Bernard McKenna & David Rooney
University of Queensland Business School, Australia
Critical Ontological Acuity as the Foundation of Wise Leadership
6th Annual International Studying Leadership Conference
WarwickBusinessSchool: Purposes, Politics and Praxis
13th and 14th December 2007
Theme 3: The development of a critical leadership praxis.
Contact
Dr Bernard McKenna
University of QueenslandBusinessSchool
University of Queensland-Ipswich Campus
11 Salisbury Road
Ipswich Q 4305
AUSTRALIA
ABSTRACT
Leadership theory has fragmented with various types of leadership (charismatic, transformational, authentic and spiritual etc.) being advocated. Yet, vital issues of global warming, the Iraq imbroglio, and tectonic geopolitical shifts (Islam-West divide; China’s spectacular growth), which impact on our economic and social life are not going to be effectively dealt with using an “empowering” leadership discourse (itself an appropriation from anti-colonialist struggle). Furthermore, events like Enron and the SubPrime Mortgage Collapse show that greedy, unethical and stupid behaviours are reflections of the ontologies underlying many normative discourses of business practice.
This paper argues that effective leadership theorising needs to be informed by wisdom theory if it is to provide our most powerful leaders with a frame of reference to guide their deliberations and actions (cf. McKenna, Rooney, & Boal, in-press). Our paper presents a case for wise leadership rooted in the neo-Aristotelian principle of eudaimonia, which Nussbaum (1994: 15) understands as "human flourishing". We argue that human flourishing occurs in conditions of life-affirming principles that favour democracy, equality, and equity/fairness, and that these should be markers of business ethics.
While wisdom must be founded on firm axiological principles it must equally understand how to manage knowledge and its underlying ontologies in a complex environment (Hunt, Osborn, & Boal, 2007). Using Foucault’s (1972: 191) notion of episteme as “the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems,” we claim that organisational discourse legitimates, valorises and reproduces (usually tacit) ontologies. Heracleous and Barrett (2001: 19) call these discursive deep structures that “are relatively stable, mostly implicit, and continually recurring processes and patterns that underlay and guide surface, observable events and actions”. Furthermore, we argue these organisational discourses are themselves the manifestation of larger isomorphic forces (McKenna, Rooney, & Liesch, 2006; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999).
Thus, we argue that wise leaders must be able to understand epistemic structures and their inherent ontologies, a capacity we call ontological acuity. Such a capacity implies that wise leaders are, in a sense, critical discourse analysts who can recognise the potential isomorphism of “common sense” and evaluate normative practice, as needed, by understanding inherent ontologies. In this way they can provide alternative ways of knowing, deciding, and acting.
Our interdisciplinary approach incorporates a blend of Aristotelian wisdom theory (McKenna et al., 2006) psychological theories of wisdom (Staudinger & Pasupathi, 2003; Sternberg, 1998); complexity theory (Gardner, Avolio, Luthans, May, & Walumbwa, 2005; Wang & Chan, 1995); structuration theory (Giddens, 1979); and critical discourse theory (McKenna, 2004). Although organisational knowledge comprises multiple, often contradictory assumptions, beliefs, intuitions, memories, cognitions, etc. (Rooney & Schneider, 2005), its discursive stability can be understood by seeing organisations as autonomous self-organising systems that emerge within a bounded context (Chia, 1998; Spender, 1996; Stacey, 2001; Tsoukas, 1996). This implies that wise leaders must understand organisational knowledge not as facticity, but as plastic (re-formulating flows and relations within a discursive formation).
By understanding wise leadership largely as a capacity for ontological acuity and life affirming ethics, we argue that organisations are more likely to avoid the coercive, mimetic, and normative forces that produce unethical and stupid outcomes.
1
CURRENTSTATE OF LEADERSHIP THEORY
Current leadership theories have drawn on a variety of factors, including ethics, cognitive complexity, connectedness, and reflexivity. All of these area certainly necessary. However, we argue that the essential elements of wise leadership are encapsulated in virtue-based wisdom of a leader who also displays ontologcial acuity. It is this capacity for ontological acuity that this paper focuses on.
