Les Oubliés de l’histoire’ Les Harkis: A history distorted by official narratives

Hannah Yadi, University of Durham

Contents

Introduction 2

i. The neglect of Harki history: the ‘triple silence’ 3

ii. Using private memories in history5

iii. The Harkis: a definition6

I. Narratives: writing about the Harkis and the problem of silence9

i. Official Algerian memory 10

ii. Official French ‘amnesia’ 13

II. Motivations: the debate about the Harkis in the French army 17

i. Pressure of the French Army 18

ii. The violence of the National Liberation Movement 21

iii. The assimilated elite 24

III. Responses: the Harki diaspora in France 28

i. The treatment of the Harkis in France 29

ii. The response of the Harkis 30

iii. Algerian attitudes towards the Harkis 32

iv. Les fils de harkis: identity crisis 33

v. Algerian attitudes towards Les fils de harkis 36

Conclusion 39

Bibliography 42

Introduction

The Harkis are the Algerians who fought as auxiliaries alongside the French during the Algerian War of Independence, 1954 to 1962. In the eyes of Le Front de LibérationNationale (FLN) - which led the War of Independence, came to power in 1962, and whose politics and personalities still have great influence in modern Algeria - the Harkis were, and remain, traitors. At the close of the conflict, the Harkis were hunted down by the FLN and killed. There is no consensus about how many were killed, but estimates range between 10,000 and 100,000.[1] Those who survived fled to France for protection. Once in France, however, they were deliberately isolated from French society, and were treated with hostility and contempt as they brought with them the embarrassing reminders of a less than perfect process of decolonization. As a consequence, the Harkis have been denied their own history by both the Algerian and French authorities and are suffering from a complex identity crisis, which has been until recently shrouded in silence. This dissertation does not seek to reconstruct a lost Harki history, or to rescue this category of people from the ‘dustbin of history’.[2] Rather, it seeks to understand how and why the Harkis past has been concealed, manipulated and distorted by the official memory of the FLN and the official ‘amnesia’ of successive French governments, and what effect this has had on them.

The mere existence and post-war treatment of the Harkis served to disrupt the myths of colonialism and decolonization. They exposed the contradictions of both French Imperialism and Algerian Nationalism; as such the Harkis have been exiled from Algeria, ignored by France, and forgotten in official history. The Harkis provide evidence that Algerian Nationalism did not represent a united struggle against the French. To the same extent, the manner in which the French abandoned the Harkis, allowing them to be massacred in Algeria, revealed the French ideal of Algérie-française, the idea that Algeria was part of France and that Algerians were French, to be a colonial illusion. This dissertation explores the private memories of both the Harki community and of contemporary Algerians in order to shed light on those aspects of Harki history which have been distorted by official narratives and to discover the true motivations, treatment and identity of the Harkis.

The neglect of Harki history: the ‘triple silence’

Following the War of Independence, the Harkis were rejected on both sides of the Mediterranean. In his 1976 thesis, Pierre Baillet described the Harkis as les oubliés de l’histoire(history’s forgotten ones).[3] It is certainly true that in the years immediately following independence, the French and the Algerian governments successfully maintained an atmosphere of silence surrounding the treatment of these Muslim auxiliaries. Unsurprisingly, this silence still persists in contemporary Algeria, as several of the original FLN members remain in government today; indeed, the current President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was himself a former member of the Armée de Libération Nationale(ALN).

Added to the silence on both sides of the Mediterranean, the Harkis themselves have shown a personal reluctance to recount their past, for reasons of shame and fear of reprisal. This has been depicted as a ‘triple silence,’ which has denied the Harkis their own representation of their past.

Nevertheless, the suggestion that they are lesoubliés de l’histoire is misleading. The French government was more than aware of their existence; indeed it was responsible for their ill-treatment. This is precisely why they sought to conceal it. The Algerian government was equally aware of their continued existence in France but ignored it, considering it a French problem. One former officer in the ALN, interviewed by the author, remarked that ‘the Harkis are no longer Algerian…this is a French problem now’.[4]

The fragmented nature of the Harki narrative ensures that the sources, too, are equally fragmented. The ‘triple silence’ has meant that academic research was largely non-existent until the 1990s. Even then, the only historians who began to document the experiences of the Harkis had personal motivations to do so. As such, most of the secondary literature on the Harkis to date has been written by their own children, who are seeking to establish their own place in history by challenging the official narratives.

