Phil. 702 1/18/07
-Some Epistemology: See “What Is Epistemology?” [http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/What-Is-Epistemology.htm], “Responding to Skepticism” [http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/responding.htm].
-Internalism vs. Externalism; Justification and Knowledge
-twins, justification, & knowledge; my positions
-“safety” & “double-safety” accounts of knowledge
-how internalist justification could be necessary for externalist knowledge; how justification could be necessary for knowledge while knowledge is conceptually prior to justification
-Closure: Some principles & counter-examples
- [K(p) & pÞq] à K(q) [K(p1) & K(p2) & … K(pn) & (p1-pn)Þq] à K(q)
- [K(p) & K(pÞq)] à K(q)
- add to ant: attitude-of-knowledge toward q
- add to con: … or can come to know that q by deduction
- the “aggregation of risk” problem for MPC
- the “just barely” problem for SPC (see http://fleetwood.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/index.php?p=38 )
-Lotteries
-problem of conflicting beliefs
-Do I know I’ve lost?
-a contextualist answer & a potential closure-generated problem
-Some Philosophy of Language: interpreting talk so as to make it come out true
-Principle of Charity (“The murderer of Smith is insane” example), Paradigm Case Arguments
-Ref: K. Donnellan, “Paradigm-Case Argument,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Macmillan, 1967)
-Charity, principle of
The principle of charity governs the interpretation of the beliefs and utterances of others. It urges charitable interpretation, meaning interpretation that maximizes the truth or rationality of what others think and say. Some formulations of the principle concern primarily rationality, recommending attributions of rational belief or assertion. Others concern primarily truth, recommending attributions of true belief or assertion. Versions of the principle differ in strength. The weakest urge charity as one consideration among many. The strongest hold that interpretation is impossible without the assumption of rationality or truth.
The principle has been put to various philosophical uses. Students are typically instructed to follow the principle when interpreting passages and formulating the arguments they contain. The principle also plays a role in philosophy of mind and language and in epistemology. Philosophers have argued that the principle of charity plays an essential role in characterizing the nature of belief and intentionality, with some philosophers contending that beliefs must be mostly true. A version of the principle has even served as a key premise in a widely discussed argument against epistemological scepticism.
--Richard Feldman, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P006
-Robotic cats cases – Putnam
-what w/should we say when discovered?, relevantly omniscient observers before discovery
-vary extent, at current time, into past
-involve mistaken beliefs, assumptions about relevant matters
-paradigm case arguments (brief)
****
-Cases involving no mistaken beliefs, assumptions about relevant matters
-Too demanding: “physician”
-Too lax: “bachelor”
-Implicatures intro – Grice; conventional, conversational; “It’s possible that the book is in my office” example.
-“Pragmatics” & Unger’s argument from PR.
-Back to “physician” case, with an Unger-like maneuver
-Back to “bachelor” case, with an appeal to an implicature
-A Principle of Charity (?):It’s a substantial strike against a semantic theory concerning a common term of a natural language that it involves the speakers of that language in systematic and widespread falsehood in their use of that term, even though their false applications are not based on any false beliefs the speakers have concerning relevant underlying matters of fact.
1/25/07
-Cases involving no mistaken beliefs, assumptions about relevant matters
-Too demanding: “physician”
-Too lax: “bachelor”, “knows”
-“Pragmatics” & Unger’s arguments from DS/Ig (CED, 192) & from PR (CED, 193).
-Implicatures intro – Grice (L&C 1967, 1989; see citation at PR 121, n3); conventional, conversational; “It’s possible that the book is in my office” example.