Leadership theory has fragmented, with various types of leadership (charismatic, transformational, authentic and spiritual etc.) being advocated to enhance managerial and organisational practice. In the past decade, charismatic, transformational, authentic, and spiritual leadership scholars have dealt with issues about ethics, trustworthiness, and the capacity to contribute to the common good (Bass, 1990; Howell & Avolio, 1992; Avolio & Bass, 1995; Bass, 1997; Gardner & Avolio, 1998; Luthans & Avolio, 2003; Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Gardner, Avolio, Luthans, May, & Walumbwa, 2005; Kriger & Seng, 2005).Charismatic theories (e.g., Hinds, 2005; Driscoll & McKee, 2007; Markow & Klenke, 2005) are individualistic, operating on such factors as affect, loyalty, identity, commitment, motivation and performance of the organisational member who are expected to identify with the leader (Boal, 2004). Generally, charismatic leaders emerge because their particular vision is enthusiastically adopted or in times of crisis. Essentially, the success of this leadership depends on the extent to which individuals’ perceived needs and values are articulated through the interpretative framework established by the leader. Transformational leadership (Avolio & Bass, 1988; Avolio & Bass, 1995; Gardner & Avolio, 1998; Avolio, Bass, & Dong, 1999; Harvey, Martinko, & Gardner, 2006), acknowledging that leaders significantly impact on organisational values (Gottlieb & Sanzgiri, 1996; Grojean, Resick, Dickson, & Smith, 2004), is particularly concerned with the ethical dimension of leadership (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999: 182) and so is different from transactional leadership, which uses contingent reinforcement to direct organisational behaviour. Authentic transformational leadership (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Gardner, Avolio, Luthans, May, & Walumbwa, 2005; Harvey, Martinko, & Gardner, 2006) elaborates transformational leadership theory, but identifies values as a central concern. These values are “connected to friends, family, and community whose welfare may be more important to oneself than one’s own” (Grojean, Resick, Dickson, & Smith, 2004: 186). Not only do authentic leaders “possess self-awareness of, and act in accordance with, their values, thoughts, emotions, and beliefs” (Harvey, Martinko, & Gardner, 2006: 1), they are future-oriented (Luthans & Avolio, 2003). Empathy and emotional sensitivity are important characteristics of authentic leaders (Michie & Gooty, 2005; Kellett, Humphrey, & Sleeth, 2006). Clearly, spiritual leadership is values-based, and considers such matters as transcendence, spiritual practices that develop higher ethical sensibilities, contemplative wisdom, humility (Reave, 2005; Collins, 2001), and timeless qualities (Whittington, Pitts, Kageler, & Goodwin, 2005). It emphasises possibly more than other leadership theories, the significance of balance, harmony, and unity (Kriger & Seng, 2005).
Although promoting admirable traits, transformational, charismatic, spiritual and authentic leadership literatures do not effectively show how wise leaders deal with the complexity of contemporary organisations. Boal & Hooijberg’s (2000) Integrative Model of Strategic Leadership combines the key elements of interest in organisational complexity as well as social, behavioural and ethical considerations. However, applying wisdom theory,McKenna, Rooney, & Boal’s (in-press) critique and reconceptualisation of this paper took up the concern of how effective leaders deal with complexity ethically. In this paper, it is assumed that effective leadership incorporates ethical values, selflessness, vision, and transcendent capacities, as well as considerable cognitive capacity. The particular cognitive capacity we identify in this paper is ontological acuity.
WISDOM-IN-LEADERSHIP THEORY
This paper argues that wisdom needs to be a characteristic of effective leadership theory. Our starting point is to locate ethical considerations as the primary concern. We adopt Aristotle’s virtue ethics and wisdom theory as appropriate guidelines for successful and ethical business in contemporary times. Underlying Aristotle’s virtue ethics is the principle of eudaimonia, which Nussbaum (1994: 15) understands as "human flourishing". Essentially, Aristotle argues that in seeking eudaimonia, or the good life, we will act virtuously because this brings about a fulfilling and happy life - it is rational. Furthermore, virtue is preferred because one should do “what one does just because one sees those actions as noble and worthwhile” (Hughes 2001, p. 89). Thus, we argue that human flourishing occurs in conditions of life-affirming principles that favour democracy, equality, and equity/fairness, and that these should be the affirmed teleological markers of business ethics. Although strongly rooted in Aristotelian theory, our theory of wisdom in leadership is strongly interdisciplinary as it also draws onknowledge theory,psychological theories of wisdom, complexity theory, structuration theory, and critical discourse theory.
