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"Major Trends in PLA Modernization and Implications for Taiwan"
Michael D. Swaine
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Prepared for the conference on
Development of the Chinese Military:
Implications for the United States and Asia
Sponsored by
The Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program
National Defense University’s Center for the Study of
Chinese Military Affairs
The Library of Congress’s Science & Technology Division
January 13, 2005
Section One---Overall Military Goals and Current Capabilities
Overall, in the conventional realm, China is shifting from a continental orientation requiring large land forces for “in-depth” defense of the homeland to a combined continental / maritime orientation requiring a smaller, more mobile and sophisticated “active peripheral defense” capability for both inland and coastal areas.
On a more specific level, this shift requires three general types of capabilities:
· The ability to respond rapidly, take the initiative, attain superiority quickly, prevent escalation, and resolve any conflict on favorable terms
· Possibly the ability to conduct preemptive offensive strikes for self-defense as well as the general use of forces for both conventional and nuclear deterrence and coercion
· Eventually, the development of limited power “projection” capabilities, likely to the level of prolonged sea presence and limited area denial; area control is probably not a desired capability over the near- to medium-term
With regard to Taiwan, this requires the acquisition of significant but limited disruption and strike capabilities against the island, as well as limited disruption and area denial capabilities against the United States, to complicate any U.S. effort to deploy forces in the vicinity of Taiwan.
In general, this strategy has required more concerted efforts to acquire specific IW and strike capabilities against Taiwan, PLUS area limited denial capabilities against the US, to complicate US efforts to deploy forces near China’s maritime borders, especially in the vicinity of Taiwan.
Over the medium- to long term, the above military goals and capabilities translate into a specific set of force structure requirements.
· A smaller, more flexible, better motivated, highly trained and well-equipped ground force, centered on rapid reaction units, with limited yet significant airborne drop and amphibious power projection capabilities
· A robust green-to-blue water naval capability centered on a new generation of surface combatants with improved air defense, ASW, and anti-ship capabilities, modern conventional attack submarines with advanced torpedoes and cruise missile capabilities, an improved naval air arm, and greatly improved replenishment-at-sea capabilities
· A more versatile, modern air force, with longer-range interceptor/strike aircraft, improved early warning (EW) and air defense, extended and close air support, and longer range transport, lift, and mid-air refueling
· A joint service tactical operations doctrine utilizing more sophisticated C4ISR, early warning, and battle management systems, and both airborne and satellite-based assets, to improve detection, tracking, targeting and strike capabilities, and to enhance operational coordination among the armed services.
In the strategic realm, China possesses a small, retaliatory “counter-value” deterrent force. A significant portion of these forces is oriented toward targets within Asia, most likely including Japan, India, Asian regions of Russia, and key forward U.S. air and naval bases in the Western Pacific. China is currently seeking to improve the survivability and potency of these forces. It is also likely contemplating the acquisition of a more sophisticated “counter-force” capability to defend against America’s technologically superior conventional “in-theater” strike assets. This transition implies, over the medium- to long-term, the deployment in Asia of:
· A relatively large number (i.e., in the high hundreds or 1,000+) of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range (<5,500 km), sold-fuelled, mobile ballistic missiles and short-range cruise missiles, with increased accuracy, and some with both nuclear and conventional capabilities
· Smaller, more powerful nuclear warheads with potential MIRV or MRV capabilities; this development will be influenced by future U.S. actions regarding ballistic missile defense
· A modern strategic surveillance, early warning (EW), and battle management system, with advanced land, airborne and space-based C4ISR assets applicable to both Asia and beyond.
