Table of Contents
Part I. Constitutional and Statutory Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction 3
Chapter 2 Justiciability Doctrines: Constitutional and Prudential Limits on Federal Judicial Power 3
§ 2.3 Standing 3
§ 2.3.2 Injury 4
§2.3.3 Causation and Redressability 6
§2.3.4 Limitation on 3rd Party Standing (Prudential Requirement) 8
§ 2.3.5 Prohibition Against Generalized Grievances (Tax Payer or Citizen standing) 9
§ 2.3.6 Zone of Interest Requirement for Standing (prudential) 12
§ 2.3.7 Special Standing Problems: Organizations, Legislators, and Government Entities 12
§ 2.5 Mootness 14
§ 2.5.2 First Exception: Collateral injury 14
§ 2.5.3 Second Exception: Wrongs Capable of repetition yet evading review 14
§ 2.5.4 Third Exception: Voluntary cessation 15
§2.5.5 Fourth Exception: Properly certified class (Class Action: rule 23) 15
§ 2.6 Political Question Doctrine 16
Chapter 6 Federal Common Law 16
§ 6.1 Introduction 16
§ 6.2 Development of Federal Common Law to Protect Federal Interests 16
§ 6.2.1 Introduction and Overview 16
§ 6.2.2 Federal Common Law to protect Federal Proprietary Interests in Suits Involving the United States or its Officers 17
§ 6.2.3 Federal Common Law to Protect Federal Interests in Suits Between Private Parties 18
§ 6.3 Development of Federal Common Law to Effectuate Congressional Intent 19
§ 6.3.1 Introduction 19
§ 6.3.2 Congressional authorization for federal courts to create common law rules 20
§6.3.3 Creation of private rights of action (Implying private actions from Federal Statutes) 21
Part II. Federal Court Relief Against Government and Government Officers 27
Chapter 7 Suits Against State Governments: The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 27
§ 7.1 Introduction 27
§7.2 History of Ratification of the 11th Amendment 27
§ 7.3 What Does the 11th Amendment Mean? Competing Theories 28
§7.4 Application of the 11th Amendment - What’s Barred and What’s Allowed? 29
§7.5 Ways Around the 11th Amendment: Suits Against State Officers 32
§7.5.1 Suits against state officers for injunctive relief 32
§ 7.5.2 Suits against state officers for monetary relief 32
§7.5.3 Exceptions to Ex parte Young (i.e. 11A DOES BAR these suits) 34
§ 7.6 Ways Around the 11th Amendment: Waiver 36
§ 7.7 Ways Around the 11th Amendment: Suits Pursuant to Federal Law (abrogation) 37
Chapter 8 Federal Court Relief Against Local Governments and State and Local Government Officers: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 41
§8.1 Introduction 41
§8.3 The Meaning of “Under Color of State Law” 42
§8.4 Exhaustion of State Remedies Not Required for § 1983 litigation 48
§8.5 Who Is a “Person” for Purposes of §1983 Liability? Municipal Governments 48
§8.5.1 Are municipalities persons and if so, when are they liable? 48
§ 8.5.2 How is the existence of an official municipal policy proven? 49
§ 8.5.3 Municipal Immunities 51
§8.6 Who Is a “Person” for Purposes of §1983 Liability? The Liability of Individual Offenders 51
§ 8.6.1 Introduction to individual officers’ immunities 51
§8.6.2 Absolute immunity 52
§8.6.3 Qualified (or good faith) immunity 54
§8.7 Who Is a “Person” for Purposes of §1983 Liability? State Gov'ts & Territories 55
§ 8.8 What Federal Laws May Be Enforced via §1983 Actions? 56
§ 8.9 When May §1983 Be Used for Constitutional Claims? 58
§ 8.10 Preclusive Effect of State Court Judgments and Proceedings 60
§8.11 Remedies Available in §1983 Litigation 62
· Attorneys fees (NOT LIMITED TO 1983) 63
Chapter 9 Federal Court Relief Against Federal Officers and the Federal Government 65
§9.1 Suits Against Federal Officers 65
§ 9.1.1 Introduction 65
§ 9.1.2 Cause of action against federal officers for monetary relief 66
§ 9.1.3 Exceptions: Situations where Bivens suits are not allowed 68
§ 9.1.4 Bivens suits against government and private entities (overview) 70
§9.2 Suits Against the Federal Government 70
§ 9.2.1 The principle of federal sovereign immunity 70
§ 9.2.2 Injunctive relief against the United States 71
§ 9.2.3 The Federal Tort Claims Act 71
Part III Federal Court Review of State Court Judgments and Proceedings 74
Chapter 11 Statutory Control of the Relationship Between Fed. Courts & the States 74
§ 11.2 The Anti-Injunction Act 74
§11.3 The Tax Injunction Act 76
Chapter 12 Federal Court Abstention Because of Unclear State Law 76
§12.1 Abstention Overview 76
§ 12.2 When Is Abstention Because of Unclear State Law Appropriate? 76
§ 12.2.1 Pullman abstention: avoiding federal court constitutional ruling 76
§12.2.2 Thibodaux abstention: unclear state law in diversity cases 78
§ 12.2.3 Burford abstention: defer to complex state administrative procedures 78
§12.3 Procedures for Abstention 79
