Case Summary and Analysis Paper
Ellen Schall and the Department of Juvenile Justice
Legislative Strategies
Introduction
Intergovernmental relations (IGR) describe activities and interactions that occur between governmental units of all types and levels within the United States federal system (Anderson in Wright). The federal government is the broadest context within which intergovernmental relations operate. Wright discusses four characteristics of IGR. Interactions between agencies take place between the national and sub-national (federal and state) level as well as on the national-local, national-state-local, or state-local levels. The subject of IGR is the study of configurations and combinations of relationships between units of government that takes place in the broader context of the federal system (Wright). This is the first characteristic of IGR.
Within the federal, state, local systems, the units that carry out IGR are people. A second feature of IGR as Anderson (in Wright) points out is the “attention paid to the activities, interactions and working relations among persons occupying official positions in the units of government under consideration”. “It is human beings clothed with office who are the real determiners of what the relations between units of government will be” (Wright p.4). The study of IGR then, must be formulated in terms of human relations and human behavior.
The third element of IGR (Wright) relates to IGR being more than occasional interactions between people but rather “continuous day-to-day patterns of contact, knowledge, and evaluations of officials who govern” (p.4). This relates to the formal and informal ongoing relationships that must flourish in order for cooperative action at all levels to take place.
Ellen Schall, appointed in 1983 as the second commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in New York City illustrates the point that interactions with people are the basic units that drive IGR in her essay, “Learning to Love the Swamp” (Schall). Commissioner Schall stepped into her position as commissioner of the New York City DJJ and faced challenges on personal and professional levels and across vertical and horizontal domains.
Ms Schall said the following regarding her role as commissioner: “The role of commissioner evoked strong feelings in people, often complicated by early experiences staff had had with authority figures, only sometimes positive ones. I learned to distinguish feelings whether positive or negative that came to me in my role from the ones that were directed to me as a person, even a person taking up a role. I learned to tolerate being hated (which is the job of a manager) and survive being praised for work that was a collective.” (Schall p. 205). Schall needed to create change, forge networks and build collaboration with people who disliked and resented her. This passage illustrates the complexities that interpersonal relationships play in IGR.
A fourth characteristic of IGR is its awareness of the importance of the roles public officials play in IGR (Wright). Members of congress, city council members, governors and state legislators have always played roles in IGR. But in recent years, according to Wright, “the actions, attitudes and roles of appointed administrators” have played roles of increased importance. This has been an outgrowth of public bureaucracies playing an increased role of importance, particularly since the New Deal. The DJJ (Schall), the Department of Social Justice (DSJ) and Office of Internal Special Investigations (OISI) (Legislative Strategies) are examples of public bureaucracies with appointed administrators playing key, powerful roles in their respective networks.
This paper will link some of the class readings to the case of Ellen Schall and the New York City DJJ and the issues at play in the Legislative Strategy pieces, as they relate to IGR.
The Department of Juvenile Justice and Ellen Schall
The DJJ was organized into four major divisions: secure detention (Spofford Juvenile Center, a non-secure detention facility (NSD), Court Services and an aftercare program. Ellen Schall was the second DJJ commissioner. The previous commissioner, Paul Strasburg, appointed by Mayor Edward Koch, left his position abruptly (along with several of his administrators) six weeks before Schall’s appointment. Strasburg and Mayor Koch had come to an impasse over the size and location of a proposed, new detention facility. Mayor Koch had withdrawn his support for the proposed new facility and Strasburg and company left DJJ. Strasburg had had broad-based support in DJJ and in the child welfare community in general.
A serious problem with Strasburg’s departure was the high number of vacancies of top staff. The departure of two out of three deputy commissioner and three line division staff left DJJ with vacant key positions (Gilmore, Schall, 1986). The Spofford facility was programmatically and organizationally weak (Gilmore, Schall) and unsafe with sexual assaults and aggression among the detainees. At one point in the 1970’s, its nickname was “the sieve” due to so many run-a ways. The non-secure detention program had a high number of elopements and a poor record getting children to court on time. The aftercare program, the newest program under the previous administration served too few clients. Relationships with the mayor’s office and city government and overseeing agencies were “in need of attention” (Gilmore, Schall) 1986). Schall had a narrow mandate from the mayor, who told her “do as much as you can for them” and “Don’t let any of them get out” (Legislative Strategies. p.5).
Gilmore (p. 269) characterizes the tensions Schall faced in how she should proceed re-building her department. Should she “fix” the current pressing problems or take time to develop a “more comprehensive agenda”? What is the relationship and relevance between “care versus custody” as it relates to the agencies mission? How should she develop the top and middle tiers of management while attending to line level staff? How should she prioritize “programmatic initiatives versus organizational and managerial improvements”? (p. 269)
The DJJ was rife with racial tensions between the white, for the most part college educated managers and the black and Hispanic line staff, the latter of which were educated at the high school level and whose ethnicity reflected the population served by the DJJ. DJJ was one of 33 agencies whose commissioners reported directly to the mayor and to 3 oversight agencies. In addition, it was accountable to two advisory boards that made recommendations to the commissioner and reported to the mayor. The DJJ was also regulated by the state Division for Youth (DFY).
Models of Relationships between Federal, State and Local Organizations
Wright (in Gormley) describes three levels of authority relationships (Ch.5). These models provide a framework with which to view power, power sharing and decision making capacities from particular areas of jurisdiction and from federal, state local levels.
The coordinate authority model is described as having distinct boundaries that separate state and national government. Local government units are included within and are dependent on state governments (Wright in Gormley, p. 72) State-local entities is independent and autonomous and linked tangentially to the national government. This model is practically obsolete in IGR practice (Wright).
