Out of Many Notes / Outlining Chapter 16: the Civil War

Out of Many Notes / Outlining Chapter 16: The Civil War

Chapter Overview

16.1 – Communities Mobilize for War (pp. 450-455)

16.2 – The Lincoln Presidency (pp. 455-457)

16.3 – The Confederacy (pp. 458-459)

16.4 – The Fighting through 1862 (pp. 459-464)

16.5 – The Death of Slavery (pp. 464-467)

16.6 – The Front Lines and the Home Front (pp.467-472)

16.7 – The Tide Turns (pp. 472-477)

Two big themes the textbook emphasizes:

1)  There were substantial social and political changes created by the unprecedented nature and scale of the Civil War.

2)  In the eyes of both North and South, the end of slavery was of central importance.

. . . There is a third theme about the military campaigns – of peripheral importance for APUSH

Introductions and Conclusion: The textbook emphasizes the way in which the war changed America deeply and permanently in four years of horror. The heroes appear to Abraham Lincoln and the slaves. Lingering and most pressing consequence will be how the dramatically empowered federal government will deal with securing justice after the crisis of war passes.
16.1 – Communities Mobilize for War (pp. 450-455) – “But the most basic similarity was not yet apparent: both sides were unprepared for the ordeal that lay ahead.”

Political Developments

·  Both presidents pray for peace but posture for war in inaug. addresses

·  Ft. Sumter the symbolic political pawn – a federal fort Lincoln pledged “to hold, occupy, and possess” but in the heart of secessionism, Charleston (and controlling the port, too)

·  Typical of Lincoln’s style, sought advice from several different parties, then acted on Ft. Sumter

·  Lincoln’s decision with Ft. Sumter forced Davis to act

·  Building militaries:

o  CSA first: Congress called for vol. army of 100,000 to serve 12 months

o  North after Sumter: Lincoln called for 75,000 state militia to serve for 90 days

·  After Sumter, border states must decide

o  12/20/60 and 2/1/61 – seven states left

o  April/May – VA, AS, TN, and NC secede, too (VA’s secession tipped the other three)

o  MD, KY, MO, and DE – each “controlled vital strategic assets”

·  Lincoln imposes martial law and suspends writ of habeas corpus in BAL to ensure MD’s loyalty to the Union – Lincoln’s rejection of Taney’s decision regarding suspension of Civil Liberties the beginning of a precedent Lincoln set in the war where basic civil liberties were violated on grounds of national security

·  Retention of four slave states “punched a huge hole” in CSA argument about secession=preservation of slavery

Social / Cultural Developments

·  In South, there was no difficulty finding volunteers when CSA Congress first called up troops

·  Davis’s inaugural address echoed calls of 1776 – tyranny, free people and their rights

·  Tremendous patriotism in north as well in 1861 after Ft. Sumter startled gov’t and population into action

·  Relief organizations, like the first one organized in Chester, PA, supplied troops with clothing and helped families left behind; “played a vital role in supplying the troops”

·  Baltimore, a hostile city to Union troops on way to Washington

·  Guerilla battles in MO

·  Over course of war, ¼ of soldiers who fought never returned home (620,000)

·  S mobilizes a far greater proportion of its eligible fighting population – 90% to 44%

·  S had an advantage in military tradition and leadership talent

Economic Developments

·  Illegal trade with CSA often took place in KY (to TN)

·  The four slaves states that stayed: would have added 45% to the white population and military manpower of the CSA, 80% to its manufacturing capacity

·  Union’s commanding edge: 2.5X the population (remember, of the 9m CSA, 3.5 m were slave); 9X industrial capacity of the South; 97% of firearms mfr’ing, 71% of RR mileage, 94% of cloth mfr’ing, 90% of footwear mfr’ing (great table p. 453); by end of war, Union put 2m in field compared to 800k;

·  South’s important short-term assets: defensive nature rapidly mobilizes support

·  North’s economic advantages seemed unimportant in short term

Foreign Relations / Diplomatic Developments

·  South was confident cotton would secure them recognition from FRA and GBR

16.2 – The Lincoln Presidency (pp. 455-457) – “Fortunately, the nation had found in Lincoln a man with the moral courage and the political skill to chart a course through the many conflicting currents of northern public opinion.”

