THE MORAL MAJORITY AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Moral Majority is an interesting case as a social movement. Although it was an organization advocating for social change, and had a form of leadership and a constituency, it presents challenges to the typical model of a social movement. For example, a well defined stratification system within the movement was nonexistent, and leadership tended to be regional as well as national in nature. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it was very difficult to establish who members really were. Were they individuals who tuned in to watch Jerry Falwell on television, those who responded to pleas for money, those placed on the Moral Majority's mailing list, or those who, when polled, admitted to agreeing with various positions of the Moral Majority? This ambiguity is partially due to the media's penchant for using the terms "the New Christian Right" and "Moral Majority" synonymously.
Nevertheless, scholars have treated Moral Majority as a social movement (Liebman, 1983; Simpson, 1983; Snowball, 1991). In reviewing the literature, it becomes very apparent that scholars have had a difficult time agreeing upon the level of support for the Moral Majority within the country (Simpson, 1983; Buell & Sigelman, 1985; Wilcox, 1989). In fact, much of the literature I discovered attempted to address this issue.
I did not find much in the way of social movement literature on the Moral Majority that dealt specifically with the three dynamics discussed in class. Thus, I have chosen to read the articles and book chapters in the context of these dynamics, using the events to explain how each of the dynamics interacted with one another over the life course of the movement. Therefore, this essay will proceed in the following manner: I will present five sections, each corresponding to a particular aspect of the movement. I explain how the dynamics of organization, ideology, and environment interact with one another in particular reference to the specific aspect of the movement covered in that section. Finally, a brief discussion will follow to tie up any loose ends.
THE EMERGENCE OF MORAL MAJORITY
The political and religious ideologies collectively termed "the New Christian Right" provided the context for the emergence of Moral Majority. Researchers have suggested that the Christian Right arose in opposition to perceived liberal trends in society such as the legalization of abortion, the purging of religion in public schools, and general moral decay (Liebman and Wuthnow, 1983; Bromley and Shupe, 1984; Wilcox, 1989; Moen, 1994). This particular religious movement in turn, produced a number of organizations. The National Christian Action Coalition, the Religious Roundtable, Christian Voice, and Moral Majority were organized to address and correct these and other perceived problems within society.
The Moral Majority Inc. was established in June of 1979 by a group of Baptist pastors around the country (Georgianna 1989). As Liebman (1983) points out, it was a movement of megachurches from the very beginning. Each one pastored a church with a congregation well over 6,000.
Ideology and environment played a very important role in the emergence of Moral Majority. The preexisting networks established by pastors were crucial. The original "triad" of founding members consisting of Jerry Falwell, Greg Dixon, and Timothy La Haye knew one another well before 1979. Bob Billings, the first executive director, continued to work with his own organization "Christian Voice," after his appointment. He later helped to establish networks between Moral Majority and the secular New Right when he served as religious adviser to the Reagan campaign, eventually becoming an assistant in Reagan's department of education.
Charles Stanley, a pastor of a large Southern Baptist Church, and D. James Kennedy, a Presbyterian minister in Florida were added to Moral Majority's board shortly after its creation. This allowed the organization to increase its appeal to those outside independent fundamentalist Baptist groups. Both Stanley and Kennedy pastored large church's and were known outside their respective states.
Obviously, the immediate political environment coupled with the network structure of these pastors provided fertile ground for the creation of Moral Majority. Each one of these Christian leaders felt that America was on a moral downward spiral that needed to be reversed. Falwell (1981) himself suggests that he had waited "for years" for a Christian leader to emerge and lead America back to morality. He reports that Tim La Haye and Greg Dixon "urged" him to put together a political organization after sensing a "crisis" and realizing that no one else would mobilize others to "lead the way out of the wilderness" (Falwell, 1981: 187).
Falwell and Moral Majority leaders felt they were merely articulating the concerns of others. Many felt that the government was threatening their lifestyles with the legalization of abortion, the threat of the Equal Rights Amendment, and the rising sentiment toward homosexual rights, etc. The immediate political environment was ripe for a group like the Moral Majority to offer alternative political solutions based upon shared religious doctrines.
