Political
136 PCCEE 03 E
Original: English
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
SUB-COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE
VISIT TO TBILISI, GEORGIA
Secretariat Report
27-30 April 2003
International Secretariat 27 August 2003
This Secretariat Report is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly.
Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int
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136 PCCEE 03 E
1. Members of the Sub-Committee on Central and Eastern Europe visited Tbilisi, Georgia, from 27 to 30 April 2003 to learn about the country’s security issues and its strengthening partnership with the Alliance. The visit, which included a day-long trip to the Pankisi Gorge that borders Chechnya, also provided opportunities to obtain a broader perspective of Caucasus security issues. The eight members of the delegation, led by Sub-Committee Chairman Markus Meckel of Germany, met with senior representatives of the Georgian government and parliament. The programme also included roundtable discussions with Ambassadors from NATO countries, senior OSCE and UN representatives, as well as independent security experts.
I. Security challenges in Georgia (and the region)
2. Welcoming the delegation in Tbilisi, the head of the Georgian delegation to the NATO PA, Georgi Baramidze, underlined the strong interest of his country to move closer to the Alliance and to deepen its co-operation with NATO with the eventual aim of becoming a full member.
3. Mr Baramidze provided a short overview of the security situation in his country. Though Georgia is geographically located in a relatively volatile environment, there is no immediate threat to its security. Rather, the most important national security issues for Georgia were domestic, said Secretary of Security Council Tedo Japaridze. Host country speakers unanimously identified the “frozen conflicts” as the most serious challenges to security in Georgia.
II. "Frozen conflicts"
A. Abkhazia
4. The host speakers were clearly most concerned about the situation in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. Territorial re-integration of the breakaway Republic was considered “very complex”, a political solution appeared “currently impossible”, as ‘radical anti-Georgian forces had just seized power in Abkhazia’, Georgian speakers added. In a separate discussion, representatives from NATO countries generally concurred with this view. The lack of ‘stable governmental structures’ in the region and, as Georgian commentators repeatedly emphasised, the fact that the majority of citizens (of Georgian origin) had been forced to flee brought Abkhazia’s viability as an independent entity into question. One speaker even maintained that the region was ‘more or less run by a kind of mafia’. The Minister of Special Affairs, Malkhaz Kakabadze, estimated the number of Abkhaz still living in the breakaway Republic as being between 50,000 and 120,000.
5. To date, Georgian and international initiatives to create a loose federal arrangement, powersharing, etc. have failed to produce any concrete results. The most recent - the so-called “Bodendocument” (named after Dieter Boden, - former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General – UNSR - to Georgia) that spelled out “basic principles on the distribution of competences” between Tbilisi and Sukhumi” has long been blocked by Russia within the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General for Georgia (i.e., the US, the UK, France, Germany and Russia) and was recently rejected by Abkhaz representatives on the ground that it recognised the territorial integrity of Georgia.
6. Georgian speakers repeated that there had been more than 20 UN resolutions on Abkhazia, none of which had been implemented. The UN Observers Mission to Georgia (UNOMIG) since August 1993 and, since July 1997, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG), have not yet succeeded in ending the conflict. In fact, many Georgians were critical of what they consider an inefficient and inactive UN. Nonetheless, ForeignMinister IrakliMenagarishvili believed that the UN should play a role in international security. However, the UN was in need to be reformed, as the non-implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on the Abkhazia conflict and, more recently, the crisis over Iraq had made clear.
7. In the meetings with the Sub-Committee members, quite a few Georgian interlocutors blamed Russia for the continuation of the Abkhaz conflict. In the opinion of Mr Baramidze and other Georgians, the Russian peacekeepers - who operate under a CIS mandate since 1994 - “practically became border guards” thus dividing Abkhazia from the rest of the country. Replacing Russian peacekeepers by other nationalities, as favoured by the Georgian side, appeared unlikely. Moreover, by introducing a VISA regime for Georgia, but none for Abkhazia, Russia had further divided their country, Georgian speakers criticised. Some speakers suggested that Russia ignored the negative effect Abkhazia had on the region, including Russia itself. For example, the Secretary of the Security Council, Tedo Japaridze, thought that the conflict in Chechnya was at least partly a result of the instability created by the Abkhazia conflict.
