A Case Study in Fraternization
Only days after a ship returned from deployment a story broke in several local newspapers: “Commanding Officer relieved for fraternization.” Navy spokesmen were careful to simply describe the relationship in question as “inappropriate.” The Executive Officer was relieved as well for knowing about the relationship but failing to take action. But as rumors circled throughout the Surface Warfare community it seemed as though no sexual relationship had existed.
Oftentimes fraternization is not black and white. But how could a Commanding Officer define an “unduly familiar” senior-subordinate relationship so drastically differently from his Commodore that it would lead to his relief? Officers in these two positions are generally only four years removed from each other; they are nearly peers. What's more, each has been hand-selected by a board of senior officers and has bested his peers in various career milestones throughout the past 15 to 20 years. These officers are simply the best the Navy has to offer.
The Elusive “Appearance of Impropriety”
Consider the following actions between a subordinate and a senior. Do any of them constitute fraternization by themselves?
The Commanding Officer goes out on liberty in a foreign port with a Department Head.
The Commanding Officer arrives at an official function overseas with a Department Head.
The Commanding Officer eats an early breakfast with a junior officer before meal hours.
A junior officer brings the Commanding Officer a plate of food in the wardroom.
The Commanding Officer watches a movie in his cabin with a junior officer.
The medical officer enters the Commanding Officer's cabin using the combination.
A junior officer is counseled behind closed doors in the Commanding Officer's cabin.
The majority of these actions, when considered singly, do not constitute fraternization. In fact, many would be lauded as proper mentoring on the part of the Commanding Officer, while others could be considered proper courtesies or even going “above and beyond” by junior officers. But read the list again, this time rewritten to demonstrate that in this case study, each of these actions are continually with the same individual:
The Commanding Officer only goes out on liberty in foreign ports with LT X.
The Commanding Officer frequently arrives at official functions overseas with LT X.
The Commanding Officer eats breakfast nearly every morning with LT X before meal hours.
LT X frequently makes the Commanding Officer a salad while at the salad bar in the wardroom.
The Commanding Officer watches movies in his cabin with LT X on several occasions and never with anyone else.
LT X enters the Commanding Officer's cabin using the combination.
LT X is frequently behind closed doors in the Commanding Officer's cabin.
It should become evident that although these actions seem relatively harmless individually, together they create the appearance of impropriety. Viewed in this light the Commanding Officer's relief should no longer be a mystery.
Perspective is Paramount
One serious question still remains, however: if this relationship appears inappropriate to the casual observer, how could the Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer not recognize it as such? Since both the author and the average reader have not earned a doctorate degree in Psychology, we may never be fully certain of the technical answer to this question. What we can be certain of is that their perspective is paramount to the issue. The Commanding Officer and Executive Officer did not perceive the appearance of impropriety from their vantage point, while the rest of the ship did. The Commanding Officer considered the department head in question simply as a confidant, and the Executive Officer accepted this answer when they discussed the relationship. The reader's dismissive answer here would be to avoid the situation entirely by following the age-old adage “it's lonely at the top.” Many Commanding Officers avoid personal relationships at all costs and take their counsel from senior mentors alone. When seeking council they choose to involve groups: the Executive Officer and the Command Master Chief, or the department heads. For the sake of valuable reflection, please don't assume you might never find yourself in this situation.
The command investigation revealed that the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and junior officer in question were the only three members of the crew that thought that the relationship was not “unduly familiar.” When other junior officers and even the Command Master Chief brought their (and their Sailors') perceptions to the Executive Officer, they were quickly dismissed. When a fellow department head directly emailed the Commanding Officer and junior officer in question, the junior officer replied in a derogatory and dismissive tone while the Commanding Officer remained silent. The issue was never brought directly to them again. The perception that the Commanding Officer had an unduly familiar relationship with the department head spread throughout the ship. While many junior Sailors simply snickered, others wondered what would occur if one of their ranks was disciplined for an inappropriate relationship with a shipmate. Many members of the Chiefs' Mess and Wardroom perceived that the department head in question was securing preferential treatment for her Sailors. While these sentiments alone are enough evidence of fraternization, in the course of the investigation email records revealed correspondence between the two that appeared to be inappropriately familiar and seemed to suggest a peer-to-peer friendship. Both officers and the Executive Officer were removed from the ship by the Commodore shortly after the investigation concluded.
