CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………..1
WELCOMING SPEECH AT THE RECEPTION IN HONOR OF
THE DELEGATION OF THE OXFORD RESEARCH GROUP
Zhu Shanqing……………………………..5
SESSION I
TECHNICAL AND ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS OF BMD
Ballistic Missile Defence Re-visited I
Frank Barnaby……………………………...7
Ballistic Missile Defence Re-visited II
Frank Barnaby………………………...…14
Impact of Development of BMD on International
Arms Control and Disarmament Process
Chen Jifeng & Wang Zheng…………………..……….18
Ballistic Missile Defense: A Technical Analysis
Chen Guoying…………………...……....25
Arms Control or the Weaponisation of Space:
the Planetary Connotations of BMD?
Neville Brown…………………………...31
ABM System and Outer-space Weaponization
Pan Jusheng…………………….….....37
SESSION II
THE IMPACT OF BMD DEPLOYMENT FOR THE ABM TREATY
National Missile Defense and the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty
Li Bin…………………………..…42
The Impact of Major Modification or Abolition of the ABM
Treaty on Europe
Heiner Horsten………………….……...48
Is National Missile Defence a Relevant Answer to Threats of
Mass Destruction?
Neville Brown………….……………..52
The US Domestic Politics of NMD and its Negative Impact
on Nonproliferation
Gu Guoliang………………………...56
SESSION III
THE MILITARY AND DETERRENT IMPLICATIONS OF BMD
Technical Options for a Minimum UK Nuclear Deterrent
If faced with a Proliferation of National Missile Defences
Paul Roper………….…………….60
Why NMD is a Wrong Approach
Pan Zhenqiang.……………………….65
Military Implications of Investment in Ballistic Missile Defences
Timothy Garden………………………69
SESSION IV
REGIONAL SECURITY ASPECTS OF BMD: EUROPE AND ASIA
TMD Shaking East Asian Stability
Yan Xuetong……………………...74
The Prospect and Impact of TMD Deployment on Europe
Hugh Beach……..………………..79
SESSION V
STRENGTHENING THE ABM TREATY
Multilateralisation of the ABM Treaty
Nick Ritchie & Scilla Elworthy ……………………84
Confidence Building Measures as a Means to
Enhance Strategic Stability
Isabelle Cordonnier……………………..88
Strengthening the ABM Treaty
Liu Gongliang, Tian Jingmei & Yang Xianjun…………………….90
SESSION VI CONCLUSION
The Impact of the US Missile Defence Programme
on the Global Security Structure
Sha Zukang……………………..94
Appendix I Name-list………………………………………………………..….100
Appendix II Seminar Program……………………………………………………..102
INTRODUCTION
EDITOR
During March 12-19, 2000, the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD) had an honor to host the delegation of the Oxford Research Group (ORG). Being a high-power" team, the delegation was composed of three British generals, senior officials from the French Ministry of Defense and German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, renowned scholars from the British academic circles, and of course our old friends from ORG as well. March 13 – 15, the CPAPD organized a group of 14 experts from the Chinese military, academic circles and government institutions friends being familiar with work in the field of arms control in China would be unlikely to disagree it was a high-power group as well to hold a 3-day Seminar with our 10 distinguished guests from Europe. Convened in the first Spring of the new millenium and the most romantic season of Beijing, the Seminar, entitled Missile Defense and the Future of the ABM Treaty, covered a serious and hard subject the Ballistic Missile Defence. While being featured with humor and sincerity, the discussions proceeded seriously and conscientiously.
At the Seminar, the BMD issue was mainly analyzed from the following five perspectives: (1) Technical and arms control aspects of BMD; (2) The impact of BMD deployment for the ABM Treaty; (3) The military and deterrent implications of BMD; (4) Regional security aspects of BMD: Europe and Asia; (5) Strengthening the ABM Treaty. The participants submitted 18 papers in all to the Seminar.
With a view of enabling our readers and our colleagues all over the world to learn more about the Seminar, we have herein developed the SPECIAL ISSUE OF PEACE from all the 18 papers in full text as a special tribute of our English magazine Peace in the year 2000. What should be particularly clarified is that these papers only express the views of the authors who are held accountable for the views, and not necessarily those views of the institute or government agency each author is working for or of the editors of the CPAPD.
Here our thanks would also go to the ORG, co-sponsor of the Seminar the third cooperation between our two organizations. We once jointly held the 1995 Beijing Seminar and the 1997 Oxford Seminar entitled International Security under the New Conditions and Striving for a Nuclear Weapon Free World respectively. Each cooperation is quite fruitful, of which we feel very proud.
We would also express thanks to the 10 distinguished experts from Britain, France and Germany, who came to China from afar, and the 14 Chinese experts, whose participation in and contributions to the Seminar are highly appreciated.
