LEGISLATION & REGULATION: Professor Manning, Fall 2011
PART 1: LEGISLATIVE POWER AND INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
- Introduction to Legislation and Statutory Interpretation
TVA v. Hill: Endangered Species Act passed during dam construction; Secretary of Interior finds ESA binding on TVA, private party sues to enjoin opening of dam (threatens snail darters)
- Text: majority found plain meaning (text prohibits opening of dam)
- Text of ESA: “All departments and agencies shall take necessary action to ensure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered and threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of their habitat.”
- Court lays language is plain and clear
- Congress’ plain intent was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost
- Inclusion of “authorized funded, and carried” out covers everything – past and present
- Overall purpose of statute – highly protective; dangerous to reason from overall purpose to specific statutes
- Legislative History: current version of ESA lacked qualifiers found in earlier statutes, implying broader scope; reconciled House/Senate version supported majority; Sen. Dingell’s statement
- Final version of 1973 Act omitted prior reservations in 1966 Act
- 1966 Act qualified obligation to preserve endangered species “insofar as is practicable and consistent with their primary purposes.”
- Bills introduced in 1973 Act also had this language; omission shows intent
- Senator Dingell’s explanation as to why language was removed (reliable?)
- Whooping cranes were being threatened by air Force bombing activities in Texas; implied that Secretary of Defense would be required to “take proper steps” once legislation was enacted to eliminate the threat to the endangered species
- Floor statements are at the low end of legislative history; not necessarily representative of all of Congress
- Separation of powers – if Congress wanted this, it is not the judiciary’s place to change that
- Substantive Canons: implied repeals are disfavored
- Retroactivity canon
- Clear statement rule: Congress cannot alter substantive law through appropriations measures; would have to explicitly state in bill that TVA is exempt (appropriations canon?)
- Dissent: absurd consequence; says there are many federal projects and potentially billions of dollars in jeopardy
- Costs are huge and benefits are small; no reasonable member of Congress would have supported this
- Absurdity doctrine is about intent; looking at consequences and reading backwards to figure out intent
- Letter of the Law vs. Spirit of the Law
- Rules embedded in a statutory text – letter of the law
- General background purpose of the statue – spirit of the law
- Enforcing spirit of the law better approximates what the legislator would have done had he or she expressly dealt with the case at hand
Riggs v. Palmer (1889): grandson poisoned grandfather, would inherit under statute literally construed
- Will was technically valid and enforceable; made according to the requisite procedures
- Only things that would invalidate will were fraud, duress, or incapacity
- Court says Elmer collecting inheritance would be an absurd result
- Cites common law maxim: you cannot profit by your own wrongdoing
- Statues in conflict with common law should be narrowly construed
- Rational interpretation: the writers of laws do not always express their intention perfectly, but either exceed I or fall short of it, so that judges are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only
- To ascertain legislative intent: suppose the lawmaker present and that you could ask what intent was
- Reasonable person constructs pervade the law; if this amendment had come across the floor, legislators would have supported it
- Rules v. standards
- Rules – sharp-edges statements of policy; eliminate value judgments and fact determinations from courts
- Standards – involve more value judgments and fact determinations
- Dissent: “The matter does not lie within the domain of conscience. We are bound by the rigid rules of law”
- Legislature has prescribed exactly when and how wills may be made, altered, and revoked
- Have left no room for the exercise of an equitable jurisdiction by courts over such matters
- Rules are rules; some value in valuing predictability/certainty
- Rational for legislators to value this
Church of Holy Trinity v. United States: church made contract with pastor to bring him from England to New York. US claimed K was forbidden by Alien Contract Labor Act, which made it illegal to bring foreigners to the US “to perform labor or service of any kind”
- Text: to discern what this encompasses, court looks at other statutes, media, dictionary
- Labor is defined as “work, toil, expenditure of muscular force”
- Service – “performance of labor for benefit of another; act of serving another”
- Makes exceptions for actors, artists, singers, lecturers, domestic servants
- Court’s arguments lead to counter-textual conclusions
- Not intended to apply to brain-toilers
- Could not have been intended to apply to a minister; US is a Christian nation
- Can’t know why they chose “labor or service of any kind”
- May be overinclusive for a reason
- Maybe they misspoke
- Mischief Rule: to discover purpose, look at specific evil legislature was trying to remedy when it enacted the statute
- Companies were in-sourcing labor, mainly from southern and eastern Europe
- Knights of labor – members were being undercut by this influx; mainly in factories and iron/coal mines; this group lobbied for this act
- Letter of the law gives way to the spirit
- Looks at intent; general purpose of statute is to minimize influx of immigrant laborers
- Look at initial petitions for bill (who was pushing for it)
- Look at committee reports (education and labor)
- Senate committee explicitly said it was to address manual labor and manual service
- Canons: superfluity canon: read language in a statute not to be superfluous; legislators are rational, would not include extra words
- Evidence that inclusion of word “service” was not an oversight
- Drafters made Act comprehensive to avoid disputes about what is considered manual labor
- Rules are broad, inclusive; take away need to make borderline decisions
- Conflict between title and text: one is broader than the other; read text with respect to title
- Purpose of title is to convey purpose of bill; almost like a preamble
- Rule: title is relevant to interpretation of an operative provision if the operative provision is ambiguous; cannot contradict
- Title is a general statement of purpose; specific governs the general
- Individual provisions fulfill purpose of title
- Title is part of cumulative evidence that shows purpose is narrower than language in section
- Expressiouniusest exclusion alterius: inclusion of some things is to exclude others
- By enumerating exceptions, Congress impliedly includes everything else
- Legislative History: can’t argue that “Congress didn’t anticipate it” argument
- Act passed during following session; could have easily added “manual”; didn’t’ because they didn’t think it would get passed
- Why didn’t Congress explicitly mention ministers?
