Jordan 1
Taryn D. Jordan
WGS 700
Professor Sparks
6 October 2014
In Defense of Experience
Johanna Oksala article “In Defense of Experience” has three aims: a critique of Joan Scott’s canonical text The “Evidence of Experience”usingaphilosophical and political framework.Second,sheruminateson the political implications of linguistic and post-structuralist turn in the field of gender studies. Third, her work is articulating a future of feminist theory with the capacity to bridge the divide between theory and practice. Oksala’s challenge to Scott’s is not interested in denying the importance of her article to the field of gender studies. Scott’s work critiquing the evidence of experience pushed feminist scholars away from narratives based on identity and victimization toward a much broader critique of them (388). Nonetheless Oksala thinks it important to critique Scott’s argumentand defend the validity of experience.Her nuanced critique of Scott’s work is not in a desire to return to feminism of the past where women shared their story seeking a natural experience of women (389). Instead she is advocating for an understanding of experience that is conceptual at its base and is linguistically and empirically coextensive (394). Oksala’s arguments are a bold return to feminist theoretical orientations of the past while presenting a vision for a feminist future by disconnecting experience from identity formation.
Oksala critiques Scott work by asking, “What does it mean for feminist theory to define experience as a linguist event as Scott suggests” (389)? She asserts Scott’s critique of experience is based on three philosophical claims that are ontological, ideological, and epistemological. Scott argues, ontologically experience is a discursive construction based on ideology that reflects oppressive power relations. Scott’s formulation positions experience as discursive and ideological, rendering experience derivative, making claims of epistemology of experience invalid(Oksala 390). Oksala critiques Scott by picking apart her conflation of identity and experience. And she critiques Scott’s demand to sever the relationship between words and things. Both contribute to, what Oksala calls, a discursive idealism—a purely discursive realm with no connection to reality (390). Instead she argues through a philosophical understanding of “subjective apprehension of reality” experience can do the opposite of Scott’s concerns and is indispensable in challenging the metaphysical and epistemological foundationalism of them (389). Oksala approaches her argument by following Scott’s line of argumentation by maintaining experience as a discursive event completely (392). She does this by putting Scott into conversation with John McDowell, a philosopher who argues that experience is conceptual to the core, in order to illuminate the philosophical concerns of a experiential knowledge claims (392).
Oksala’s move to put McDowell and Scott into conversation is arduous and did not necessarily illuminate how philosophy can further the validity of epistemic claims of experience. Perhaps this is due to reader’s lack of knowledge of philosophical terms or arguments regarding a subject’s relation to the world. What is particularly troubling is the inability to discern Oksala’s and McDowell’s definition and use of the term “conceptual.” Doing a quick Internet search didn’t provide any additional clarification; conceptual is defined as, “of relating to, based on mental concepts” (google) making McDowell’s and Oksala’s claims difficult to grasp. What could be distilled through Oksala’s reading of is both McDowell alongside Scott is experience, at its most basic level, is conceptual (394). Oksala states:
Because Scott denies the epistemological and political significance of the evidence of experience, she has problems acknowledging women’s role in the renewal and transformation of the cultural and linguistic tradition in which they find themselves. Shefails to recognize the continual negotiation and adjustment of thought to experience and experience to thought that must characterize the dynamism of cultural traditions” (396).
Putting together both the literal definition of conceptual and Oksala’s quote, one could argue the relationship between experiences, language, culture are much more complicated then Oksala’s reading of Scott can contain. Experience is a viable location of academic knowledge production and, most importantly for Oksala, experience is a coherent call for politics.
The strongest section of Oksala’s article is the section where she elucidates her political commitments to a feminist theory that is based on social justice (396-7). Oksala recognizes her questions on the methodology of feminist theory, toward politics, are beyond the scope of Scott’s article (388). In order not to recreate the conditions and make the same mistakes in which Scott makes her arguments about experience in the past. Oksala restates her desire to reexamine experience separate from reductive nature of identity formation, due to the ability of experiential claims to connect various people through shared experience and awareness of the a issue (397). Oksala bridges the gap between feminist theory and practice by advocating for feminist scholars to seriously engage with experience. She argues experience can create the conditions for instances of solidarity and Foucaultian practices of the self that lead to transformation (398). She is interested in a feminist politic that movesbeyond representation, or women power, she wants a feminist theory that can radically transform society (397). At this point of the article Oksala claims begin to sound like a manifesto, particularly as she evokes Foucault’s practices of the self. Shetheorizes that “the practices of self” can come to fruition through a reformulation of consciousness groups of the early feminist politicalera (398). She argues that the consciousness groups can fight for a transformation of self that can act as “kind of therapy” but does not give into individualizing neoliberal logics (397). Oksala’s moves back and forth between her scholarly voice and her political desires felt inspiring. It was refreshing to read what is at stake for a scholar within their scholarship powerfully stated without apology.
In conclusionOaksala’s article “In Defense of Experience” was a philosophical and political critique of Joan Scott’s canonical work presented in the “Evidence of Experience.” Oksala’sattempt to critique Scott’s arguments against experience missed the mark due to the arduous theoretical work that evoked philosophical terms but didn’t fully explicate them. Second, her politicized rumination of the turn towards post –structuralism within he field of Gender Studies was interesting. She elucidated her own political stakes within her argument while seriously engaging Scott’s work without aggressive discounting it. She highlighted what she and other scholars call a gap between theory and practice. Oksala attempted to “fill” the gap with a vision for a feminist political project consisting of radical social transformation through a reformulation of consciousness raising groups. Ultimately, Oksala moves away from feminist past formulations of experience by distancing herself from experience as identity formation. And turn she turns toward a radical feminist political future by arguing for the repairing of experience as a valid epistemic claim.
Works Cited
Oksala, Johanna. "In Defense of Experience." Hypatia 29.2 (2014): 388-403. Web. 5 Oct. 2014.