BEEHIVE UNDERBURN
ESCAPED PRESCRIBED FIRE REVIEW
November 19, 2009
Okanogan - Wenatchee National Forest
Wenatchee River Ranger District
Leavenworth, Washington
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
PURPOSE OF REVIEW 3
BACKGROUND 3
PROCESS 6
FINDINGS 6
Element 1: Seasonal Severity, Weather, and On-Site Conditions Leading Up to the Wildfire Declaration 7
Element 2: The Actions Taken Leading Up to the Wildfire Declaration, to Determine Consistency with the Prescribed Fire Burn Plan 9
Element 3: The Prescribed Fire Burn Plan and Consistency with Policy 9
Element 4: Prescribed Fire Prescription and Consistency with On-Site Measured Prescription Parameters 10
Element 5: Approving Line Officer’s Qualifications, Experience, and Involvement 11
Element 6: Qualifications and Experience of Other Key Personnel 11
Element 7: Key Causal Factors 11
CONCLUSIONS 11
RECOMMENDATIONS / OBSERVATIONS / LESSONS LEARNED 12
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On Friday, October 2, 2009, a U.S. Forest Service prescribed fire near Wenatchee, Washington, escaped, resulting in 41 acres of private land being burned (Longview Fiber).
The Beehive Under-burn was planned to treat 538 acres of natural fuels on National Forest Lands. Its’ escape and the resulting wildfire caused 41 acres of private land to burn. The initial phases of the wildfire were managed by the local resources then transferred to the local Type 3 Incident Management Team (Unified Command with DNR ICT3 Goetz, FS ICT3 Nalle, FS ICT3(T) Smith).
The Okanogan - Wenatchee National Forest, Deputy Forest Supervisor convened a team to conduct a review into the key causal factors for this escaped prescribed fire. The Review Team interviewed personnel associated with the implementation of the burn, and reviewed and examined written documentation of events and actions leading up to and immediately following the escape.
The Review Team found that the ignition phases of the prescribed fire were conducted successfully, but the prescribed fire escaped sometime between the late night of September 30 and early morning October 1, 2009 during the patrol phase. The principle causal factor of the escape stemmed from a weather event the evening or early morning following ignition. This weather event was not forecasted, had it been a night patrol may have been put in place. No agency policy was violated.
PURPOSE OF REVIEW
The Okanogan - Wenatchee National Forest, Deputy Forest Supervisor convened a team of three people to conduct a review into the key causal factors for this escaped prescribed fire. The Review Team interviewed personnel associated with the implementation of the burn, and reviewed and examined written documentation of events and actions leading up to and immediately following the escape.
· Determine if the Prescribed Fire Plan was adequate for the project and complied with policy and guidance related to prescribe fire planning and implementation.
· Determine if the prescription, actions, and procedures set forth in the Prescribed Fire Plan were followed.
· Describe and document factual information pertaining to the review.
· Determine if overall policy, guidance, and procedures relating to prescribed fire operations are adequate
· Determine the level of awareness and the understanding of the personnel involved, in regard to procedures and guidance.
BACKGROUND
The Wenatchee River Ranger District is one of seven Ranger Districts on the Okanogan - Wenatchee National Forest in Washington.
On Friday, October 2, 2009, a U.S. Forest Service prescribed fire near Wenatchee, Washington, escaped, resulting in 41 acres of private land being burned (Longview Fiber). The project had been initially ignited on September 28, 29 and 30, 2009. The escaped fire initially burned with moderate intensity with rates of spread that made the initial suppression efforts successful. However, numerous spot fires from late night / early morning winds and from rolling material resulted in an escaped fire. This wildfire, mainly consumed grass, brush and small seedling and sapling sized trees, and a few larger overstory trees.
The escape was initially managed by local resources, then transferred and managed as a Type 3 Incident (as recommended by a complexity analysis) and was established as the Beehive Fire, Incident WA-SES-1076. Incident Objectives were: 1) SAFETY-Provide for firefighter and public safety at all times. 2) Limit acreage burned by keeping fire north and west of FSR 9712-902, south of the major ridge in the SW of the NW, Section 7. 3) 100% Mop up on private lands where safe and feasible. 4) Maximize opportunity for cost saving without jeopardizing public or firefighter safety. 5) Tight trail significant areas of unburned fuel, and secure perimeters where safe to do so.
