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Counterintelligence Awareness: Foreign Delegations

International exchanges are a normal part of academic and scientific life. The vast majority of international delegations and visitors come to the USfor innocuous and legitimate purposes. Unfortunately, foreign intelligence services have used academic and scientific delegations to gather intelligence and to assist foreign governments to spot and assess potential agents. By being aware of anomalous behavior you can help mitigate the risks posed by illegal intelligence activity masked as an international exchange.

The most common form of intelligence collection during a foreign visit is elicitation, or the use of seemingly normal conversation to extract information about one’s work or personal life. Understanding the basics of elicitation may be the best defensive tool available. It can be difficult to identify and is easy to deny; but, thereare several things you can do to successfully counter elicitation:

•Prepare talking points ahead of time that do not disclose sensitive information

•Do not engage in conversation alone

•Redirect the conversation

•Excuse yourself from the conversation

•Reply to a question with a question

•Provide vague or hypothetical responses

•Provide historical, publicly known information

•Change the topic

•Feign ignorance

•Ask “Why?”

Other behaviors that may be of counterintelligence interest include:

  • Offers by foreign internsor researchersto work at a research facility for free, or with unclear funding, usually for long periods (2-3 years)
  • Last minute or unannounced changes to attendance lists for a conference, meeting or visit
  • An individual who asks questions outside the scope of the original meeting, visit or conference
  • A known individual from a previous encounter who is using a different name
  • Delegation members who wander off or separate from the group
  • Attempts to arrange a meeting outside the official schedule
  • Contact by a third party who introduces himself/herself as a friend of the delegation
  • Unexplained individuals on the periphery of the delegation (e.g. administrative assistants, translators or undefined staff)
  • Requests for impromptu contact with nationals from the same country
  • Unexpected contact following the delegation visit, either by telephone, text message, e-mail or chat room
  • Delegation members who attempt to connect portable electronic devices or media (e.g. laptops, iPods, thumb drives) to host computer systems without permission

If you observe any activity that seems to be out of character with the purpose of a foreign visit, please contact the FBI San Diego Field Office at 858-565-1255

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