Crying: a Two-Edged Sword

Devarim

Devarim 6 Av 5771

Crying: A Two-Edged Sword

Harav Daniel Mann

(condensed from an article by the author in "Tisha B’Av To Go, 5770")

Our parasha mentions crying in connection to the Sin of the Spies, and the start of Megillat Eicha (1:2) features it prominently in the aftermath of the churban habayit (destruction of the Beit Hamikdash). The gemara (Taanit 29a) famously connects the two: “You cried for no reason; I will set for you a weeping for generations (on the same night, as all these events occurred on Tish’a B’av).”

At first glance, this sounds like a claim that the destruction was a punishment for the Sin of the Spies. However, unlike the Golden Calf, where the Torah says that the punishment would be in the future (Shemot 32:34), the Torah specifies that the punishment for this sin was the 40 years in the desert. In regard to the destruction of the Beit Hamikdash, Chazal also identify specific sins the people of that era committed and do not mention the Sin of the Spies.

It would appear that rather than a punishment, the weeping set over the churban was intended to initiate a process of tikkun (repairing) of the misuse of a powerful tool. Crying is neither good nor bad. It is triggered when one is sad, but also when one is happy. It can be a self-standing outburst of emotion, or it can be part of a charged expression of content, as Esther used it (Esther 8:3). It can be used properly, and it can be abused.

In the desert, our forefathers used it improperly in a sign of disbelief in Hashem and disapproval of His wonderful plan for us. They were punished for what they said, but they also soiled a powerful gift they were given (Bava Metzia 59a- “Even when the gates of prayer are sealed, the gates of tears are not sealed”). Hashem told them: if you want to purify the power of your tears, use them to cry for a constructive purpose. Use them to have pain over that which deserves it – the churban habayit – and toward the goal of a remorse that brings repentance and future rebuilding.

Rabbi Akiva displayed a particularly deep outlook on crying. The gemara (Makkot 24b) tells that when other rabbis were crying upon seeing a fox in the place of the Holy of Holies, Rabbi Akiva was happy. As he explained, the fulfillment of a prophecy of doom is a good omen regarding the prophecies of liberation. Fine, so Rabbi Akiva was an optimistic person who did not cry easily! Yet a different gemara (Avoda Zara 20b) tells us that he cried when he saw the beautiful woman who he would later marry because her beauty would deteriorate in the grave. Why cry over a quite natural future event? The answer is that Rabbi Akiva was able to look toward the future endgame. The woman’s beauty was indeed lost in the grave and would no longer bring anyone joy. On the other hand, the tragic state of the Beit Hamikdash was actually a building block or road mark toward a better future.

Most of us cannot pretend to master a Rabbi-Akiva-like approach to sad events. Although not commanded specifically to cry, we would do well to express our appropriate emotions over the churban and realize that our proper use of the powerful human emotional act is a step toward fixing past mistakes and ushering in a brighter future.

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by Rav Daniel Mann

Question:I often take an intercity bus ride with a group of peers. One person has been reciting Tefillat Hederech over a microphone, and everyone answers Amen. Are we properly fulfilling the mitzva by microphone?

Answer:Tefillat Haderech is an obligatory prayer for protection from danger, instituted in beracha form under certain set circumstances (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 110: 4-7). As such, there is strong reason to believe that it follows the basic rules for fulfilling the obligations of other berachot and prayers.

One of the most basic rules of being yotzei (fulfilling) an obligation by means of another person is that the latter must be obligated in the mitzva (Rosh Hashanah 29a). Even answeringAmenrequires one to hear the beracha from a person whose beracha is meaningful (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 215:3 regarding a small child’s beracha). Therefore, all agree that one is not yotzei and does not answer Amen to that which he hears on a recording, as he does not hear something being said now by a person.

