Re: Gongos: Tools of Autocratic Misdirection

February 27, 2015

To: Professor Ekiert

From: Chris Carothers

Re: GONGOs: Tools of Autocratic Misdirection

Introduction

Recently, there has been an explosion of scholarship on the strategies authoritarian regimes employ to stay in power and fend off international criticism of their nondemocratic practices. One technique autocrats employ widely is the creation of GONGOs, the paradoxically named “government-organized non-governmental organizations.” These government-run NGOs are autocrats’ answer to the NGO boom the democratic world experienced in the 1980s and 1990s. GONGOs are specifically designed to mimic independent NGOs and therefore to be mistaken for autonomous, grassroots societal organizations. Through this sometimes elaborate charade, dictators “legitimize government policy, soak up foreign funding from genuine NGOs and confuse the public about who is in the right, the government or its critics” (Dobson 2012).

GONGOs are an understudied phenomenon. There are few scholarly studies comparing their use across authoritarian regimes, though some scholars have done single-country studies.[1] GONGO is not a common term. When used, it most often refers to organizations in China’s state-led civil society. Most definitions of GONGOs explain that these non-governmental organizations are state-led or significantly controlled by the state, but do not elaborate on this definition. GONGOs should be distinguished from state-led societal organizations under traditional state corporatism, for example.

This memo examines basic features and questions concerning GONGOs, including their distinguishing characteristics and basic typology, the existing literature on the topic, and key questions for future research.

Distinguishing Characteristics

Synthesizing the various definitions and cases scholars provide, I propose that the following key characteristics distinguish GONGOs from independent NGOs. This three-part characterization is certainly not exhaustive, but it serves to focus the discussion on what would otherwise be an unmanageably diverse array of social organizations with state loyalties.

1.  GONGOs are non-governmental organizations that are nonetheless created by and/or controlled by the state.

2.  GONGOs purposefully mimic Western NGOs in structure and style in order to obscure their close government ties.

3.  GONGOs represent a strategic autocratic response to the rise of the public-interest, “do-good” NGO model in new democracies in the 1980s and 1990s.

The Human Rights Society of China (HRSC) is a paradigmatic example. Started in 1993 by a former government spokesman, it was announced by state-run newspapers as an NGO (Ching 1994). The HRSC did not disclose its funding, but from the beginning had close ties to the government. In the 1990s it praised the Chinese government’s human rights record at international conferences of NGOs and countered U.S. accusations of human rights violations. In its first major report, the HRSC lambasted American human rights violations, comparing the U.S. situation unfavorably with China’s. For example, it noted that “more than 130 people in Washington froze to death during a blizzard in January, while in Beijing not a single person froze to death this year” (ibid 1994).

The purpose of the Human Rights Society of China is clear: to use the cover of NGO status both at home and abroad to distract attention away from the Chinese Communist Party’s human rights abuses. Even if the message is not altogether persuasive or successful, it can muddy the waters. Not knowing HRSC is a GONGO, an outside observer might reasonably conclude that some in Chinese society accept their government’s rather unique perspective on human rights.

Types of GONGOs

All GONGOs serve their authoritarian masters, but there are different types of organizations for different tasks. Drawing on cases discussed in the literature from China, Russia, Venezuela and other authoritarian states, it seems that there are essentially three varieties of GONGO. I call these the Propaganda GONGO, the Militant GONGO, and the Developmental GONGO. In practice, some GONGOs do have the characteristics of more than one type. I will briefly explain each kind of GONGO and give examples.

Propaganda GONGOs. The Propaganda GONGO is usually a small organization with a do-gooder name. Autocrats use it to defend their regime from foreign criticism or advance the regime’s political agenda. The Human Rights Society of China is a Propaganda GONGO. Another would be World Without Nazism: a Russian state-controlled organization claiming to be an NGO fighting to stop fascism. It labels Russia’s geopolitical opponents in Eastern Europe fascists and attempts to pedal pro-Russian propaganda to American state legislators.[2] The Moscow Bureau for Human Rights began as a somewhat independent organization but has become a GONGO as its ties to Russian government increased. Its director, Alexander Brod, sets up pro-government human rights conferences immediately after real NGOs hold critical conferences, creating confusion among outside observers (Dobson 2012). Cuba has also used GONGOs to its advantage for propaganda purposes. At a 2009 UN Human Rights Council meeting on Cuban human rights violations, representatives of Cuban GONGOs managed to secure eight of ten allotted NGO seats and proceeded to shower the regime with praise.[3]