There are two main issues that this dissertation challenges. Firstly, the issue of official memory which has neglected and distorted fundamental aspects of the Harkis experience. Henry Rousso has observed that ‘the collective memory of an event is shaped by all representations of that event’.[5] However, the dominance of official memories of the Harkis has, for a long time, prevented the Harkis from writing their representation of that history. Whilst the children of the Harkis have begun to recount the experiences of their fathers, the stereotypical images of the Harkis created by official narratives are still accepted by most historians. The most obvious one, and central to the understanding of this dissertation, is the mistaken notion that the Harkis were a homogenous group with unified motivation for joining the French army. This dissertation combines the emerging testimonies of les fils de harkis, and those of a series of Algerians interviewed by the author, not in an attempt to rewrite a Harki history, but to investigate how their narration differs to that of French and Algerian officialdom.It uses private and personal narratives to deconstruct the problem of official or public narratives, and of opposing national histories.

Chapter One explains why the French and Algerian authorities sought to create their own history of the War which omitted the Harkis, and how the denial of the Harkis own history has laid the foundations for their recent agitation in France. It answers questions about why the Harkis were massacred in Algeria, why the French allowed it, and why the Harkis were not welcomed in France as heroes.

Chapter Two challenges the durability of stereotypical images created by these official narratives: firstly, the presumption that the Harkis were a homogenous group with unified motivations and secondly, the binary understanding of the Harkis as being either traitors from the Algerian perspective, or loyal French patriots from the French perspective. This chapter challenges these presumptions by exposing the multiple motivations of the Harkis and by analysing contemporary Algerian attitudes as opposed to relying strictly on official accounts. By analysing the attitudes of ex-officials as well as ordinary Algerian citizens this chapter also assesses whether official discourse of the Harkis still dominates in modern Algeria.

Chapter Three focuses on the problems created by the official denial of a Harki history, namely the isolation of the Harkis in France, their failure to integrate into French society and their resultant identity crisis. More pertinently, it considers the unexplored contemporary Algerian attitudes towards the situation of the Harkis now living in France and questions whether after forty years of exile they are welcome in their native land.

Using private memories in history

This paper would not be possible without the use of private interviews. The ‘triple silence’ ensures that primary source material is largely unavailable. The representations of the Harkis offered by the official discourse of the French and Algerian authorities have clear agendas. The testimonies of the Harkis and their offspring are equally limited in that most only document the experiences of an individual. Interviews have therefore been conducted by the author with Algerians living in Algeria, France and Britain, in an attempt to bring a new dimension to Harki history. The aim of these interviews is to fill the ‘memory gap’ between official accounts from above, and the fragmented personal testimonies and autobiographies of the Harki community from below. This is a form ‘micro history’ used by the historian Martin Evans, which draws upon a collection of personal memories in its attempt to traverse the interface between personal identities and national politics.[6] This study will use a collection of private memories to directly challenge official and national narratives and the assumption that collective memory or history must include the memory of the state, in this case both the Algerian and French, as the definitive ones.

Very few Algerians have publicly or privately expressed their real views about the Harkis: it is still a forbidden subject. Consequently, this study has set out to gather as much original research from the surviving Algerian participants of the War as is possible within the remit of this dissertation.

Seven Algerians, including five high-ranking former FLN and ALN officers and two second-generation Algerians, agreed to discuss their memories of this difficult period, the impact it had on their lives, and the history of the people involved. Many were surprised at being asked to be interviewed about the Harkis, almost as though they too had put the past behind them, and most were nervous about having to recall such a sensitive subject. However, once the interviews began, they became enthusiastic and curious about this attempt to put greater meaning and context to such a complex and emotionally charged part of their lives.

All the interviewees received a list of set questions in advance. Participants were given adequate time to consider their answers, and questions were formulated to avoid leading the interviewee. Although five of them had been senior officers in the freedom movements, which traditionally meant toeing the party line (FLN) and never talking to the press or any foreign parties, they were exceptionally forthcoming. The lapse of time since the War may help to explain why those directly involved were willing to talk at length about such a controversial issue. Clearly, many of the interviewees saw this research as an opportunity to explain their private history, but also as an attempt to put into context the problems faced by the second and third generation Harkis living in France today.

What these personal memories showed most of all, however, were the extraordinary contradictions endured by so many families. The experience of one young second-generation French-Algerian, now living in London, Kamal (who did not want his surname disclosed), demonstrates this vividly: his grandfather was killed by a Harki and yet his cousin was forced to join the Harkis at a young age. All of the interviewees said they knew someone who had become a Harki, and one ex-ALN officer admitted to giving orders for their massacre.

These interviews are by no means unmediated reconstructions of the past. But rather they are retrospective accounts and must be treated as such. It is important to maintain an awareness that these accounts might have been effected, filtered or manipulated by events which have occurred following the War. Nonetheless, the responses are passionate, suggestive, and unique, whilst it is possible to identify reoccurring themes in their responses.

