SCU – Legal Profession
Eleventh Week – Civil Litigation
April 3, 2012
FAQ’s / All Students ReadEx. 11.1 / Mr. Hairpiece / All Read and ready to discuss
Ex. 11.2 / Fisons / All Read and ready to discuss
Ex. 11.3 / Two Standards? / No one
Ex. 11.4 / Qualcomm / No one
Ex. 11.5 / Boss’s Keeper? / No one
Ex. 11.6 / Candor / All Read and ready to discuss
Ex. 11.7 / A Liar for a Client / All Read and ready to discuss
Ex. 11.8 / Outline regarding Perjury / All read
Read MR 3.1 – 3.9
11. Civil Litigation
11.1. Frequently Asked Questions
(11.1.1):Whatarethe sourcesofthelawoflawyeringforcivillitigation?
Interms oflegalethics rules, welookto theModel Rules 3.1– 3.9. But wealsolookto codes ofcivil procedureand to thecommonlaw oflegal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty,and malicious prosecution.
(11.1.2):WhatModelRulescovercivillitigation?
As noted, rules 3.1– 3.9 do. Therearethree kinds oflitigators regulatedin those rules: (1)the regular rules forall litigators, includingcivillitigators; (2)the special rules,especially 3.8,thatconstraincriminal prosecutors;and (3) the special rules,especiallythe second sentence of Rule 3.1,thatliberatecriminal defensecounsel.
(11.1.3):Whatarethe keydifferencesbetweentheethicsofcivilandcriminallitigators?
As noted,the two kinds ofcriminallitigators have particular regulations that don’tapply to civillitigators.For example, thecriminal prosecutoris supposedto “do justice,” or “seek just results,” but so longascivillitigators play by the rulestheyareallowedto seek beneficial results fortheirclienteven if justice doesn’t result. Criminal defense lawyersare given speciallicenseto fightclaimsthatthelawyer knowsaretrue, butcivillitigatorscan’tlitigate that aggressively.
(11.1.4): Rule 3.1 provides that a lawyer may not bring frivolous claims or defenses.
What does“frivolous” mean? Frivolous usually meansa claimthatislacking any reasonable factual orlegal basis.Sometimesthat’seasyto spot,as whena civillitigator realizesthat no witness and no documents provideany support fortheclient’slegal position, or whenall the governinglaw precludestheclaim thelawyer wantsto assert.
But sometimes “frivolous” is harderto define. Litigators needto developa sense of what kinds ofclaims the judges, juries,and opponents willconsiderto be unusually weak. Wecan say thata lawyer needsto developa “common sense.” We mighteven say thatthelawyer needsa sense of what, ultimately,countsas “law.”
(11.1.5):Whatisthedutyofcandorto thetribunal?
It’s an important rule—onethatcantrumpthe duty ofconfidentiality.You needto read Rule 3.3carefully. Thereis an Appendixto this readingthat will help you understanda lawyer’s obligation whena clientintendsto commit, or hascommitted perjury.
(11.1.6):Whatdutiesdoesthecivillitigatoroweto theopponent?
In one sense,all the 3.x rules benefit your opponents, asthey preclude you from unfairlitigation. In particular, Rule3.4lists duties runningto the opponent.
(11.1.7):Whataretheethicsofpre-trialdiscovery?
Rule 3.4 deals with discovery, but most ofthe regulation of theethics of discoveryiscontainedincodes ofcivil procedure. Many of thosecodesactuallycontain mini-codes ofethics,complete with penalties.Forthat reason, the ethics of discovery is regulatedto a significant degree bylaw outsidetheethics rules.
11.1. Example: Mr. Hairpiece Gags a Maggot
JoeJamail isa legendary Texastriallawyer.He wona $1 billion judgment in the Pennzoil-Texacocase—which he had ona 33%contingent fee. Considerthe following two excerpts from depositions heattended.DoesJamail play legitimate hardball oris he overtheline? How welltakenare hiscomplaints?
