HPT001.113
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NUCLEAR TRAINING
TRAINING MATERIALS COVERSHEET
RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION TECHNICIAN INITIAL TRAININGPROGRAM
FIELD OPERATIONS SPECIALTY TRAINING / HPT001
COURSE / COURSE NO.
FOREIGN MATERIAL EXCLUSION / HPT001.113
LESSON TITLE / LESSON PLAN NO.
INPO ACCREDITED / YES / X / NO
MULTIPLE SITES AFFECTED / YES / X / NO
PREPARED BY
Brian K. Fike / ______
Signature / Date
PROCESS REVIEW
David Stewart / ______
Signature / Date
LEAD INSTRUCTOR/PROGRAM MGR. REVIEW
Rob L. Coleman / ______
Signature / Date
PLANT CONCURRENCE - BFN / ______
Signature / Date
PLANT CONCURRENCE - SQN / ______
Signature / Date
PLANT CONCURRENCE- WBN / ______
Signature / Date
TVAN CONCURRENCE- Corporate / ______
Signature / Date
Receipt Inspection and Distribution:
Training Materials Coordinator /Date
Standardized Training Material
Copies to: / SQN Technical Training Manager, STC 2T-SQN
WBN Technical Training Manager, WTC 1D-WBN
BFN Technical Training Manager, BFT 2A-BFN
TVA 40385 [NP 6-2001] Page 1 of 2
NUCLEAR TRAININGREVISION/USAGE LOG
REVISION
NUMBER / DESCRIPTION
OF CHANGES / DATE / PAGES
AFFECTED / REVIEWED
BY
0 / Initial issue / TBD / All / B. K. Fike
I.Program:Radiological Protection Technician Initial Training
II.Course:Field Operations Specialty Training
III.Lesson Title:Foreign Material Exclusion (FME)
IV.Length of Lesson:2 - 4 hours depending on audience
V.Training Objectives
A.Terminal Objective
Upon completion of this course, the participants will demonstrate their knowledge and understanding of the information presented during RADCON Technician training by obtaining a score of greater than or equal to 80% on a written examination. The information presented in this lesson plan may be part of an overall exam or be the only information for which the student is examined. SPP-6.5 is allowed as reference material for the examination.
B.Enabling Objectives
1.Describe terms and general requirements outlined in the FME procedure and this course.
2.State the purpose of Foreign Material Exclusion.
3.Identify responsibilities of various personnel for work preparation through job closure to include recovery from loss of FME controls.
4.Identify the most common causes of Foreign Material Intrusion (FMI).
5.Identify potential radiological hazards and other concerns resulting from foreign material "intrusion" (FMI) or loss of FME controls.
6.Identify FME requirements for special activities and specific areas.
7.Identify points from industry events concerning FME, including SOER 95-1.
8.Correlate error prevention tools used to prevent foreign material intrusion.
VI.Training Aids
A.Classroom setting
1.Whiteboard and markers
2.Overhead projector and screen if transparencies are to be used
3.Computer workstation with projection equipment if PowerPoint presentation is to be used
B.Computer Based Training Setting
Computer workstation with access to WinCBT
VII.Training Materials
A.Appendices
1.Handouts
- HO-1/TP-1: Course Objectives
- HO-2: Student Notebook
- HO-3: Attachment 1
- HO-4: Optional, Attachment 2
2.Any visual aids from Attachment 2 can be used electronically or as transparencies.
B.Attachments
1. SPP 6.5, Foreign Material Controls, Latest Revision.
2. FME PowerPoint Module at P:\Training\Technical Programs and Services\Radcon\Initial Program\Lesson Plan Library\Power Point Files. Suggest using the Student Notes or Handout (2 per page) feature of PowerPoint if handing out presentation.
VIII.References
A.SPP 6.5, Foreign Material Controls, Revision 7.
B.INPO SOER 95-1, Reducing Events Resulting From Foreign Material Intrusion.