Militant GONGOs. Militant GONGOs, by contrast, are not small outfits primarily for propaganda aimed at foreigners. These mass organizations are the foot soldiers of antidemocracy; they mobilize in the streets to counter anti-government protests, crowd out independent civil society, and harass democracy advocates and opponents of the regime. Probably the most powerful Militant GONGOs in the 21st century has been Nashi. Nashi (or ‘Ours’) is a “patriotic, pro-Kremlin youth organization” launched at a mass rally in 2005 (Hemment 2012). Nashi mixes ideology and propaganda with identity politics and some material incentives for participants. Nashi’s rallies surged quickly to as many as 200,000. This devotedly pro-Putin mass organization has received generous financial support from the Russian government. Beyond the intimidation factor of these numerous and aggressive patriots, opposition parties report that Nashi members are trained in “paramilitary” tactics “for challenging those who take to the streets to protest the Kremlin” (NYT 2007).

Venezuela’s Circulos Bolivarianos, though a much less clear case than Nashi, are thought by many critics of President Chavez to be essentially a GONGO. In 2000 “President Hugo Chavez issued a call to Venezuelans to form ‘Circulos Bolivarianos’ as part of a broader strategy to organize his Bolivarian movement for a democratic revolution” (Hawkins and Hansen 2006). These small groups (or circles) of patriotic Venezuelans are fanatically devoted to President Chavez and his revolution. Their ranks may have peaked at around 2.2 million, but in 2004 their influence began to wane. Like Nashi, the Circulos Bolivarianos carry out pro-regime counter-protest activities and physical harassment with seeming impunity. Like Nashi, they have been linked to attempts by the government to create a paramilitary force. On the other hand, some scholars see a mixed picture, including signs of “internal democracy” in these Bolivarian Circles, and note that state funding is relatively limited (Hawkins and Hansen 2006).

There are two cases of state-run civil society in China that are candidates for the Militant GONGO category. The first is the Alliance for Peace and Democracy in Hong Kong. Joining with several other pro-Beijing groups, the Alliance for Peace and Democracy mobilizes both locals and Chinese mainlanders to counter Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protests.[4] While much less militant than Nashi or the Circulos Bolivarianos, it uses rent-a-protestor tactics to stage large rallies and even compiled a database of high schoolers skipping class to join pro-democracy protests in order to intimidate them. Another organization the Chinese government uses to actively oppose democracy is the so-called 50-cent Party: a shadowy group of professional online comment writers hired to defend the government’s image and cast doubts on pro-Western or pro-democratic arguments. While not physically present on the streets of China, this state-organized army of comment writers influences the virtual public square. Under the guise of grassroots patriotism, they defend authoritarianism for money. The name 50-cent Party refers to the rumor that each pro-government post online earns the poster 50 cents.

Development GONGOs. Compared to Militant GONGOs, Developmental GONGOs are much more low-key and much less politically contentious. They tend to focus on domestic economic development and service provision. In an international environment where local NGOs are seen as better partners than governments, Developmental GONGOs are a way for autocrats to capture Western aid and funding that might otherwise go towards more independent and political NGOs in their country. Collecting this money for state purposes kills several birds with one stone. It starves real NGOs, solidifies regime legitimacy at home due to improved welfare, and gives the government access to international NGO conferences. Just by attending these conferences on issues like women’s rights or child malnutrition, GONGOs create the impression of a strong civil society even without making overt propaganda or political statements.

China has a particularly advanced Developmental GONGO sector. Of the “almost $500 million sent by US foundations to Chinese grantees between 2002 and 2009, less than 6 per cent went directly to grass-roots NGOs. The vast majority (85 per cent) went to government-controlled organizations such as GONGOs, academic institutions and government agencies themselves” (Spires, Tao and Chan 2012). The China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF) is a Chinese Developmental GONGO under the tutelage of the Chinese Communist Youth League. Started in 1989 by a former division director of the Youth League, the CYDF supports impoverished rural students in China through the now-famous Project Hope (or Hope Project). Another often-cited example is the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF). Although the organization has existed since the Communist takeover of China, it underwent substantial changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s that made it more independent from the state. The ACWF shifted from a state organ under corporatism to a somewhat more independent GONGO, bringing on fresh blood and developing a real voice for women’s issues (Ma 2006). It described itself as an NGO for the first time in 1994, though other women’s groups around the world questioned this designation. Because it retains close ties with the government and is highly politically trustworthy, the ACWF is entrusted to supervise other Chinese NGOs working on women’s rights (ibid 2006).