The preexistent networks were the backbone for the building process. While the environment was conducive for the emergence of Moral Majority, it was not enough. If it had been, one would expect that Moral Majority would have formed long ago as the issues perceived as threats by fundamentalists were not new. Conversely, networks were also not enough. As I have already pointed out, Dixon, Falwell, and La Haye knew one another well before 1979. Rather, it seems that the preestablished networks and the perception of an impending crisis worked together to bring Falwell and the others to a decision to act when they did. Once a decision for action was made, the Moral Majority was able to move very quickly because of these friendships.
Eventually, organizational features interacted with the religious environment, forming new coalitions based upon these networks. For example, some of the organizations within the New Christian Right were loosely linked through Moral Majority. Billings for example, used the same mailing list as Moral Majority for his organization "Christian Voice." Moral Majority, Christian Voice, and other religious and political organizations could now share resources to recruit and mobilize members.
Falwell was able to recruit and mobilize members using his church as well as television and radio broadcasts. Falwell pastored a congregation of over 11,000 members at Thomas Road Baptist Church in Virginia. Meanwhile, his "Old Time Gospel Hour," constructed around the 11:00 Sunday service at Thomas Hill was broadcast weekly on over 350 television stations nationwide. Over 300 radio stations nationwide broadcasted both the Old Time Gospel Hour and the Daily Moral Majority Commentary (Crawford, 1980). Finally, the organizational newsletter "Moral Majority Report" reached over 840,000 homes with an estimated readership of three million (Liebman, 1983).
The Old Time Gospel Hour raised $35 million during fiscal year 1979, and in 1980 contributions from combined fundraising activity approached $1 million a week (Liebman, 1983). Obviously this would be a staggering amount for an organization that was only a year old. But Falwell and company already had a "built in" pool sympathetic for Moral Majority recruitment and mobilization.
While Falwell was attempting to recruit those in his own church and audiences by way of radio and television, La Haye and Dixon (who pastored the 8,000 member Indianapolis Baptist Temple) were able to appeal to their large audiences. La Haye was a nationally well known author of at least sixteen books selling more than 300,000 copies a year (Liebman, 1983). Meanwhile, Stanley and Kennedy were strategic ties to other potential recruitment and mobilization pools. Stanley, a wellrespected Southern Baptist pastor of a large church in Atlanta helped to reach other Southern Baptists; the largest denomination in the United States. Kennedy, a respected Presbyterian minister was chosen as the liaison to this and other like minded denominations. By choosing a diverse, yet highly networked leadership, Moral Majority was able to reach others that normally would have ignored them. Meanwhile, the fact that others outside the independent Baptist circle sat on the board of Moral Majority lent credibility to the organization.
Many diverse groups heard Moral Majority's message between Falwell's own media blitz and the other board member's audiences. Consequently, this has presented problems for researchers who tried to define Moral Majority's membership (see Yinger and Cutler, 1984). The organization claimed a membership of over four million Americans (a figure that climbed to 6.5 million), and over 72,000 ministers, priests, and rabbis (Covert, 1981; Falwell, 1981; Georgianna, 1989). Meanwhile, conservative estimates set Moral Majority's membership at around 400,000 50,000 (Liebman, 1983; Buell & Sigelman, 1985).
There is no question that Moral Majority's message reached a large audience, yet it is unwise to suggest that everyone that agreed doctrinally supported the Moral Majority. Some evangelicals and fundamentalist may have agreed that America was troubled morally, but disagreed in Moral Majority as a political solution. Others may have agreed on some Moral Majority positions while disagreeing with others. Financial statements, if available, would be of little help because it has been suspected that Falwell has redistributed funds from his other ministries to Moral Majority coffers. These funds could then be used to sustain the enormous amount needed for the mass mailings, television and radio broadcasts, etc., used to reach potential members.
The organizational aspects of the Moral Majority allowed Falwell to exploit, maintain, and eventually broaden existing networks between Moral Majority leaders, members, and potential recruits. By redirecting funds, or using previously existing platforms (like his church) Falwell was able to reach a sympathetic audience to Moral Majority's platform. The networks that emerged out of the larger political and religious environment enabled Falwell to recruit men like Kennedy and Stanley, who in turn, could lend credibility to Moral Majority while addressing their preexisting networks that existed outside Falwell's immediate influence. These networks in turn, presented Falwell and Moral Majority with potential resources such as members and money.