-Grice & “A-Philosophers” (SWW 10.4), example (cited at SWW 5.2):
-Norman Malcolm, “Defending Common Sense,” The Philosophical Review 58 (1949): 201-220 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108%28194905%2958%3A3%3C201%3ADCS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J]:
Three cases have been described in which it would be a correct use of language, although it might be false, to say, “I know that that’s a tree”; and innumerable other cases could be given. Let us notice some features common to these three cases: (1) There is in each case a question at issue and a doubt to be removed. (2) In each case the person who asserts “I know that that’s a tree” is able to give a reason for his assertion. (3) In each case there is an investigation which, if it were carried out, would settle the question at issue. I wish to show that all of these features are missing when Moore says in a philosophical context “I know that that’s a tree.” (p. 203)
-Back to “physician” case, with an Unger-like maneuver
-Back to “bachelor” & “knows” case, with an appeal to an implicature
-A Principle of Charity (?):It’s a substantial strike against a semantic theory concerning a common term of a natural language that it involves the speakers of that language in systematic and widespread falsehood in their use of that term, even though their false applications are not based on any false beliefs the speakers have concerning relevant underlying matters of fact. (see OLB, 174.7)
-Contextualism & WAMs (CED, 195-6; AKC 170-1)
-Good vs. Bad WAMs
-Set-up (CED, 196-7; AKC 172-5, 191-2): defense of DKO vs. crazed defense of “bachelor” (both) / “knows” (AKC only)
-distinguishing features
-better if target is a good candidate, where negation also seems wrong (CED, 198.7; AKC 192.2-.6)
-better if it’s an attempt to explain away apparent falsity thru a claim that a false implicature is generated rather than apparent truth (CED 198.9-200.1; AKC 192.7-193.2; OLB 174-5)
****
-use of a general rule (CED 200.2; AKC 175-6)
-The Generality Objection
-raised: AKC 177-9
-answered (answer depends in part of KAA): AKC 188-190
-OLB 172-175: Presumption of truth (principle of charity?) & mutually enforcing strands of evidence
-Case for contextualism OLB 190-192, not indirect OLB 192
-Where next?
-KAA-based argument for contextualism
-objections
-
2/1/07
-3rd distinguishing feature: use of a general rule (CED 200.2; AKC 175-6)
-The Generality Objection
-raised: AKC 177-9
-answered (answer depends in part on [?-is aided by?] KAA): AKC 188-190
-don’t need KAA to observe that GO can’t account for our willingness to deny in HIGH; do need it to provide the better account
-OLB 172-175: Presumption of truth (principle of charity?) & mutually enforcing strands of evidence
-Basic argument for contextualism OLB 172.5, 172.9-173.2, 190-192
-two stages: I: truth of the key claims; II: therefore, contextualism
-based on affirmations vs. denials of (& not just lack-of-affirmations of) knowledge
-engages the presumption of truth for the appropriate
-avoids generality objection
-issue of “metalinguistic negation” (see AKC 202, n. 37, 38)
-contextualist’s “home court advantage”: can focus on the best cases for his position (OLB 176.3). Some features of the best cases:
-standards appropriate to practical context (OLB 175.8-178.3)
-cases involving no disputes and no reversals (178.3-181.7), just informing (181.1)
-best also to use 3rd, not 1st, person cases (181.8-187.9), but for very different reasons (181.8)
-argument not indirect OLB 192.0-.4
-KAA-based argument for contextualism
-KAA: AKC 179.7
-2 forms: AKC 179.8-180.6
-“secondary (im)propriety”: AKC 180.7; n. 23 (199-200)
-rival: probability accounts (e.g. Lewis’s “sufficiently close to 1” account) & lottery problems (AKC 200, n. 24)
***********
-Grounds for KAA
-basic conversational grounds: tough to admit someone knows yet claim that she shouldn’t assert, or to admit she may assert while saying she doesn’t know; “You don’t know” seems a challenge to an assertion; etc.
-clashing conjunctions: AKC 180.9-181.7; n. 26 (200-201)
-refs: Unger, Chapter 6; Williamson, Chapter 11
-KAA relativized: AKC 182.1
-2 possible relativizations; the first of which is the one I go for:
-KAA-R: A speaker, S, is well-enough positioned with respect to P to be able to properly assert that P if and only if S knows that P according to the standards for knowledge that are in place in S’s context as S makes her assertion.
-KAA-R2: A subject, S1, is well-enough positioned with respect to P to make true the claim a speaker, S2, that S1 is “warranted in asserting that P” if and only if S1 knows that P according to the standards for knowledge that are in place in S2’s context as S2 makes her claim.
-note how the grounds work for the relativized version
-note that the relativization doesn’t beg the question against invariantism
-The argument: AKC 182.2-.6; 187.2-188.3
-SSI introduced
-CI vs. SSI
-SSI agrees with the contextualist in Stage I of the basic argument for contextualism, at least when it’s based on first-person claims; resists Stage II, the inference to contextualism; provides an alternative account of how both key claims are true. The basic arg is effective against SSI when & only when based on 3rd person cases. (OK if those 3rd person cases are just as good.) CI resists the basic argument at Stage I.
-KAA-based argument for contextualism effective only against CI (SSI must be attacked on other grounds): arg. shows that varying epistemic standards comprise a truth-condition of first person knowledge claims; SSI agrees
2/8/07
-skipped: “metalinguistic negation”
-Grounds for KAA
-basic conversational grounds: tough to admit someone knows yet claim that she shouldn’t assert, or to admit she may assert while saying she doesn’t know; “You don’t know” seems a challenge to an assertion; etc.
