Japan Aff Michigan 2010

1/96 CCGJP Lab – 7wks

Japan Withdrawal Affirmative/Negative

***Aff 1

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [1/10] 2

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [2/10] 3

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [3/10] 4

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [4/10] 5

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [5/10] 6

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [6/10] 7

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [7/10] 8

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [8/10] 9

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [9/10] 10

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [10/10] 11

Exts: US-Japan Relations [1/5] 12

Exts: US-Japan Relations [2/5] 13

Exts: US-Japan Relations [3/5] 14

Exts: US-Japan Relations [4/5] 15

Exts: US-Japan Relations [5/5] 16

US-Japan Relations Good – Terrorism/Prolif [1/1] 17

US-Japan Relations Good – Global Security/Stability [1/1] 18

Exts: Japan Politics – Uniqueness 19

Exts: Japan Politics – Troop Withdrawal Key 20

Exts: Japan Politics – Bases Key 21

Exts: Japan Politics – US Refusal on Troops Key 22

Exts: Japan Politics – US Troop Stance 23

Exts: Japan Politics – 2AC Economy Add-on [1/2] 24

Exts: Japan Politics – 2AC Economy Add-on [2/2] 25

Exts: Japan Politics – Economy 26

Exts: Japan Politics – Climate 30

2AC Add-on: US Economy [1/2] 31

2AC Add-on: US Economy [2/2] 32

Exts: US Economy Add-on 33

Exts: Japan Rearm – Inevitable 35

Exts: Japan Rearm – Fast 36

Exts: Japan Rearm Good - China 37

Exts: Japan Rearm Good – Asian Stability 38

Exts: Japan Rearm Good – Checks Nuke Escalation 39

JAPAN KEY U.S. ECONOMY 40

japan economy key world economy 41

General Prolif Good 42

Exts: Total Withdrawal Solves 44

Exts: Withdrawal Solves 45

A2: Topicality – Military Presence Not Troops 46

A2: Deterrence (Nuclear Umbrella) 47

A2: Deterrence 48

***Neg 49

T: Presence 50

Relocation CP 1NC (1/3) 51

Relocation CP 1NC (2/3) 52

Relocation CP 1NC (3/3) 53

Presence Key (1/5) 54

Presence Key (2/5) 55

Presence Key (3/5) 56

Presence Key (4/5) 57

Presence Key (5/5) 58

Withdrawal bad 59

Military in Japan does not affect alliance (1/5) 60

Military in Japan does not affect alliance (2/5) 61

Military in Japan does not affect alliance (3/5) 62

Military in Japan does not affect alliance (4/5) 63

Military in Japan does not affect alliance (5/5) 64

Military presence k2 alliance (1/7) 65

Military presence k2 alliance (2/7) 66

Military presence k2 alliance (3/7) 67

Military presence k2 alliance (4/7) 68

Military presence key to alliance (5/7) 69

Military presence key to alliance (6/7) 70

Military presence key to alliance (7/7) 71

U.S. Jap relations good 72

Status quo solves relations (1/2) 73

Status quo solves relations (2/2) 74

Troops k2 deterrence (1/3) 75

Troops k2 deterrence (2/3) 76

Troops k2 deterrence (3/3) 77

Japan rearm bad (1/2) 78

Japan rearm bad (2/2) 79

rearm à war 80

REARM BAD: SOUTH KOREA 81

REARM BAD: INDIA/PAKISTAN 82

XT: EXTINCTION IMPACT 83

rearm kills japan economy 84

JAPAN KEY U.S. ECONOMY 85

japan economy key world economy 86

A2: Japan Econ Add-On (1/2) 87

A2: Japan Econ Add-On (2/2) 88

Consult Japan 89

Troops withdrawal inevitable 90

Troop withdrawal not inevitable 91

DPJ unpopular (1/2) 92

DPJ unpopular (2/2) 93

DPJ Popular 94

Plan unpopular 95

***Aff

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [1/10]

Observation One – Inherency

Despite protests, the United States is committed to expanding its military presence in Japan – plans are in place to expand to Nago