Excerpt 1.With respectto thisexcerpt,the Delaware Supreme Court blastedJamail. Would you have?
A. [Mr. Liedtke] I vaguely recall [Mr. Oresman’s letter] . . . . I think I did read it, probably.
Q. (By Mr. Johnston [Delaware counsel for QVC]) Okay. Do you have any idea whyMr. Oresman was calling that material to your attention?
Mr. Jamail: Don’t answer that. How would he know what was going on in Mr. Oresman’s mind?Don’t answer it. Go on to your next question.
Mr. Johnston: No, Joe—
Mr. Jamail: He’s not goingto answer that. Certifyit. I’m goingto shut it down if you don’t go to your next question.
Mr. Johnston: No. Joe, Joe—
Mr. Jamail: Don’t “Joe” me,asshole.Youcanask some questions, but get off of that. I’mtired of you.Youcould gaga maggot offa meat wagon.Now,we’ve helped you inevery way wecan.
Mr. Johnston: Let’s justtakeiteasy.
Mr. Jamail: No, we’re not goingto takeiteasy.Get done withthis.
Mr. Johnston: We will go onto the next question.
Mr. Jamail: Do it now.
Mr. Johnston: We will go onto the next question. We’re nottryingto exciteanyone.
Mr. Jamail: Come on. Quittalking. Ask the question.Nobody wantsto socialize with you.
Mr. Johnston: I’m nottryingto socialize. We’ll go onto another question. We’recontinuing the deposition.
Mr. Jamail: Well, go onand shut up.
Mr. Johnston: Are you finished?
Mr. Jamail: Yeah, you—
Mr. Johnston: Areyou finished?
Mr. Jamail: I may beand you may be.Now, you wantto sit here andtalkto me, fine. This depositionis goingto be over with.You don’t know what you’re doing.Obviously someone wrote outa long outline of stuff for youto ask.You have no concept of what you’re doing.Now, I’ve tolerated you forthree hours. If you’ve gotanother question, get on withit. This is goingto stop one hour from now, period.Go.
Mr. Johnston: Are you finished?
Mr. Thomas: Come on, Mr. Johnston, moveit.
Mr. Johnston: I don’t needthis kind ofabuse.
Mr. Thomas: Then justask the next question.
Q. (By Mr. Johnston) All right. Totryto move forward, Mr.Liedtke,. . . .I’ll show you what’s been marked asLiedtke 14 anditisa coveringletter datedOctober 29fromSteven Cohen ofWachtell, Lipton, RosenKatz includingQVC’sAmendmentNumber1to itsSchedule 14D-1,and my question—
A. No.
Q. —toyou, sir,is whether you’ve seen that?
A. No. Look,I don’t know what yourintent inaskingallthese questionsis, but, myGod,I am not goingto play boylawyer.
Q. Mr.Liedtke—
A. Okay.Go ahead andask your question.
Q. —I’mtryingto move forwardinthis deposition that weareentitledto take. I’m tryingto streamlineit.
Mr. Jamail: Come on with your next question.Don’t eventalk with this witness.
Mr. Johnston: I’mtryingto move forward withit.
Mr. Jamail: You understand me? Don’ttalkto this witnessexcept by question. Did you hear me?
Mr. Johnston: I heard you fine.
Mr. Jamail:You fee makersthink youcancome hereand sit in somebody’s office, get your meter running, get your full day’s fee byasking stupid questions. Let’s go with it.
Excerpt 2, froma transcript ofa depositiontakenin St. Louis.Joe Jamail represented plaintiffsina suitclaiming thatthe Monsanto Company hadexposed residents ofHoustonto dangerouschemicals. EdwardCarstarphen was theattorney forthe defense.Monsanto settledthecase in July for $39 million. ThetranscriptappearedintheOctoberissue ofAmerican Lawyer,a monthly publishedinNewYork City.
Jamail: You don’t run this deposition, you understand?