-clashing conjunctions: AKC 180.9-181.7; n. 26 (200-201)
-refs: Unger, Chapter 6; Williamson, Chapter 11
-KAA relativized: AKC 182.1
-2 possible relativizations; the first of which is the one I go for:
-KAA-R: A speaker, S, is well-enough positioned with respect to P to be able to properly assert that P if and only if S knows that P according to the standards for knowledge that are in place in S’s context as S makes her assertion.
-KAA-R2: A subject, S1, is well-enough positioned with respect to P to make true the claim a speaker, S2, that S1 is “warranted in asserting that P” if and only if S1 knows that P according to the standards for knowledge that are in place in S2’s context as S2 makes her claim.
-note how the grounds work for the relativized version
-note that the relativization doesn’t beg the question against invariantism
-The argument: AKC 182.2-.6; 187.2-188.3
-SSI introduced
-CI vs. SSI
-SSI agrees with the contextualist in Stage I of the basic argument for contextualism, at least when it’s based on first-person claims; resists Stage II, the inference to contextualism; provides an alternative account of how both key claims are true. The basic arg is effective against SSI when & only when based on 3rd person cases. (OK if those 3rd person cases are just as good.) CI resists the basic argument at Stage I.
-KAA-based argument for contextualism effective only against CI (SSI must be attacked on other grounds): arg. shows that varying epistemic standards comprise a truth-condition of first person knowledge claims; SSI agrees
Into K&L…
2/15/07
ANNOUNCEMENT: No meeting next week, on 2/22
It is possible that X V’s, but it is not possible for X to V
It is possible for X to V, but it is not possible that X V’s
(said in HIGH, having previously been in LOW):
No, what I said – namely, “I know that it’s open” – was true. But now I wish to add this: I didn’t know that it was open
(said in LOW, having previously been in HIGH):
No, what I said – namely, “I don’t know that it’s open” – was true. But now I wish to add this: I knew that it was open
Hawthorne
--SSI/IRI Introduction (using talk of “standards”, despite H’s possible resistance (57-58, n23))
--H on contextualism: ascriber’s context calls the shots (59.3; cf 103.3)
--The contextualist’s freedom, and the 3rd person argument against SSI (OLB 183-190)
--Knowledge’s ties with assertion and with practical reasoning: does contextualism problematically sever them – or does SSI make them too tight? (85-91)
--H’s anti-contextualism argument(s) of 98-108 & response (Bamboozled, sects 4-5 (pp. 9-18)
3/1/07: Discussed Stanley & Hawthorne’s “Knowledge and Action”
3/8/07
1. Knowledge and action
a. review of the two key types of cases
1. agent acts wrongly (rashly) & seems subject to “But you didn’t know…” criticism
2. agent acts correctly, though it seems they didn’t know
Probably my most serious doubt about your position is in the neighborhood of your "Objection 2." But what I worry about are cases where there is a more robust belief involved, but still not yet knowledge. And the worry is that it seems like sometimes, you don't need knowledge; you can perfectly well act on a certain enough belief that P. To be sure, at other times, like in the kinds of at-least-fairly-high-stakes cases you utilize, it seems that only knowledge will do. But in other situations, you don't need to know. Or so it often seems to me. So, take a case where you would describe yourself as believing that the restaurant is to the left, and not just as believing it's likely that it's to the left. Suppose, for instance, you're driving around in a town you lived in as a boy. When you first get into town, you might only have beliefs about chances: You have hunches about which direction to go to get where, but would only describe yourself as having beliefs about likelihoods, etc., and not as believing, say, that the YMCA is to the right. But now, you've been driving around a bit, it's all been coming back to you, and you are ready to describe yourself as believing that the restaurant is down the left fork in the road, and not just as believing that there's a good chance that it is. But you still wouldn't describe yourself as knowing. And if you get this thing wrong, no big deal. You'd rather get it right, but it's not important. So, you act on your fairly confident & quite well-grounded belief that the restaurant is to the left, and, lo and behold, there it is, to the left. Everything worked out fine. If someone asks whether you knew it would be to the left, you answer, "No, I only believed it; I wouldn't say I knew it. But the belief was pretty confident and quite well-grounded." If they then complain, "Well, then you had no business acting on your belief that it was to the left. You should take P as a reason for acting only if you know that P," this would seem to be a pretty plausible rejoinder: "Well, I didn't know it was to the left, but, like I said, I had a quite confident and well-grounded belief that it was to the left, and that seems more than enough to go on in a case like this, where there's not much riding on my being right. Here it seemed quite appropriate to treat P as a reason for acting, even though I didn't know that P."