Political Developments

·  Civil War forced the federal government to assume powers unimaginable just a few years before

·  Lincoln asserted control over his own cabinet

o  Many rivals for nomination on the cabinet

o  Seward the informal leader of the Party; at first expected to “manage” Lincoln but became the president’s willing partner

o  S. Chase the abolitionist thought Lincoln too conciliatory – as a Radical Republican remained a vocal and dangerous critic

o  Remember, Republicans were a “not-quite-jelled mix of former Whigs, abolitionists, moderate Free-Soilers, and even some prowar Democrats”

·  With Congress not in session, Lincoln undertook broad, bold steps: call up state militias, order a naval blockade of the South, raise budget for military, retain the border states

·  Repudiated General J. C. Fremont’s emancipation of slaves in MO (fear of tipping other border states)

·  Greatest goal for Lincoln: persuade South to rejoin union (reconciliation) and that guided his strategy

Social / Cultural Developments

Economic Developments

·  War Dept. (E. Stanton) bore great responsibility to procuring supplies for and equipping the military; by 1862 it was primarily doing this, but scope of the contest required efforts by federal and state governments as well as aid societies

·  Treasury Sec’y S. Chase worked with Congress to finance the war

o  Relied heavily on private bankers, merchants, and business leaders

o  J. Cooke helped market bonds in quantities as low as $50 – sold $400 million (and collected a “fair commission”)

o  U.S. borrowed $2.6 billion to fund the war effort

o  Salves taxes and federal income tax (3% for those with >$800/ann.) helped fund war, too

o  Uniform paper currency established (state banks had to apply for federal charters) – unthinkable with Southern Democrats (“Greenbacks”)

·  Republicans’ comprehensive program of economic development (Henry Clay’s American System realized) – and this stuff will stick after 1865

o  Morrill Tariff

o  Union Pacific and Central pacific

o  Homestead Act

o  Morrill Land Grant Act

o  Dept. of Agriculture

Foreign Relations / Diplomatic Developments

·  Big task: keep GBR and FRA from recognizing CSA – and this wasn’t certainly accomplished for two years (until G and V)

·  Cotton doesn’t work too well as a diplomatic tool: Europe had reserves, IND and EGT supply some, and there’s strong anti-slavery sentiment in GBR

·  When GBR company (Laird) tries to sell ships to CSA, we threaten war and they back off

·  Seward in 1861 wanted to go to war, Lincoln cautioned “One war at a time.”

·  Nonbelligerence a big tool for Union: ignoring FRA intrigue in MEX

16.3 – The Confederacy (pp. 458-459) – “Lincoln faced a major challenge in keeping the North unified enough to win the war, but Jefferson Davis’s challenge was even greater.”

Political Developments

·  Davis unable to hold CSA together despite his experience – doubtful anyone could have

·  Davis’s cabinet had one rep. from each of seven seceded states (except MS – that’s Davis) – points to a fundamental flaw in CSA

·  Davis’s personality flaws: autocratic, micro-manager, insensitive to political common sense

·  April 1862 – CSA Congress passes first draft law in U.S. history (N does so in March 1863)

Social / Cultural Developments

·  Davis a “nabob” and scorned by old money planters

·  Initial surge of volunteers fell off by 1862 in S and N

·  Substitution

o  Both N and S allowed able-bodied white men to pay for a substitute

o  In S, price rose to $10,000 by end of war

o  In S, one white man on each plantation with 20 or more slaves exempt (boy, that went over well)

·  Southern nationalism remained a contradiction – loyalty to state trumped loyalty to nation

Economic Developments

·  Europe found other sources of cotton during embargo, and when South lifted embargo, prices plunged

·  Financing the war was “perhaps the greatest southern failure”

o  At first relied on levies by states, which governors often refused to do

o  Uniform taxes didn’t come in until 1863 (too late)

o  Heavy borrowing and printing large sums of paper money – runaway inflation the result (9,000 percent by 1865 compared to 80% in N)

Foreign Relations / Diplomatic Developments

·  South stunned that “King Cotton” didn’t secure recognition immediately; their adjustments in vain (win a glorious victory and/or withhold cotton from market)

16.4 – The Fighting through 1862 (pp. 459-464) – “The initial policy of limited war, thought to be the best route to ultimate reconciliation, ran into difficulties because of the public’s impatience for victories.”