Carstarphen: Neitherdo you, Joe.
Jamail: You watch and see.You watchand see who does, big boy. And don’t betelling otherlawyersto shut up. Thatisn’t your goddamned job, fat boy.
Carstarphen: Well,that’s not your job, Mr.Hairpiece.
Witness: AsI said before, you havean incipient—
Jamail:What do you wantto do aboutit,asshole?
Carstarphen: You’re not goingto bullythis guy.
Jamail: Oh, you big tub of shit, sit down.
Carstarphen:I don’tcare how many of youcome up against me.
Jamail:Oh, you big fattub of shit, sit down.Sit down, you fattub of shit.
Watchtheseclips:
- Texas Style Deposition:
- How To Handle a Tough Deposition Question:
If you werea Magistrate Judge,Discovery Commissioner, or Judgeinany thesecases,and you werealertedto that conduct, what would you do? What rulescould you use? Oristhis simply some of theinevitable “blowing off steam” that necessarilyaccompanies high-stakeslitigation?
As forthe expression“youcould gaga maggot offa meatwagon,” whatthe hell does that mean?Didn’t he mean either“youcould gaga maggot,” or “youcouldlurea maggot offa meat wagon”? Isn’t counsel mixing his metaphors? Isn’tthat initself grounds for sanctions?
11.2. Example: The Fisons Case
Inthisexample,ask yourself abouttheline betweentruth and deception. When,ifever, do literalanswers become deliberately misleading?Do what extent isa litigatorentitledto blamethe otherlitigator forasking sloppy questions, or for not following up? Please readModel Rule 3.3 (Candortowardthe Tribunal)andthe Comments.
WashingtonStatePhysiciansInsuranceExchangeAssociationv. FisonsCorporation
SUPREMECOURTOFWASHINGTON
122Wn.2d299;858P.2d1054;1993Wash.LEXIS241
September16,1993,Decided
September16,1993,Filed
OPINION:[*306] [**1058]
Factsof Case
Weareaskedinthiscaseto decidewhethera physicianhasa causeofactionagainsta drugcompanyfor personal andprofessionalinjurieswhichhesufferedwhenhispatienthadanadversereactionto a drughehad prescribed.Thephysicianclaimedthedrug[***15]companyfailedtowarnhimoftherisksassociatedwiththe drug.Ifsuchactionislegally[*307]cognizable,wearethenaskedto determinewhetherdamagesawardedby thejurywereexcessiveandwhetherattorneys'feeswereproperlyawardedbythetrialcourt.Wearealsoaskedto rulethatthetrialcourterredindenyingsanctionsagainstthedrugcompanyforcertainabusesinthediscovery process.
Thephysician'sactionbeganaspartofamalpracticeandproductliabilitysuitbroughtonbehalfofa child who wasthephysician'spatient.OnJanuary18,1986,2-year-oldJenniferPollocksufferedseizureswhichresultedin severeandpermanentbraindamage.Itwasdeterminedthatthe seizureswerecausedbyan excessiveamountof theophyllinein hersystem.ThePollockssuedDr.JamesKlicpera(Jennifer'spediatrician),who hadprescribed thedrug,as wellasFisonsCorporation(thedrugmanufacturerand hereafterdrugcompany)whichproduced SomophyllinOralLiquid,thetheophylline-basedmedicationprescribedforJennifer.
Dr.Klicperacross-claimedagainstthedrugcompanybothforcontributionandfordamagesandattorneys'fees undertheConsumerProtectionAct[***16]aswellas fordamagesforemotionaldistress.