We are especially indebted to Ambassador Sha Zukang, Director General of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC. He attended the closing session of the Seminar, and made a special speech entitled The Impact of the US Missile Defence Program on the Global Security Structure, which is also included in the Special Issue of Peace. He also managed to find time meeting with the delegation at the Foreign Ministry. Our special thanks would also go to General Xing Shizhong, President of China National Defense University, and Major General Chen Kaizeng, Vice-President of China Institute of International Strategic Studies, who respectively met with the delegation at their offices, and held friendly and frank exchanges with the delegation.
On March 16, Mme. He Luli, Vice-Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and President of the CPAPD, met with the delegation at the Great Hall of the People. During the meeting, President He expressed wishes that the cooperation between the CPAPD and the ORG would continue to make progress hereafter, members of the delegation would visit China again, and the conscience and wisdom of mankind would help us bring peace to our planet. These certainly are the common aspirations of all our colleagues.
Welcoming Speech at the Reception
in Honor of the Delegation of the Oxford Research Group
ZHU SHANQING
Member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and Vice–President of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament
First of all, please allow me on behalf of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD) to express warm welcome to the delegation of the Oxford Research Group (ORG) from far away and the Chinese participants to attend the CPAPD-ORG Beijing Seminar. I would like to take this opportunity to offer our gratitude to Ms. Scilla Elworthy, ORG Director, who has made great efforts for facilitating the convocation of this seminar.
Since its founding in 1985, the CPAPD has consistently maintained friendly exchanges and conducted fruitful cooperation with the ORG. In the second year following its inception, the CPAPD hosted an ORG delegation. In 1995 and 1997, the two organizations cosponsored seminars entitled International Security Under the New Conditions and Striving for Nuclear Weapon Free World respectively in Beijing and Oxford. There is no doubt that it is the successful convocation and fruitful results of these two seminars that have laid a foundation for cooperation between the two organizations again today, giving an opportunity to the Chinese and foreign participants to gather together in Beijing to voice their concerns for world peace and security.
I wish the seminar would be completely successful and productive. I believe that a successful meeting should be one at which participants should speak their minds and voice their views in spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences so as to expand common understanding. I think the discussions at the sessions and the exchanges after the sessions can be combined so as to create a sound atmosphere for in-depth and frank academic exchanges. I hope that every participant feel it worthwhile coming to the seminar after its conclusion.
All the participants here are experts in this field. However, I wish to present my personal views of the current international arms control on this occasion.
1. Arms control and disarmament is right at the crossroads, and reversing changes are possible. At the turn of the centuries, we have grievously noticed the negative international developments. NATO reduced the small, weak and sovereign Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to a test-ground for its "new strategic concept" bypassing the UN Security Council. The passage of the related bills for the New Guidelines on Japan-US Defense Cooperation has strengthened the Japan-US military alliance, and a certain country has rocketed its military budget and developed TMD and NMD, and bent on the realization of its objective despite of the damage to the ABM Treaty. The aforementioned negative developments have brought about a serious challenge to the progress achieved through the efforts of the international community in the field of arms control and disarmament.
2. The fundamental factors responsible for failure of the international arms control and disarmament progress lies in the fact that a certain country attempts to seek unilateral absolute security supremacy by developing ballistic missile defense. The development of ballistic missile defense will be bound to violate ABM Treaty and the violation of the ABM Treaty can only jeopardize the global strategic balance, thus hindering the nuclear disarmament process and triggering off a new round of arms race at an elevated level. That runs counter to the trend of times for seeking peace and promoting development.
3. The arms control and disarmament should in no way be taken as a means to contain and weaken others and to reinforce oneself, nor the security of a country be based on insecurity of other countries. To seek absolute security on the basis of weakening others can only lead to absolute insecurity of oneself and the final outcome is harmful to both oneself and others. The objective for striving for disarmament should enhance the universal security of all countries with the common efforts and equal participation of the international community.
4. In spite of profound changes in the international situation, China will continue her economic construction as the central task, in the meantime appropriately reinforce national defense, and speed up the high-tech development. However, China will not take part in any form of arms race. We believe that even though there is no tranquility in the world, peace and development are still the main theme of our times, and the political multi-polarity and economic globalization are trends of our times independent of man's will. We are ready to make concerted efforts with peace-loving peoples in the world to promote healthy development of arms control and disarmament.
I believe that the extensive exchanges at the seminar will be bound to deepen mutual understanding and friendship between Chinese scholars and scholars from Britain, Germany and France, and especially understanding of China as well as of the China's position on arms control and disarmament by friends of the ORG delegation.
I wish the seminar a complete success! I wish all the participants a pleasant stay in Beijing!