The inclusive authority model (Wright) is depicted by three concentric circles, which diminish in size. The federal government occupies the largest outer circle and national, state and local entities occupy smaller concentric circles within the federal sphere. This model assumes supremacy of the federal government and dependency of lower level units on the federal government. Illustrations of this model are evident on policies in which the federal government has expanded its powers at the expense of state and local powers. The “No Child Left Behind Act” (NCLB), signed into law by President Bush on January 8, 2002 is an example of this model of authority. This act gives considerable power to the federal government over state boards of education in setting national educational objectives and bench- marks. Schools receive report cards assessing their performance with their funding tied to performance. Under performing schools receive fewer resources. Schools across the country are held to the same standard, be they in a wealthy suburb, a poor inner-city neighborhood or in between. National tests are administered to all students who attend schools that accept federal funding. States have no latitude in setting their own standards or tailoring programs fitting the needs of their different school populations. Many state boards of education are not in a financial position to say no to NCLB funding so they comply with testing schedules and benchmarks they may not agree with. The issue of having to comply with standards they don’t believe hold validity to their populations, but having to comply in order to receive funding to provide basic educational services, is a dilemma faced by officials in the educational sphere.
The overlapping authority model of IGR is described as the most representative model in practice and suggests inter-dependence between state, local and federal government jurisdictions. Three equal size circles, each representing the national, state and local levels of government, represent it. At the points of over-lap, where multiple governmental jurisdictions intersect, bargaining and shared decision-making take place. The over-lapping authority model represents the cases discussed in this paper. Two of the paired cases talked about in class also clear are examples of this model.
Ruchelshaus/ EPA and New Bedford Harbor/ Puget Sound Water Case has several offices of the federal government (HEW, FDA, OMB) as active partners in having to share and determine authority and sharing decision-making capacity in fiscal and policy arenas. Active public interest groups on national, state and local levels, the media, and members of Congress were active on the issues as well.
In neither Schall nor Legislative Strategies, do departments or offices of the federal government play direct roles except to serve as the greater context within which DJJ, WSP and DSJ operate. DJJ operates within NY state government domain and concurrently under federal authority and regulation.
Commissioner Schall is directly accountable to the mayor, an advisory board and the New York State Division for Youth (DFY) who would be above DJJ on an organizational chart. The commissioner’s office is above Deputy Commissioner of Operations, Administration and the Assistant Commissioner of Program Planning and Development. The Commissioner in this instance, is not bargaining, power sharing or negotiating with partners outside her agency. Her work was focused on gaining cooperation and program buy-in from within the organization.
The Secretary of the Department of Social Justice (DSJ) in the state of Washington had a broader network of outside organizations to negotiate with than did Commissioner Schall. Legislative Strategies, parts A and B depicts a legislative move by state senators to reorganize two large state government departments by moving a division from one department to the other. This move could signal a trend to a call from some parties to downsize government with the hopes of improving efficiency and increasing accountability. Several outspoken critics opposed the plan moving OISI to WSP, saying moving the division will not improve efficiency and will have the effect of ruining a successful program. Political pundits are saying that the move, rather than being borne of “astute political planning and public administration” is a move from a “cynical and frustrated” perspective. Other groups opposing the move are unions, lobbying groups composed of former inmates and families of former and current inmates and other legislators. The governor has not weighed in on the matter. However, he is a strong advocate of law and order and advocated in previous sessions for state government reorganization measures. The Governor’s previous attempts failed to pass the full legislature due mainly to “persistent lobbying on the part of affected agencies, unions and interest groups”.
The division in question is the Office of Internal Special Investigations (OISI) a division of DSJ. The proposal is to move OISI to the Washington State Police Department (WSPD). OISI has been successful in its mandate to investigate criminal activity within state correctional facilities. Its peer- mentoring program has highly trained staff and ex-inmates as well as families of current inmates are highly vocal about the programs success. The Office of Financial Management (OFM) will evaluate the efficacy and cost effectiveness of moving OISI. OFM has a state mandate to “make efficiency surveys of all state departments and institutions and the business and administrative methods pursued … and make confidential reports to the Governor”.
In this we can see an example of “multiple governmental jurisdictions sharing decision-making responsibilities in a policy arena characterized by bargaining rather than central decision-making” (Wright). The Secretary of DSJ and supporters of her plan would be meeting with members of the legislature who both oppose and support the plan. Heads of WSPD and DSJ would be evaluating the move and as is the OFM. Members of the media and lobbying groups are working to influence the legislature to promote their cause. The ultimate decision for whether to move OISI rests with the legislature and will be based on expert opinions of OFM, professionals in the field and public opinion.
Saliency and Complexity in Washington State and NYC
Gormley discusses bureaucracy’s bosses in Chapter 3 of the text and discusses saliency and complexity of issues. The framework attempts to explain what factors capture the attention of different sets of actors in different areas of regulation. Gormley uses the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) ruling during the Clinton Administration as an example of when bosses of the bureaucracy become involved in policy action and what may result. OSHA issued a ruling designed to protect workers from injuries related to repetitive motion (p.51). The ruling had a broad impact on hundreds of thousands of workers and was controversial. It was projected that businesses would incur astronomical expenses correcting problems contributing to repetitive stress injuries, as well as having to pay for legal and medical expenses and lost revenues from decreased productivity due to ergonomic-related injuries. The OSHA ruling was repealed (p. 51) after extensive debate but it illustrated the power that policy makers can have over an agency in part, by mandating costly and broad reaching regulations. In the OSHA case, as in other federal regulatory situations such as the NCLB Act or the EPA case pair, Derthick’s “middle tier” of state government bears the burden of costly regulation and compliance.