InJanuary1989,afternearly3yearsofdiscovery,Dr.Klicpera,hispartnerandtheEverettClinicsettledwith thePollocks.Thesettlementagreementessentiallyprovidedthatthedoctors'insurer,WashingtonState PhysiciansInsuranceExchangeAssociation(WSPIE),wouldloan$ 500,000to thePollockswhichwouldbe contributedintheeventofa settlementbetweenthePollocksandthedrugcompany.ThePollocks were guaranteedaminimumtotalrecoveryof$1million,andintheeventoftrialDr.Klicperaagreedto remainasa partyandto payamaximumof$1million.ThesettlementbetweenthePollocksandDr.Klicperawas determinedbythetrialcourtto bereasonablepursuantto RCW4.22.060.
Morethan1yearafterthis settlement,anattorneyforthePollocksprovidedDr.Klicpera'sattorneya copyofa letterreceivedfromananonymoussource.Theletter,dated[*308]June30,1981,indicatedthatthedrug company wasawarein1981of"life-threateningtheophyllinetoxicity"inchildrenwhoreceivedthedrug while sufferingfromviralinfections.Theletterwassentfromthe drugcompanyto onlya small numberofwhat[***17]thecompanyconsideredinfluentialphysicians.Theletterstatedthatphysiciansneededto understandthattheophyllinecanbea "capriciousdrug".
ThePollocksandDr.KlicperacontendedthattheirdiscoveryrequestsshouldhaveproducedtheJune1981letter andtheymovedfor sanctionsagainstthedrugcompany.Therequestfor sanctions wasinitiallyheardbyaspecialdiscoverymaster,who deniedsanctions,but whorequiredthe[**1059]drugcompanyto deliverall documentsrequestedwhichrelatedto theophylline.Documentsthatthedrugcompanyanditscounselhad immediatelyavailableweretobeproducedbythedayfollowingthehearingbeforethespecialmaster.The remainderofthedocumentswereto beproducedwithin2weeks.ThetrialcourtsubsequentlydeniedDr. Klicpera'srequestto reversethediscoverymaster'sdenialofsanctionsandatthecloseoftrialdenieda renewed motionfor sanctions.
Thedayafterthe hearingonsanctions,thedrugcompanydeliveredapproximately10,000documentsto Dr. Klicpera'sandPollocks'attorneys.Amongthedocumentsprovidedwasa July10,1985memorandumfrom CedricGrigg,directorofmedicalcommunicationsforthedrugcompany,to [***18]BruceSimpson,vice presidentofsalesandmarketingforthecompany.
This1985memorandumreferredto adramaticincreaseinreportsofserioustoxicityto theophyllineinearly1985andalsoreferredto thecurrentrecommendeddosageasa significant"mistake"or"poorclinical judgment".The memoalludedto the"sinisteraspect"thatthephysicianwhowasthe"pope"oftheophylline dosagerecommendationwasaconsultantto thepharmaceuticalcompanythat wastheleadingmanufacturerof thedrugandthatthisconsultantwas"heavilyinto[thatcompany's]stocks".Thememoalso notedthatthe toxicityreportswerenotreportedinthejournal[*309]readbythosewhomostoftenprescribedthedrugand concludedthatthosephysiciansmaynotbeawareofthe"alarmingincreaseinadversereactionssuchas seizures, permanentbraindamageanddeath".Thememoconcludedthatthe"epidemicoftheophyllinetoxicity providesstrongjustificationforourcorporatedecisionto ceasepromotionalactivitieswithourtheophyllineline ofproducts."Therecordattrialshowedthatthedrugcompanycontinuedto promoteand selltheophyllineafter thedateofthis memo.
On April27,1990,[***19]shortlyafterthe1985memowasrevealed,thedrugcompanysettledwiththe Pollocksfor$ 6.9million.Thetrialcourtdeterminedthatsettlementto bereasonable,dismissedthePollocks' claims,extinguishedDr.Klicpera'scontribution/indemnityclaimsagainstFisonspursuantto RCW4.22.060and reserveddeterminationofwhatclaimsremainedfortrial.Thetrialcourtthenorderedthelawsuitrecaptioned, essentiallyasDr.JamesKlicpera,plaintiffv. FisonsCorporation,defendant.
