Charges of inconsistency and the tu quoque fallacy
Bart Garssen, ILIAS and University of Amsterdam
1. The tu quoque fallacy
In argumentative discussions inconsistencies between propositions advanced as standpoint or premises are detrimental to the process of resolving the difference of opinion. This, however, does not mean that all inconsistencies can be seen as unreasonable discussion moves. Charges of inconsistency can be seen as fallacious discussion moves when an arguer points at an inconsistency between his opponents’ words (standpoint or premises) and deeds or between a proposition that is part of the opponents’ concessions in this discussion and a proposition that does not in any pertain to the discussion at hand. These kinds of moves amount to a tu quoque fallacy.
When language users are confronted with clear cases of violations of rules for criticaldiscussion they consistently judge these discussion moves as unreasonable. This is the mainconclusion of the comprehensive empirical project on the conventional validity of thepragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion carried out by van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels (2009). Overall, the respondents in this study believed that fallacious discussion moves wereindeed unreasonable while non-fallacious discussion moves were regarded as reasonable.Time and time again it was found that language users denounce fallacious discussion moves. The picture, however was not less clear for the tu quoque variant of the argumentum ad hominem. Overall, the respondents considered clear cases of the tu quoque fallacy less reasonable than non-fallacious attacks but all the same more reasonable then the abusive variant.
Why is the tu quoque fallacy seen as more reasonable than other fallacies? In order to answer this question I will first turn to the pragma-dialectical conception of fallacies. Next, I will consider the tu quoque as a derailment of a mode of strategic maneuvering and, finally, I will compare the tu quoque attack to charges of inconsistency outside an argumentative context.
2 The pragma-dialectical view of the tu quoque fallacy
Fallacies in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation are violations of the rules for critical discussion. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst ‘The rules must specify in which cases the performance of certain speech acts contributes to the resolution of the difference of opinion’ (2004: 135). For a critical discussion it is necessary that a difference of opinion is completely externalized. Only when a dispute has fully come to light that it becomes possible to make attempts at resolving it. Without a difference of opinion, there is nothing to resolve, and the argumentative discussion is superfluous (2004: 135). This means that no special conditions apply to the propositional content of the assertives that are part of the standpoint and of the propositional content of the negation of the commissive with which a standpoint is called into question. That is why in the practical code of conduct the freedom ruleis formulated for the confrontation stage:
Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from calling standpoints into question.
Every violation of this rule – or of any of the other rules – makes the resolution of the difference of opinion difficult or even obstructs the resolution totally. A consequence of the rule for the confrontation stage is that standpoints can refer to anything, and that in principle, every standpoint can be called into question, that everyonecan put forward standpoints, and that everyone can call standpoints into question. The freedom rule can be violated in a number of ways. The first type of violation occurs
when a discussant imposes certain restrictions on the standpoint that may be advanced orcalled into question. In this type of violation restrictions as to the content of the standpointare imposed. The second type of violation occurs when a discussant denies the opponent theright to advance a standpoint he would like to advance or to criticize the standpointhe or she would like to criticize. In doing so the discussant infringes the opponent’s personalliberty by denying the right to advance a standpoint or to criticize it. This can be seen as anattempt to eliminate him as a serious partner in the discussion (van Eemeren &Grootendorst, 1992, p. 108).
The tu quoqueattack is a rule violation that belongs to the second category, along with the abusive and circumstantial variants of the argumentum ad hominem.The tu quoque variant of the argumentum ad hominem is aimed at bringing to light a conflict in the positions that the opponent has taken on various occasions. The conflict may arise from the opponent now taking a standpoint different from one he took in the past or that the standpoint he professes to hold with his mouth is not in accordance with his acts. Although all three of the variants of the argumentum ad hominem are aimed at the person of the opponent and have the purpose of undermining his or her credibility, there is a significant difference in the way in which this goal is sought. In fact the difference between the three variant is so fundamental that would be something to be said for regarding them as separate categories of fallacies and not as three different variants of the same fallacy. However, they each constitute a transgression of the same fundamental norm for argumentative discussions that are aimed at resolving a difference of opinion: All three of personal attacks amount to one discussion party denying the other party the right of speech and thus the freedom rule that applies in the confrontation stage of a critical discussion is violated. In the tu quoque variant of the argumentum ad hominem, an attempt is made to find a contradiction in the opponent’s words or between his words and his deeds. This is not to be seen as an attempt to attack the speaker’s standpoint, but to undermine his positions as a serious arguer and by doing so let him retract the standpoint.
