A Strategic Planning Framework

International Relations 550

San Francisco State University

19 December 2000

I. Elements of the Plan

A. The Identification of the Problem

B. The Urgency of the Problem

C. Goals and Objectives

D. The Background: Conditions, Events, and/or Actions Leading to the Problem

E. Lessons from a Past Analogous Case

F. Projection of Current Trends Without Resolution

G. Threat Assessment

H. Opportunity Assessment

I. Positions and Interests of Contending Parties

II. Construction of Scenarios

A. Guiding Principles

B. Proposed Strategy and Tactics for Solving the Problem

C. Culture Constructs: The Leaders in Context

D. Strength and Weakness of Involved Parties

E. Obstacle Anticipation: Domestic and Foreign

III. The Estimation of the Costs and Benefits of the Scenarios

IV. Bibliography

I. Elements of the Plan

This strategic planning framework for Libya addresses the problem of U.S. sanctions against Libya. In order to develop the strategy, we will first identify the dynamics of the U.S. sanctions, rate the priority of the problem, and identify the objectives to meet the specific goals. As a background, we will review the history of terrorism and disinformation in U.S.-Libya relations, and for comparison, the case of U.S. sanctions and relations with Sudan will be studied. We will also take a look at current trends, particularly in Libya’s economy, in order to predict future threats should the U.S. sanctions remain in place. Lastly, we will assess the level of opportunity at this time to follow the proposed course of action and the positions and interests of the parties involved.

A. The Identification of the Problem

U.S. Sanctions, 1986 & 1996

In reference to U.S.-Libyan relations, Geoff Simon states that “the Libyan question is not an isolated event, but part of a broader picture in which a powerful hegemonic state adumbrates to itself the right to define moral right and international law in its own perceived interests.[1]” In brief, the problem for Libya is that the United States has placed unilateral economic sanctions for the past 14 years and been the forerunner in United Nations Security Council Resolutions for multilateral economic sanctions against Libya for the past 8 years. Both sanctions have political and security consequences, and both are based on moral grounds set by the United States according to that country’s interests.

The economic sanctions imposed on Libya by the U.S. Reagan administration in January of 1986 came about due to the concern of the U.S. government “about the murderous terrorist activities instigated by, and carried out with, the help of Libya and its erratic, outlaw dictator, Muammar Qaddafi.[2]” The sanctions prevented U.S. companies from engaging in new contracts in oil-related economic activities and froze Libyan assets in the U.S.[3]

The sanctions also had political and military consequences as well. Politically, they succeeded in isolating Libya in international relations by labeling the country a “rogue” state and spreading disinformation about Libya and Qadhafi’s ties to terrorist organizations and actions. Militarily, the sanctions left an open door to the use of force by the U.S. who could claim that all other courses had been exhausted. This U.S. exemplified this attitude in the April 1986 bomb raid of Libya.

B. The Urgency of the Problem

Priority Rating: 7

While the problem of U.S. sanctions levied against Libya is the most important international problem that Libya is currently facing, it is not the top priority at this time. Libya is working toward increasing her international status and her economic prospects through improving relations with other African countries and neighboring European countries, respectively.

Nevertheless, if Libya is to fully integrate into the international political economic system, the sanctions against her must be lifted. The sanctions are a threat to Libya economically, politically, and militarily as has been mentioned earlier.

The impact of the sanctions in practice have not had the effect of crippling the Libyan economy due to their unilateral nature, although it has benefited European and Asian companies over U.S. companies[4]. They have isolated Libya politically, and leave an open door to military action. This impact was much more severe in the late 1980’s, particularly during the tense moments of military confrontation between the U.S. and Libya, but has since been restrained by international opposition to the hard-line stance of the U.S. Libya policy.

Another factor affecting the priority of the removal of U.S. sanctions is that it is a long-term problem. The U.S. placed the initial sanctions in 1986, 14 years ago. They were reinforced in 1996 with the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which was particularly significant in its attempt to place secondary sanctions against foreign companies who invested more the $40 million in Libya’s oil sector. While on the one hand it is urgent that Libya has the sanctions lifted to jumpstart the economy, on the other hand Libya has learned how to work around the sanctions.

C. Goals and Objectives

End U.S. Sanctions

Libya’s overall goal is to improve her international relations in order to improve her international and domestic political economy and bring credibility back to the Qadhafi regime that will soon be succeeded by his son, Saadi Qadhafi[5]. This strategic planning formulation, however, is based on the specific, tangible, and realistic goal of ending the U.S. sanctions levied against Libya.