Afteramonth-longjurytrial,thecourtinstructedthejuryon Dr.Klicpera'sclaimswhichwerebasedonthe ConsumerProtectionAct,RCW19.86,theproductliabilityact,RCW7.72,andcommonlawfraud.Thejury wasalsoinstructedonWSPIE'sfraudclaimseekingto recoverthe$ 500,000paidinsettlementto thePollocks. ThetrialcourtruledthatWSPIEcouldnot maintainaConsumerProtectionActcauseofactionagainstthedrug company.
Ona specialverdictform,thejuryconcludedthatDr.Klicperawasentitledto recoveragainstthedrugcompany underhisConsumerProtectionActclaimandunderhisproductliabilityclaim,butnot underthefraudclaim. ThejuryawardedDr.Klicpera$ 150,000[***20]forlossofprofessionalconsultations,$ 1,085,000forinjury toprofessionalreputation,and$ 2,137,500forphysicaland mentalpainand suffering.ThejuryfurtherfoundDr.Klicperato be3.3percentcontributorilynegligent.ThejuryfoundthatWSPIEwas not entitledto recover underits fraudclaimagainstthedrugcompanythe$ 500,000settlementpaidto thePollocks.
[*310]Thetrialcourtdeniedthedrugcompany'smotionforjudgmentn.o.v.andfora newtrial.Onamotion for reductionofthejuryaward,thetrialcourtreducedtheamountawardedforlossofprofessionalconsultations from$ 150,000to$ 2,250butrefusedto reducetheawardsforlossofreputationandforpainandsuffering.The trialcourtalsodeniedWSPIE'smotionforjudgmentn.o.v.ora newtrialbasedonthedismissalofWSPIE's ConsumerProtectionActclaim.
Thetrialcourtawarded$449,568.18to Dr.Klicperaasattorneys'feesunderthe ConsumerProtectionAct findingthat50 percentoftheattorneys'timeinthelawsuit[**1060]wasattributableto the Consumer ProtectionActcauseofaction.ThecourtdeniedDr.Klicpera'srequestforfurtherattorneys'feesbased upona theoryofequitable[***21]indemnification.
Pursuantto theinjunctivereliefsectionofthe ConsumerProtectionAct,thecourtorderedthedrugcompanyto sendtheJune30,1981letterregardingthedangersoftheophyllinepoisoningto theWashingtonStateMedical Association.
Thedrugcompanysoughtdirectreviewbythiscourtandweacceptedreview.Dr.Klicperaand hisinsurer (WSPIE)cross-appealfromthetrialcourt'srefusalto awarddiscoverysanctionsfortheallegeddiscovery violations.WSPIEalsoappealsthetrialcourt'sdismissalofitsConsumerProtectionActclaimagainstthedrug company.
Theparties'63 assignmentsoferrorraise9 principalissues.
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Issue Nine.
Conclusion. The trial court applied an erroneous legal standard when ruling on themotion for sanctions for discovery abuse and erred when it refused to sanction the drug company and/or its attorneys for violation of CR26(g).
Thedoctorand hisinsurer,[***74]WashingtonStatePhysiciansInsuranceExchangeAssociation (hereinafterreferredto [*337]collectivelyas"thedoctor"),askedthetrialcourtto sanctionthedrugcompany anditslawyersfordiscoveryabuse.Thisrequestwasbasedonthefactthatatleasttwodocumentscrucialto the doctor'sdefenseas wellasto theinjuredchild'scase werenotdiscovereduntilMarchof1990 -- morethan1 yearafterthedoctorhad settledwiththechild,nearly4yearsafterthecomplaintwasfiled andapproximately1 monthbeforethescheduledtrialdate.Thetwodocuments,dubbedthe"smokingguns"bythedoctor,showthat thedrugcompanyknewabout,andinfact hadwarnedselectedphysiciansabout,thedangersoftheophylline toxicityinchildrenwithviralinfectionsatleastasearlyasJune1981,4yearsbeforeJenniferPollockwas injured.
