Leonardo R. Arriola

PS 311

Prof. D. Laitin

18 October 2001

‘No Bourgeois, No Democracy’: Reconsidering the Relevance of Moore’s Thesis

Barrington Moore’s 35-year old study of alternative routes to modernity continues to set the parameters of debate within comparative social science.[1] The appeal of Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy stems from its ability to offer a comprehensive explanation for the complex process of political modernization by employing a relatively small set of variables -- king, lord, bourgeois, and peasant. Theda Skopcol et al further note that “[a]lthough Barrington Moore took considerable intellectual inspiration from classic Marxist theoretical ideas about class relations and the social underpinnings of politics, he did so with a new twist: Social Origins made a distinctive contribution by emphasizing not the political roles of capitalist bourgeoisies or the wage-earning proletariat, but instead the role of ‘lord and peasant in the making of the modern world.’”[2] It is precisely in this latter context, however, that current students of comparative politics should question the continued relevance of Moore’s thesis. Considering the qualitative and quantitative research that has been conducted since Social Origins was first published, should the original emphasis on the role of the peasant-lord relationship still stand? If not, should the Moore thesis on political modernity be rejected?

The research findings of scholars such as Gregory M. Luebbert and Dietrich Rueschemeyer force us to critically reexamine the balance of class power in the process of regime change. Their work underscores the need to amend -- not reject -- Moore’s configuration of class dynamics. According to the work of Luebbert and Rueschemeyer, the lord-peasant alignment does not overdetermine a state’s path to modernity, be it democratic, totalitarian, or dictatorial. The Moore thesis should be reformulated to: include a larger role for the urban working class, a group largely overlooked in his original analysis; and acknowledge the more ambiguous role played by the bourgeoisie, which Moore assumed to be largely positive.

In Social Origins, Moore convincingly explains that a state’s path from feudalism to political modernity is paved with its own particular class conflicts. Based on historical case studies of England, France, the United States, Germany, Russia, China, Japan, and India, Moore finds that “the ways in which the landed upper classes and the peasants reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture were decisive factors in determining the political outcome.”[3] That is, the displacement of traditional agrarian society, which is rooted in the lord-peasant relationship, by the development of capitalism produces revolutionary conflict. The winning class coalition that eventually emerges from this struggle determines the character of the modern state.

Moore offers a typology of the principal modern state forms. First, a “bourgeois revolution” produces a capitalist-democratic state, as exemplified by England, France, and the United States. The landed upper classes and the peasantry are either absorbed by modernizing commercial interests, or they are completely eliminated as a social force. Second, a “revolution from above” leads to the rise of a fascist state that is both capitalist and conservative. The traditional upper classes in countries like Germany and Japan are able to subdue bourgeois interests and maintain their repressive coalition intact; this coalition then actively manages the transition from feudalism to industrialization. Third, a “peasant revolution” leads to communism in states such as China and Russia, where the peasant masses were completely alienated from the landed elite.

Finally, a running theme in each of the ideal types is the instrumental role of violence in the process of modernization. Competing groups, particularly the landed elites, resort to state-sponsored coercion to calibrate a new balance of power among the classes. Moore offers a lesson from England’s democratization: “Perhaps the most important legacy of a violent past was the strengthening of Parliament at the expense of the king. The fact that Parliament existed meant that there was a flexible institution which constituted both an arena into which new social elements could be drawn as their demands arose and an institutional mechanism for settling peacefully conflicts of interest among these groups.”[4]

Moore’s historical approach offers a useful, comprehensive framework for examining modernization, but recent scholarship makes clear that his analysis of two factors is wrong, namely the decisive role of the lord-peasant relationship and the democratizing influence of the bourgeoisie. In the first instance, Moore contends that a fascist regime will usually emerge when the landed upper classes co-opt a weak bourgeoisie and peasantry. But in “Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe,” Luebbert offers three observations from his research on regime change that bring the lord-peasant relationship into question: there was no correlation between the rural social structure and regime outcome; a landed elite’s economic control of the rural masses did not necessarily translate into effective political control; and the landed elite could install an authoritarian regime without political control of the rural masses.

Luebbert finds, instead, that the “form of the political order was determined by the coalition of urban and rural interests that emerged in response to the crises.”[5] Wherever a cohesive liberal party, as a representative of bourgeois interests, was able to accommodate an inchoate workers movement by extending political and labor rights, that coalition could keep the conservative landed elite in check. In contrast, when liberal parties were unable to contend with the demands of increasingly radicalized workers, the peasantry reacted by joining in a coalition with the landed elites and tipping the balance in favor of authoritarianism.

The comparative research of Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens also challenges Moore’s thesis on the democratizing role of the bourgeoisie. Considering the bourgeoisie to be the “democratic hero” of modernity, Moore asserts “strong agreement with the Marxist thesis that a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeois, no democracy.”[6] Although Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens concur with Moore on most aspects of his thesis, they diverge on this point. In their own historical case studies, the authors find that the bourgeoisie was often not “the primary agent of democracy,” for they rarely supported the introduction of universal enfranchisement.[7] Bourgeois reaction tended to depend on the class alliance options available as well as on possible threats to their class interests.

Although Moore ignores the urban working class in Social Origins, particularly in his analysis of democratizing factors, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens describe the working class as the most consistently pro-democratic force in their case studies. The overall impact of the working class, nevertheless, was highly variable. It had the capacity for self-organization and the articulation of a political agenda, but it could not introduce or consolidate a democratic regime without other class allies. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens conclude, “The respective positions of the bourgeoisie and the working class show that capitalism creates democratic pressures in spite of capitalists, not because of them.”[8]

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[1] A sample of the writings produced in direct response to Moore’s study reflects the ongoing effort to either challenge or confirm his findings in a variety of contexts: Michiel Baud, “Barrington Moore in Latin America: Coffee, Power and Modernity,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 64 (June 1998): 113-121; Gordon Bennett, Merchant, Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern China: Moore's Social Origins Revisited (Austin: University of Texas, Center for Asian Studies, 1978); Francis G. Castles, “Barrington Moore’s Thesis and Swedish Political Development,” Government and Opposition 8 (Summer 1973): 313-331; Evelyne Huber and Frank Safford, eds., Agrarian Structure and Political Power: Landlord and Peasant in the Making of Latin America (Pittsburgh and London: Pitt Latin American Series, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); Barrett L. McCormick, “Modernization, Democracy, and Morality: The Work of Barrington Moore, Jr.,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 13 (Summer 2000): 591-606; Jeffery M. Paige, “The Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution in Central America,” Journal of Developing Societies 6 ( Jan-Mar 1990); John D. Stephen, “Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis,” American Journal of Sociology 94 (March 1989): 1019-1077; J. Samuel Valenzuela, Class Relations and Democratization: A Reassessment of Barrington Moore's Model (Notre Dame: The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1999).

[2] Theda Skopcol, ed., Democracy, Revolution, and History (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 9.

[3] Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), xxiii.

[4] Moore, 29.

[5] Gregory M. Luebbert, “Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe,” World Politics 39 (July 1987): 452.

[6] Moore, 418.

[7] Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 271.

[8] Rueschemeyer et al, 271.