The objectives, or means, of achieving this goal are three-fold. First, Libya must pressure the U.S. Congress to repeal the sanctions. The U.S. Congress is the body responsible for making the decision to or not to end sanctions against Libya, and therefore that body is the focus of the strategy. There are three effective lobbies that can pressure Congress on behalf of Libya: European countries, U.S. oil companies, and pro-African lobbies, such as the Nation of Islam. In addition, Libya should appease those lobbies that would seek to pressure Congress not to repeal the sanctions in order to soften their objections, such as AIPAC, Israel, and the families of the Lockerbie victims.

Second, Libya should meet the demands of the sanctions in the legal aspects. Without meeting the demands, Libya and those lobbying for Libya have no case to make for the ending of the sanctions. If the demands are met, the argument can be made that there is no reason to continue them.

Last, Qadhafi can tone down the revolutionary and anti-West rhetoric that he has been made famous for. This will serve to soften the general U.S. population and the Congress in their attitude toward Libya, and will make it easier for the U.S. media to present Qadhafi as a changed man.

D. The Background: Conditions, Events, and/or Actions Leading to the Problem

Terrorism or Disinformation?

The causes of the problem of the U.S. sanctions against Libya stems from the misperceptions of the U.S. about Libya’s interests and intents and from the fear of the Reagan administration in particular of the growing influence of the “Evil Empire” in the Middle East.

With the rise of Qadhafi after the Libyan revolution in 1969, there also arose his ideology of Libyan Islamic socialism. This was an anathema to the U.S. version of a liberal democracy on two fronts. First of all, the use of the Shari ‘a (Islamic law) in civil affairs sharply contrasts with the concept of the separation of church and state that is so important in the U.S. system. Second, Qadhafi’s version of socialism and consequent social and economic changes, such as the nationalization of U.S. oil-companies, positioned him in alliance with the U.S.S.R. in the perception of the U.S.

Qadhafi’s relations with the U.S.S.R. did nothing to dispel U.S. fears of losing ground in the Middle East. In 1972, Libya and the U.S.S.R. signed cooperation agreements, and in 1974 they signed their first major arms deal[6]. Between the closure of western bases and nationalization of western oil companies, Qadhafi’s anti-imperialist rhetoric and ideological conflict with the U.S., and on top of that the seeking of agreements with the U.S.S.R., the U.S. viewed Libya as tipping the international balance of power in favor of the Soviets, particularly once Reagan and his black-and-white thinking came to power.

In order to combat this, the U.S. began a disinformation campaign and a covert military strategy designed to destabilize Qadhafi’s regime and isolate Libya in the world system[7]. The campaign included planted evidence to convince Qadhafi that his life was in danger and implicating Libya in terrorist activities whether or not the U.S. had sufficient evidence to make those claims. Among them included the bombing of a disco on 5 April 1986 in West Berlin frequented by U.S. servicemen. Two soldiers were killed.

In retaliation for the bombing, the Reagan administration ordered the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi on 14 April 1986, killing between 40 and 100 civilians, and one soldier[8]. By then, U.S. sanctions against Libya had already been place since January of that year, leaving the door open for exactly this kind of situation. William Blum reviews the questionable evidence of the U.S. in implicating Libya in the case of the West Berlin disco, and comes to the conclusion that “Qaddafi’s principal crime in Reagan’s eyes was not that he supported terrorist groups, but that he supported the wrong terrorist groups; i.e., Qaddafi was not supporting the same terrorists that Washington was . . .[9]”

In addition to the disinformation campaign, the U.S. initiated an economic campaign against Libya beginning 1985 with sanction on oil-related activities for U.S. companies in Libya, and in 1986 with much broader sanctions. By 1992, the U.S. had succeeded in convincing the international United Nations Security Council that multilateral sanctions should be enforced against Libya with resolution 748, and in 1996 the U.S. instituted the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which added secondary sanctions to foreign companies.

There have been a few attempts to resolve this problem on the part of Qadhafi. For example, in an attempt to preempt the further deterioration of U.S.-Libyan relations, during 1978 and 1979, both the U.S. and Libya sent delegations to each other’s countries for talks. Another attempt of Libya was in 1999, when Libya finally met the three demands of the UNSC sanctions to pay compensation to the family of Yvonne Fletcher, the policewoman killed in the machine-gunning of anti-Libyan demonstrators in London, to pay compensation to France for the shooting down of a UTA plane over Chad, and to turn in the two Libyan suspects of Pan Am flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland[10].

The success record of these attempts is a failure. The talks in 1978-1979 ending in no positive result, and the meeting of the UNSC demands has only resulted in the suspension of sanctions, and not the lifting of sanctions, due to the use of the U.S. veto power on ending the sanctions completely. And U.S. sanctions are still in place. Ambassador Ronald Neumann emphasized that “as a practical matter, we will not be able to assure ourselves that Libya is cooperating fully with the [Lockerbie] trial until after it is substantially underway.[11]”

E. Lessons from a Past Analogous Case

Sudan

In order to have a greater understanding of the nature of the problem between Libya and the U.S., we can look at a similar case between the U.S. and Libya’s neighbor, Sudan. The differences between the two countries could affect their ability to deal with the U.S.