8. While the chance of solving the issue in the short term appears slim, in the longer term, a federal state of Georgia might be a solution to end the conflict, an Ambassador from a NATO country commented. However, the question was whether the Abkhaz wanted to re-join Georgia.
B. South Ossetia
9. Another Georgian conflict zone is South Ossetia, a region bordering Russia equalling about 5% of Georgia’s territory. During the time of armed insurgency between November 1989 and July1992, more than 1,000 people have been killed and around 60,000 have been displaced (Internally Displaced Persons - IDPs). Repatriation of Georgian families, though started, has been halted primarily because of difficult socio-economic conditions and the absence of property restitution regulations. Thus, the conflict appears “frozen” as no political settlement has been agreed upon. On a practical level, the situation is relatively stable and not least due to the OSCE, which has been in charge of the South Ossetian peace process.
10. The OSCE Border Monitoring operation (BMO), established in 1999, has recently expanded along nearly the whole Northern border of Georgia proper, thereby also helping to prevent a spill over of the Chechen conflict. In the BMO, unarmed OSCE monitors, accompanied by the Georgian border guard units patrol the border areas. The BMO, which also includes Russian staff, has been very successful not only in monitoring border movements, but also in training Georgian border forces, stressed the deputy head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, Hans Wesseling.
11. Pankisi Gorge: A daylong excursion to the Pankisi Gorge gave the delegation an impression of the security situation in the gorge, which borders Chechnya to the North. The gorge has a substantial Kist minority (ethnic Chechens who migrated from the Northern Caucasus in the early 19th century). Following the second war in Chechnya in 1999 it became one of the most troublesome regions plagued by kidnappings, drug smuggling and organised crime.
12. The deterioration of the security situation in the Pankisi Gorge also led to a considerable deterioration in bilateral relations with Russia, which accused Georgia of harbouring Chechen terrorists. In discussions with Sub-Committee Members, Georgians unanimously rejected these allegations as “false” and suggested that “certain Russian circles” used the problem to undermine Georgian independence.
13. By November 2000, Georgian authorities had virtually lost control of the gorge, which was by then dominated by some 600–800 criminals. Only gradually, after over two years of joint operations among Georgian law enforcement, security, and military units could authorities reestablish control, according to the Minister for Internal Affairs Lieutenant-General KobaNarchemashvili. The co-ordination of security forces originally posed a problem, but has been overcome. By the end of 2002, the Pankisi gorge was again under control, the crime rate would be “zero”, according to the Minister, only 6 or 7 individuals remained at large.
14. The inflow of refugees from Chechnya has been significant, increasing the total population to between 9,000 and 9,500, of which an estimated 4000-4500 were refugees, according to the Minister of Interior, down from around 8000 in 1999. As Georgi Baramidze, the head of the Georgian delegation, pointed out, Georgia has already received a substantial Georgian refugee community from Abkhazia, numbering approximately between 260,000 to 300,000 – a burden that weighed heavily on the economy and the scarce resources of the country.
15. Chechen refugees who met with the delegation expressed gratitude for Georgian aid and asylum. However, the refugees also emphasised the need for additional help, as living conditions were difficult, due to limited Georgian resources available for aid. Children in particular suffered from the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, some have never attended school, the delegation was informed. Chechen refugees stressed their desire to leave the region and that they found the presence of military units “disturbing”.
16. This success notwithstanding, the security situation required continued attention and Georgian border officials anticipated increasing numbers of attempts to illegal border crossings during the summer after the snow has melted. Additional efforts would be necessary to prevent the infiltration of suspicious groups and individuals from the Northern Caucasus. Therefore, an additional 100 soldiers will be dispatched to the Georgia-Chechen border in the summer and the OSCE plans to expand its Border Monitoring operations in the summer.
C. Georgia’s security environment
17. Though religious fundamentalism posed no direct, immediate threat to the country, ForeignAffairs Minister Menagarishvili said he observed developments in the region with some concern. He underlined that Georgia was actively participating in the war on terrorism and had supported the military campaign against the regime of Saddam Hussein. In the absence of discernable imminent outside security threats other than the South Caucasus’ “frozen conflicts”, government officials and parliamentarians from the host country put domestic matters strongly on top of the list of the country’s security challenges.