Johnson, 2010 [Chalmers, Professor Emeritus of the University of California—San Diego and President and Co-founder of the Japan Policy Research Institute; “Another battle of Okinawa,” May 6; Accessed online at

http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/06/opinion/la-oe-johnson-20100506]

The United States is on the verge of permanently damaging its alliance with Japan in a dispute over a military base in Okinawa. This island prefecture hosts three-quarters of all U.S. military facilities in Japan. Washington wants to build one more base there, in an ecologically sensitive area. The Okinawans vehemently oppose it, and tens of thousands gathered last month to protest the base. Tokyo is caught in the middle, and it looks as if Japan's prime minister has just caved in to the U.S. demands. In the globe-girdling array of overseas military bases that the United States has acquired since World War II — more than 700 in 130 countries — few have a sadder history than those we planted in Okinawa. In 1945, Japan was of course a defeated enemy and therefore given no say in where and how these bases would be distributed. On the main islands of Japan, we simply took over their military bases. But Okinawa was an independent kingdom until Japan annexed it in 1879, and the Japanese continue to regard it somewhat as the U.S. does Puerto Rico. The island was devastated in the last major battle in the Pacific, and the U.S. simply bulldozed the land it wanted, expropriated villagers or forcibly relocated them to Bolivia. From 1950 to 1953, the American bases in Okinawa were used to fight the Korean War, and from the 1960s until 1973, they were used during the Vietnam War. Not only did they serve as supply depots and airfields, but the bases were where soldiers went for rest and recreation, creating a subculture of bars, prostitutes and racism. Around several bases fights between black and white American soldiers were so frequent and deadly that separate areas were developed to cater to the two groups. The U.S. occupation of Japan ended with the peace treaty of 1952, but Okinawa remained a U.S. military colony until 1972. For 20 years, Okinawans were essentially stateless people, not entitled to either Japanese or U.S. passports or civil rights. Even after Japan regained sovereignty over Okinawa, the American military retained control over what occurs on its numerous bases and over Okinawan airspace. Since 1972, the Japanese government and the American military have colluded in denying Okinawans much say over their future, but this has been slowly changing. In 1995, for example, there were huge demonstrations against the bases after two Marines and a sailor were charged with abducting and raping a 12-year-old girl. In 1996, the U.S. agreed that it would be willing to give back Futenma, which is entirely surrounded by the town of Ginowan, but only if the Japanese would build another base to replace it elsewhere on the island. So was born the Nago option in 1996 (not formalized until 2006, in a U.S.-Japan agreement). Nago is a small fishing village in the northeastern part of Okinawa's main island and the site of a coral reef that is home to the dugong, an endangered marine mammal similar to Florida's manatee. In order to build a large U.S. Marine base there, a runway would have to be constructed on either pilings or landfill, killing the coral reef. Environmentalists have been protesting ever since, and in early 2010, Nago elected a mayor who ran on a platform of resisting any American base in his town. Yukio Hatoyama, the Japanese prime minister who came to power in 2009, won partly on a platform that he would ask the United States to relinquish the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station and move its Marines entirely off the island. But on Tuesday, he visited Okinawa, bowed deeply and essentially asked its residents to suck it up. I find Hatoyama's behavior craven and despicable, but I deplore even more the U.S. government's arrogance in forcing the Japanese to this deeply humiliating impasse. The U.S. has become obsessed with maintaining our empire of military bases, which we cannot afford and which an increasing number of so-called host countries no longer want. I would strongly suggest that the United States climb off its high horse, move the Futenma Marines back to a base in the United States (such as Camp Pendleton, near where I live) and thank the Okinawans for their 65 years of forbearance.

Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military presence through the phasing out of all US troops in Japan

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [2/10]

Advantage One – US-Japan Relations

Current US-Japan relations are in a state of flux

Congressional Research Service ’10 “Japan- U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress” www.crs.gov Chanlett-Avery, Cooper, Manyin. February 24, 2010

Overall U.S.-Japan relations appear to be in a state of flux. Analysts are divided over whether current controversies are temporary blips in an otherwise strong partnership or are indicative of more fundamental shifts. New leaders in Washington and Tokyo have emphasized repeatedly the strategic importance of the relationship in multiple high-level meetings. Both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have re-affirmed the axiom that the U.S.-Japan alliance is “the cornerstone of U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy.” Although the DPJ was critical of some aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance while campaigning and has called for a more U.N. and Asia-oriented diplomacy, it has also acknowledged the central role of the alliance with the United States in providing for Japan’s security. Although the DPJ’s election provided the impetus for a re-examination of ties, friction in the alliance and stalemate on the Okinawa agreement had been present for several years under previous LDP governments. After a period of rejuvenated defense ties in the first years of the George W. Bush Administration, expectations of a transformed alliance with a more forward-leaning defense posture from Japan diminished. In the final years of the decade, political paralysis and budgetary constraints in Tokyo, Japan’s slow-to-little progress in implementing base realignment agreements, Japanese disappointment in Bush’s policy on North Korea, and a series of smaller concerns over burden-sharing arrangements led to reduced cooperation and a general sense of unease about the partnership.

Furthermore, the current Cold War model of the Japan-US alliance is outdated and troop presence is uniquely contentious

Congressional Research Service ’09 (Emma Chanlett-Avery (specialist in asian affairs) and Weston S. Konishi (analyst in asian affairs) Congressional Research Service: “The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests” July 23, 2009)
Some analysts argue that the Cold War formula for the U.S.-Japan alliance is outdated and that the forward presence of 53,000 U.S. troops is an unnecessary burden to the U.S. military. They assert that Japan has the resources to develop into a more autonomous defense force and could cooperate with the U.S. military in areas of mutual concern on a more limited, “normal” country- to-country basis. Further, advocates argue that the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japanese soil could cement a more durable strategic partnership than the current configuration.31 Opponents of this strategy argue that the large-scale U.S. military presence is necessary in a region with simmering tension and the rise of China, a power that may challenge U.S. hegemony in Asia. Some military experts argue that reducing the number of Marines stationed in Japan, while maintaining air and sea assets, could reduce some of the burden on local communities and still maintain a strong U.S. deterrence in the region.

Japan Withdrawal – 1AC [3/10]

Strong US-Japan alliance is key to solving Chinese invasion of Taiwan through economic interdependence

Nye, 2008 [Joseph Nye, 5-12, Korea Times, “Future of US-Japanese Alliance,” Lexis]

Japan and the U.S., unlike China, are both democracies, and they share many values. In addition, both Japan and the U.S. face a common challenge from China's rise and have a strong interest in ensuring that it does not become a threat. The U.S. regards a triangular Japan-China-U.S. relationship as the basis of stability in East Asia, and wants good relations between all three of its legs. But the triangle is not equilateral, because the U.S. is allied with Japan, and China need not become a threat to either country if they maintain that alliance. On the other hand, China's power should not be exaggerated. A recent poll indicates that one-third of Americans believe that China will "soon dominate the world," while 54 percent see its emergence as a "threat to world peace." To be sure, measured by official exchange rates, China is the world's fourth largest economy, and it is growing at 10 percent annually. But China's income per capita is only 4 percent that of the U.S. If both countries' economies continue to grow at their current rates, China's could be larger than America's in 30 years, but U.S. per capita income will still be four times greater. Furthermore, China's lags far behind in military power, and lacks America's "soft power" resources, such as Hollywood and world-class universities. China's internal evolution also remains uncertain. It has lifted 400 million people out of poverty since 1990, but another 400 million live on less that $2 per day. Along with enormous inequality, China has a migrant labor force of 140 million, severe pollution, and rampant corruption. Nor has its political evolution matched its economic progress. While more Chinese are free today than ever before in Chinese history, China is far from free. The danger is that party leaders, trying to counter the erosion of communism, will turn to nationalism to provide ideological glue, which could lead to an unstable foreign policy ¡ª including, for example, conflict over Taiwan. faced with such uncertainty, a wise policy combines realism with liberalism. By reinforcing their alliance, the U.S. and Japan can hedge against uncertainty while at the same time offering China integration into global institutions as a "responsible stakeholder." The greatest danger is that an escalating fear of enmity in the three countries becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. In that sense, the U.S.-Japan alliance rests on deeply rooted joint interests.