Political Developments

·  Both presidents forced by public pressure to fight a more aggressive war than they wanted to fight

Social / Cultural Developments

·  As North captured coastal islands, many slaves came to greet the troops and secure emancipation; soldiers (?) had unwittingly freed slaves in advance of official policy

·  B. Butler – Union general near NOR who refused to return “contrabands” and who therefore set a trend

·  There was a Contraband Relief Association

·  By April 1865, one million slaves had fled to Union strongholds (this statistic has me a bit troubled)

Economic Developments

·  Union’s blockade initially unsuccessful – only 33 ships to blockade 189 ports and 3,500 miles of coastline

o  Only 1/8 of CSA shipping stopped in 1862

o  1863, tide turns and by 1864 1/3 of runners were captured; 1865, less than ½ got through

Foreign Relations / Diplomatic Developments

·  Confederacy promised many Indian tribes (p.d. OK) representation in Congress in exchange for their support, therefore many Indians supported Confederacy; victorious Union Congress will use that as a pretext for post-war policies in West

16.5 – The Death of Slavery (pp. 464-467) – “Any northern policy that ignored the issue of slavery and the wishes of the slaves was unrealistic.”

Political Developments

·  Lincoln abhorred slavery but pragmatism (helping Unionists at first in South, retaining border states, maintaining loyalty within the North) dictated he make this a war for Union, not ending slavery

·  Lincoln lurches toward a new position on slavery

o  March 1862, urging states to undertake gradual emancipation and resettlement in HAI or PAN

o  Great exchange between Greeley and Lincoln in August 1862 on p. 465

o  August / September 1862 (and January 1, 1863) – Emancipation Proclamation links slavery to Southern war effort – Text’s interpretation of this event is critical – posing the E.P. as more puzzling than decisive

o  Amendment – Lincoln urges it be in platform for 1864, states move on it in 1865

·  Emancipation Proclamation clearly allows blacks to enter armed forces

Social / Cultural Developments

·  “Realizing the symbolic importance of the proclamation, free African Americans predicted that the news would encourage southern slaves either to flee to Union lines or refuse to work for their masters.” BTW, these two things were already happening

·  In loyal border states, 25% of population volunteered for service in army (this statistic is a bit hard to peg down)

·  Prejudice and racism: white officers and white soldiers looked down on them, unequal pay until 1864, Southern policy of treating captured soldiers as escaped slaves (execution)

·  Black service put a tremendous dent in Northern prejudices – some examples of civil liberties adjusted in northern states

Economic Developments

·  Black troops represented 10% of Union army by war’s end – 1/5 black males in the nation!

Foreign Relations / Diplomatic Developments

·  Emancipation Proclamation’s impact in GBR more puzzled than anything else

16.6 – The Front Lines and the Home Front (pp.467-472) – “[The letters written by soldiers] are a testament to the patriotism of both Union and Confederate troops, for the story they tell is frequently one of slaughter and terror.”

Political Developments

·  Stephen Douglas offered Lincoln his full support “There can be no neutrals in this war, only patriots – or traitors!” (but he died in spring 1861)

·  Democrats remained powerful in N politics

o  won 44% of N in 1860 election

o  their unity made Lincoln cautious on slavery

o  actively politicked against emancipation, the draft, martial law, economic policies of Congress

o  broke into two factions: Peace Democrats (Copperheads) and War Democrats

o  By 1862, Lincoln declared many Copperhead tactics illegal and arrested/imprisoned 13,000 (C. Vallandingham exiled)

·  Lincoln faced a lot of problems within Republican party, too (S.P. Chase, the biggest thorn)

Social / Cultural Developments

·  Hideous death toll

o  Technology a big factor

o  General slow to adjust to new changes in technology (Jomini doctrine)

o  Medical ignorance and sanitation (latter more a problem earlier in war)

o  Lack of mechanism for gathering dead and wounded in major battles

o  Unprepared to deal with prisoners

·  Women forge ahead despite objections and tradition to become actively involved in nursing during the war

·  Sanitary Commission paid attention, but weakly described (referred to several times)

·  Fraternization between the sides was common

·  20% of Union army was immigrant

·  Conscription was a major source of social tension ($300 substitution fee didn’t help matters)

o  Substitution had been a common issue, but Democrats politicize it here

o  Draft fairly unsuccessful: only 7% of those drafted actually served (25% hired a sub., 45% won exemptions, and remainder just didn’t show up)

o  “Rich man’s war, poor man’s fight” coined in S but relevant in N, too

o  Draft riots in NYC (though other causes more important) in 1863

o  Black men helped ease tensions because they helped fill gap draft was intended to address