Althoughinterrogatoriesandrequestsforproductionshouldhaveled to thediscoveryofthe"smokinggun" documents,theirexistencewasnotrevealedto thedoctoruntiloneofthemwasanonymouslydeliveredto his attorneys.
A motionfor sanctionsbasedondiscoveryabuse was heard firstbyaspecialdiscoverymasteronMarch28,1990,beforethe[***75]child'scase wassettled.Thespecialmasterruledthat hecouldnotfind"onthebasis ofthisrecordthattherewasanintentionalwithholdingofthisdocument."(Italicsours.)Clerk'sPapers,at9693.Thespecialmasterthenturnedtowhat hedeterminedwasthemorerelevantissue,additionalandfulldiscovery ofothertheophylline-relateddocumentsinthedrugcompany'spossession.Thespecialmasterorderedthedrug company'sattorneysto turnoveranyimmediatelyavailabledocumentsconcerningtheophyllineto attorneysfor thechildandthedoctorbynoonthe nextdayandto reviewtheremainderofthedrugcompany'sfilesand produceotherrelevantdocumentsattheendof2weeks.Thenextday,the second"smokinggun",a 1985internalmemorandumdescribingtheophyllinetoxicityinchildren,wasdeliveredalong withabout10,000other documents.
Althoughotherdocumentswererelevantto thecase,thetwosmokinggun[**1075]documentswerethemost important.The first,a letter,datedJune30,1981,discussedanarticlethat[*338]containeda studyconfirming reports"oflifethreateningtheophyllinetoxicitywhenpediatricasthmatics. . . contractviralinfections."
[***76]Exhibit3. Thesecond,aninterofficememorandum,datedJuly10,1985,talksofan"epidemic"of theophyllinetoxicityandof"adramaticincreaseinreportsofserioustoxicityto theophylline."Exhibit7.
Bothdocumentscontradictedthepositiontakenbythedrugcompanyinthelitigation,namely,thatitdid not knowthattheophylline-basedmedicationswerepotentiallydangerouswhengivento childrenwithviral infections.
Afterthe1985 memorandumwasdiscoveredand stillpriorto trial,the specialmaster'sdenialofthe sanctions motionwasappealedandaffirmed,withoutspecificfindings,bya judgeoftheSuperiorCourt(JudgeKnight), whoessentiallydeferredto thespecialmaster.
Themotionfor sanctionswasrenewedand heardbyanotherjudgeoftheSuperiorCourt,thetrialjudge(Judge French),atthecloseoftrial.Thetrialcourtdeclinedto imposesanctions,deferringto theearlierdecisionsofthe specialmasterandJudgeKnight.Thedoctorthenappealedthedenialof his sanctionsmotiondirectlyto this court.
*****
The concept that a spirit of cooperation and forthrightness during the discovery process is necessary for the proper functioning of modern trials is reflected in decisions of our Court of Appeals. In Gammon v. Clark Equip. Co., 38 Wash. App. 274, 686 P.2d 1102 (1984), aff'd, 104 Wash. 2d 613, 707 P.2d 685 (1985), the Court of Appeals held that a newtrial should have been ordered because of discovery abuse by the defendant.Then Court of AppealsJudge Barbara Durham wrote for the court:
TheSupremeCourthas notedthattheaimoftheliberal federaldiscoveryrulesisto "make a triallessa gameofblindman'sbuffandmorea faircontestwiththebasicissuesandfacts disclosedto thefullestpracticableextent."Theavailabilityofliberaldiscoverymeansthat civiltrials[***86]no longer needbe carried on in the dark. The way is now clear . . . for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.
This system obviously cannotsucceed without the full cooperation of the parties. Accordingly, the drafters wisely included a provision authorizing the trial court to impose sanctions for unjustified or unexplained resistance to discovery.
(Citations omitted.) Gammon, 38 Wash. App. at280.