Chapter 13 Federal Court Abstention to Avoid Interference with Pending State Proceedings 80
§13.1 Intro 80
§ 13.2 Younger v. Harris (1971) 80
§13.3 Extension of Younger v. Harris 82
§ 13.3.1 Declaratory and monetary relief when there are pending state court proceedings 82
§ 13.3.2 Fed. court declaratory injunctive relief in the absence of pending state proceedings 83
§13.3.3 Application of Younger to pending state civil proceedings 84
§13.3.4 Application of Younger to pending state administrative proceedings 85
§13.3.5 Application of Younger to prevent federal court injunctive and declaratory relief against the executive branches of state and local government (i.e. police departments) 85
§13.4 Exceptions to the Younger Doctrine 86
Chapter 14 Federal Court Abstention to Avoid Duplicative Litigation 86
§14.2 When Should Fed. Courts Abstain Due to Duplicative Litigation in State Courts? 86
2
Part I. Constitutional and Statutory Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction
Chapter 2 Justiciability Doctrines: Constitutional and Prudential Limits on Federal Judicial Power
§ Justiciability Doctrines
o General prohibition against advisory opinions (must be actual case or controversy & decision by court would actually have an effect)
o Standing
o Ripeness
o Mootness
o Political Questions
§ 2.3 Standing
· Introduction: standing is one of the most confused areas of the law - opinions are best described as “erratic” and “even bizarre”
o Elements of standing may be viewed in a different light based on the merits of the case - the courts will often use standing (and other justiciability doctrines) in order to avoid a ruling on the merits of a difficult case or a case that the resolution of would create additional problems for courts
§ General Constitutional Requirements for Standing:
o Injury in Fact - this is the core principle of standing
§ An invasion of a legally protected interest which is:
· Concrete and particularized (Lujan); and
· Actual rather than hypothetical
§ Must not be merely speculative (Lujan)
o Causation:
§ The injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s action.
§ The injury cannot result from the independent actions of some third party not before the court.
o Redressability:
§ It must be likely that the injury will be directly redressed by a favorable decision.
§ Prudential Standing Doctrines
o 3rd Party Standing - generally, cannot assert the rights of another (Singleton v. Wulff)
o Taxpayer Standing - generally, cannot sue when only injury is an increased tax burden (but see Flast v. Cohen)
o “Zone of Interest” Requirement - P must be part of group intended to benefit under the law (Data Processing v. Camp)
§ 2.3.2 Injury
· P must show that he has sustained (personally suffered) or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the challenged conduct and the injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical (City of Los Angeles v. Lyons)
Two questions Arise:
1) What does it mean to Personally Suffer Injury?
· Injury must be personally suffered (Sierra Club v. Morton)
o Failed to allege any of its members would be affected in their activities or pastimes by proposed development
o Mere interest in problem = not sufficient (i.e. claimed “interest” in conservation of the park)
o US v. SCRAP: rail freights would discourage recycling which would cause pollution which would lessen enjoyment of nature in DC area
o This shows: Ideological interest alone is not enough
· Gerrymandering:
o Only person in the gerrymandered/redrawn district has standing to sue (not those outside district). Hays
· Key: Show that you use the land in question (and conduct will affect your use of that land in some way)
· Injury in fact = an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (1) concrete or particularized and (2) actual or imminent (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife)
2) What types of Injuries are sufficient for standing?
· P can claim an injury to common law rights, constitutional rights, and statutory rights
o CL: tort, contracts, property
o Constitutional: refused some generalized grievances
§ i.e. statement and account of all expenditures & prevention of members serving
§ If violation of individual liberty (Due Process of law; freedom of speech) = standing usually allowed
o Statutory: Congress has broad authority to create injuries that are the basis of standing (FEC v. Akins; Trafficante v. Met. Life Ins.); while statute may authorize “citizen suit;” however, under Lujan P must still show constitutional requirements for standing
§ So if citizen suit = OK as long as it meets constitutional requirements
o ACLU v. NSA (6th Circuit): suit against NSA for wiretapping.