Background on the Beehive Prescribed Under Burn:
This area was commercially thinned in the early 1990s and had subsequent fuels treatments done. The Squilchuck Community wildfire Protection Plan has done fuels reduction treatments on private lands near the Beehive area. The management direction is to maintain fuels in this area at a low level to help protect the nearby community from a large destructive wildfire, and keeping any fire starts in the area to a low level surface fire.
Long Term Objectives:
· Maintain the area in a condition class one by keeping fuel loadings to less than 4 tons per acre across 80% of the project area.
· Raise height to live crowns on average to approximately 7-10 feet above the forest floor.
· Reduce ladder fuels mainly in the form of conifer reproduction to keep future fires from transitioning from ground fire to crown fire.
· Retain as many existing sound snags over 16” DBH and 20 feet tall as possible without compromising fire fighter and public safety.
· Thin the emerging under story with fire and reduce stocking levels in trees less than 2” in diameter to less than 100 trees per acre.
· Minimize mortality of over story to 10-20%
Beehive Under Burn Site Description: (Pre burn)
The burn area is nearly a section of land that surrounds the Beehive and H+H reservoirs. The terrain is relatively gentle and rolling with some areas of steeper ground particularly along the north end of the project area. See photo on previous page. The section of land where the project area lies is surrounded by private land on three sides. At least one of these (section 1) has been logged previously.
The project area was logged in the early 1990s under the Beehive Thin and West Thin timber sales. The area had some fuels reduction work completed shortly after logging which included prescribed burning. The project area’s vegetation consists of an over story of ponderosa pine, Douglas fir, grand fir and western larch with a grass, brush and reprod under story. Small pockets of aspen are found mainly in the riparian areas within the project area.
Much of the project area was recently precommercially thinned which has added scattered concentrations of thinning slash (See Photo 2 and cover photo).
Photo 2. Scattered concentrations of thinning slash.
PROCESS
The Review Team spent October 5, 2009, in the field looking at the unit, interviewing key personnel, researching, examining decision-making processes, and reviewing materials relevant to the Beehive Prescribed Fire.
The review process included review or analysis of:
· The Prescribed Fire Burn Plan.
· Weather and on-site conditions leading up to the escape.
· The qualifications of personnel involved.
· The actions leading up to the escaped fire, for consistency with the Prescribed Fire Burn Plan, including causal agents contributing to the escaped fire.
· Interviews with participants of the prescribed fire.
Review Team
Laura Mayer / Team Leader / R6 Fuels Analysis / State Office Regional OfficeLeanne Mruzik / Team Member / Fuels Management Specialist / State Office Regional Office
Anthony Starkovich / Team Member / South Zone Fire Mgt Officer / Mt. Baker-Snoqualmie NF
Forest Participants
Clint Kyhl / Deputy Forest Supervisor / Supervisors OfficeMaureen Hansen / Acting District Ranger / Wenatchee River RD
Bobbie Scopa / Forest Fire Staff / Supervisors Office
Richy Harrod / Forest Fire Ecolgist / Supervisors Office
Michelle Ellis / Division Chief / Wenatchee River RD
Kevin Smith / Prescribed Fire Burn Boss / Wenatchee River RD
FINDINGS
The emphasis of the Review Team’s findings is based on the following seven assigned elements: (Interagency Prescribed Fire Planning and Implementation Procedures Guide, July 2008, page 29)
1. An analysis of seasonal severity, weather events, and on-site conditions leading up to the wildfire declaration.
2. An analysis of the actions taken leading up to the wildfire declaration for consistency with the Prescribed Fire Plan.
3. An analysis of the Prescribed Fire Plan for consistency with policy.
4. An analysis of the prescribed fire prescription and associated environmental parameters.
5. A review of the approving line officer’s qualifications, experience, and involvement.
6. A review of the qualifications and experience of key personnel involved.
7. A summary of causal agents contributing to the wildfire declaration.
In preparing this report, the team focused on findings that were considered significant contributing factors to the escape of the prescribed fire.
The information under each element of the review is organized leading with a finding, followed by supporting discussion and background information. Recommendations are summarized in a separate section that follows the element reviews.