- Violation of separation of church and state
- People tried to add other exceptions but sponsors rejected them; could have raised more questions; led to bargaining
- Could have been debate about what religions to include
- Bargaining process is more difficult than explaining principles
- Absurdity doctrine in this case: Can you imagine a legislator voting for this outcome?
- In Riggs, clear idea of injustice if Elmer got money
- Here, it’s possible that a legislator could have voted for it
- Argument: Court spared Congress’ burden that they should have had to bear without this legislation
- Ugly piece of legislation
- Directed toward low-wage workers from Southern Europe
- By making it broad, it doesn’t make it look as ugly; seems to encompass everyone
Modern Incarnation of Holy Trinity: US v. American Trucking Associations (1940)
- “No more persuasive evidence to purpose of a statute than the text..”
- Questions turn on reading the text
- Court once behaved as if texts had intrinsic meanings
- Would say when text is plain, no need for interpretation
- No one believes this position today
- Must always read language in context
- Important to investigate words and figure out how they’re used in the appropriate communities
III. The New Textualism
- Built on premises of legislative supremacy
- Requires courts to enforce clear import of enacted text
- Emphasizes that judges must respect the legislative compromise embedded in the statutory text
- Criticism of purposivism: statutes embody legislative compromises, so a statute may not have a single coherent “purpose” – emphasizes respecting the compromise
- Inconsistencies reflect inevitable conflict of Congressmen
West Virginia Hospitals v. Casey(1991): federal statute allows for fee shifting of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” Does this include an expert’s fee?
- Looks at record of statutory usage: many statutes explicitly shift both expert fees and attorney’s fees
- These statutes would be redundant if both were included in attorney’s fee
- WVUH wants to use mischief rule
- Statute was designed to overturn Alyeska and to allow civil rights plaintiffs to recover all fees
- Court rejects – employs a textualist interpretation
- Scalia says: court’s job to create a rational semantic regime; should be able to use language to make precise judgments about what should and should not be excluded
- Court now says Congress must say what it means and mean what it says
- Making language a currency to interpret Congress’ purpose
- Legislative History proves an arbitrary line born of politics was drawn
- If they had included expert fees, other members would not have approved it
IV. The New Purposivism: Textually Constrained Purposivism
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline (SC, 2004): GD made it so that people under 50 would not get the same benefits as people over 50? Does ADEA protect younger workers from age discrimination?
- “Age” has 2 meanings: number of years since birth and old age
- Bonafide Occupational Qualifications - legal to differential based on prohibitive characteristic
- BFOQ: if age means old age, then old age is a BFOQ; even if you’ve discriminated against someone who is younger, you’re excused because its allowed in the statute
- Look at statements of purpose and findings
- Stress impediments suffered by older workers/incidence of unemployment among older workers
- Objects were “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; and to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment”
- “Statutory language must be read in context since a phrase ‘gathers meaning from the words around it”
- Social History – connotation that surrounds age discrimination is discrimination against older people
- Record is devoid of any evidence that younger workers were suffering at the expense of their elders
- Legislative History – testimony at hearings was all about older people
- Yarborough’s sponsor statement indicating that the statute is meant to protect the old as well as the young is a single outlying statement that cannot stand against a tide of context and history
- Evidence that this colloquy was pre-planned to get into the record
- Wanted to show constituents that it protected the young too
- Judicial Correction of Legislative Mistakes: Absurdity
US v. Kirby (Supreme Court, 1868): Kirby arrests murderous mail carrier and is indicted for obstructing/retarding the passage of mail.
- Text of statute: “knowingly and willfully obstruct or retard the passage of the mail”
- Knowingly and willfully implies consciously stopping the mail
- Under this definition, Kirby committed the crime
- Had the discretion not to; consciously did it when mail as being delivered
- Willfully has the connotation of a bad intent/strong will
- Court holds: spirit of the law prevails over the letter
- If action is lawful arrest and mail interruption was incidental, it was not a crime
- Letting a murderer roam free is a greater inconvenience to society than interrupting mail delivery
- Guiding principle: general terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence
- Court is assuming that Congress has not adopted an unreasonable result
- Court can make this assumption if:
- There’s ambiguity/vagueness in the language
- It imposes a reasonableness: court has some authority to impose a reasonable result even if it can’t be inferred from language
- Whenever an agency writes a governing text, it must write it in general terms so that it can e read to include reasonable exceptions
- Court acts as a faithful agent to Congress
- Asks – what would Congress have decided?