SESSION ITECHNICAL AND ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS OF BMD
Ballistic Missile Defence Re-visited I
Technical issues
FRANK BARNABY
Scientific Consultant to Oxford
Research Group, UK; former
Director, SIPRI.
The realization that the defence of the United States against a full-scale ballistic missile attack, of the type envisaged in President Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), would cost up to a million million dollars and would not, in any case, be technologically feasible, caused a considerable loss of interest in ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems. But BMD against limited ballistic missile attacks is now back on the political agenda in Washington, Tel Aviv, Tokyo and some European capitals. This renewed interest has been triggered by: the realisation that ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological, are spreading to more and more developing countries; and the development of new technologies favourable to BMD, particularly suitable lasers and methods of imaging incoming hostile warheads, decoys and debris. Over 20 developing countries now have ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 1,500 or so kilometres (for example, the North Koreans are deploying the Nodong-1 ballistic missile, reportedly with a range of 1,300 kilometres, and are developing a longer-range version, Nodong-2). Some of these ballistic missiles may soon be equipped with warheads carrying a number of sub-munitions containing chemical or biological agents, each with terminal guidance for pinpoint accuracy. For many, these are powerful arguments for ballistic missile defences. The protection of military forces deployed abroad against short-range ballistic missile attacks may soon, it is argued, be affordable and effective. But the desirability, and cost-effectiveness, of protecting a large nation's cities and industry against a long-range ballistic missile attack even a limited one is, to say the least, much more controversial. This paper will consider both national missile defence systems, designed to protect all or large areas of the home country against attack by long-range ballistic missiles, and theatre missile defence systems, designed to protect one's forces in the battlefield against ballistic missile attack.
American Plans for a National Missile Defence System
The only country thinking of defending its territory against strategic attacks by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is the USA. In mid-March 1999, the US Congress voted by 97 to 3 to pass a bill supporting a National Missile Defence (NMD) system, a decision supported by the Senate. The NMD will defend the USA against a limited attack with ballistic missiles. The purpose of the system is stated to be the protection of the United States against attacks by a limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) carrying nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. A 'limited number' apparently ranges from a few to a few tens of missiles. Possible ballistic missile attacks include: an accidental or unauthorised launch of ICBMs by Russia; a deliberate or unauthorised attack from China; and a deliberate attack from other countries armed ICBMs.
The Proposed American NMD System
The NMD system being developed would employ ground-based radars and sensors on satellites to detect a hostile missile launch and track the missile and its warhead. A ground-based anti-ballistic missile, carrying a hit-to-kill vehicle (called an Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, EKV), would be fired towards the incoming hostile missile. After the kill vehicle had been released, sensors carried by it would track the target, manoeuvre towards it, and collide with it at high speed to destroy it. The interception would take place above the atmosphere, when the incoming warhead is in the mid-course of its trajectory. Initially, existing early-warning satellites, called the Defense Support System (DSS) would be used; they carry infrared sensors able to detect the hot plume emitted by a missile booster during the early stage of its flight. Beginning in 2004, DSS satellites will be replaced by a new set of early warning satellites, with improved capabilities, called Space-Based Infrared System-high-earth orbit, SBIRS-high). SBRIS-high satellites will also use infrared sensors to detect hostile missile in their boost phase. The early warning satellite data would be transmitted to the NMD Battle Management Center, to be located at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. After the booster has stopped burning, the missile and any objects it releases would be detected and tracked by different sensors with sufficient accuracy to guide the interceptors and to discriminate the real warheads from decoys and other false targets. These sensors include existing early warning radars at Clear, Alaska; Beale, Marysville, California; Thule, Greenland; Cape Cod, Massachusetts; and Flyingdales, England. These radars will be upgraded to make them accurate enough for NMD purposes. And new X-band radars (probably using new 10-GHz radars) will be deployed designed specifically for NMD with much superior discrimination. This set of ground-based radars will be supplemented by 24 or so SBIRS-low missile-tracking satellites designed to provide track data so accurate that interceptors can be guided to their targets without assistance from other sensors. The data from the various sensors would be analysed by the Battle Management Center that would decide which objects should be intercepted. Interceptors would then be launched and guided towards their targets. Communications from the Battle Management Center to interceptors that have flown over the horizon would be relayed by a set of several ground stations deployed at forward locations. As it approached its assigned target, each interceptor would release its EKV, which will use infrared and optical sensors to detect the target and try to identify it as a real warhead rather than a false target. The EKV would then use its thrusters rockets to steer itself to the warhead and destroy it. There are two current candidates for NMD interceptors: the US Army system using the Ground-Based Interceptor, a new interceptor carrying an EKV, now under development; and the US Air Force system using modified Minuteman III missiles as interceptors, carrying an up-graded version of the LEAP kill vehicle being developed by the US Navy.