18. To different degrees, President Eduard Shevardnadze and senior government officials stressed the impact of Georgia’s weak economy on the security of the country. While the country’s GDP has grown for the past years (approximately 2.1 % in 2002) and is anticipated to increase by 5.5% in 2003, it is only about 40% of its 1989 level. Though Georgian speakers considered the legal basis generally well developed, problems remained in some areas, including insufficient tax revenues, weak energy sector, high unemployment and a very low average standard of living. According to some speakers, more between 60% and 70% of the population lived below the poverty line. Moreover, as one Ambassador added in a separate meeting, poverty figures were even increasing. President Shevardnadze provided a more optimistic picture, stressing the anticipated economic benefits of the pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) for Georgia and the region.
19. Organised crime posed a serious security challenge to the country. According to the Minister for State Security, Valeri Khaburdzania, organised crime was especially active in extortion and drug trafficking, and, he added, had extended its reach into the political realm. Law enforcement was hampered by poor technical equipment and also by partly sluggish procedural adjustments in law enforcement, the Minister responded to a question by Karl A. Lamers. But progress has been seen and he pointed to a new criminal code that was being discussed in the parliament. In a similar vain, the Chairwoman of the Georgian Parliament, MrsNinoBurjanadze, depicted combating corruption, implementing economic reforms, and strengthening democratic political structures as highly important.
20. Accordingly, Georgian interlocutors stressed the importance of the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for November 2003, for the stability as well as the future of the country. In this regard, Mrs Burjanadze emphasised free and fair elections as a first priority for the country. The Georgian people wanted to see change towards security and stability, she said but added that they would be “wary of voting”. Reflecting a degree of uncertainty, many international missions and organisations have called for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections and pledged to provide assistance in this regard.
III. Georgian relations with NATO
21. Georgian officials unanimously considered NATO the “supreme guarantor of European security” as President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze put it. Reminding the delegation of his announcement at the Alliance’s 2003 Prague Summit that Georgia wanted to join NATO, he stressed that “Georgia in NATO means more trust, more confidence”. The Secretary of Security Council Tedo Japaridze considered NATO as the only organisation that guarantees stability and democracy. The Minister for Foreign Affairs Irakli Menagarishvili emphasised that joining NATO, which was the “cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic structures”, was the key foreign and security priority for Georgia.
22. In meetings with the delegation, Georgian speakers repeatedly stressed Georgia’s profound interest in greater co-operation with NATO and in a stronger presence of the alliance in the region. President Eduard Shevardnadze, emphasised the high strategic importance of the Black Sea region. The discussions revealed a general perception among Georgian officials that the West, and NATO in particular, was not doing enough in the region. Some Georgian speakers, including the head of the National Security Council, even suggested that NATO was “absent” from the Caucasus and lacked a congruent policy towards Georgia and the Caucasus at large. Some Georgian officials, including the Secretary of Security Council Tedo Japaridze, maintained that NATO had “no clear vision” of the Caucasus and of Georgia. Participants agreed that a peaceful and stable Europe was impossible if its Southeastern frontier, i.e. the Caucasus, remained unstable and insecure.
23. Other speakers were less sceptical of NATO’s approach towards the Caucasus. The President and other government officials considered the invitation for Bulgaria and Romania to join NATO as a very important and welcome signal and added that this had strengthened security in the Black Sea region. Foreign Minister Menagarishvili also stressed NATO’s special relationship with Ukraine, which, he said, reflected the fact that NATO had “already taken on responsibility for the Caucasus”.
24. Different views of NATO and what Georgians expected from the Alliance came also to the fore during a discussion with independent Georgian security analysts. Some suggested that NATO could assist in the reintegration of Abkhazia by taking over the peacekeeping operations from Russian peacekeepers. Others stressed that implementing reforms necessary for eventual membership in the Alliance would be a prerequisite for the country’s further democratic and economic development. Again others commented that the large majority of Georgians would not know what NATO was about and what Alliance membership required. Loïc Bouvard proposed that NATO should, in the first phase, assist Georgia to shape its own opinion.