It's Always a Team Effort
We've all heard it said that a team is greater than the sum of its individual members. Although the Commanding Officer is the most senior and most experienced officer onboard, he or she will never have all the answers. In this case, the perspective of the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer prevented them from correctly processing the situation. An important lesson for the Naval Officer can be emphasized here: continually and deliberately strain to listen to your team. Each enlisted Sailor has an area of expertise in his or her rating. Every Chief Petty Officer is recognized to be a subject matter expert. Officers are expected to be knowledgeable in their area of warfare qualification and to also have a general knowledge of wider-ranging Naval issues. And every Sailor has an opinion about command climate and the work environment. An officer at any rank that does not engage his team when making decisions of importance is almost certainly heading into shoal water.
Oftentimes listening to your Sailors will be easy and need not feel like a “deliberate strain.” However, in many circumstances – particularly with the delivery of bad news – some Naval officers have a tendency to “shoot the messenger.” When this happens, the officer will eventually find that bad messages will be delivered with less frequency, and sometimes not at all.
Along the same lines, often a perspective that one has not yet considered can seem threatening or disrespectful in a room full of “Type A” personalities. If dissenting views have a tendency of being dismissed they will eventually no longer be presented. In the above case, there was only one junior officer – another department head – who had the courage to address the situation, albeit through an email. While the Commanding Officer was dismissive, it turns out that his entire crew felt the same way as that single voice. If he were always tuned to listen to the dissenting voice, he may have taken heed. Naval officers must continuously encourage their teams that the only stupid question is the one that goes unasked, and the only stupid idea is the one that is not presented. CO's must encourage subordinate's feedback at all costs.
A Junior Officer's Dilemma
The lessons learned in this case should not stop with prospective Commanding Officers. Junior Officers have much to learn as well. A division officer, especially, can feel helpless in such a situation. What change could a recent college graduate really affect, especially when he or she only controls a handful of Sailors and spaces? One division officer in this case had this to say:
What could I possibly expect to gain from this situation? First and foremost, the Commanding Officer has far more experience than I in these scenarios. Surely he knows what the definition of fraternization is. This leads to two possibilities: either this isn't frat, or the CO doesn't care. Either way, my approaching the Commanding Officer could not lead to any change. If I'm wrong, at best the CO's opinion of me will lessen, while at worst this affront will be documented in my fitness report.
Again, a Commanding Officer needs to continually emphasize his approachability to his junior officers, and that actively insist that each member of the team truly matters. But the lesson for the junior officer here is that one's loyalty to a senior officer should never come at the cost of one's integrity. As this cannot be expressed more eloquently than in the words of Admiral J. C. Harvey, Jr., we will let him have the last word:
To stand-up, speak out and take action in support of the best interests of the Navy and in support of our core values - honor, courage and commitment - whenever we see those core values threatened or those interests undermined by an individual's behavior, whoever that individual may be and wherever in the chain-of-command that individual resides, is our duty. Doing your duty to the best of your ability, and knowing in your heart you have taken the right actions despite the possible repercussions on your career or your physical well-being, is its own reward. For those of us who have raised our right hands and sworn an oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies ...," doing one's duty without regard to possible consequences, good or bad, is the essence of our profession.
It is always to be hoped that properly performing one's higher duty for the good of the Navy will be appropriately recognized, be the matter large or small, by the chain-of-command as the particular issue is resolved. But as hard as so many good people in our Navy work to do the right thing under sometimes very difficult or challenging situations, there can be no guarantees your actions, however righteous, will be truly recognized for what they are and not leave you open to negative repercussions.[1]
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