Aristotelian Wisdom Theory
The components of Aristotelian wisdom of most relevanceto leadership theory are phronesis (prudence), aesthetics, techné, balance, and virtue. Aristotle proposed phronesis as the form of practical wisdom, and sophia as the form of philosophical wisdom, both of which need to inform wise action (Kekes 1995: 16). By phronesis Aristotle means “intuition and scientific knowledge” [NE, 1141a19], where intuition is more than “gut feeling”. Intuition requires discernment (Schuman, 1980, in Noel, 1999: 279-280) and insight (Dunne, 1997) which are crucial in balanced practical deliberation: phronesis is the means “by which instrumental rationality is balanced by value rationality” (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 285). The dynamic balance that Aristotle espoused is also central to Sternberg’s (1998) psychology-based views of wisdom (see also Labouvie-Vief, 1990). This requires experiential richness, a creative and imaginative capacity, and logical coherence. Apparently contradictorily, balance also requires acknowledgement, not suppression of emotions. Aristotle’s wisdom concepts were entirely in the Hellenistic tradition (apart from the Stoics) in acknowledging the validity of emotions in our judgment and virtuous action: “virtue is expressed not merely in fine action but in fine emotions as well” (Sherman, 1997: 24). Hellenists understood the social construction of emotion, and that there was an underlying psychology of emotion. However, these emotions must be open to scrutiny (Kekes 1995: 10). Anger, for example, may be justified when an injustice occurs, but achieving what is right must be balanced by good judgment (Eflin 2003; see also Sherman, 1997, ch. 2).
Because Aristotelian wisdom must be practical, Aristotle identified constructive work (poiesis) as an essential element of our humanity. Techné is the practical knowledge of expert makers who can rationally explain their activity: a person displaying techné “understands the principles … underlying the production of an object or state of affairs” (Dunne, 1997: 244). Hence, techné requires instrumental rationality (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 287). While essential for an organisation to operate, techné alone is inadequate as it must be balanced by phronesis, virtue, and aesthetics. Aristotle understood aesthetics as the psychological and social processes that activate sensory-emotional dynamics that can enhance transcendent knowledge. Thus aesthetics in an organisational sense could be seen as an “aesthetic a priori synthesis of feeling and image within intuition” (Croce, 1995: 31), and as something that is “distinguished … from practical, moral, and conceptual activity as intuition” (p. 49; italics in original). Strati (2000) understands organisational aesthetics similarly, such that rational and intuitive/aesthetic knowledge are not symbiotic, for the “aesthetic approach emphasises that rational analysis neglects extremely important aspects of quotidian organizational practices” (Strati, 2000: 16). To sum up, then, techné needs to be balanced by transcendence, the capacity to go beyond the explicit and the literal, and the norm: “One can go beyond both common sense and present science, to grasp the dynamic structure of our rational knowing and doing, and then formulate a metaphysics and an ethics” (Lonergan 1957: 635). The final component of Aristotelian wisdom is virtue (Aristotle, 1984). This need for virtue, which emerges from an ancient commitment to values and ethics, is consistent with recent psychological theory about wisdom(Sternberg & Ben-Zeev, 2001). For example, integral to Sternberg’s three-part Balance Theory of Wisdom is virtue, or socially valued behaviour: the “balance” that he speaks of “all hinges on values. Values therefore are an integral part of wise thinking” (Sternberg, 2001:231). It manifests as concern for others, being thoughtful and fair, admitting mistakes, and also learning from them (Baltes, Staudinger, Maercker, & Smith, 1995; Sternberg, 1990).
Psychological Theories of Wisdom
The most important contributions from psychological theory to a theory of wisdom come from Robert J. Sternberg and the BerlinSchool (the late Paul Baltes and the Max Planck Institute in Berlin). Contemporary psychological theory strongly reinforces the Aristotle’s characterisation of wisdom, the five characteristics of which are outlined in Rooney & McKenna (in press). Three of these shared wisdom characteristics are particularly relevant. Firstly, both Aristotle and wisdom psychology assert that complementing reason there must be a metaphysical quality that does not bind it only to the rules of reason. Psychologists, Baltes and Staudinger (2000), use the concept of a “metaheuristic”, not metaphysics, to describe this feature, which actually combines two heuristics: one that “organizes, at a high level of aggregation, the pool (ensemble) of bodies of knowledge”; and another at a more explicit or detailed level used by “individuals in planning, managing and evaluating issues surrounding the fundamental pragmatics of life” (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000: 132). This implies that wisdom must be practical. A wise person can draw on rich factual, or declarative, knowledge about “the fundamental pragmatics of life” (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). This declarative knowledge provides the basis of prudence. For Aristotle, a prudent person is “one who is able to deliberate well concerning what is good and expedient for himself [sic] … which are good and expedient for living well [in general]” (Aristotle, 1984: Bk 6, 5: 1140b, 105). These pragmatics include “insight into the social nature and incompleteness of human existence, the variability of life goals, knowledge about oneself and the limits of one’s knowledge, and insight into how knowledge is translated into behaviour” (Staudinger & Pasupathi, 2003: 240). The capacity for “being tolerant of ambiguous situations”—what Sternberg (1996) calls a “progressive style”—is one of the most salient predictors of wisdom according to Baltes & Staudinger (2000: 129). This metaheuristic capacity is also associated with imagination and creativity, enabling those who have this capability to “see” beyond normally held assumptions about reality. This capacity to manage uncertainty arises from a wise person’s understanding that life is contingent, constructed from various perspectives,is ontogenetic, and historically situated (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). Both Baltes and Staudinger (2000) and Sternberg (1990) assert that wise people realize the limits of human information processing and that the future cannot be predicted through technical applications (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000: 126; Sternberg, 1990: 157).