Taken together, the above objectives present a major challenge for the Chinese military, which is not yet fully configured or trained to attain them. At present, China’s force structure and doctrine provide the following capabilities in Asia:
· Highly effective “defense-in-depth” against any conceivable effort to invade and seize Chinese territory; much less effective defense against precision, long-range attacks on Chinese territory from > 200 km beyond China’s borders
· Effective power projection across land borders against smaller regional powers to within 100 km, to inflict punishment and deter attacks on the periphery
· Effective power projection to dislodge smaller regional powers from nearby disputed land and maritime territories such as various border areas in Northeast, Central, and Southeast Asia, and the Paracel and Spratly Islands; only a limited capability to hold and seize such territories, especially against combined regional forces
· An extremely limited ability to project force against the territory or forces of Russia, India, and Japan, and an even weaker ability against U.S. forces in Asia. The greatest potential threats to these more militarily capable countries are presented by ballistic and cruise missiles and, in the case of India and especially Russia, perhaps air and ground forces deployed within contiguous border areas
· Ability to undertake intensive, short-duration air and naval attacks on Taiwan, as well as more prolonged air, naval and possibly ground attacks; China’s ability to prevail under either scenario would be highly dependent on Taiwan’s political and military response, and especially on any actions taken by the U.S. and Japan
· An effective deterrent against nuclear threats or attacks from within the region; China’s confidence in this area has arguably been low in recent years, but is probably increasing as a result of ongoing improvements in strategic capabilities
China’s relatively small MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM forces serve as the primary delivery system for China’s nuclear arsenal. These systems were developed solely for deterrence purposes, to prevent nuclear blackmail or nuclear attack by holding at risk a small number of key population centers and major forward-deployed military assets (i.e., “counter-value” targets) of a more powerful, nuclear-armed adversary (i.e., the United States or Russia), and to caution other nuclear or proto-nuclear powers such as India against contemplating the threat or use of WMD against China. This capability constitutes a “limited, self-defense counterattack” force that can undertake small-scale nuclear retaliation at a time, and against targets, of Beijing’s choosing. The resulting “minimum deterrence” doctrine generally assumes that China would absorb an initial nuclear attack rather than undertake a launch-under-attack (LUA) or a launch-on-warning (LOW). Perhaps most important, the effectiveness of this deterrence hinges on the inability of an adversary to destroy all of China’s WMD capabilities, especially its strategic missile force, in a first strike.
China’s ability to conduct the above-outline longer-range regional power projection missions, or even to seize and hold nearby objectives against relatively capable adversaries is limited by the current absence of:
· A sizeable military air- and sea-lift capacity
· A demonstrated off-shore, long-range bomber or strike aircraft capability
· An operational, in-flight refueling capacity for >100 aircraft (four regiments)
· The demonstrated ability to mount sustained naval operations at sea
· An indigenous, operational advanced fighter / fighter-bomber (J-10)
· A large-scale amphibious attack capability
· The capability to undertake true joint operations or coordinated deployments across military regions
· An airborne early warning and control capability and a strategic warning and real-time surveillance and reconnaissance capability
However, China is gradually improving its regional capabilities in many areas, including:
· The rate of production and deployment of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, as well as improvements in accuracy and payload packages (including MIRVs, counter-measures, etc.)
· The deployment of land-attack cruise missiles on naval and air platforms
· The deployment of improved anti-ship cruise missiles
· Increased deployments of AA-12 or similar AAMRAM-type missiles
· Improvements in submunitions capable of severely disrupting air bases and C4ISR facilities
· Improvements in electronic warfare capabilities, including anti-ELINT, ASAT, and GPS capabilities
· The acquisition of ISR to detect and track U.S. carrier battle groups
· Improvements in data / intelligence fusion and dissemination for battle management and C4ISR
· The ability to mount sustained air sorties and to avoid friendly shoot-downs
· The deployment of a large numbers of additional Fourth Generation and Third Generation fighters (Su-30, Su-27, J-8II, JH-7, J-10))
· The ability of aviation forces to support ground and naval operations
· Improvements in combined submarine-and-surface naval operations
· Increased numbers of more sophisticated diesel and nuclear-powered submarines (Kilo-class, Types 093, 094)
· Significant increases in the number of troops (airborne, SOF and marines) considered deployable and supportable across the Taiwan Strait
Despite objections against theater missile defense (TMD) in Japan and Taiwan, Beijing is also engaged in the deployment of lower-tier “point defense” anti-missile systems as a means of protecting small areas of China from missile attacks. It has purchased from Russia S-300 (NATO designation: SA-10) SAM systems which have an inherent anti-missile capability; China might also be developing its own lower-tier TMD system.