C.BFN PERs - 980046, 980194, 980465, 98003984, 980899, 951168
D.WBN Event - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-390/97-11
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Instructor Notes
IX.IntroductionForeign material introduced into plant systems can cause equipment degradation, inoperability of components, or even fuel damage which may lead to higher radiation and contamination levels. / Objective 2
Significant industry events continue to occur due to inadequate control of Foreign Material Exclusion (FME). Several events and SOER 95-1 concerning foreign material intrusion will be reviewed as part of this course.
TVAN has had its share of FME events. Some are:
1998 - A hose was floating in the BFN Unit 3 spent fuel storage pool. The hose broke and a part fell to the bottom of the pool.
1998 - Foreign material was found in a steam trap at BFN U2-TRP-073-005 and appeared to be welding slag and grinding dust. The trap had been replaced during U2C9 outage.
1997 - Clear cellophane wrap was used to support RADCON activities on the refuel floor at BFN. This is contrary to FME control requirements.
1995 - Plastic type material was wrapped around the lower suction portion of the BFN U-3A core spray pump impeller.
For these reasons, nuclear plants have a Foreign Material Control program in place.
SPP 6.5, Foreign Material Controls, provides administrative controls and requirements for maintaining nuclear plant cleanliness by preventing the uncontrolled introduction of foreign material into equipment, components, or systems. This procedure emphasizes a "focus on prevention" attitude for users. / Error Prevention:
Procedure Adherence
and identification of
In addition to programs and procedural direction, our work practices and habits have a great impact on the end result of all that we do. / Critical Steps during the pre-job brief that would cause FMI.
X.Lesson Body
A.TVAN Procedures on Foreign Material Control
1.SPP 6.5 requirements apply to all maintenance, modification, operations and testing activities which involve open systems or components. / Give out HO-1 and review.
Give out HO-2.
HU Tool - Adherence to Proce- dures
2..The methods used to control foreign materials within areas will depend on the configuration and safety significance of the system, the activity being performed, and the probability of foreign material intrusion.
3.Several activities such as valve packing and pump repacking are NOT considered as opening of a component or system. Also, some activities are exempt from the FME requirements under certain conditions. / Access SPP-6.5 to find other examples.
2.These terms and definitions from SPP-6.5 are important. / Objective 1
a.Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) / Access SPP-6.5 section 5.0 for
b.FME Area (FMEA) / definitions.
c.Maintenance Residue
d.Source Term
e.Fail-Safe
f.FME Monitor (FMEM)
g.FME Accountability Log
h.Temporary Cover
i.Lanyard
j.Non-Fail-Safe
B.Work Planning
A foreign material exclusion (FME) evaluation for controls should be performed whenever a system or component is to be opened. For standard recurrent activities in which FME is required, a mandatory FME list and standing instructions concerning FME controls (requirements) should be developed. SPP 6.5 provides examples for specific areas. / Objective 3
SPP 6.5, Appendices
1.This evaluation is typically performed by the work planner.
2.More stringent FME requirements may be mandated for any work that is listed in the Appendices of SPP 6.5.
3.Less stringent controls must be approved by the FME Program Coordinator or designee.
4.Discuss the responsibilities of the work planner and work supervisor in the work planning phase. / SPP 6.5 is used for classroom discussions.
C.Work Preparation
1.Discuss other responsibilities of the work supervisor, worker, and FME Monitor during work preparation. / SPP 6.5 is used for classroom discussions.
D.Work Performance
1.FME areas are classified as:
a.Level 1 - FME General Housekeeping
b.Level 2 - Systems/Components which the opening is small, or all areas can be visually inspected and foreign material removed.
c.Level 3 - Systems/Components in which all areas cannot be visually inspected and foreign material removed. / Objective 6
Remember - the higher the number the more stringent the FME controls.
Example: Suppression Pool if divers are not used.
2.SPP 6.5 Appendices contain requirements for specific activities for these levels. / Have students review appendices.
3.Discuss responsibilities of the work supervisor. / Objective 3
SPP 6.5 is used for
4.Discuss responsibilities of the FME Monitor. / classroom discussions.
5.Discuss log-keeping requirements
6.Discuss control of material entering FMEAs.
7.Discuss good work practices to minimize maintenance residue generated during the activity. / Emphasize Radcon’s role in minimizing FMI.