Secondly, wise people, Aristotle claims, while respecting experience and tradition, are epistemologically sceptical (NE: Bk 6, 1142b: 9, 25-28), or at least curious. Sternberg (1990: 157) asserts that wisdom is “more than just cognitive skills” because it requires “an attitude toward knowledge as [much as] knowledge itself”, a form of fluid intelligence (Sternberg, 1990: 323). Thus, a wise person needs, from time to time, to be sceptical of the given “facts”, and of orthodoxy, tradition, majority view, or “common sense”. Furthermore, the wise person may need to evaluate the salience (i.e., relevance and strength) of facts in a given situation.
Accepting the validity of a reflexive “gut instinct” is the third feature of wisdom shared by Aristotle and contemporary psychology. This means that sensory and visceral responses can be important and valid components of decision-making. Empirical evidence in brain science, consciousness studies, and emotional intelligence (Wade, 1996; Ashkanasy, 2003) supports the proposition that “gut” level intuition can be valuable in making judgments. Baltes and Staudinger’s (2000: 123) research into folk-psychological approaches to wisdom reveals a “coordinated and balanced interplay of intellectual, affective, and motivational aspects of human functioning”.
The strong congruence between Aristotle’s theories and modern psychological theories and empirical evidence relating to wisdom provide a strong degree of validity about our model of wisdom. Clearly, it goes far beyond mere knowledge, although knowledge is extremely important.
Organisational Knowledge
To be a leader, then, requires at least techné (practical knowledge) and phronesis (practical knowledge balanced by non-rational forms of knowing). As the context of this knowing is within organisations, it is important that this context is well understood. Although organisational knowledge comprises multiple, often contradictory assumptions, beliefs, intuitions, memories, cognitions, etc. (Rooney & Schneider, 2005), its discursive stability can be understood by seeing organisations as autonomous self-organizing systems that emerge within a bounded context (Chia, 1998; Spender, 1996; Stacey, 2001; Tsoukas, 1996). This implies that wise leaders must understand organisational knowledge not as facticity, but as plastic (re-formulating flows and relations within a discursive formation). Yet organisations are quite stable, and discourses are relatively consistent because an organisation can be envisaged as “an autonomous self-organizing system that emerges as the outcome of the interaction of different types of knowing within a bound and deliberately created context” (Spender, 1998: 246; Stacey, 2001). Understanding organisational knowledge not as facticity, but as flows, relations, and patterns that are contextualized in particular complex systems has important implications for leaders’ decision making. These flows and relations are articulated through discourse, and as discourse is used at the organizational level (i.e., the texts of conversation, documents, email, websites, etc), we can understand it as situated action (Marshak & Heracleous, 2005). Recent ethnographic research into the finance industry shows how this constructedness of discourse can be seen even in an industry where huge amounts of “objective” data and a strong ethic of individualistic decision-making is assumed to be the norm (Pryke & Du Gay, 2007; see also MacKenzie, 2001; Knorr-Cetina, 2006).
According to Fairhurst (2007), successful leaders reflexively “monitor the ongoing character of social life … vis-à-vis specific norms, rules, procedures, and values in interaction with others” (p. 14). In other words, leaders not only have elevated levels of formal knowledge (e.g. a senior engineer in an engineering firm or a senior public servant’s knowledge of policy and regulations), but also have processual knowledge (“know-how” that is situated or context dependent (Gourlay, 2006: 1426)and which incorporates norms, procedures and social patterns), and intuitive knowledge (ability to understand tacit matters, “gut” feelings)[1].