3 Tu quoque as a derailment of strategic maneuvering
The pragma-dialectical account of the tu quoque fallacy is not complete without giving attention to the persuasiveness that fallacy may have. The inclusion of rhetorical insight in the pragma-dialectical theory that van Eemeren and Houtlosser have brought about is an effort to bridge the conceptual and cultural gap between dialectic and rhetoric that currently exists (van Eemeren, 2010). They started from the observation that in argumentative discourse, whether it takes place orally or in writing, it is not the sole aim of the arguers to conduct the discussion in a way that is considered reasonable, but also, and from a certain perspective even in the first place, to achieve the outcome that is from their point of view the best result. The arguers’ rhetorical attempts to make things go in their way are, as it were, incorporated in their dialectical efforts to resolve the difference of opinion in accordance with proper standards for a critical discussion. This means in practice that at every stage of the resolution process the parties may be presumed to be at the same time out for the optimal rhetorical result at that point in the discussion and to hold to the dialectical objective of the discussion stage concerned. In their efforts to reconcile the simultaneous pursuit of these two aims, which may at times be at odds, the arguers make use of what van Eemeren and Houtlosser have termedstrategic maneuvering. This strategic maneuvering is directed at diminishing the potential tension between jointly pursuing the “dialectical” aim of reasonableness and the “rhetorical” aim of effectiveness.
In argumentative discourse, strategic maneuvering manifests itself in the moves that are made in three aspects, which can be distinguished only analytically: “topical choice,” “audience adaptation,” and “presentational design.” Topical choice refers to the specific selection that is made in a move from the topical potential – the set of dialectical options – available at a certain point of the discussion, audience adaptation involves framing a move in a perspective that agrees with the audience, and presentational design concerns the selection that the speaker or writer makes in a move from the existing repertoire of presentational devices. In their strategic maneuvering aimed at steering the argumentative discourse their own way without violating any critical standards in the process, both parties may be considered to be out to make the most convenient topical selection, to appeal in the strongest way to their audience, and to adopt the most effective presentation.
A clearer understanding of strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse can be gained by examining how the rhetorical opportunities available in a dialectical situation are exploited in argumentative practice. Each of the four stages in the process of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits is characterized by having a specific dialectical objective. Because, as a matter of course, the parties want to realize these objectives to the best advantage of the position they have adopted, every dialectical objective has its rhetorical analogue. Because in each discussion stage the parties are out to achieve the dialectical results that serve their rhetorical purposes best, in each stage the rhetorical goals of the participants in the discourse will be dependent on – and therefore run parallel with – their dialectical goals. As a consequence, the specifications of the rhetorical aims that may be attributed to the participants must take place according to dialectical stage. This is the methodological reason why the study of strategic maneuvering that we propose boils down to a systematic integration of rhetorical insight in a dialectical framework of analysis.
Although in strategic maneuvering the pursuit of dialectical objectives can well go together with the realization of rhetorical aims, this does not automatically mean that in the end the two objectives will always be in perfect balance. If a party allows his commitment to a critical exchange of argumentative moves to be overruled by the aim of persuading the opponent, we say that the strategic maneuvering has got “derailed.” Such derailments occur when a rule for critical discussion has been violated. In that case, trying to realize the rhetorical aim has gained the upper hand – at the expense of achieving the dialectical objective. Because derailments of strategic maneuvering always involve violating a rule for critical discussion, they are on a par with the wrong moves in argumentative discourse designated as fallacies. Viewed from this perspective, fallacies are derailments of strategic maneuvering that involve violations of critical discussion rules.
Deviations from the rules for critical discussion may be hard to detect because none of the parties will be very keen on portraying themselves as unreasonable, so that it is to be expected that to realize a purpose that is potentially at odds with the objective of a particular discussion rule, rather than resorting to completely different means, they will stick to the usual dialectical means for achieving their objective and try to “stretch” the use of these means in such a way that they allow for the other purpose to be realized as well.
The most tricky fallacies are violations of rules for critical discussion that manifest themselves in derailments of strategic maneuvering which can easily escape our attention because the derailed cases may be very similar to familiar instances of sound strategic maneuvering: the fallacy and its reasonable look-alike are in most cases hard to distinguish.
Attacking a discussant of being inconsistent is mode of strategic maneuvering which may occur in all stages of a critical discussion and in all stages of a critical discussion it may occur in a reasonable way. In the confrontation stage, a proponent may take inconsistent positions, for instance when the dispute is multiple and a proponent puts forward two standpoints that are pragmatically inconsistent. To accuse this opponent of being inconsistent is not unreasonable because it will be impossible to resolve the ensuing difference of opinion. There all kinds of different unallowable inconsistencies possible in the confrontation stage. In the opening stage an inconsistency between a proposal for procedural rules may come to light or between a material starting point and the standpoint put forward in the confrontation stage. In the argumentation stage inconsistencies may occur between critical attacks and starting points that are agreed upon in the opening stage and, finally, in the concluding stage pragmatic inconsistencies may occur between the concessions made earlier and the commissive speech acts pertaining to the outcome of the discussion.Accusing the protagonist or antagonist of an inconsistency in all these cases may be perfectly legitimate, given that there really is an inconsistency of some sort.