8.Discuss valve stellite hard-facing and the impact on source term/accrued radiation dose.
E.Suspension of the Job / Objective 3
Plant conditions change often and work within a FMEA is stopped for a period of time. Anytime continuous or immediate access through opening is not required or if work is stopped during a shift, between shifts, or for a period of time certain actions are required.
Discuss requirements for suspension of job. / SPP 6.5 is used for classroom discussions.
F.Recovering from Loss of FME Controls
1.Discuss worker responsibilities, especially notifications. NOTE: It is very important for workers to not remove foreign material without first having the material surveyed by Radcon. Unplanned radiation dose events have occurred because workers handled foreign material that was highly radioactive.
2.WBN Event NRC Inspection Report No. 50-390/97-11
On September 20-21, 1997, with the reactor defueled, a rad-worker noted four, small foreign objects lying on the reactor vessel flange. Because of his concern for foreign material exclusion (FME), the rad-worker placed three pieces of the material in a plastic bag without having the appropriate radiation survey conducted and subsequently removed the bag from the reactor vessel cavity area. One piece of foreign material was later determined to have a contact reading of 56 Rem/hour. Calculations indicate that the worker received 3.645 Rem to his hand or about 7% of the NRC annual extremity limit of 50 Rem. Although no limit was exceeded , this rad-worker received needless dose. / Error precursor: “Can-do” attitude.
Good discussion point/OE for a PJB.
HU tools - STAR;
Stop When Unsure
2.Discuss work supervisor responsibilities.
G.Completing the Job Closeout
Discuss job closeout requirements.
H.Training Requirements
Discuss Training requirements
I.Periodic Assessment
The Site FME Coordinator should periodically perform an assessment of how well the FME program is working. This would involve review of such items as work documents and PERs concerning loss of/or suspected loss of FME controls. Trends will be reviewed and any corrective measures should be implemented.
J.Common Causes of FMI / Objective 4
1.Insufficiently established and communicated management expectations for the implementation of Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) controls.
2.Limited supervisory emphasis on FME considerations and practices during prejob briefings and monitoring of work.
3.Insufficient trained workers in basic FME practices and a lack of specific training for work activities involving specialized activities of key plant systems.
K.INPO Recommendations
1.Provide clearly established management expectations for foreign material exclusion controls and practices.
2.Verify work control process reinforces FME controls.
3.Ensure initial, continuing and job-specific training programs provide the knowledge and skills needed to implement effective FME practices.
L.Summary of Industry Events on FMI (Foreign Material Intrusion) / Objective 7
1.Pilgrim / Ask what part of a pre-job brief this
On August 29, 1994, a main generator fault caused a load rejection that resulted in a reactor scram from 100 percent power. The fault resulted from overheating of stator bar insulation. The overheating has been attributed to foreign material restricting flow of the stator cooling water. Two pieces of gasket material were found in the stator cooling water outlet header. Imprints in one piece of the gasket material indicate that the material may have covered as much as 80 percent of the outlet flow area from the most severely damaged stator bar.
The unit remained shutdown for 14 weeks to rewind the main generator stator and rotor. / would apply. Response should be the ‘R’ part of SAFER.
2.Biblis A
On March 4, 1994, during preparations for plant restart following a refueling outage, a fire occurred in the motor of a reactor coolant pump as a result of a short circuit in the motor windings. When the motor was inspected, a chisel, left in the motor during a previous motor inspection, was found to have caused the short circuit. Plant restart was delayed for approximately one month while the damaged motor was replaced with a spare.
3.Robinson 2
On October 10, 1993, parts from a refueling tool came loose and lodged in the control rod guide tube of a fuel bundle. The next day, contractors who performed the work were not available, and they did not report this to their supervisor or to station personnel. Eighteen hours later, the contract personnel informed their supervisor that the missing parts were at the bottom of the spent fuel pool. Their supervisor thought this was of limited significance and did not report it to station personnel. Approximately one hour later, when a control rod would not fully insert into a fuel bundle, station personnel were informed that missing tool parts may be the cause. Visual inspection of the control rod revealed one of the missing parts stuck to the end of the control rod. The other parts remained in the guide tube of the affected fuel bundle.