*****
The trial court erred in concluding as it did. As stated above, intent need not be shown before sanctionsare mandated. A motionto compel compliance with the rules is not a prerequisite to a sanctions motion. Conduct is to be measured against the spirit and purpose [***91] of the rules, not against the standard of practice of the local bar. Furthermore, the burdenplaced on the doctor by the trial court in this regard was greater than that mandated under the rule.
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ExampleOne:
For example, the drug company's response to the following interrogatory propounded by the doctor demonstrates the resistanceto comply with discovery. Although we do not condone this kind of answer, this answer, alone, would not warrant sanctionsas it does raise some legitimateobjections. The doctor's simple request, and the answer thereto, are as follows:
INTERROGATORYNO.2:CanTheophyllinecausebraindamageinhumans?
ANSWER:See generalobjections[set forthintwopages]attachedheretoasExhibitAandincorporated hereinbyreference.Thisinterrogatorycallsforanexpertopinionbeyondthe scopeofCivilRule26(b)(4), andis,inanyevent,premature.Furthermore,thisinterrogatoryappearsto callforanopinionbasedon medicalknowledgeafterJanuary18,1986,whereastherelevanttimeframeisonorbeforeJanuary18,1986. Inaddition,thisinterrogatoryis notreasonablycalculatedto leadto discoveryofadmissibleevidenceunder CR26(b)(1).Thisinterrogatoryisalso vague,ambiguousandoverbroad.Forexample,theterm"cause"is vagueandambiguousinthatitdoesnotspecifywhetheritincludesindirect,asopposedto direct,causes.
Theterm"braindamage"is similarlyvagueandambiguousandisoverbroadasto timeand scope.For example,itisunclear whethertheterm"brain"includestheentirecentralnervoussystem;itisfurther unclear whethertheterm"braindamage"includestemporaryas wellaspermanentchanges.
ExampleNo.2:
[*347]Thespecificinstancesallegedto besanctionableinthiscaseinvolvemisleadingor"non"responses toa numberofrequestswhichthedoctorclaimsshouldhaveproducedthesmokinggundocuments themselvesorawayto discovertheinformationtheycontained.Thetwosmokinggundocumentsreportedly werecontainedin fileswhichrelatedto Intal,a cromolynsodiumproduct,whichwasmanufacturedby Fisons andwhichcompetedwithSomophyllin.The managerofmedicalcommunicationshada thorough collectionofarticles,materialsandotherdocumentsrelatingto thedangersoftheophyllineand usedthe informationfromthose materialstomarketIntal,asanalternativeto SomophyllinOralLiquid.Thedrug companyavoidedproductionofthesetheophylline-relatedmaterials,andavoidedidentifying[***95]the managerof medicalcommunicationsasa personwithinformationaboutthedangersoftheophylline,by givingevasiveormisleadingresponsesto interrogatoriesandrequestsforproduction.
The followingisbuta samplingofthediscoverybetweenthe parties.
The firstdiscoverydocumentsdirectedto thedrugcompanywerepreparedbythechild'sattorneyandwere datedSeptember26,1986.Theinterrogatoriescontaineda shortdefinitionsectionstatinginpart:
Theterm"theproduct"asusedhereinafterintheseinterrogatoriesshall meantheproduct whichisclaimedto havecausedinjuryordamageto JENNIFERMARIEPOLLOCKas allegedinpleadingsfiledon herbehalf,namely,towit:"Somophyllin"oralliquid.
ExampleNo.3:
Thesefirstinterrogatoriesrequestedinformationabout"the product"whichismanufacturedbythedrug company,Fisons,as wellasabouttheophylline,a drugentitywhichistheprimaryingredientofthedrug company'sproductSomophyllinOralLiquid.Theinterrogatoryregardingtheophyllinewasansweredbythe drugcompany,as weretheinterrogatoriesabout"theproduct".