While China dominates scholarly attention to Developmental GONGOs, there are many examples elsewhere. In Cuba, GONGOs like the Felix Varela Center and the Martin Luther King Center serve to attract foreign funds and connections. The Felix Varela Center hosts concerts for economic development goals and talks about new kinds of issues for Cuba, like gay rights (Horowitz and Suchlicki 2003). The Martin Luther King Center hosts foreign delegations and gives tours of Cuba with embedded political messages about the harm done by American sanctions to the Cuban economy. Though they promote themselves as NGOs, these organizations are run only by trusted Cubans with close connections to the government (Fernández 2000) Cuban GONGOs are seen as “within-regime reformers” that still support socialism (Horowitz and Suchlicki 2003). I have characterized these as primarily Developmental GONGOs, but they may be more of a hybrid considering their propaganda work.

Literature Review

Most scholars who write on GONGOs have so far not addressed them in a systematic and comparative way. However, there are some discussions that address parts of the topic, usually in a single country. This section looks at three issues scholars have looked at: why Chinese GONGOs boomed in the 1990s, whether Developmental GONGOs are becoming more independent, and what relationship GONGOs have to NGOs.

Why did the Chinese government choose to create so many GONGOs in the 1990s? The main reasons seem to be that the state retreated from welfare and service provision in the 1980s (Unger and Chan 2008, Hsu and Hasmath 2014), that Beijing wanted to capture foreign aid in an international climate favoring NGOs (Wu 2003), and that GONGOs can provide jobs to laid-off state workers (Ma 2006, Wu 2003). The China Social Workers Association, for example, was founded in 1991 under the Ministry of Civil Affairs and was headed by three generations of former MOCA officials (Ma 2006). These economic rationales for GONGOs speak to China’s large number of Developmental GONGOs.

Some scholars argue that, in China at least, Developmental GONGOs become more independent over time. According to Wu, it is “well known among national GONGO leaders” that the government intends to decrease and then eliminate its funding of many of these spun-off organizations (Wu 2003). Because of this, as Ma says, the trend is GONGOs relying less on the government (Ma 2006). Saich agrees, explaining that as funds coming from the government decrease, independent organizational identities will become more pronounced (Saich 2000). Over time, even members of state-controlled organizations have ways of subverting authority and influencing policy up the chain. Even when controlled by the government, the work environment in a GONGO is different and “provide[s] the rare opportunity for [its] participants to acquire the skills and habits of self-governance” (Yang 2004). Furthermore, pressure from international donors who want to cooperate with local NGOs can increase GONGO independence from the government (Lux and Straussman 2003). As GONGOs deal with foreign organizations, democratic norms may creep in (Chen 2006). Their own “organizational ideologies and capacities” and “the scope of their activities, and the recognition they have obtained from both insiders and outsiders have gone far beyond what the state ever intended” (Wu 2003).

In some of the only cross-country comparative work on this topic, scholars have examined the relationship between GONGOs and domestic NGOs in different authoritarian settings. Heurlin distinguishes between a corporatist strategy and an exclusionary strategy toward NGOs (Heurlin 2010). In the corporatist strategy, typified by China and Vietnam, the state attempts to coopt NGOs. All organizations must register with the state or with a GONGO directly, and GONGOs serve as supervisors for NGOs in their field.[5] In the exclusionary strategy, as in Indonesia under Suharto, the government focuses on making life hard for NGOs and tries to prevent them from developing. GONGOs are used as an alternative to NGOs. Corporatist model states want their NGOs to attract foreign funds, whereas the exclusionary model tries to cut off international linkages. The latter seems to be what Putin wants for Russia’s NGOs. Richter and Hatch contrast how Russia’s state crowds out civil society with how the Chinese state is enmeshed within society (Richter and Hatch 2013).

Future Questions