These were important for Moral Majority to gain national credibility so that the organization could begin to grow into a full fledged movement. But to do so, Moral Majority had to go beyond building a base constituency, they had to reframe their agenda to make it resonate with potential members. Thus new issues and goals had to be added to existing ones.
MORAL MAJORITY'S GOALS
While the environment interacting with ideology and organization provided a source for the emergence of Moral Majority, it also assisted the expansion of the movement's agenda. As Moore and Whitt (1986) point out, Moral Majority was originally a single issue movement addressing government interference with Christian private schools. Falwell wasted little time in expanding his agenda to include such thing as the opposition toward legalized abortion, homosexual rights, illegal drugs, pornography, and the Equal Rights Amendment. Meanwhile, he advocated support for the nation of Israel, a strong national defense, and prayer in public schools (Falwell, 1981; Kuter, 1982; Moore & Whitt, 1986; Georgianna, 1989).
Falwell appealed to the ideological fundamentalist religious beliefs of his audiences to take up the movement's cause. He also pointed out the problems with the current political environment by suggesting that the government was openly hostile to fundamentalist ideology. He argued that the government would continue to infringe upon the civil liberties of fundamentalists unless it was held back. By appealing to fundamentalist's ideologies and reframing the political environment as a "fight for religious liberty," Falwell hoped that he could galvanize support and secure more resources for the movement.
Moral Majority worked aggressively to mobilize a grassroots constituency. Within two years they had chapters in all 50 states, numerous local affiliates, and an active Washington office that spent over $6 million dollars in fiscal 1981 (Georgianna, 1989). Much of this money went to the movement's media campaign (Liebman, 1983). Moral Majority used its "Moral Majority Report," along with its extensive mailing list to mobilize its constituents to action. The movement called on members for anything from sending in money, writing congressmen and other state officials, and mobilizing local affiliates. Snowball (1991), suggests that the Moral Majority Reports devoted as much space to mobilization as it did to the ten next most important issues combined. These articles often instructed members in the structure and content of letter writing.
Falwell's job was undoubtedly made easier by the pre mobilization accomplished by previous groups within the New Christian Right movement. These other organizations allowed Moral Majority ready access to mobilized constituents. Moral Majority appealed to these constituents on the basis of common ideology and the weak political and religious structure of the Christian Right. Although there were groups that had already mobilized a portion of the constituents, they were relatively small with few resources or initial direction. Moral Majority offered constituents direct ties to an organization that boasted not one, but a number of wellrecognized leaders. This also gave potential recruits an impression of strong leadership and organization. Falwell also had access to an enormous mail list from his television and radio broadcasts that could be used to recruit, mobilize, and raise money. The visibility of Falwell also helped Moral Majority. A December 1980 Gallup poll reported that 40% of its sample had heard of Moral Majority. In May of 1981 a similar poll conducted by the Washington Post and ABC reported that this figure raised to 49% (Liebman, 1983).
Thus Falwell had ready access to three groups, (1) his own audience, (2) those already mobilized by other groups within the Christian Right, and (3) other's outside of Christian fundamentalism. Moral Majority used a strategy of frame extension to recruit and mobilize others from this last group. The movement attempted to appeal to conservative religious ideologies congruent with their own, again using the same rhetoric of the possibility of lost religious liberties. Jews, Catholics, and Pentecostals were all targeted initially, and yet as we shall see later on, Moral Majority was largely ineffective in recruiting from these populations.
Falwell had hoped to use Moral Majority to reach individuals from these three targeted groups by appealing to mutually shared goals based upon common conservative ideologies. The political and religious environment was ripe as fundamentalists continued to fear for their religious liberties, and groups within the Christian Right mobilized constituents. Falwell and the Moral Majority were largely successful in recruiting fundamentalists from the first two target groups (1) other organizations and (2) Falwell audiences. Much of this success was due in part to the organizational structure of Moral Majority, a feature we need to explore more fully.