Almost all poskim agree that one cannot fulfill the mitzva of hearing shofar via microphone or other electronic means because one must hear the direct sound of a man blowing a shofar (see Rosh Hashana 27b). The ruling regarding Megilla reading via microphone is less clear. Although one does not hear the actual voice of a valid ba’al koreh, it is better than a recording in two ways. First, the sound is produced directly based on the sound waves from the ba’al koreh, not by means of someone else pressing a button. Secondly, the reproduction is heard at the same time the ba’al koreh reads. Therefore, although most poskim believe one cannot fulfill the mitzva via microphone, the lenient position is somewhat tenable (see Tzitz Eliezer VIII, 11; Minchat Shlomo I, 9 in the name of the Chazon Ish; Igrot Moshe OC II, 108).

The gemara (Sukka 51b) minimizes the importance of hearing the voice of the person reciting, if one knows what is being said. It discusses a huge structure in Alexandria where the audience could not hear, and instead flags were waved to inform people when to answer Amen. However, Tosafot (ad loc.) limits this precedent to cases where participants were not attempting to fulfill any mitzva at the time. Nevertheless this does indicate that one can answer Amen without hearing the voice in a case where one knows what beracha it is and does not need to be yotzei (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 124:8).

The much stronger position is that one cannot be motzi others via microphone, including in Tefillat Haderech. On the other hand, while few Orthodox shuls use a microphone for Megilla, it is commonplace for people to say Tefillat Haderech over a microphone. Can the two practices be reconciled? The answer is: arguably yes. Firstly, it is generally assumed that the level of obligation of Tefillat Haderech is of a lower level than that of set tefillot, thus making leniency in a case of machloket easier. On a bus, there is often another reason for leniency. Rav Ovadya Yosef (Yechaveh Da’at III, 54) assumes that whoever could hear without the microphone can be yotzei even if he hears primarily the microphone. While one can take issue with this assumption, it is a reasonable one (see Bemareh Habazak, I, 26). Most times most people could hear without a microphone, just not so well or every word. (For Megilla, there is a need to hear every word.)

It seems halachically preferable for people to say (along) their own Tefillat Haderech, especially those who could not have heard without the microphone, although doing it noticeably when the group does not could cause problems of yohara (looking haughty). We note that regarding many drives, there is actually a machloket whether Tefillat Haderech should be said, at least with its beracha ending. One may answer Amen based on the Alexandria precedent and if the beracha should not have been made, an unjustified Amen is less severe than saying the beracha oneself. Therefore, having one be motzi others has a slight element of advantage, and we can find some support for the common practice (as is our usual preference).

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Choice of the Individual, Not the Collective

(condensed from Ein Ayah, Berachot 7:21)

Gemara: [Regarding a full zimun of ten,in which Hashem’s Name is invoked,] nine regular men and one eved (an originally gentile servant of a Jew, who accepts to keep most mitzvot but is not a convert) can combine [to make the zimun].

Ein Ayah: As the number of participants increases, so too the lofty and holy honor of the service of Hashem increases. However, we should realize that the main ability to reach shleimut (completeness) is through the ability to exercise free will and through it to have a realization of the full truth and straighten one’s path based on the dictates of the Torah and the mitzvot.

Therefore, the sanctification of Hashem, which requires a congregation, should not be formed by avadim who are subservient to their human master and whose actions are forced upon them without their own choice to act. This is part of the reason that the Torah distances us from slavery, as it says, “To Me are Bnei Yisrael servants” (Vayikra 25:55), which Chazal explained: “servants to Me and not servants to servants” (Kiddushin 22b). In a similar vein, the Yerushalmi (Berachot 3:3) says that the reason an eved is exempt from Kri’at Shema is that it is intended for those who have only one master. In other words, one’s recognition of Hashem’s Name must come from his own recognition, knowledge, and the pure emotions of his soul. This is based on the important rule that human shleimut is built on free will.

The thesis of the centrality of free will is true regarding the individual, as each person has full ability to choose his path for good or for bad. This is not so on the national level, in whose regard Hashem said, “I swear in My life, if not with a strong hand … I will rule over you” (Yechezkel 20:33).