Element 1: Seasonal Severity, Weather, and On-Site Conditions Leading Up to the Wildfire Declaration
The area of the Beehive incident lies within Fire Weather Zone 676, in the Spokane Fire Weather Forecast area. The historical observations taken by the Dry Creek Remote Automated Weather Station (RAWS 352620) best represent seasonal fire weather indices for the area of the Beehive incident. The fire season had been about average with the indices staying well below the 90th percentile. A few drying trends in early August and late August push all indices to above the 90th percentile. Rain events occurred in mid August then again during Labor Day weekend driving all indices well below the annual historical averages. On September, the first day of day of ignition fire weather indices where in the 30th to 40th percentile range, see table below. The indices slowly declined during the next three days, when the spot fire that led to the declaration of a wildfire occurred on October 1, 2009. Weather observations taken on the prescribe burn show a slight increase in daily minimum relative humidity, and an increase in cloud cover over the three day ignition period.
Fire Weather Observations from WIMS for Dry Creek RAWS using NFDRS Fuel Model C for September 28 –October 2, 2009.
Sept / Fuel Moisture 10, 100, 1000 / Ignition Component / Spread Component / Energy Release Component / Burning Index / Haines Index28 / 4, 5, 10 / 39 / 16 / 19 / 41 / 4
29 / 6, 6,10 / 21 / 11 / 14 / 31 / 2
30 / 7, 8, 10 / 20 / 13 / 13 / 32 / 3
01 / 9, 9, 11 / 11 / 9 / 10 / 24 / 2
02 / 8,10,10 / 21 / 16 / 12 / 34 / 2
On the first day of ignition the relative humidity was observed to be 28-30% at 0852 hours, and the spot weather forecast called for a minimum RH of 28%. At the time of the test fire on September 28, the relative humidity was 28%. This was below the lower thresholds recorded in the Prescribed Burn Plan. Fire behavior within the test fire was well within the Prescribed Burn Plan prescriptions. After getting line officer approval, the burn plan was amended using 20 percent for the minimum relative humidity, and ignition continued. All burning activities that occurred from September 28 to October 1 were consistent with the prescriptions identified within the burn plan.
A sudden shift in the winds near the end of the first burn period caused torching near the north flank control line, which produced spotting across the line. Two spots where reported, suppressed and controlled at less than half an acre in size.
On September 29, the spot weather forecast called for a minimum RH of 52% and southwest winds with gust to 16 mph. Morning RH observations were also considerably higher than the previous day, and ignition operations continue on September 29 with no incident.
The spot forecast for September 30 predicted a dry cool day on September 30, with increasing clouds overnight and a slight chance of precipitation on October 1, and a persisting cool unsettled pattern. Minimum RH was predicted to be 44%, maximum temperature 47, and winds from NW with afternoon gusts up to 20 mph.
On September 30, at 1600 hours the firing boss contacted the helicopter to report spotting across the east flank near Beehive Mountain. The helicopter was used to help suppress the spot fires, and to further pre-treat the east flank while the ignition team continued to carry the ignition operations down the east flank. By 1640 ignition operations were completed. Mop-up and patrol started immediately. Sometime between 1800 and 1900 two small spot fires were reported below the 212 spur on the eastern flank of the fire. Both spots where on Forest Service land. At 1930, both spots where lined and controlled, crews were debriefed and all resources were off the burn by 2000. No night patrol.
The weather observations taken on the prescribed burn indicated increasing humidities, with relative humidity recorded at 42 percent at 1600 hours with heavy cloud cover, and very cool temperatures. Weather observations at the Dry Creek RAWS station for the night of September 30 and early morning of October 1, recorded a maximum relative humidity of 85 percent with a minimum temperature of 33 degrees. These observations coincide with the weather forecast, however, the first weather observations taken on site the morning of October 1 indicate that the same humidity recovery may not have occurred on the prescribed fire area. Crews indicated very dry conditions first thing in the morning; with moderate fire behavior. The first weather observations taken on site at 1000, recorded a relative humidity of 53 percent with temperature of 49 degrees. The recorded observations by Dry Creek RAWS at the same time were 78 percent relative humidity with temperature reading of 36 degrees. The Dry Creek RAWS sits at 3661’ elevation, 28 miles NNW of the burn site. The Beehive prescribed burn is approximately 4,000’. It is possible the Beehive incident was within a thermal belt the evening of September 30 and did not have the humidity recoveries anticipated.