4.Milhama 1
On August 17, 1993, a turbine overspeed trip test was performed on the main turbine during startup following a refueling outage. During this test, observed bearing lube oil pressure was 14 psig instead of the normal 24 psig at rated turbine speed.
The reactor was subsequently shut down on August 18, 1993, and station personnel continued to investigate the reason for the low lube oil pressure. The bearing oil pump ejector nozzle was found clogged with paper towels that had been used to wipe the main oil pump flanges. Identification and removal of the foreign material resulted in an additional six days off-line. / Objective 7
5.Perry 1
On May 22, 1992, during a refueling outage, a video camera inspection of the suppression pool floor and all suction strainers in the suppression pool identified debris on the pool floor and on the suction strainers for two residual heat removal (RHR) pumps. Corrective action was deferred to a mid-cycle outage in January 1993. During the mid-cycle outage, the suppression pool floor was vacuumed, the pump suction strainers were cleaned, and two RHR pump suction strainers were replaced due to deformation from excessive differential pressure caused by debris on the strainers.
Subsequently, during a March 1993 plant transient, the RHR system was operated in the suppression pool cooling mode. Following the transient, an inspection of the suppression pool pump suction strainer for RHR pump B found debris coating the strainer.
Filter media for three large air filters (each approximately 60-square feet) in the drywell air coolers, used to provide filtered air in the drywell during plant outages, was determined to be the source of the fibrous material.
6.Dresden 3
On February 26, 1993, an automatic scram occurred on high reactor pressure. The high pressure was caused by a flow restriction in the high-pressure section of the main turbine. A bolt, slugging wrench, and key stock that fit together to form a tool used to perform work on the main turbine control valves had been left in the main steam piping during a previous refueling outage.
The three parts of the tool entered the turbine and caused extensive damage to the first-stage turbine rotor and stationary diaphragm blades. The blading deformation partially blocked the steam flow. Inventory methods for controlling tools had not been implemented during the control valve work, and the post-work inspection did not identify the tool in the steam piping.
A two-month forced outage was required to repair the high pressure turbine.
7.Hatch 2
On October 16, 1992, during a refueling outage, fuel sipping identified three failed fuel bundles. Visual inspection of two of the bundles found evidence of debris-induced clad fretting damage. The 384 fuel bundles scheduled for reload were inspected, and debris was found in 102 of the bundles. The debris found was of ferrous metal chips from machining activities performed on primary system piping during the previous refueling outage.
8.Point Beach 2
On September 18, 1992, discharge pressure oscillations were observed during containment spray system annual performance testing. The pump was shut down and vented. Following restart, the containment spray pump discharge pressure was 0 psig, and the pump made abnormal sounds. The pump was shut down and inspected. The plug had been installed in the piping for cleanliness control during modification work that installed full flow test lines in the containment spray, residual heat removal, and safety injection sytstems during the 1991 refueling outage.
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Instructor Notes
9.Sequoyah 1SQN PER 03-009344-000:
During downpower inspection of 1B MFPT lower cooler, Maintenance found a 12" X 18" cloth rag in the inlet side of the heat exchanger head. Rag and one clam shell removed from inlet head area.
SQN PER 03-009269-000: This PER is initiated based on the observations of our Siemens Westinghouse representative and bring in question our sensitivity (Maint/Mods) to FME issues associated with work activities potentially affecting the exciter. Per the observation during TVA's work in the Unit 1 exciter housing there were several issues that could present FME problems including: 1) Observing the exciter covers and doors being left open for over two days to inspect for leaks with no barriers or covers or FME control point. 2) Watching TVA craft work on the exciter piping inside the housing for three days with no FME control point in place. 3) Watching TVA craft wire and test the exciter from inside the housing with no FME procedures. 4) SWPC covering the exciter cooler pipes and then watching TVA craft work on the coolers with no FME and in the process degrade the pipe covers without replacing them. These issues all reflect that work inside the housing without FME control could potentially result in a catastrophic failure during the operating cycle if foreign material inadvertently left in the housing were to get inside the machine (diode wheel).
HPT001.113