Like Libya, Sudan has been accused by the United States of actively contributing to terrorism and of proliferating chemical weapons. Sudan’s threat has been termed a “national emergency,[12]” paving the way for economic sanctions which were set in place in 1997 by the U.S. and soon after by the UN, and for military actions to follow.

The U.S. plagued Sudan with a bomb raid just a few months after the declaration of economic sanctions, in 1998. The bombing was of a pharmaceutical plant where the Sudanese were supposedly building chemical weapons.

What can we learn from the case of Sudan and U.S. sanctions? The significance lies in the differences in the objective conditions of Libya and Sudan. First of all, Sudan is one of the poorest countries in Africa, while Libya is the richest.

This disparity is due to the abundance of high quality crude oil that Libya has and the world demands. As a result of this demand, Libya has maintained European support both economically and politically, particularly with Italy, Spain, and Germany. This fact puts Libya in a better negotiating position than Sudan who has very little to trade.

In addition, Libya is emerging as a leader in the African continent. The Organization of African Unity recently convened in Tripoli and Qadhafi has been actively involved in peace-making missions in Sierre Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This leadership position gives Qadhafi the backing of many African leaders and gives him and Libya a higher status in the international system. As a result, Qadhafi is in a better negotiating position.

F. Projection of Current Trends Without Resolution

Libya’s Stifled Economy

[13]Ironically, the consequences of the U.S. and UN sanctions have not had the effect of crippling Libya’s economy, although growth has been stifled. Instead, the U.S. has suffered both economically and politically due to indirect effects of limitations on the ability of U.S. firms to invest in Libya’s oil industry.

As we can see from the above chart,Libya’s economy has not been greatly affected by the sanctions. The only major drop was in revenue from oil exports, but the overall drop in world oil prices was probably the main factor. In addition, we can see that Libya’s external debt actually has gone down during sanctions, positively affecting the economy.

On the other hand, we also see that foreign direct investment and gross national product have been stifled, and this has adversely affected Libya’s economic growth. Yet, considering the sanctions and low world oil prices, Libya was able to maintain a stable economy and even improve due to trade with European markets.

For the U.S., the consequences of not resolving the issue are also disheartening. U.S. oil companies are at a disadvantage against their European and Asian counterparts. Especially with the suspension of UN sanctions and the subsequent pursuit of Libyan contracts by several foreign oil companies, U.S. firms are starting to wonder who is being punished by the sanctions.

The U.S. government is feeling the pinch also. In a report given by U.S. President Clinton updating the Committee on International Relations on the sanctions, he stated that in the January – July 1999 six month period “the OFAC [Office of Foreign Assets Control] has collected 7 civil monetary penalties totaling $38,000” and that expenses directly related to “the declaration of the Libyan national emergency are estimated at approximately $4.4 million.[14]”

As if the economic consequences for the U.S. were not enough, politically the U.S. policy is creating greater and greater tensions with European Union. In fact, the E.U. has threatened to bring the U.S. to court in the W.T.O. based on unfair secondary sanctions from the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 that punishes non-U.S. firms from investing more that $40 million in Libya’s oil industry and thereby hinders trade[15].

The consequences for the rest of the world in general are the continuing international and regional instability caused by the U.S. sanctions on Libya in particular. The stifled Libyan economy has caused domestic unrest within Libya that has effects on Libya’s regional relations, especially in terms of foreign workers who are currently being forced out of Libya to make room for Libyan workers. Internationally, while U.S. – E.U. tensions affect those two parties the most, they also have a significant affect on the world system.

G. Threat Assessment

U.S. Disadvantaged

From our previous discussion of the current trends without resolution, we can predict possible threats should the U.S. sanctions against Libya persist.

For Libya, it is clear that the persistence of the sanctions would continue to be an obstacle to economic development. If the sanctions continue, Libya will be even more dependent on the European markets as the basis for her economic well-being, and this will not suffice to develop and grow economically.

As we have mentioned earlier, as long as the sanctions are in place, the U.S. is only one step away from using military intervention. This creates an unstable political environment that discourages long-term foreign investment, especially in infrastructure.

However, the threat to the U.S. of persistence of the sanctions is also great. If the sanctions persist, the U.S. will continue to throw away money to enforce sanctions that are not having their desired affect while at the same time prohibiting U.S. companies from benefiting from trade with Libya. Increasing tensions with E.U. would be equally damaging to U.S. interests, and to the U.S. pocketbook should the case against the U.S. in the W.T.O go through.

In addition, the U.S. attitude toward countries like Libya could contribute to a reformation of Cold War alliances as Russia tries to come back as a world leader, and this could have adverse consequences to the U.S. and the world as a whole.