Section Two---Projections of Future Capabilities
Assuming that Beijing is able to sustain or even accelerate somewhat the current tempo of its modernization program and overcome the problems mentioned above, one might expect that China could attain the following overall regional military capabilities by the year 2007-2010:
· The ability to conduct limited[1] air and sea denial (as opposed to sea control) operations up to 250 miles from China’s continental coastline
· The ability to strike a wide range of civilian and military targets in East, Southeast, and South Asia.[2] with a large number (perhaps 1,000+) of nuclear or conventionally armed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
· The ability to transport and deploy 1-2 divisions (i.e., approximately 15,000-30,000 fully equipped soldiers) within 100 miles of China’s continental borders, via land, sea, and air transport
· The ability to survive a preemptive strike against China’s nuclear facilities and retaliate within the region (and beyond) with a significant number of improved accuracy intermediate and long-range land- and sea-based ballistic and perhaps cruise missiles
· The ability to overwhelm any likely space-based or air-breathing missile defense system deployed in Asia
If one projects the above trends for another ten years or so, to the year 2020, one might expect the following general military capabilities:
· The ability to routinely patrol a single, non-carrier surface and sub-surface battle group within 1,000 nautical miles of China’s continental coastline
· The ability to conduct both sea and air denial operations within 500 nautical miles of China’s continental coastline
· The ability to attempt a naval blockade, with air support, of islands within 200 nautical miles of China’s continental coastline
· The ability to transport and deploy 3-4 divisions (i.e., approximately 45,000-60,000 fully equipped soldiers) within 200 miles of China’s continental borders, via land, sea, and air transport
Section Three---Overall Implications for Taiwan
The acquisition of even rough approximations of the above capabilities poses several significant implications for the security situation regarding Taiwan.
Some analysts believe that, as a result of the 1995-1996 tensions over Taiwan, China's weapons programs now place an increased emphasis on acquiring capabilities designed to strengthen the credibility of Beijing's military options against the island, and to deter the U.S. from deploying aircraft carriers in an effort to counter such options. Even by 2010, the type of increased Chinese capabilities summarized above could lead China’s leaders to attempt a variety of military actions against Taiwan, including another, more intensive round of military intimidation through various exercises and missile “tests,” a naval blockade, a limited direct missile or air attack, and even perhaps limited ground incursions in an attempt to establish a fait accompli in Beijing’s favor that the U.S. would find difficult to counter. In particular, the Chinese leadership might calculate that a large number of conventional ballistic missile strikes—when combined with aircraft and cruise missile attacks, and the rapid deployment of special operations and fifth column forces—could destroy many of Taiwan’s critical military and political assets and terrorize the population, thereby allowing China to seize the battlefield initiative and establish the conditions for victory in a future confrontation over the island
Chinese military advantages vis-á-vis Taiwan will continue to increase over time. For the moment, and probably for several years to come, the relatively superior Taiwanese Air Force, which is in the process of integrating into its force structure aircraft like the F-16, the Mirage 2000 and the Indigenous Defense Fighter in tandem with airborne warning and control platforms like the E-2T, can effectively blunt the worst threats that could be mounted by the PLAAF. Even here, however, Taiwanese strengths should not be exaggerated: the ROC air force, for example, has serious problems with integrating its existing equipment; its training regimes are not entirely adequate; and its bases (along with many other military and political assets) remain vulnerable to barrage fires of Chinese missiles. In general, the Taiwanese armed forces are still organizationally “stovepiped” in many undesirable ways. They continue to possess a force structure that is not entirely congruent, in terms of both equipment and training, to the needs of island defense. And they will remain disadvantaged by their relative lack of numbers and the continuing obstacles confronting efforts to carry out necessary defense reforms.
Taiwan’s defense capabilities should be grounded on the following assumptions:
· Taiwan cannot defend itself unaided by the US, but the US cannot perform all defensive tasks for Taiwan
· Taiwan’s primary strategic objective is to resist an initial PRC attack
(militarily, politically, and socially) until the US can deploy forces sufficient to repel further attacks and prevent escalation, if possible
· Most critical capabilities should be deployed within 5-6 years.
This implies a sharper focus on: early detection, mobility and rapid response, effective ASW, air and missile defense, hardening, protection of key political, military, and economic sites, creating a more survivable, interoperable, and effective national and operational-level command and control system; vastly improved training and morale; probably a committed NCO corps; a reduction in Army dominance of many reform and development decisions.