- Mala prohibita v. mala in se
- Mala prohibita – regulatory offenses; something that is banned because costs outweigh benefits
- Mala in se – something that’s intrinsically bad
- Bolognian and Plowdien laws (surgeon and prisoner examples) are not direct authority, but they demonstrate why an absurdity doctrine is necessary
- Give examples so horrifying we can deduce that no reasonable legislator would have intended this consequence
- What if Kirby had been delivering a subpoena for divorce proceedings?
- Would have committed a crime – public servants are exempt from arrest for civil crimes
- Gray area: misdemeanor; committing crimes, posing an immediate threat
- Doctrine of necessity: you can do something that’s a crime if the purpose is to prevent something that’s a much larger crime
Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice(Supreme Court, 1989): DOJ regularly seeks advice from ABA’s Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary in making judicial nominations. Is it “utilized” by the President such that it constitutes an “advisory committee” under the Federal Advisory Committee Act? N.
- Absurdity Doctrine: Congress could not have intended this; would discourage candid discussion, as the advisory committees must publish transcripts of proceedings & go out of business after 2 years
- Committee is an advisory committee according to the plain sense of the word
- Court says it’s a “wooly word” – can encompass almost anything
- Utilization connotes a more formal arrangement – not just getting advice in an incidental way
- Reasons why a rational policy maker would want ABA committee to be included exist
- No transparency in the process; imaginable that a rational legislator would want this
- However, taking away confidentiality would be detrimental
- Definition: if you can conceive of a rational justification for it, its not absurd
- Hard to identify a genuine political absurdity; legislative process is chaotic
- Important questions:
- Can you conceive of a reasonable legislator adopting the policy?
- Can it be explained by political compromise?
- Today’s absurdity doctrine: If something is absurd but can be attributed to political compromise, it can be sustained
- Preserves absurdity doctrine but adds an exception to account for political compromise
- Concurrence: Sees absurdity doctrine as a legitimate tool of the Judiciary but only as long as the Court acts with self-discipline by limiting the exception to situations where the result of applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd (94)
- Court’s loose invocation of the “absurd result” canon creates too great a risk that the court is exercising its own will of judgment & substituting its own pleasure to that of the legislative body
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal (2002)
Issue: Should the tax set up under the coal industry retiree health benefitact be upheld given a clearly absurd application?
Holding: YES. Respect the bargaining and compromise process, can see arational process justification
Facts: Congress set up a tax on coal companies to fuel pensions. Fundrequired contributions from coal companies(signatory operators) &other firms ( related persons) who had signed any of the collectivebargaining agreements.
Absurdity
- Clear anomaly- the act required contributions from a company that was a successor in interest to a related person but not to a signatoryoperator. i.e. If a coal company & dairy farm each sold theirinterest, the successor of the dairy farm would pay but not the coal company successor
- Class example: Acne mining owns a bakery and the bakery sells itsassets it has to ay for the pensions of the mining company but thecompany that bought the mining company does not.
Holding: “its delicate crafting reflected a compromise of highly interestedparties attempting to pull the provisions in different directions. Assuch, a change in any individual provision could have unraveled thewhole”
→ quite possible that a bill that assigned liability to successors of signatory operators would not have survived the legislative process
Takeaway: Sustain statute despite absurdity because we can think of a rationalreason why the legislative process would yield such a result
Two questions: (1) would a reasonable legislator adopt it, (2) Can you attribute it to legislative compromise
Reflects new textualist view of legislative history- the drafting question is more complicated than the underlying policy question-large majority may want to alter or change but the legislative
bargaining necessary may prevent it.
Brings up underlying questions of absurdity: under this doctrine do we relieve legislators of pinning down what they really mean; do we upseta political compromise- all they could agree on was X language.
NOTE: this new approach would change holy trinity, public citizen
- Judicial Correction of Legislative Mistakes: Scrivener’s Error
United States v. Locke(Supreme Court, 1985): mineral claims must be filed prior to Dec. 31…scrivener’s error?
- “Prior to” by definition means preceding or before
- Scrivener’s error usually involves punctuation or inclusion/omission of word “not”
- Typos in text
- Legislature does not know what “prior to” meant; finds it odd that they would change their language
- Must have genuine confidence that its not the result of a compromise
- Difference between scrivener’s error and absurdity
- Can it be attributed to a compromise?
- Is this the type of thing where people make typos?
- Is there a substantive reason for Congress to pick the day it picked?
- For it not to be absurd, it has to be imaginable
- Key Q: can you conceive of a reason why they would have written it this way?
- Use rubric of scrivener’s error rather than absurdity when you can
- Framing issue = absurdity = harder sell
- Clue to scrivener’s error: there’s something senseless about it and I think I know what happened
- Absurdity: senseless and I can’t imagine Congress doing this
- What is “the Text?”
Nix v. Hedden(Supreme Court, 1893): is a tomato a fruit or a vegetable within the meaning of the Tariff Act of 1883?