From one perspective, the group is a collection of individuals. However, the collective has an advantage, in that there is no possibility for it to choose evil in a complete manner or forsake its relationship with Hashem. The element that is left to choice is whether the individuals who make up the collective will be of a higher or a lower level.

Ten is the minimal number that constitutes a group. Nine represents a maximum number of individuals, and when the tenth comes, he turns them into a collective. Let us remember that the shortcoming of the eved in this regard is his lack of free will, which is necessary of the individuals who make up the group. However, when a full complement of individuals is present and it is a question of turning it into a collective, the eved is capable, since on the level of the collective, the lack of full free will is less of an issue.

The Difference Between the Ninth and Tenth for a Minyan

(condensed from Ein Ayah, Berachot 7:22)

Gemara: How could [an eved count as the tenth]? Wasn’t a story related that Rabbi Eliezer did not find a tenth in shul and he released an eved from servitude in order to have a minyan? The story was that two were missing: one eved was released, and the other counted as is.

Ein Ayah: Since the element of creating the group is accomplished by the tenth, we can overlook the inability to choose only in regard to the tenth. However, regarding the nine who make up the individuals, who have to be able to complete themselves with clear recognition and free choice, an eved cannot join. The story of two avadim where one was freed and one did not need to be freed stresses the distinction between the shleimut of the individual and that of the nation, which is a foundation of the Torah upon which the covenant was made.

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Beit Din Ruling Based on Secular Law

(based on Shurat Hadin, vol. VIII, pp. 86-92)

There was a fundamental machloket between the regional and supreme rabbinical courts regarding a case where litigants committed in advance to have their interactions governed by relevant non-Torah laws, but they came to beit din to adjudicate in that context. There are three approaches beit din could take: 1. Refuse to hear the case, having it to go to secular court (regional court); 2. Hear the case, following Torah law; 3. Hear the case, applying the non-Torah laws the sides accepted (supreme court). A halachic analysis follows.

The Shut Harosh (18:4) discusses a case of two people who formally accepted upon themselves to adjudicate according to penalties the non-Jewish courts levy. The Rosh says that as long as the defendant is willing to go to beit din, the plaintiff cannot sue him in non-Jewish court. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 26:3) accepts the Rosh in a straightforward manner, the S’ma (26:11) makes the following distinction. If the laws the non-Jewish courts are based on give one party the rights to money not coming to him by Torah law, then a kinyan to accept their laws is a binding monetary obligation. Elsewhere (61:14) he clarifies that in such cases, beit din should rule according to the non-Jewish laws he accepted, unless they violate a Torah law, e.g., forcing someone to pay after Shemitta. The Netivot Hamishpat (26:10) agrees with the S’ma. While the Shulchan Aruch (CM 61:6) seems to argue, the Gra (ad loc. 23) says that acceptance of a non-Torah rule does work to create new monetary obligations; it just cannot create new rules of adjudication and enforcement.

The Taz (26:3) seems to categorically reject the S’ma, saying that such an obligation is a “condition against the Torah” and therefore void. This is difficult since such conditions are valid regarding money (Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer 38:5), but apparently the Taz views this stipulation as beyond monetary by giving preference to a non-Jewish system. The S’ma must see it as accepting a specific monetary provision, and thus striving to follow the non-Jews’ rules in order to know what the sides halachically accepted upon themselves does not disgrace the Torah system. The Birkei Yosef (CM 26:8) argues that if the sides accepted the monetary consequences of going to non-Jewish court, this removes any theft involved in benefiting from the ruling , but this does not remove the violation of going to non-Jewish courts.

According to most of the opinions we have seen, beit din has no right to give the matter over to the secular courts. Because of the acceptance of the secular rules, beit din will have to rely on the opinions that it can rule according to non-Torah laws. The Birkei Yosef distinguishes between cases where the acceptance was to adjudicate before the non-Jewish court, where there is a machloket if beit din may use their rules, and a case where the agreement was to go to beit din to apply the non-Jewish rules, which works according to all opinions.

Therefore, in our case, beit din should hear the case according to the laws accepted.

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