Another complication is that not all unreasonable accusations of inconsistency constitute tu quoque fallacies. These kinds of charges may also constitute a strawmen fallacy or a violation of the usage rule (Mohammed, 2009). The question is then when exactly is the freedom violated by means of a tu quoque attack? We have to turn to the confrontationstage for the answer to this question and take a look at the dialectically relevant moves in this stage. The possible moves and their relative positions in a certain stage given a certainpoint of departure can be represented in a dialectical profile (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, &Snoeck Henkemans, 2007, p. 18). A dialectical profile of the confrontation stage provides anindication of the different patterns that may normatively occur in the moves that are madein the different rounds, leading to a dispute of a particular type. The simplest type ofdifference of opinion is a single non-mixed dispute. In a single non-mixed dispute there is onlyone issue under discussion and only one of the parties puts forward a standpoint about thisissue; the other party expresses doubt. A dispute is initiated when one party (arguer 1) putsforward a standpoint and the other party (arguer 2) makes it clear that he does not sharethis standpoint.
T1:+/p
T2:?(+/p)-/p
T1:+/p+/p
T2:?(+/p)?/(+/p)
Figure 1: Dialectical core profile for a single non-mixed dispute (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007)
In the confrontation stage both parties have the opportunity to maintain theirposition on further consideration or not. A single non-mixed dispute “arises because A2
doubts A1’s standpoint, and both parties maintain their position, or because A2, at first,expresses a standpoint that is opposite to A1’s standpoint, but, on second thought, reducesit to doubt” (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007, p. 25). These twopossibilities are represented in the dialectical profile in Figure 1.As the dialectical profile for the confrontation stage shows, dialectically relevant reactionsin the confrontation state are 1) expressions of doubt and 2) maintaining a standpoint as areaction to doubt. In the second round A2 may react to the initial expression of thestandpoint by doubting the standpoint or by putting forward the opposite standpoint. Thesediscussion moves derail when A2 shifts the focus of attention from the propositional contentto personal characteristics of A1. In principle the same can happen in the fourth round. A1’sreactions in the third round can derail in a similar manner. This reconstruction is possiblebecause of the position of the legitimate moves in the profile: they are a reaction to anexpressed standpoint or expressed doubt and they refer to a negative aspect of the positionof the contender.As said before, not every charge of inconsistency in the confrontation stage and in these positions in the profile are fallacious. They are only reasonable if there really is an inconsistency and the inconsistency pertains to commitments of the arguer under attack that are part of the discussion at hand. All other types of inconsistency are irrelevant for this purpose. This means that an inconsistency between a position taken in the confrontation stage and the arguer´s behavior is not relevant in this respect. The same goes for an inconsistency between the arguer´s position and an utterance made earlier, outside the discussion at hand. As van Eemeren and Houtlosser put it: ‘from a pragma-dialectical point of view, an inconsistency between something that is presently said and something that was said on a different occasion matters only if it involves an inconsistency in one and the same discussion’ (2003: 7). The problem here is that it is not always clear whether a certain utterance should be seen as part of the discussion or not. According to van Eemeren and Houtlosser two pieces of argumentation can be seen as parts of the same discussion if these are aimed resolving the same difference of opinion and have the same material and procedural starting points (2003: 7).
In short a tu quoque fallacy: 1) takes place in the confrontation stage, 2) is a reaction to an expressed opinion or to expressed doubt, 3) can be put forward by both the antagonist and the protagonist of a certain standpoint, and 4) is an accusation of inconsistency between the position of the opposing party and a his behavior or an utterance made outside the discussion.
4 Charges of inconsistency in non-argumentative contexts
The fact that it may be hard to distinguish between tu quoque charges and other reasonable attacks of inconsistency may explain why it is such a difficult fallacy to understand. However, this goes for many – if not all – other fallacies. The fact that the criterion of consistency plays such an important role here may also contribute to the problems.
Let’s take a look at otherinstances of charges of inconsistency. Suppose one crosses the street at a traffic light, which happens to be red and some-else who is crossing at the same time says in a reproaching way: you are ignoring the red light! One may take it that in this situation the critical pedestrian did not expressa standpoint and did not intent to engage in an argumentative discussion. He just expressed criticism and his utterance may be seen as a simpleand straightforward accusation. Of course, the accusation can become a standpoint, when the speaker is confronted with doubt regarding the acceptability of the accusation or when the speaker anticipates doubt and is willing to defend his position by way of argumentation. This however is certainly not automatically the case.