mr. Jaramillo and remarks by Mr. Joshua Lichstenstein (Bank Information Center) that summarized comments made at a recent consultation event in Washington D.C.

The following is a thematic summary of the main comments made at the consultation. This summary was circulated among the participants before it was submitted formally to the Bank as a record of the discussion.

Summary of individual comments:

The World Bank and information disclosure

·  The approach paper lacks objectives that link access to information with the Bank’s mission, vision and objectives. It does not state how the disclosure policy will help promote higher efficacy and efficiency, empowerment and impact on development policies and poverty alleviation.

·  The Bank is a public organization and as such it needs to have an updated disclosure policy, like all public organizations do in member states.

·  There is a perception that the Bank has been a leader in promoting transparency and access to information in client countries and through an ongoing support to regional and state organizations but unfortunately its internal transparency is lacking. The international financial institutions should lead by example and support others to build a culture of transparency.

·  The Bank should lead by example, advancing not only in its external values but also ensure that those are in line with its internal values of transparency and openness.

·  The Bank’s disclosure policy should be consistent with those of client states and supported by civil society around the world.

·  The right to information is a fundamental human right. The document should make this explicit. Disclosure of information is not just something useful from the point of view of public management efficiency.

·  The policy should be explicit as to that the principles it upholds such as the right to privacy, etc. First of all these principles should be explicitly stated.

·  The Bank’s disclosure policy should be driven by the public interest, as it is a political, public, inter-governmental organization. It should not be driven exclusively by its own interest or those of its member countries.

Disclosure policy implementation plan and budget

·  The document does not include an implementation plan, schedule nor budget.

·  Public Information Centers in some countries do not have the necessary resources for appropriate access and disclosure of information.

·  The policy will not be complete without an explicit link to the Bank’s policy (and budget) for translation of documents.

·  It should be recognized that appropriate implementation of the new approach will require significant budgetary resources.

Negative list and exceptions list

·  Regarding the automatic dissemination “negative list” we are in favor of this change but we believe that the policy should still require a “positive list” and would like to have this list expanded.

·  The policy lacks a proposal as to what Board documents will be available.

·  Many civil society organizations want access to draft documents or deliberative documents. This is key to ensure that inputs are received before decisions are made, especially from communities affected or potential beneficiaries of Bank projects.

·  The policy should make available deliberative documents in order to realize the right of free prior and informed consent especially for indigenous communities.

·  All the exceptions should be based on proof of harm. But if there is a list of documents that are in the exceptions list these do not necessarily have a proof of harm. They should not be there but only if and only if there is a proof of harm if they are disclosed.

·  All deliberative documents should be published if they are not harmful.

·  The list of country documents in the exceptions is too broad and a bit vague; the policy gives the right to veto to third parties. This enables any third party officer to limit the right to information.

·  If someone is denied access to a certain document, proof of harm/damage needs to be explicitly provided.

·  To say that there is information that belongs to the countries or that require government approval for disclosure implies some will hold a clear veto on what becomes public. The relationship between the Bank and the member states needs to be spelled out (who discloses, when and how) otherwise there is a risk that they can hide behind each other to avoid disclosure.

·  Public reforms projects do not have an immediate but a longer term impact on the people; this makes it necessary that the documents of these types of projects be discussed well in advance of being implemented.

·  Regarding culture of transparency there is a section on Whistleblowers. This should be elevated to a point that the rights of whistleblowers will be protected. And the rights of whistleblowers should be extended to contractors.

·  Whether information is classified/confidential or not should not depend on third parties or on the people that produced the information. It is the innate quality of the information itself whether it should be classified or not.

·  The idea that an exception is accepted when a piece of information can generate a problem with a member country should take into consideration that any act of corruption could fall under this circumstance. The same could be said about paragraph 15 where information on contractors falls under the exceptions. What happens with fees paid to specialists within Bank financed projects and reports on investigations that have ended?

·  Exceptions to disclosure should based on the public interest, not that of the Bank or specific governments.

Appeals mechanism

·  The creation of the appeal mechanism is welcome. However, for it to be truly effective it must be really independent. A possibility is to set it up as an external panel, without a direct link to Bank management. A discussion is needed on what kinds of people could serve there.

·  A time frame of 20 to 30 days should be set to receive a reply to an appeal.

·  There should be some form of sanction, not criminal punishment, but some form of disapproval and indiscipline for staff who do not comply with the Bank’s disclosure policy.

·  Suggest you keep track of denials of information request. It will be useful for later analysis and revisions to the policy.

Equal access to information

·  Not everyone has equal access to information. Those with higher incomes and better education and connectivity enjoy greater access. The Internet can help make access more equitable though communities in remote areas may not be connected.

·  Given that one of the Bank’s primary objectives is to empower communities and that stakeholders have the right to participate, including indigenous communities (which have the right to free, prior and informed consent according to international laws), Bank documents need to be translated into national languages, and also when possible local languages. When possible, the Bank should use local people to translate.

Disclosure Periods

·  Twenty years for historical disclosure is too long. Five years should be a maximum. In some cases records of historical nature could proactively be disclosed and even made available before that, if no harm is done by releasing them sooner.

·  The time period for disclosure should not be a fixed term. As time elapses, the danger of harm may disappear, in which case the document should be made public. Hence, there should be a continuous assessment of the status of disclosure.

Other issues

·  The document does not spell out the procedures to request information or to appeal a decision. We would like to have the opportunity to revise and comment on these procedures as the devil is often in the details.

·  How is the Bank going to ensure that governments (national or local) that use Bank resources also guarantee access to information?

·  What happens with the disclosure policy of other institutions related to the WB, such as IFC? Will they adapt these policies?

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