§ Argument that wiretapping injures lawyers w/ overseas clients and journalists who call overseas. 6th Circuit rejected. No specific lawyers or journalists mentioned. Mere chilling (like Laird)
· Compare: Presbyterian Church v. US
o Said undercover agents at church to monitor sanctuary movement to harbor illegal aliens (INS agents taping ministers actions)
o Court: more than chilling, some people actually not going to church
o Laird v. Tatum: suit claiming army’s secret infiltration of civilian groups opposed to Vietnam chills right of association. (Constitutional Injury = 1A freedom of expression)
§ USSC finds no standing b/c speculative that P will be injured. No standing if only allegation is mere existence of a program or some concern that it may be used against your group - alleged chill not the same as actual harm
o Moose Lodge: suit by blacks against white club for membership policy.
§ USSC finds no actual injury b/c Ps are just complaining about policy, they didn’t actually apply and get denied
.
o O’Shea v. Littleton: suit brought against state judge claiming bails judge imposes are unconstitutional.
§ Ps have no standing b/c there’s nothing to show they’d be arrested. It’s merely speculative that injury will occur.
o City of Los Angeles v. Lyons: Suit brought by black guy against police seeking injunction against chokehold they use. (Type of Relief Important)
§ No standing - suit not proper for injunction b/c P can’t show substantial likelihood of future injury (too speculative whether he will be arrested again and receive choke hold). Could still sue for damages though (because there was an injury in fact in the past)
§ Court determined standing on the basis of the relief sought - which is contrary to the Fed. R. Civ. P.
o Allen v. Wright: Mere stigmatization by law is insufficient injury for standing purpose (too speculative)
o Roe v. Wade (companion case): adverse effect on “marital happiness” is insufficient for standing (too speculative)
o Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: Suit brought by owners of land adjacent to area where mining is proposed.
§ Ct holds this is not direct injury so no standing. Injury must be direct injury.
o Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: (proof of future injury) Suit challenging head of Dept of Interior’s failure to consult with other agencies w/ re: to endangered species - statute says “any person may commence a civil suit” (Other Injury: right to view endangered animals for purely aesthetic purpose is enough: not const, statute, or CL)
§ USSC: When P is not himself the object of gov’t action, standing is not precluded, but it’s substantially more difficult.
§ Must have PARTICULARIZED INJURY - constitutional requirements must be met
o Stewart v. Blackwell: Post-Lujan 6th Circuit Case. Example of panel playing w/ Lujan and injury requirement. Suit seeks injunction against use of punch cards or optical scan voting in Ohio claiming violation of EPC. Lujan required particularized injury, but this panel says allegations of an increased threat of harm are sufficient to meet standing in 6th Cir.
o Tropicana: intellectual outrage may be enough
BUT SEE
o U.S. v. S.C.R.A.P.: most liberal standing case - this is not the winning argument before the current court - SC concluded that aesthetic or environmental harm is enough BUT P must personally suffer the harm (buy a ticket, actually go there, etc.)
§2.3.3 Causation and Redressability
Often treated as one prong, though under Allen v. Wright the analysis is entirely separate
How the injury is defined will likely determine if these prongs can be satisfied (discretion of the courts to redefine the injury in order to either extend or deny standing
Ex: Northeast Florida General Contractors v. Jacksonville, FL - city ordinance created preference for minority businesses in receiving city contracts
City’s argument - no standing because P could not demonstrate they would have received the bids otherwise
U.S.S.C. - the injury is actually the denial of the opportunity to compete for the contracts; standing exists if law makes it more difficult for a class of people to get something (Thomas, J.) (relying on earlier rationale from Regents of the University of California v. Bakke)
§ Causation:
o P must allege that the D’s conduct caused the harm
o Warth v. Seldin: Suit claiming zoning restrictions of city, which required large lots, prevented the construction of low-income homes.
§ Ct held that the availability of affordable housing was caused by other intervening factors – economics of housing market. (Also a redressability issue since P could not demonstrate that housing would be constructed without the zoning restrictions)
o Allen v. Wright: must not be independent act of third party
§ Court: Not fairly traceable to gov’t conduct (independent action of third party = the discriminatory schools)
· Allen v. Wright: causation and redressability are treated as separate hurdles – both of which must be met