[*348]Somophyllinanditsprimaryingredient,theophylline,[***96]werenotdistinguishedin discussionsbetweentheattorneysorindrugcompanyliterature.TheprintedpackageinsertforSomophyllin OralLiquid(exhibit93)and marketingbrochuresreferto the namesSomophyllinandtheophylline interchangeably.One marketingbrochurestates:
Theophylline
Theophylline
Theophylline
Theophylline
Theophylline
Theophylline
Theophylline
Theophylline
Theophylline
The one name to remember . . . Somophyllin
Exhibit 111.
The drugcompany's responsesto discovery requestscontainedthe following general objection:
RequestsRegardingFisonsProductsOtherThanSomophyllinOralLiquid.Fisonsobjects to alldiscoveryrequestsregardingFisonsproductsotherthanSomophyllinOralLiquidas overlybroad,undulyburdensome,harassing,and notreasonablycalculatedto leadto the discoveryofadmissibleevidence.
ExampleNo.4:
Theophylline is not a Fisons "product". Furthermore, because theophylline istheprimary ingredient in Somophyllin Oral Liquid, anydocument focusing on theophylline would, necessarily, beone regarding Somophyllin Oral Liquid.
[**1081] In November 1986 thedoctor served his first [***97] requests forproduction on thedrug company. Four requests were made. Three asked fordocuments concerning Somophyllin. Request 3 stated:
3. Producegenuinecopiesofanyletterssentbyyourcompanyto physiciansconcerning theophyllinetoxicityinchildren.
The drug company's response was:
Suchletters,ifany,regardingSomophyllinOralLiquidwill beproducedata reasonable timeandplaceconvenienttoFisonsanditscounselofrecord.
Conclusion
The drug company's responses andanswers to discovery requests are misleading. The answers state that all information regarding Somophyllin OralLiquidwhich had been requested would beprovided. They further imply that all documents which arerelevant to theplaintiffs' claims were being produced. They do not specifically object to theproduction of documents that discuss thedangers of theophylline, but which are not within [***104] theSomophyllin OralLiquidfiles. They state that there is no relevant information within the cromolynsodium product files.
Itappears clear that no conceivable discovery request could have been made by thedoctor that would have uncovered therelevant documents, given theabove andother responses of thedrug company. The objections did not specify that certain documents were not being produced. Instead the general objections werefollowed by a promise to produce requested documents. These responses did not comply with either the spirit orletter of thediscovery rules andthuswere signed in violation of thecertification requirement.
The drug company does not claim that its inquiry intotherecords did not uncover thesmoking gun documents. Instead, thedrug company attempts to justify its responses by arguing as follows: (1)The plaintiffs themselves limited the scope of discovery to documents contained in Somophyllin Oral Liquid files. (2) The smoking gun documents were not intended to relate to Somophyllin OralLiquid, but rather were intended to promote another product of thedrug company. [*353] (3) The drug company produced all of thedocuments itagreed to produce [***105] orwas ordered to produce. (4) The drug company's failureto produce thesmoking gun documents resulted from theplaintiffs' failure to specifically askforthose documents orfrom their failure to move to compel production of those documents. (5)Discovery isan adversarial process and good lawyering required theresponses made in this case.
If thediscovery rules areto beeffective, then thedrug company's arguments must berejected.
First, neither thechild nor thedoctor limited the scope of discovery in this case.Attorneys forthechild, the doctor andthedrug company repeatedly referred to both theophylline andSomophyllin Oral Liquid. There was no clear indication from thedrug company that it was limiting all discovery regarding Somophyllin Oral Liquid to material from that product's file. Nor was there anyindication from thedrug company that it had information about theophylline, which is not a Fisons "product", orinformation regarding Somophyllin Oral Liquid that it was not producing because theinformation was in another product's file. The doctor was justified in relying on the statements made by thedrug company's attorneys that all relevant [***106] documents hadbeen produced and hecannot bedetermined to have impliedly, albeit unknowingly, acquiesced in limiting the scope of discoverable information.