The Harkis: a definition

Harki is a derivative of the Arabic word harka, meaning movement. The word was originally adopted to describe mobile militia units, which were set up in Algeria by the French political authority. This was a strategy which had been pursued in Algeria since the eighteenth century.[7] In 1954, the first modern harka was created in the Aurès by the French ethnologist Jean Servier. In February 1956, their use was institutionalized by the Resident Minister and Governor, General Robert Lacoste.[8] The Harkis were originally intended to serve as defence units, but they soon evolved into mobile fighting groups who participated in organized military offensives alongside the French. The historian Géraldine Enjelvin places particular emphasis on the notion that the Harkis fought with, rather than for, the French army during the War of Independence.[9] Whilst this is true, it is not to say that the Harkis were all willing volunteers for the French army. Indeed this dissertation questions the notion of choice in becoming a Harki and demonstrates that the reasons behind their enrolment were varied, complex and often unavoidable.

It is crucial to note the disparity in material status between two types of Harki. Firstly, there were lesFrançais-musulmans. These were drawn from the French-educated Algerian elite and included teachers, doctors and lawyers as well as land-owners; they saw themselves as part of French civilisation, and were patriotic to France. Although many of these people were actually subject to racism by the French, they identified more with French values and culture than with the Arab world. The second group of Harkis, which comprised the majority of this group, were lessupplétives: these were drawn from a poor, rural, illiterate and dispossessed sector of the population. Most were ignorant of the national liberation movement and saw the French army as an escape from poverty.

The sheer number of Harkis meant that the label was often used to describe any number of pro-French, ethnic Algerian groupings.[10] These include the Groupesd’autodéfense(GAD), who were charged with the protection of isolated villages; the Groupes mobiles de sécurité (GMS), who worked with the rural police force, and the Moghaznis who were assigned to protect the Section administrative spécialisée (SAS), (the French ‘missionaries’ seeking to convince Algerians to maintain a French Algeria).[11] In 1957, approximately 10,000 Harkis had been mobilised. They became an indispensable asset for the French, and by January 1961 their number had risen to 61,600, before falling back to 55,000by April 1962.[12] It has been suggested that by 1961, there were more Algerians enrolled in the French army than there were in the FLN.[13] The total number of Harkis and other Algerian draftees and supplementary troops totalled up to 210,000 in 1961, supposedly outnumbering the 37,000 FLN troops by a ratio of approximately six to one.[14]

Whilst the term Harki should refer strictly to the Muslim auxiliaries who served in the French army from 1955 to 1961, it has become a generic one for all Muslims who took a ‘pro-French’ stance in the Algerian War. The historian and son of a Harki, Mohand Hamoumou insists that ‘before 1955, the Harkis did not exist; and after 1961, they ceased to exist’.[15] However, because the Harkis have been shunned from Algeria and are not of French decent, they have been labelled by both camps, as Harkis. Moreover, many of the Harkis themselves have clung to the term as a means of showing they deserve to live in France and be French; this idea is expanded upon in Chapter Three.In Algeria the word is still synonymous with ‘traitor’ or ‘collaborator’.

The very term ‘Harki’ is problematic, insofar as it implies that they were a homogenous group with common motivations. The use of the term has allowed French and Algerian officialdom to simplify their role, dismissing them and the significance of their history.

I

Narratives: writing about the Harkis and the problem of silence

Official memory, fabricated and promoted by the authorities is privileged over history.[16]

William Cohen

Interrogating the silence of the Harkis must begin with the breaking down of traditional and opposing official narratives: there is an official Algerian narrative, and an official French narrative. While 1830 marks the beginning of the colonial experience for both countries, it has become a useful starting point for opposing interpretations of Algerian history.[17] Following the War of Independence the French and Algerian governments battled to construct their own image of Algérie-française, and to provide their own explanation of how decolonization had come to pass. They have each had a selective memory of the past and as such, certain events have suffered neglect and distortion from both sides, resulting in a complex web of opposing narratives.

The role of the Harkis in the French army has, however, served to disrupt the myths of both French colonialism and Algerian nationalism. As a result, they have become fraught victims of these conflicting official narratives: French official discourse has tried to justify the use of the Harkis by claiming that they were all ‘loyal fighters’ for France while Algerian official discourse has sought, for as long as possible, to ignore the role of the Harkis, in their attempts to deny the existence of internal Algerian conflict. The memory of the Harkis has certainly been dictated by institutional memory or amnesia. This, added to their own personal silence, ensured that they were denied their own history.